Here’s an argument against any form of modalism about the Son, which says that the Son just is, or is a mode of God, or of the Father. The following objection would apply, then, to any form of modalism which affirms one of these claims. So it would apply to a modalism which says that only the Son is a mode of God, or to (as I understand it) historical Sabellianism, and to any form of what I called FSH-modalism in a previous post. I’ll put the objection in terms of the Son being a mode of God, but I think the argument works the same way if you substitute “Father” for “God”.
- Suppose that modalism is true about the Son.
- Therefore, either the Son is identical to God, or the Son is a mode of God. (2)
- The Son is identical to God only if whatever is true of God is true of the Son, and vice versa.
- Some things are true of God which are not true of the Son, and vice versa.
- Therefore the Son is not identical to God. (3,4)
- If the Son is a mode of God, then the Son at no time has a loving interpersonal relationship with God.
- The Son has had a loving interpersonal relationship with God.
- Therefore, the Son is not a mode of God.
- Therefore, modalism about the Son is false; the Son is not a mode of God. (2,5,8)
Some explanatory comments on the steps of the argument:
1 – a supposition that is disproved by the rest of this argument
2 – true by definition
3 – a necessary and self-evident truth – just an application of Leibniz’s Law to God and the Son
4 – Straighforwardly implied by many passages in the New Testament. Just off the top of my head: e.g. The Son was sent by God to save the world, but God wasn’t so sent. At Gethsemane, God wanted the Son to be crucified, but the Son didn’t want himself to be crucified. The Son is the mediator between God and humankind, but God isn’t.
5 – implied by 3 & 4
6 – It is a necessary truth that modes of personal being can’t enter into interpersonal relationships. e.g. My wife can’t be best friends with my easygoingness.
7 – Again, New Testament.
8 – implied by 6 & 7
9 – implied by the preceding. Basically, there are two ways modalism about the Son could be true, but both are inconsistent with the New Testament. So, on the supposition that we should believe about God what the NT says, modalism about the Son is false.
This seems to me to be pretty close to a knockdown argument, for people committed to the New Testament (such as me).
The only possible way I see out is challenging 6. But 6 seems true. It is an obvious truth that no mode, even if it is mode of personal being, is itself a personal being (it ain’t, insofar as it is a mode, a being / entity / substance). And it is an obvious truth that only personal beings can be the relata of interpersonal relationships.
Isn’t this enough to convince us to reject modalism about the Son? Do we really need to get into specific passages of the NT? It seems to me that one can be a modalist about the Son only by leaving aside the plain assertions of the NT, or else the plain deliverances of common sense. (Or, both – some types always go for the extreme options!)
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Dale,
Seems to me about as knockdown as arguments get…
If the Son is a mode, then modes can think. But modes can’t think, subjects of modes think.
I feel that better strategy is going to involve developing a different way to understand ‘modes’ so that they can survive as subjects, otherwise the project seems to me a bit hopeless.
[...] I won’t be recommending this book. The author at the same time downplays the importance of theory, but clearly loves his own pet theories, which he almost hypes. (Hear the pitch straight from the horse’s mouth here.) His claims about the Nicene creed are dubious at best, and I doubt that one can make a historical case that the various segments of the church have unduly focused on one member or other of the Trinity to the exclusion of the others. For a number of reasons, theological traditionalists will break out in hives upon reading this book. But the main reason I didn’t like it, is that I think the claim that the Son is mode of God is false, and far from trivial in its theoretical and practical consequences. (I’ll outline these in a future post.) Moreover, I think Son modalism has been adequately refuted. [...]
What a thoroughly enjoyable site! I’m glad I stumbled across your work here.
I am fascinated by the distinct ways in which academic philosophers and theologians approach the same question.
I have encountered modalists and “Jesus only” people in churches that I have pastored. As I have pondered these things in what little spare time available to me, I find two arguments particularly compelling. One approaches the question from an understanding of propitiation; the other from what is implied in God being “personal.”
I have taken the liberty of linking to your website from one of mine. I look forward to hearing more from you!
[...] I’ve been harping on modalism about the Son for a while now, and I’ve even given what I think is a convincing argument against it. Still, what if it is false? Why do I care? Why do I think it matters? [...]
[...] I’ve been harping on modalism about the Son for a while now, and I’ve even given what I think is a convincing argument against it. Still, what if it is false? Why do I care? Why do I think it matters? [...]
