Last time, I mentioned a well done book by evangelical philosopher Gregg Ten Elshoff on the topic of self-deception and the Christian life.
He noted that one may easily have a false belief about what one believes, and he noted that there can be strong social pressures to believe that one has beliefs one doesn’t (and that one lacks beliefs one in fact has). As an example, he noted that every Biola University employee’s continuing employment requires that they yearly affirm, I assume in writing, Biola’s doctrinal statement.
As an aside, here’s the core part of their statement on the Trinity:
There is one God, eternally existing and manifesting Himself to us in three Persons: Father, Son and Holy Spirit.
This sounds like an expression of modalism - one great self, with three aspects or personalities (“Persons”), and yet Biola’s statement goes on to describe Jesus as a man, and surely no man is a mode of anything, but is instead an entity/substance, and no mode is a substance or vice versa. Surely, they’re assuming the identity of the second member of the Trinity (the Son) with Jesus. So, it looks paradoxical.
But that isn’t what concerns me here. In our recent debate coverage, we noted that most evangelicals assert that Jesus is God. And by that, it seems that most mean that Jesus and God are numerically one being, one magnificent self, one divine person. They confess and assert this. But do they believe it?
I wonder (seriously – I really wonder – this is not a sarcastic pseudo-question). See, I assume that most hold the two to qualitatively differ. How they differ depends on one’s views on the Trinity. God has three persons, or centers of consciousness, or rational faculties in him. Jesus doesn’t. God has never not been omniscient; Jesus has. God sent his Son. Jesus didn’t. God is like a loving community, Jesus is not. So, when it is time to confess, they say “Jesus is God”. But their actions – specifically, the way they talk about Jesus and God in various non-argumentative contexts – show that they don’t believe that. Or do they?
Is this self deception (falsely believing yourself to believe Jesus to be God) or is it inconsistent belief (you believe they are one, and that they are two)? Or does it vary by person?
Here’s one angle on it. Consider these three claims:
- Jesus and God are numerically one.
- Numerically one things can’t differ.
- Some things are true of Jesus which are not true of God, and vice-versa.
If you believe all 3, you have inconsistent beliefs. I would guess that a lot of evangelicals hold 1 as a central belief, don’t notice too often that they also believe 3, and actively ignore 2. I think that’s were I stood, before I started reading the recent philosophical literature on the Trinity.
But how does one tell three inconsistent beliefs from two consistent ones and an imaginary third (which is inconsistent with the conjunction of the first two)?
Go back to Gregg’s example of the old lady who falsely believes that she believes all races to be equal. That she’s self-deceived is one interpretation of what we observe.
But maybe in church she thinks that, but out about town, she doesn’t. If a belief is a tendency to think a certain way, maybe she believes both that blacks are inferior and that blacks are as good as whites – but different circumstances trigger each tendency in her, and she conveniently ignores the obvious inconsistency of the resulting thoughts and claims. (It helps that everyone at her church is white.)
But back to 1 – Could it be that many believe both 2 and 3, and believe that they believe 1, even though they do not? Given that they know 2 and 3, they’re also aware at some level that 1 is false. And yet there is tremendous social pressure to verbally affirm the words of 1.
Imagined train of thought:
But of course I believe 1 – anything less is denying Christ. And I don’t deny Christ. I believe him, and in him. If were a Christ-denier, I wouldn’t be a Christian, but I am. And I’d be going to Hell – but I’m not. So, surely I do believe 1. How could I not?
Christian philosophers (philosophy PhDs), interestingly, are different. They’re trained to ferret out inconsistencies – at least, to expunge inconsistencies from their statements and thoughts. (But I reckon we’re about as prone to self-deception about our beliefs as people generally.) A good many, I would guess most conservative Christian philosophers, deny 1. (In fact, while I was an undergraduate at Biola I distinctly remember a philosophy professor clearly and firmly denying 1 in class.) This is surprising, but I think they are able to do this because they continue to say the words “Jesus is God” meaning something other than 1. (But, disconcertingly, they are aware that others understand those words as 1.) Others deny 2. I think the average evangelical pew-dweller would be befuddled by this, but at least on the surface, it is consistent (accepting 1 and 3 while denying 2.) I’m not aware of any who deny 3; both the Bible and the catholic tradition imply it.
