How Trinity theories conflict with the New Testament (Dale)

May 172012
 

Most Christians are (at least in theory, according to creeds and statements of faith promulgated by denominations) trinitarians, believers in a triune or tri-personal God, which they call the Trinity. But some have always been unitarians, believers in one God who is one perfect self, who does not in any way contain three selves or “persons.” Nowadays, these are a minority (again, going by official statements and membership rolls – I think the facts about Christians’ actual beliefs are more complicated than the official documents suggest).

In my view, before around fifth century, unitarians were always a majority. Of course, they didn’t call themselves “unitarians” – that term is of late 17th c. coinage – but arguably most of them were unitarians - for some arguments read this.

In any case, one can’t determine what is true by taking a vote. Truth may be unpopular. But also, it can be popular. So, who is right?

I propose that the following clear arguments provide a way forward. Which should we accept?

T1 The Father is not the Trinity
T2 The Trinity is God.
T3 Therefore, the Father is not God.

T1 The Father is not the Trinity.
U2 The Father is God.
U3 Therefore, The Trinity is not God.

“Is” here means numerical identity throughout. If x in this sense “is” y (in logic we write x=y) then x and y are one and the same, numerically one thing, numerically identical, and so x and y can’t ever differ in any way. The order doesn’t matter: it will be true that x=y just in case it is also true that y=x. And if it is false that x=y, then x and y are truly two – those terms name different things. To repeat: every “is” in these arguments is the “is” of identity. This is why we’re dealing with clear arguments. We’re not talking about some less close relation or association.

“God” here names Yahweh, the one true God asserted in the Hebrew scriptures.

Each argument is valid; in each case, if both premises were to be true, then the conclusion would also be true.

But we can’t consistently accept both arguments as sound. T2 conflicts with U3, and T3 conflicts with U2 (in both cases the pairs are contradictories – pairs such that one must be true and the other false).

So what to do?

Let us start on common ground. All sides should agree Continue reading »

King of the Non Sequitur (Dale)

May 132012
 

The word is “Therefore…” When you are making a deductive argument, this means that what you are about to say logically follows from (is implied by) what you have just said. That is, if the former part were to be true, what you’re about to say must also be true.

A non sequitur (Latin for: “it doesn’t follow”) is an invalid argument, one in which the premises don’t imply the conclusion, that is, where one could consistently accept all the premises and yet deny the conclusion.

I recently stumbled upon this youtube video, The Trinity Explained (with Reason), featuring a supremely confident sounding young man. I watched amazed, as a torrent of non sequiturs ensued.

If only this fellow was as good at constructing arguments as he as at selecting pictures!

Here are most of them – not that in each case, the step starting with “Therefore” is not implied by the premises.

1. If unitarianism is true, God is more comprehensible than if trinitarianism is true.
2. God is not totally comprehensible and not fully explainable.
3. Therefore, unitarianism is false.

1. Unitarianism is true.
2. Therefore, God is no greater than a human being. Continue reading »

Patton’s problem with Apologists (Dale)

May 072012
 

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I recently stumbled upon a great post by Michael Patton that just about perfectly expresses how I’ve felt about Christian apologists since growing past teenagerhood.

In part:

This is the problem that I have with some apologists (those who defend the faith). Don’t get me wrong, I believe very much in apologetics and also love many apologists. But very rarely do I find a reasonable apologist. Most are very hardened because they are committed first to defending their particular position, not so much to learning.

Read the whole thing. He also has done a similar post recently.

I would add: apologists too often fall into mere rhetorical violence: hyperbole, attacking a straw man, verbal aggression, smug, acid condescension, simply repeating oneself more loudly, insults, poisoning the well, and so on. And this is leaving aside poorly constructed arguments. Sadly, debates between philosophers (one or both of whom may be atheists) are nearly always ”cleaner” (more reasonably and respectfully conducted) than your average debate between a Christian apologist and anyone else.

I’m always reminded of what James says: Continue reading »

Defining the concept of a Christian unitarian (Dale)

Apr 242012
 

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Thanks to reader Mike Gant  for his question about my last post.