[...] Again, the familiar idea that it is only serial modalism which is objectionable. Sigh. And here’s the modalism, presumably something like eternal, concurrent, noumenal, essential FSH modalism. Muslim scholars make a big point of computing the mathematical impossibility of the Trinity. After all, does not 1+1=3? It certainly does if you add them, but Christians instist that this is the wrong way to understand the Trinity. The triunity of God is more like 1×1×1=1. In other words, we multiply, not add, the one God in three persons. That is, God is triune, not triplex. His one essence has multiple personalities. (269, original emphases in italics) Further, some have pointed to the fact that Muhammad was simultaneously a prophet, a husband, and a leader. Why then should a Muslim reject the idea of a plurality of functions (persons) in God. [sic] Within the Islamic system is the very proof that plurality within unity, as it relates to God, is not unintelligible. By the same token, then, there is no reason Muslims should reject the doctrine of the Trinity as nonsensical. (276, emphasis added) [...]
[...] That seems correct, which is to say that Leftow’s theory doesn’t amount to the above kind of modalism, but rather, to non-sequential, noumenal, essential FSH modalism. Unfortunately, that implies S-modalism, and I’ve argued here and here that S-modalism and any theory which implies it should be rejected by people who think the New Testament is accurate. Leftow, I take it, is one of those people. Hearing the footsteps of these sorts of objections, he briefly tries to head them off, in the following highly compressed passage. The question is sure to come, though: aren’t your Persons still “modes,” if not modes of appearance, “adjectival” rather than “substantival”? One reply is that one the present account, each Person is as substantial as the one God is, since each Person is God in a different “part” of His life. If an infant isn’t a mode of a substance, neither is a Son. Again, arguably a person could be a substance despite having identity-conditions that depend on events… (328) [...]
I take it ‘Son’ here precisely refers to Jesus Christ, which seems clear enough. I’d perhaps mention here that some modalist accts. of divine persons do not posit ‘modes alone’, rather they posit that each divine person is constituted by (i) a non-shareable mode and (ii) a common shared property (divine essence). (i) typically is defined as an non-shareable relative property and (ii) as an shareable absolute (non-relative) property. So, if we are talking about the Logos Asarkos (the Son not yet identified as Jesus Christ), (i) and (ii) on some modalist’s view is sufficient to say that the the Son is a thinker and willer. If this is true, then 6 & 7 don’t contradict one another. Further, the eternal Son is divine b/c of being constituted by (1) and esp. (2) So, on this view, a divine person constituted by (1) is identical with ‘God’ (though I’d like to see what you mean precisely by the name ‘God’). Given the ambiguity of what ‘God’ refers to, I doubt 7, b/c we say the Son has an interpersonal relationship with his Father. (I happen to take the word ‘God’ as an ambiguous concept that does not identify any peculiar divine actor, but may refer to any divine actor. Generally with monotheism, ‘God’ just refers to one divine person with absolute person-constitution. But this is a further point–for historically trinitarians argue for relative-person constitution.)
But, once we introduce the incarnation things get more complicated. The identity of the eternal Son as Jesus Christ is a contingent identity (non-necessary). So 4 seems right to me.
But 5 is a bit more messy. If we grant 4, does 5 necessarily follow? I suppose we could ask, is such and such person constituted by the divine essence? Jesus Christ is believed to be constituted by the divine essence (i.e. 2 natures: divine and human, in one person). But Jesus Christ is not just constituted by the divine essence, but he is identical with the eternal Son b/c the particular properties of the eternal Son (i) personal mode of existence (non-shareable mode) and (ii) divine essence constitute (albeit contingently) Jesus Christ. Of course, Jesus Christ is also constituted by human nature too (it is another question whether the human nature in question is a universal property or an individual property (trope)).
So, given all the above, I am not yet convinced that 8 & 9 are true. When talking about Jesus Christ even the contingent divine constitution of him would seem to indicate that the eternal Son’s contingent constitution as Jesus Christ means that the eternal Son’s personal property (i) (and (ii) constitutes Jesus Christ.
Also, much has been made in the tradition that it was the eternal Son who became incarnate; somehow the Son eternally does what the Father does; likewise, Jesus Christ does what he sees his Father doing/commanding. There’s a certain kind of subordination here, both of the eternal Son’s relation to his eternal Father and to Jesus Christ’s relation to his Father.
[...] are not held to be “intrinsic to God’s nature”. On that, see here, here, and here. Again, they complain that the new PC formulas employ “words of function” – but [...]
[...] (Sidenote: the FSH modalism Bowman seemed to gesture at in round 1 would get him out of this – but would land him in equally hard problems.) [...]