In any case, for those of you who like me are offspring of the American evangelical world – are either of my diagnoses above accurate,when it comes to evangelicals in the pew, in your experience? I confessed to having had inconsistent beliefs (having believed 1-3 above), but I suspect that some more mature, more reflective evangelicals are forced into self-deception as described above.
(Commenters: If you comment anonymously, I will respect your anonymity. I don’t have the slightest interest in endangering jobs or reputations.)
While you’re thinking about it, here’s some more gratuitous Styx.
Print 
PDF
Dahms and Geisler are useful here. I might give Bowman a taste, just to see what he thinks.
Give him some Styx as well, see how he likes that.
Are they? How so? I scanned them, and it looked like a mudfight…
The relative identity theory has gained at least some traction among Christian philosophers, and that theory affirms something like (1), namely:
(1′) The Father and the Son are the (numerically) same God.
Since relative identity theorists claim that identity claims are always sortal relative, (1) could be affirmed as it stands if ‘God’ is taken to mean the Father and the implicit sortal is God.
On the other hand, I think that at least some Evangelicals affirm that ‘Jesus is God’ with the ‘is’ of predication, which makes for a more complicated paradox (I’ll use ‘is divine’ to make it clear that the predication reading is intended):
(1*) Jesus is divine.
(2*) The Father is divine.
(3*) There is exactly one divine being.
(4*) Jesus is not numerically identical to the Father.
Shameless plug: I recently considered a strategy for eliminating the contradiction on my blog, and would value your thoughts on it.
Dale,
That’s exactly why they’re useful. People with logically coherent doctrines don’t get into these kinds of mudfights.
The one thing they agree on is that the doctrine of the Trinity cannot withstand scrutiny from the law of non-contradiction.
Dale,
I believe Jesus and God are numerically one in substance and numerically three in persons. Do you see a problem with that?
Also, “God” could mean (1) the trinity, (2) the Father, (3) the Son, or (4) the Holy Spirit. Likewise, in the case of 1, Jesus and God are numerically one in substance and numerically three in persons. And in the cases of 2 and 4, Jesus and God are numerically one in substance and numerically two in persons. And in the case of 3, Jesus and God are the same.
Smith, R. A. (2002), Paradox and truth: Rethinking Van Til on the Trinity (27), Moscow, ID: Canon Press:
I don’t think I could bring myself to worship a “generic essence.” I certainly couldn’t refer to it by the use of personal pronouns. That would be utterly ridiculous.
The inability to edit posts is really driving me up the wall.
Sorry – I can edit them, but it seems there’s no easy way for me to enable that in WordPress…
What of 2? Why assume that numerically one things cannot differ? I refer, of course, to numerical sameness without (Leibnizian) identity–a la Rea and Brower. Here’s a criterion for identity: if whatever is true of x is also true of y, then x and y are identical. But what if x and y are numerically the same thing, yet x has certain modal properties that y does not have, and vice versa. In this case, there are some things true of x that are not true of y, hence they don’t satisfy Leibnizian identity. Nevertheless, x and y are numerically the same thing.
One might, like Rea, use material constitution to motivate this kind of sameness. But I don’t think one must consider material constitution to affirm numerical sameness without (Leibnizian) identity. But that’s for another time.
In other words, it’s not obvious to me that 2 is trivially false.
No worries.
Dave Burke said,
‘I don’t think I could bring myself to worship a “generic essence.” I certainly couldn’t refer to it by the use of personal pronouns. That would be utterly ridiculous.’