As of now I think I’ve got a solid definition of the concept unitarian: someone who believes that the one God just is (i.e. is numerically identical to) a certain self and not to any other self.

But I then tried to define the more specific concept of a Christian unitarian: someone who believes that the one God just is (i.e. is numerically identical to) a certain self, namely the Father, and not to any other self.

But this is not a good definition. Mike asked: what about ancient friends of God like Moses and Abraham?

D’oh! The above definition makes them Christian unitarians. Thus, it is too “broad” or “wide.” Continue reading »

A Tale of Two Tattoos (Dale)

Apr 142012
 

I love philosophy majors. The best of them almost always develop a nerdy and warped sense of humor – and I mean that in the best way. :-)

These two young ladies, recent alumnas of our department, decided to get complementary tattoos. (Sober, they swear!)

In each case, the tattoo artist left off the two initial universal quantifiers: AxAy (I can’t find the symbol codes for the upside down A representing the universal quantifier – so please imagine those A’s upside down.) They would read: For any x whatsoever and for any y whatsoever…

Now to the tattoos. “F” is supposed to be, either a predicate or a property. On the right tattoo (wrist) the right, closing parentheses is just out of view.

One of the tattoos says something nearly all philosophers agree is true (a rarity!) while the other is held to be false by many. Here’s your homework, dear reader: Continue reading »

Scott Williams’s new paper: Henry of Ghent on Real Relations and the Trinity (Dale)

Mar 262012
 

Congratulations to Scott Williams, trinities contributor and newly minted Oxford University PhD in Theology,  on his forthcoming paper:

 ‘Henry of Ghent on Real Relations and the Trinity: The Case for Numerical Sameness Without Identity’, in: Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie Médiévales 79.1 (2012), will be published.

Here is his abstract:

I argue that there is a hitherto unrecognized connection between Henry of Ghent’s general theory of real relations and his Trinitarian theology, namely the notion of numerical sameness without identity.
This last notion can be traced back to Aristotle, and pops up through the middle ages: the basic idea is that an x and y can differ, and so fail to be identical, and yet be “numerically one”. Myself, I deny that there’s any such relation, but some disagree, most notably Mike Rea and Jeff Brower. Here’s a relevant 2007 post featuring Billary.
Theories of real relations… well, Scott should get on here and explain that one! Medieval theories of relations are best left to the specialists. :-)

Worship and Revelation 4-5 – Part 7 – Morgridge on Revelation 4-5 (Dale)

Mar 112012
 

19th c. American minister Charles Morgridge makes an apt comment about Revelation 4-5:

There is not in the Bible a clearer distinction between the only true God, and his only Son our Saviour, than is here expressed. GOD sat on the throne; the Son stood amidst the elders. GOD had in his right hand a book; the Son came and took the book out of his hand. GOD was worshiped as the Being who created all things; and who liveth forever and ever. The Son was honored as the Lamb that was slain, and redeemed us unto God by his blood. And as [in 1 Chronicles 29:20] the whole congregation of Israel bowed down their heads, and worshiped the LORD and the king, who was but a type of this Lamb; so, in verse 13, the whole universe is represented as ascribing Blessing, and honor, and glory, and power, unto HIM that sitteth upon the throne, and unto the Lamb, forever and ever. (The True Believer’s Defence, p. 58, bold added)

A couple of other gems:

The word worship is now generally used to express the religious homage due to God. But this is not the only sense Continue reading »

Worship and Revelation 4-5 – Part 5 – An Objection (Dale)

Mar 082012
 

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If we stick with objections arising from the text of Revelation itself, perhaps the most obvious one is that raised in a comment on previous post by my friend James Anderson. Reformulated by me, it goes:

The text itself (Rev 19:10, 22:9) asserts that we should worship only God. And yes, Revelation plainly implies that Jesus should be worshiped. And so it plainly implies that Jesus is God. 

One might look to one of my favorite translations, the New Living Translation, which has these two verses saying, in part: “Worship only God”.

When you look at the Greek, though, you see that it simply says “Worship God.” Not the same thing! And most translations get this right. (Even The Message and the Good News Bible get it right.)

Where does the “only” come from? From the theological agenda of the translators; they want the text to be making the argument above. So in the ESV Study Bible, which translates these phrases correctly (“Worship God.”) they feel the theological need to add this footnote:

Human beings must not worship even the angels… God alone must be worshiped. Since the Lamb is rightly worshiped (5:8-14), he is God. (p. 2497)

Interestingly, these evangelical commenters agree with those in the recent Jewish Annotated New Testament that Revelation asserts that only God should  be worshiped. In their comment on 19:7-10, they assert that

It is God, not the Lamb/Jesus, who is to be worshiped. (p. 493)

And bizarrely, in their notes on chapter 5, they ignore the obvious fact that Jesus is being worshiped together with God, although they correctly note that

The heavenly song makes a clear distinction between the enthroned one and the sacrificial lamb. (p. 474)

I’m reading between the lines here, and the commenters in this book are understandably very circumspect, but I think their assumption is Continue reading »

Worship and Revelation 4-5 – Part 4 – Implications (Dale)

Mar 062012
 

Last time we carefully read through a heavenly scene in which Jesus is exalted to God’s side and worshiped alongside him.

We saw that it is indisputable that Revelation 4-5 holds forth Jesus as worthy of being worshiped.

But can this help us choose between the dueling arguments from the first post? Yes!

Given that we accept that Jesus ought to be worshiped, we must choose between Only God should be worshiped and Jesus isn’t God because we can’t consistently accept both of these, in addition to the claim that Jesus ought to be worshiped.

Based on our careful reading (Part 2, Part 3) of Revelation 4-5, let us ask which of these John would agree with?

Would John agree that only God should be worshiped?
Plainly not. 

  • Jesus is presented throughout as someone else. In these chapters, he comes into God’s throne room, receives the scroll of God’s secret plans from God, and is then honored alongside God.
  • God, the one on the throne, silently approves of all this. He lets Jesus take the scroll. It is his mission that Jesus accomplished, because of which Jesus is worthy to now be exalted. And he stands by while people worship both him and Jesus. And he does not thunder “You lousy idolaters” – worship only me!” And he, he tacitly approves of this exaltation of Jesus.
  • Smartly, the people present agree. (v. 14) No one calls out God Continue reading »

Worship and Revelation 4-5 – Part 3 – Revelation 5 (Dale)

Mar 042012
 

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Last time, in chapter 4, our author (a “John” – 1:1) was granted a vision of God in heaven, receiving worship in his throne room.

In chapter 5, God – the one on the throne – is holding a sealed up scroll – a scroll which we later find out (ch. 6-9) contains his future plans. This is what the author was promised at the start of chapter 4 – that he’d be shown the future (4:1), again, something we know from Isaiah is the prerogative of God alone.

No one is found worthy to open it, and John is bummed. Someone tells him,

“Weep no more; behold, the Lion of the tribe of Judah, the Root of David, has conquered, so that he can open the scroll and its seven seals.”

And between the throne and the four living creatures and among the elders I saw a Lamb standing, as though it had been slain, with seven horns and with seven eyes, which are the seven spirits of God sent out into all the earth.

Lamb. Who? We’ve met him before – it is Jesus, the one through whom Continue reading »

Worship and Revelation 4-5 – Part 2 – Revelation 4 (Dale)

Mar 022012
 

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What does Revelation imply about God, Jesus, and worship?

In Revelation chapter 4, the author is granted a heavenly vision:

After this I looked, and behold, a door standing open in heaven! And the first voice, which I had heard speaking to me like a trumpet, said, “Come up here, and I will show you what must take place after this.” At once I was in the Spirit, and behold, a throne stood in heaven, with one seated on the throne. (ESV, emphases throughout are added)

Awesome. Who could this be? There follows a description of the setting and the heavenly court. Featured are some wierd heavenly beings singing,

“Holy, holy, holy, is the Lord God Almighty, who was and is and is to come!”

Right – this is Yahweh. All of this is very reminiscient of the vision in Isaiah chapter 6:

In the year that King Uzziah died I saw the Lord sitting upon a throne, high and lifted up; and the train of his robe filled the temple.  Above him stood the seraphim. Each had six wings: with two he covered his face, and with two he covered his feet, and with two he flew. And one called to another and said:

“Holy, holy, holy is the LORD of hosts; the whole earth is full of his glory!”