I agree. I find such semantics a complete turnoff and irrelevant to Christian faith. “God” is the name of any one person of the trinity, or any two persons of the trinity, or all three persons of the trinity.
James:
That’s an excellent summary of the Trinitarian position. Do you agree with Bowman that “Father”, “Son” and “Holy Spirit” are literal names, and not merely titles?
Dale, thanks for editing post #8.
Dave,
I believe that “Father,” “Son,” and “Holy Spirit” are both titles and names in the context of revelation to humanity. But I believe in an egalitarian trinity while “Father,” “Son,” and “Holy Spirit” might not always have been the names or titles.
I also believe that these names and titles were decided upon prior to the creation of time as measured in our universe. And that involves a entire other problem. For example, assuming that the declaration of the Father begetting the Son occurred before the creation of time, then did that declaration always exist before creation because of the very nature of eternity past. And if it did, then Father,” “Son,” and “Holy Spirit” have always been names and titles. Oh well, but I doubt it while I’m still working on my theory of time and eternity past.:)
James, you clearly know more than most of us, including all the Biblical writers. I never ceased to be amazed at the facts Trinitarians know about God which He has never revealed. Where do you guys get your information from?
James,
I agree with Fortigurn. You guys seem to have a hotline to heaven. It’s truly remarkable!
By “egalitarian trinity”, do you mean that you believe the Son has never been subordinate to the Father in any way at all? Not even functionally? Furthermore, if “Father” has not always been the name or title of God, does this mean there was a time when He was not a Father and the Son was not a Son?
Geach’s theory, which denies that there’s such a thing as non-relative identity, is not at all popular among Christian philosophers. The more moderate Brower and Rea theory, which allows that there is absolute identity, as far as I know, has two proponents – Brower and Rea.
Do you really hold that Jesus – the Son – is tripersonal?
If so, you’ve got at least six divine persons in God (the Trinity) – Father, Son, and Spirit, and within the Son, three more.
But maybe by “Jesus” you just mean God/the Trinity.
Hey Anon,
I think you mean it’s not obvious that 2 is trivially true.
Can “numerically one” things differ? Things that can be counted as one can differ. Suppose I’m walking with a friend, and you view us from outer space. Then, we’re not distinguishable. If you’re counting objects moving across the earth, you may be forced to count us as one. But of course, my friend and I differ.
But if “two” things are not merely counted as numerically one, but really are numerically one – then those two really are one. No? And then, we’re supposing that things one thing, at one time, differs from itself.
You’re certainly right that Rea and Brower give a non-arbitrary motivation for their brand of relative id. But this requires a commitment to a number of controversial claims. Most people can’t even understand their motivations. I can, but I just can’t muster the commitment to some of the necessary views. In the end, I’m stuck with what looks like a necessary falsehood (that numerically one things can differ) – and it’s depressingly common that a philosophical program requires commitment to something which strikes most as impossible. (To pick an extreme example – what David Lewis says about possible worlds.)
I’d be interested to know what other way you think there is to motivate relative identity claims – other than the metaphysics of material constitution. I’ve found that the examples given do not compel – they’re easily understandable with only absolute id.
Dale – I was referring primarily to van Inwagen’s “And Yet There are Not Three Gods, but One” in Morris, ed., Philosophy and the Christian Faith. Van Inwagen doesn’t hold relative identity in general, but only as a theory of the Trinity. That is, he argues that we have an ordinary conception of identity which is well-adapted to dealing with the sorts of things we ordinarily interact with in everyday life (although, of course, he thinks it is sometimes vague), but that this concept cannot be properly applied to God.
Dave Burke wrote:
….
‘By “egalitarian trinity”, do you mean that you believe the Son has never been subordinate to the Father in any way at all? Not even functionally? Furthermore, if “Father” has not always been the name or title of God, does this mean there was a time when He was not a Father and the Son was not a Son?’
Answers to first two questions: 1) no and 2) no. By “egalitarian trinity,” I mean that the three persons of the trinity have always been ontologically egalitarian while in the context of creation they developed a functional hierarchy. By the way, I never heard of anybody proposing a a functionally egalitarian trinity in the context of creation. If you have heard of such a model, please let me know so I’ll know that I need to clarify that I don’t believe in such a model.
Answer to third question: As I noted in my post (21 Jun 2010 at 4:06 am), there are great difficulties with the concept of time prior to the creation of our spacetime universe. And this makes it difficult to answer your question, “does this mean there was a ‘time’ when He was not a Father and the Son was not a Son?” I suppose that since the point origin of time of the universe, the functional hierarchy has always existed. But was there time when God existed without the universe? Or was it time with a multi-directional arrow? These questions that confound physicists make it difficult for humans to understand possible sequences of events prior to the creation of the universe. I suppose that if there was a multi-directional arrow of time before the creation of our universe, then in some way there always has been the declaration of the Father begetting the Son while in other ways the Father and Son were divine persons without being Father and Son.
Dale wrote:
“….
Do you really hold that Jesus – the Son – is tripersonal?
….”
That’s not at all what I mean. I mean that Jesus is one person while the trinity is three persons and Jesus is one of those three persons. That makes Jesus and the trinity numerically one in substance and numerically three in persons.
In my post # 22, I need to clarify that physicists aren’t confounded by questions about “time or timelessness” before God created the universe, but physicists are confounded by “time or timelessness” prior to the point origin of our spacetime universe.
I don’t have it in front of me, but as I recall, what PVI is doing there is kind of odd. He doesn’t ever commit to this view of the Trinity – he’s only trying to show that there’s no *obvious logical contradiction in* “the” doctrine of the Trinity. We can’t rule out, he thinks, that it is to be understood as involving relative id. But if so, there it is, he shows, consistent according to relative id logic. So I think it is a mere apologetic defense – he’s not even trying to sketch a believable theory there, much less endorse one.
If you think about it, he’s shooting kind of low – what isn’t obviously, demonstrably contradictory, might still be contradictory, false, unclear, or just implausible.
Also, given that relative id theory was developed only recently, can’t we rule out that this is what the fathers etc. meant by the standard formulas?
1) Well, at any rate, if the theory has gone from not existing to having two ardent supporters and one hesitant supporter, then I think it is fair to say that it has ‘gained at least some traction.’ I never meant to claim that it was popular.
2) While I don’t accept the relative id analysis myself, I’m not prepared to rule out the possibility that this may be an instance of the philosophers finally catching up to what the mystics have been saying all along, several centuries late. (I used to find this position quite attractive, but, after more study of the Fathers and the Councils, I have become more skeptical.) Also, although PVI unfortunately chose to use the ‘Athanasian’ Creed, I don’t see any obvious reason for supposing that the relative id account is inconsistent with the Nicene-Constantinopolitan Creed or the Chalcedonian Definition.
Back to the subject of my post, it seems to me that Kenny denies that Jesus and God (whether by that we mean the Father, or the Trinity) are identical. I would guess, though, that he’s an evangelical Christian, and that before philosophical training he thought they were identical.
Am I correct?
Now, like any young Christian analytic philosopher worth his salt, Kenny’s trying out what I call a rational reconstruction of the doctrine, on which it does seem consistent. I just left some feedback on his blog post.
If the former assumes or asserts the identity of the Father and God, then they are inconsistent with Peter’s rel id theory.
But the question shouldn’t be – are they consistent with it. The question is – were they teaching it? The answer to that is clearly “no” – rel id theory just isn’t visible in the propositional content.
Kenny’s blog… my eyes! The goggles do nothing!
On the autobiographical question: the first time I read the PvI paper (as an undergrad), it seemed like a much more intellectually sophisticated statement of what I had believed all along. I doubt if anyone in my (non-denominational quasi-Baptist Evangelical) church growing up had ever read Geach and friends, and this is why I think it’s plausible to suppose that there were implicit relative id theorists long before there were explicit relative id theorists.