“LORD” here is the proper name Yahweh. So this is who Isaiah saw. And this, the author of Revelation is telling us, who he now sees in his vision. Much in the vision is similar to the visions in Ezekiel 1 and 10. There too, the prophet sees God himself.

If the point wasn’t clear enough in Revelation 4, some worship this one on the throne, saying,

“Worthy are you, our Lord and God, to receive glory and honor and power, for you created all things, and by your will they existed and were created.”

This recalls well-known passages later in Isaiah, were Yahweh asserts that he’s the only true God, and the only creator.

Note finally that the author here nowhere says the one on the throne is a man, although one imagines the character as humanoid – I mean, appearing to be similar to a man – he does sit enthtroned here, and in the next chapter he’s got a scroll in his right hand. Of course, he’s assumed to be a self here too. He has a will, he performs intentional actions like creating, and he can be addressed and worshiped.

He’s a glorious and powerful being here, but the author demurs from directly describing him. I think that’s why a good portrayal of this scene has a sort of non-descript person on the throne, e.g. with no articulated face, as in the picture here (which is really of Revelation 5, subject of my next post).

Worship and Revelation 4-5 – Part 1 – setup (Dale)

Feb 292012
 

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What, if anything, is wrong with this argument?

1. Only God should be worshiped.

2. Jesus should be worshiped.

3. Therefore, Jesus is God.     (1,2)

Before you answer, be sure you understand the claims fully. The “only” in 1 makes a claim of quantification, which we all understand in terms of identity. In standard logic, it would be analyzed as:

Wg & (x)(Wx -> x=g) That is: God should be worshiped, and for any x, x should be worshiped only if x is numerically the same as God.

Given 2 then (Wj) what follows logically is that Jesus is numerically the same as God. (j = g) Many evangelicals, it seems, endorse 3, and think the above to be a sound argument.

Interestingly, this conclusion 3 is not what most Christians trained in philosophy think – and I’m referring to almost all (various sorts of) trinitarians here. That’s because on anyone’s views (OK – just about anyone – I’m aware of the “oneness” folk) some things will be true of God that are not true of Jesus, and vice-versa. In short, it is obvious that they’ve differed.  So then, they can’t be numerically identical, however closely they’re related. Based on this, most of them would deny 1, interestingly enough. They would allow, consistently with this, that maybe Jesus “is God” in the sense of being divine – where this neither means nor implies being numerically identical to God.

Still, the above argument seems sound to many thoughtful Christians.

Here’s another such argument:

1.  Jesus isn’t God.

2. Jesus should be worshiped.

3. Therefore, it is false that only God should be worshiped. (1,2)

Both arguments are valid; they have the same structure – in both cases, IF 1 and 2 were true, then 3 would be true as well. But it can’t be that both are sound (valid with all true premises) since 3 in the first argument is inconsistent with 1 in the second argument. (Logically, they could both be unsound, if their common premise 2 is false.)

What to do? Accept the first argument, accept the second, or jettison both?

It seems to me that Revelation 4-5 should push us towards accepting the second argument. In the rest of this series, I’ll explain why.

 

 

Jesus, God, and an inconsistent triad (Dale)

Feb 252012
 

Christians believe in God. And Christians believe in Jesus Christ. How should we think these two (?) relate to one another? Consider this following inconsistent triad:

D: Jesus and God have differed.

N: Jesus and God are numerically one.

I: If any X and Y have ever differed, then they are not numerically one.

One can’t consistently accept all three. If any two are true, the remaining one must be false. (Go ahead: work through the combinations.)

So a thoughtful Christian ought to reject at least one. But which?

I suggest: whichever we have the least reason to believe is true. But which one is that?

We have as much reason to believe I as we have to believe anything.

Suppose I is false. Then we have some X and Y which at some time have differed (e.g. at a certain time this X was hot and Y was cold, X was here and Y was over there, X was awake and Y was asleep, X knew that P and Y did not know that P) and yet are nonetheless numerically the same. That is, one and the same thing (call it X or call it Y) at one time differed from itself – at one time was a certain way and was not a certain way. But this is obviously impossible.