On relative id and the creeds: relative id is a theory of the Trinity. In my view, it cannot possibly claim to be an interpretation of the orthodox doctrine of the Trinity, but it is a candidate for a theoretical mechanism to resolve the apparently conflicting claims in Trinitarian theology. I don’t understand your (Dale’s) claim about the identity of the Father with God. It’s been a little while since I read the paper, but I thought the claim was that the Father is the same God (and same substance) as, but not the same Person as, the Son. If this is right, then you would think that ‘the Father is God’, ‘the Son is God’, and ‘the Spirit is God’ would all be true identity statements. Each of the Persons is the same God as all the other Persons, therefore each Person is (identical with a) God (namely, the same God to which each of the other persons is identical).
On my blog color scheme: there is a link in the top right corner of every page that says ‘view with boring colors.’ It magically turns the page to black on white. (Let me know if it doesn’t work in your browser.) I periodically consider changing it to be boring by default, but that would be, well, boring.
Dale wrote:
“Back to the subject of my post, it seems to me that Kenny denies that Jesus and God (whether by that we mean the Father, or the Trinity) are identical. I would guess, though, that he’s an evangelical Christian, and that before philosophical training he thought they were identical.
Am I correct?
Now, like any young Christian analytic philosopher worth his salt, Kenny’s trying out what I call a rational reconstruction of the doctrine, on which it does seem consistent. I just left some feedback on his blog post.”
Dale,
I’ve been an evangelical for over 25 years while I don’t recall ever believing that Jesus is identical in every way to the Father or the trinity. For a long time, I’ve believed that Jesus and the Father are identical in omnipotence, omniscience, and omnibenevolence. And the trinity is inseparable and harmonious. But I don’t recall ever believing that Jesus and the Father are identical persons, not that I have the clearest memory of my beliefs soon after I converted.
By the way, I’ll never be an analytic philosopher while I’m a neophyte theological writer.
If I had a dollar for every new attempt to define and explain the Trinity…
I like James’ new definition. It’s strong, it’s bold, it’s fresh, and it’s very danceable. The lower register is well grounded, but the middle register is full and vibrant, while the sharpness of the upper register is distinct.
It’s crisp without any tinny ring, and moves easily through the full spectrum of range. There’s a brightness in the clarity, but the depth isn’t muffled.
I believe it has promise!
Kenny,
Clicking on that was the first thing I did. It worked beautifully.
If your beliefs, say, in the 10th grade, really implied relative identity trinitarianism, then you were one sophisticated sophomore! In my view, everyone has a concept of identity. But I’d be shocked if a person without philosophical training had a concept of relative identity.
I believe you when you say it seemed that that was what you believed all along. After all, the theory is expressly designed to save all the sentences of the Athanasian Creed. And if you were familiar with those, and the idea that they really are consistent, it makes sense that PVI would seem to be saying what you believed all along. It’s the only sort of strategy that gave give them an appearance of consistency, and like everything PVI writes, it is displays Mozart-level philosophical genius – the thing analytic philosophers admire most.
Re: the Father – Sorry, I was unclear. Yes, PVI says what you say – Father and Son are same god, but not the same person. But the Nicene creed, like the NT, seems to assume that the Father is one and the same as the one God:
“We believe in one God, the Father, the Almighty.” Three terms there for one self-identical thing, no? But if this is correct, PVI’s theory is not.
All right Fortigurn – ease up on the teasing.
James, it may be that you’re in the “social trinitarian” camp. This is a contingent within recent evangelicalism – I find it only among people who’ve read recent academic theology. I don’t think I ever encountered it in evangelical church life. Views like that are pretty rare in church history.
“I’ve been an evangelical for over 25 years while I don’t recall ever believing that Jesus is identical in every way to the Father or the trinity.”
Right – but this is part of my point. I used to hold them to me *numerically* identical. I used the names “Jesus”, “God”, and “Father” interchangeably. I made a point of asserting the “full deity” of Jesus, and thought it was obviously implied by his forgiving sins, doing miracles, atoning, etc. I did think he was “God in the flesh” – the same person as the one true God. But the whole time, I assume some things to be true of Jesus, which which not true of God, and vice-versa. This is not coherent – if they are numerically one, they can’t qualitatively differ. So, when you say you’ve always thought them to differ, have you always thought them to *numerically* differ?
So, it’s hard to say what ‘implies’ what when we are talking about a modification to classical logic, don’t you think? Obviously I could never have constructed anything remotely resembling PvI’s formal logic for relative identity, but it seems to me that I was antecedently inclined to assent to, e.g., the ‘same God, not the same person’ claim. (That kind of phrasing is not in the ‘Athanasian’ Creed.) Now, I had read the relevant portion of Locke’s Essay (which is where Geach got relative id from, though his interpretation is widely regarded as erroneous) before reading PvI, so it’s possible that the idea that identity was closely tied to sortals was already in my head. At any rate, as a result of my antecedent beliefs, PvI’s strategy seemed obviously right to me at the time. I no longer think it’s right, because I now think that it is an (ingenious) attempt to preserve the strict, literal, metaphysical truth of what is really a rather sloppy statement of the doctrine.
I’m still not understanding your point about the Father. Suppose that, unlike PvI (but like Geach, I think), we adopt relative id not just as a theory of the Trinity, but also as a solution to the material constitution problem. Then couldn’t we say, “the statue, the lump, the mass of particles, that thing over there – it weighs five pounds.” The point of relative id (and this is the point many commentators think Locke rejects) is that it can be the case the x is an F and x is a G and y is an F and y is a G, and x is the same F as y and x is not the same G as y. (According to non-relative id interpretations of Locke, x is not both F and G – e.g. a human and a person – rather, those are two different things, with different identity conditions. But everyone agrees that Locke thinks that there are different id relations for different sortals.) So we would say that one thing, x, is a statue, a lump, and a mass of particles. Say x gets smashed, and call the post-smashing object ‘y’. Now y is a lump and a mass of particles and is the same lump and the same mass of particles as x, but y is not a statue at all, let alone the same statue as x. If y gets shaped into a new statue, z, that will be the same lump as x but not the same statue as x.
Similarly, on the relative id view of the Trinity, there is one thing, the Father, which is (a) God, and a Person, and an Almighty Being. At the beginning of the story above, we could refer to x unambiguously as ‘the statue’. Why shouldn’t we be able to refer to the Father as the one God, on this view? It’s not as if the Father is merely a part of God; he is (identical to) the one God. It so happens that he is the same one God as the Son, but what of that? We knew relative id was weird. We also knew the doctrine of the Trinity was weird. I don’t see that saying there is “one God the Father Almighty” has created any new problems.
No malice intended Dale, though I’ll ease up on your request. It just struck me how closely modern Trinitarian theories resemble the more outlandish audiophile reviews, with the same vagaries of language which enable anything to mean anything, or nothing.
Take this review of audio cables for example.
http://www.positive-feedback.com/Issue32/anjou.htm
There’s a story to that review, and it’s hilarious.
Kenny, you mean x is an F and x was a G and y is an F and y is a G, and x is the same F as y and x was not the same G as y?
Helez – No, x is both an F and a G (e.g., a statue and a lump) at the same time. At least, that’s what most philosophers who work on this stuff seem to think is the commonsense position. It would be interesting to know if this is actually what non-philosophers think.
Dale,
I agree that I’m in the social trinitarian camp. However, I might not have heard of that term when I began to believe those ideas. I’ll briefly review some of the influences that helped me to develop my theology.