So supposing I false implies a contradiction. I must, then, be true. And once you grasp the impossibility just noted, you can be very sure I is true – as sure as you’re sure of anything.

So I is off the table. It’s down to D or N then. Which should a Christian deny?

Why believe D? The Bible. In the Garden of Gethsemane, we are told, Jesus didn’t want to die, but God wanted Jesus to die. (Jesus prays to God hoping to change his mind, but eventually acquiesces in God’s will for him.) Or: traditional catholic theology. God is triune; Jesus isn’t triune. Continue reading »

Comment on a Poll – an inconsistent triad (Dale)

Aug 192011
 

The poll below is an interesting one. (The bogus one to the left is only fun, but not interesting.) As I write this post, it is still current, and is available for voting at the upper right of the main blog page.

Which of these is false?

  1. The Christian God is a self.
  2. The Christian God is the Trinity.
  3. The Trinity is not a self.

One option is to vote that none are false, since all are true. As I write this, 27% have picked this option. But this is a poor pick. This “is” here is the “is” of numerical identity throughout. Given this, it is impossible that all three be true; they are demonstrably inconsistent. (The logical form is: 1. g=s, 2. g=t, 3. -(t=s).)  At least one must be false.

  • If 1 & 2, then not-3. If this God is a self, and is the Trinity, and it must be false that the Trinity is not a self.
  • If 1 & 3 then not-2. If God’s a self, and the Trinity isn’t, then it must be false that God just is the Trinity.
  • If 2 & 3 then not-1. If God’s the Trinity, but is not a self, then it is false that the Christian God is a self.

Why then do 27% opt for inconsistency (affirming all three)? Continue reading »

A few thoughts on generation and time (Dale)

Aug 172011
 
A reader emailed to ask me what I thought about the classic patristic doctrine of “eternal begetting.”
When this reader objected to someone that any process of begetting  must be temporal, with a before and an after, he was told that this was an illicit use of “finite logic.”
A few thoughts in response:
  • People who talk of “finite logic” generally don’t know what a logic is. I think what they mean to say is rather something about our finite, human intellectual powers, e.g. to think, believe, know, understand.
  • Of course, we can only use the powers we have! Continue reading »

Linkage: Did God the Son change in becoming incarnate? (Dale)

Aug 152011
 

“Classic” (i.e. mainstream catholic, Platonic) Christian theism holds that God is timeless, and so incapable of any change whatever.

And they add: the Word is God, and the Word became flesh.

Sounds like a change, doesn’t it? First, the Word is simply divine, and a moment later, he’s entered into a “hypostatic union” with a “complete human nature.”

Reformed philosophical theologian James Anderson takes a crack at this one. (HT: Triablogue.) I much like his set-up. I’m less keen on the solution. Short answer: it’s a mystery (apparent contradiction). You’ll have to read his post to see why I chose this pic.

A few quick comments: first, I’m with Continue reading »

On an alleged counterexample to Leibniz’s Law – Part 2 (Dale)

Aug 092011
 

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In his comment on my previous post, Brandon points out that he doesn’t assert the case described there to be a counterexample. Rather, he was wondering why it isn’t a counterexample; he was probing to see my response.

Fair enough. I’ve left the title of the post as is just for continuity with part 1.

The case Brandon described, was an omniscient God, who is both subject and object of knowledge of himself. God as knower is subject of knowledge but not object. But God as object is what is known, and not the subject of knowledge. So, don’t we here have something which is and isn’t intrinsically some way (being self-knowing) at a time? If so, the principle is false.

My response is that there Continue reading »

On an alleged counterexample to Leibniz’s Law – Part 1 (Dale)

Aug 052011
 

In a recent post I put forward my own preferred version of “Leibniz’s Law,” or more accurately, the Indiscernibility of Identicals. It’s a bit complicated, so as to get around what are some apparent counterexamples to the simpler principle which is commonly held.