In 1984, I converted the Christianity and went to a trinitarian independent Pentecostal church that was once a US Assemblies of God (AG) church. I went to an AG Bible College from 1984-89. The AG has a strong focus on trinitarianism while also strongly rejecting the modalism of Oneness Pentecostalism. I felt no specific tie to the AG or even trinitarianism while I tried to make decisions about biblical doctrine.
I recall struggling to understand the ancient Nicene Creed while I more easily understood the medieval “Athanasian Creed.” And I understand my following view reflects the Athanasian Creed: “Jesus and the Father are identical in omnipotence, omniscience, and omnibenevolence. And the trinity is inseparable and harmonious. But I don’t recall ever believing that Jesus and the Father are identical persons.”
I recall that early in my Christian faith that I felt strongly that the relationship between the Father and Son in the gospels was central to Christian faith and practice. And I clearly saw biblical teachings about the uncreated deity of the Son while the Father and Son are separate persons. And I saw that I needed to follow the example of the Son submitting to the Father. And I was recently delighted to read your description of social trinitarianism in your encyclopedia article while I realized that I believed in the concepts of social trinitarianism for many years.
I recently needed to resign from my AG credentials for eschatology while I still hold to the AG view of the trinity, which works with various models of trinitarianism except modalism.
Dale,
Also, first, I need to correct a sentence and say that “I went to an AG Bible College from 1985-89.”
Second, if somebody told me that they used the names “Jesus,” “God,” and “Father” interchangeably. Then I would suspect that they were a modalist.
I also want to clarify that I have some dear Christian friends who are modalists while they don’t also believe in the worst doctrinal problems of Oneness Pentecostalism. And I think that my modalists friends have no clue about how to interpret the verses of Jesus suffering and praying in the Garden of Gethsemane while I believe that they have a strong relationship with God.
Dale said to Kenny:
If your beliefs, say, in the 10th grade, really implied relative identity trinitarianism, then you were one sophisticated sophomore! In my view, everyone has a concept of identity. But I’d be shocked if a person without philosophical training had a concept of relative identity.
I don’t understand this argument at all. Your beliefs about mathematics in the second grade really implied the principles governing the categorial analysis of simple recursion for topoi with a natural numbers object (I am told by mathematicians who would know), but this doesn’t mean that you had to have any inkling of the concept of topoi, or of simple recursion, in the second grade. It happens all the time that people’s beliefs really imply what they only later come to have any notion of. Indeed, it’s plausible to say that everyone’s beliefs really imply notions they have no inkling of, because everyone’s beliefs imply logical concepts that haven’t been formulated yet; that’s how logic develops.
Fortigurn,
It’s funny you should make that analogy. My father was an extreme audiophile, a semi-pro recording engineer (I mean, it was a side career). He subscribed to mags consisting of reviews like that, and had a lot of audiophile friends, and claimed some very interesting abilities, e.g. to be able to hear the difference when gold-plated cables were used.
Keep in mind that for the rel id theorists, the Father is NOT identical to God, but is rather relatively-id to God (which doesn’t imply identity) or in Rea’s case “numerically the same”, where again, this doesn’t imply identity.
What’s the problem? In that phrase, there are three terms. These are assumed to be co-referential – we’re just piling three titles, as it were, onto one being. If so, God, i.e. one true God of the Bible just is (is identical to) the Father. But, this is denied by rel id people. The burden is on them, I think, to explain why it really only commits one to the Father and God being numerically the same but not identical, and to explain what is meant by this. (Geach, I think, stonewalls, but Rea would say that this just means they share one nature.) Yes, they think that “the one God” is ambiguous, applying to anything with that nature. This is mighty odd… were many OT speakers just making ambiguous statements, which didn’t express any claim that could be T or F? Since these nature-sharing beings are non-id, one way of resolving it may come out true, another way false. (e.g. “God will become the Messiah”) Similar point would apply regarding non-trinitarians today.
James:
Arguably, ST isn’t consistent with the Ath Creed. It says there’s only one omnipotence (etc.) – presumably, not only one kind of it, but only one token of it. This can’t be true, it seems, if the Trinity amounts to three co-operating selves, each one omnipotent (etc.). I have a paper online about this, actually.
Me too. I think this is more common among charismatics, Pentecostals, and Vineyard people, who believe that the miracle-working power of God is available to disciples today, who actively believe in supernatural interventions and divine leading, etc. They emphasize the Jesus did his miracles by the power of God, by the “anointing” he received – not via his inherent divinity, if there be such (and most such Christians assume there is).
But that aside, the gospels very clearly present Jesus as a model to be imitated, and a core part of his example is his personal relationship with God.
James:
AG folk, having been through the split with “Oneness” Pentecostals, are probably unusually sensitive to modalism.
People won’t tell you they use the words like that – they just do it. This is a common practice in mainstream, non-charismatic American evangelicalism. Also, there’s a usage of “Jesus” and esp. “the Lord Jesus Christ” (emphasis on last syllable) to mean God. In other words, in some context, words are names for the Son of God, in others, the God whose Son he is. And in a good number of cases, you’re not sure who is being referred to.
Dale,
In light of this revelation I can’t comment further on the subject!
The real point I was making is that such detailed descriptions of the Trinity as James and Brandon supply constitute nothing more than believers in the Trinity writing themselves a blank cheque for ad hoc argumentation in which they can say whatever they like and it’s true simply because they believe it to be true.
There’s no possible validation of these claims. It’s just like having an imaginary friend, you get to tell everyone what that imaginary friend is like because only you really know, because you made them up.
Hi Kenny, thanks for your response!
The non-philosophers commonsense position would be that while x is the same F as y (a lump), x IS not a different G as y, but WAS a different G (a statue) than y is now.
Saying “x is an F and x is a G and y is an F and y is a G, and x is the same F as y and x is not the same G as y,” implies x is (present tense) the same F as y, and at the same time IS not the same G as y.
But in your example x first has to become not-G before y can become G.
Can you give an example of something being a F and a G and some other thing being the very same F but another G at the same time?
Dale wrote:
“Arguably, ST isn’t consistent with the Ath Creed. It says there’s only one omnipotence (etc.) – presumably, not only one kind of it, but only one token of it. This can’t be true, it seems, if the Trinity amounts to three co-operating selves, each one omnipotent (etc.). I have a paper online about this, actually.”
Here are lines 3-7 and 13-18 of the Ath Creed:
3. And the catholic faith is this: That we worship one God in Trinity, and Trinity in Unity;
4. Neither confounding the persons nor dividing the substance.
5. For there is one person of the Father, another of the Son, and another of the Holy Spirit.
6. But the Godhead of the Father, of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit is all one, the glory equal, the majesty coeternal.
7. Such as the Father is, such is the Son, and such is the Holy Spirit.
13. So likewise the Father is almighty, the Son almighty, and the Holy Spirit almighty.
14. And yet they are not three almighties, but one almighty.
15. So the Father is God, the Son is God, and the Holy Spirit is God;
16. And yet they are not three Gods, but one God.
17. So likewise the Father is Lord, the Son Lord, and the Holy Spirit Lord;
18. And yet they are not three Lords but one Lord.
Given the context of the entire Ath Creed, I doubt that lines 13-14 are inconsistent with the ST. For example, lines 3-7 clearly establish the context of three persons in the trinity. Also, the Ath Creed included a refutation of ancient modalism. Given that context, lines 13-14 are parallel to 15-16 and 17-18, which focus on affirming monotheism without excluding ST.
However, I appreciate your focus on that because I believe in three almighty persons who are one God so I see that I disagree with some of the semantics of the Ath Creed.
I’ll eventually check your online paper about this or perhaps I’ve already quickly reviewed it.