Aside for non-philosophers: philosophers are usually after universal principles, truths which hold in all cases, rather than mere non-universal generalizations, i.e. rough rules of thumb which have exceptions. (An example of the latter: Boys love trucks.) Thus, when a philosophers makes a (universal) claim, other philosophers come along and try to show that it is false with “counterexamples” – real, or even merely possible, examples which show the principle to be false (as it doesn’t apply to them). For example, if someone says that all Texans love tacos, a counterexample to this would be a person who is from Texas and doesn’t like them. Just one counterexample is enough to show a universal claim to be false. When provided with a counterexample, of course, one will often refine, as it were, the original claim (e.g. All native Texans love tacos, or All Texans who appreciate Tex-Mex food love tacos) and the game goes on. This is all in the interest of discovering together what is true and what is false. (In my example, of course, those “refinements” would admit of easy counterexamples too.)

So my principle said, to paraphrase, that for any x and y, x just is (=) y, only if they don’t ever intrinsically differ. (I put this in terms of one having a “mode” at a time if and only if the other also has that mode at that time. Others would call these “intrinsic properties.”)

Here our friend, philosopher and blogger Brandon offered a counterexample, Continue reading »

A formulation of Leibniz’s Law / the Indiscernibility of Identicals (Dale)

Jul 212011
 

In discussing the Trinity or Incarnation, I often have an exchange which goes like this:

  • someone: Jesus is God.
  • me: You mean, Jesus is God himself?
  • someone: Yeah.
  • me: Don’t you think something is true of Jesus, that isn’t true of God, and vice-versa?
  • someone: Yes. e.g. God sent his Son. Jesus didn’t. God is a Trinity. Jesus is not a Trinity.
  • me: Right. Then in your view, Jesus is not God.
  • someone: But he is.
  • me: So, you think he is, and he ain’t?!
  • someone: [silent puzzlement]

In this post, I want to explain the part in italics. First: a point of clarification. The second and third lines are important. When many say “Jesus is God” they just mean that in some sense or other Jesus is “divine.” (This could mean a lot of things, depending on one’s assumed metaphysics.) But this sort of person (line 3) understands Jesus to be “divine” in the sense of just being one and the same as God – that Jesus is God himself – one person, so just one (period).

In the italicized line, I’m applying  something called Leibniz’s Law, or the Indiscernibility of Identicals. I sometimes put this roughly as, some x and some y can be numerically identical only if whatever is true of one is true of the other. That’s a sloppy way to put it.

In logic, a more precise way of stating it (used e.g. by Richard Cartwright) is:

(x)(y)(z) ( x= y only if (z is a property of x if and only if z is a property of y))

Literally: for any three things whatever, the first is identical to the second only if the third is a property of the first just in case the third is a property of the second.

The basic intuition is that things are as they are, and not some other way. So if x just is (is numerically the same as) y, then it can’t be that x and y qualitatively differ. This seems undeniable.

There are a few problems, though, with the above formula, which any person trained in philosophy may spot. Continue reading »

On Numerical Sameness / Identity / “Absolute” Identity (Dale)

Jul 202011
 

I’ve been reading some stuff about identity and relative identity lately, in the process of writing something on relative identity versions of trinitarianism. This post is to share some good finds.

In his excellent entry “Relative Identity“ veteran logican and philosopher of language Harry Deutsch says about the best that can be said for relative identity theories – that maybe, arguably, they solve or help to solve various metaphysical problems. See his sections 2 and 4 for these. His section 5 is a penetrating analysis of Geach’s very hard to follow arguments.

Deutsch’s point of view is very different from that held by most philosophers. For this, see chapter 1 of Colin McGinn’s Logical Properties. (NDPR review.) This is more or less  the “orthodox” view that most philosophers hold, atheist or theist, trinitarian or not. I largely agree with it, except for its Platonic aspect. I uphold the logic of identity as McGinn understands it, but do not want to commit to the existence of abstracta like relations. I think the truthmaker of a sentence like “Dubya just is George Bush” is going to be a concrete object, the ex-president himself. In this, I’m in the minority; most philosophers find abstracta indispensible.

Another place one can start is Harold Noonan‘s excellent “Identity” entry. He’s an excellent philosopher, and the piece has many virtues; in particular, see his section 2 on Leibniz’s Law vs. substitutivity principles.

The best thing I’ve ever read on identity and relative identity is Continue reading »

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