How Trinity theories conflict with the New Testament (Dale)

May 172012
 

Most Christians are (at least in theory, according to creeds and statements of faith promulgated by denominations) trinitarians, believers in a triune or tri-personal God, which they call the Trinity. But some have always been unitarians, believers in one God who is one perfect self, who does not in any way contain three selves or “persons.” Nowadays, these are a minority (again, going by official statements and membership rolls – I think the facts about Christians’ actual beliefs are more complicated than the official documents suggest).

In my view, before around fifth century, unitarians were always a majority. Of course, they didn’t call themselves “unitarians” – that term is of late 17th c. coinage – but arguably most of them were unitarians - for some arguments read this.

In any case, one can’t determine what is true by taking a vote. Truth may be unpopular. But also, it can be popular. So, who is right?

I propose that the following clear arguments provide a way forward. Which should we accept?

T1 The Father is not the Trinity
T2 The Trinity is God.
T3 Therefore, the Father is not God.

T1 The Father is not the Trinity.
U2 The Father is God.
U3 Therefore, The Trinity is not God.

“Is” here means numerical identity throughout. If x in this sense “is” y (in logic we write x=y) then x and y are one and the same, numerically one thing, numerically identical, and so x and y can’t ever differ in any way. The order doesn’t matter: it will be true that x=y just in case it is also true that y=x. And if it is false that x=y, then x and y are truly two – those terms name different things. To repeat: every “is” in these arguments is the “is” of identity. This is why we’re dealing with clear arguments. We’re not talking about some less close relation or association.

“God” here names Yahweh, the one true God asserted in the Hebrew scriptures.

Each argument is valid; in each case, if both premises were to be true, then the conclusion would also be true.

But we can’t consistently accept both arguments as sound. T2 conflicts with U3, and T3 conflicts with U2 (in both cases the pairs are contradictories – pairs such that one must be true and the other false).

So what to do?

Let us start on common ground. All sides should agree Continue reading »

Ramble on (Dale)

May 122012
 

I was interviewed a couple of times at the 2012 Atlanta Bible College Theological Conference.

Here’s the first, in which I ramble on about my own religious history and views about God, the Trinity, and Jesus.

Also: pacifism (I’m agin’ it. Perhaps the majority of conference goers, I think, were for it.) I wasn’t expecting that question – hence the rambling. :-)

Thanks to Carlos Jimenez for filming, editing, and posting this. You can comment on the youtube page.

Better rambling below the fold… Continue reading »

Defining the concept of a Christian unitarian (Dale)

Apr 242012
 

(click for image credit)

Thanks to reader Mike Gant  for his question about my last post.

As of now I think I’ve got a solid definition of the concept unitarian: someone who believes that the one God just is (i.e. is numerically identical to) a certain self and not to any other self.

But I then tried to define the more specific concept of a Christian unitarian: someone who believes that the one God just is (i.e. is numerically identical to) a certain self, namely the Father, and not to any other self.

But this is not a good definition. Mike asked: what about ancient friends of God like Moses and Abraham?

D’oh! The above definition makes them Christian unitarians. Thus, it is too “broad” or “wide.” Continue reading »

Defining the concept of a unitarian (Dale)

Apr 242012
 

Last time I offered a definition of the concept of a trinitarian.

This time, I will try to define the concept of a unitarian.

Many definitions of this concept are unacceptably polemical.  It is unacceptable to define a unitarian as an anti-trinitarian.  This violates requirements 3 and 5 – it doesn’t tell us what a unitarian is, but only what a unitarian is against.  And this is part of a common slashing rhetorical strategy which I have recently mentioned.  For the same reasons we must reject defining the concept unitarian as one who “denies the Trinity” or “has heretical beliefs about the Trinity,” etc. Equally, it is unacceptable to define a unitarian as one who holds the correct or biblical view about Jesus and God. Whether or not that’s so, it’s trying to sneak an argument for a thesis into a pseudo-definition of that thesis.

One common definition is,

Definition 1: someone who believes in exactly one unipersonal God.

I think this is on the right track, but the term “unipersonal” is obscure, and so this definition violates requirement 6 (and possibly also 3).

I have been working with this definition of the concept:

Definition 2: someone who believes that the one God just is (is numerically identical to) the Father.

I now think that this isn’t quite right.

First the definition is arguably too narrow.  Continue reading »

Defining the concept of a trinitarian (Dale)

Apr 232012
 

I woke up this morning, and realized that there is a problem with how I’ve been defining the concept of a unitarian.  In this post, I will attempt a definition of the concept of a trinitarian, after reviewing what is required of a good definition. Next time, I’ll try to define the concept of a unitarian.

According to the textbook I have used for years in my critical thinking class, a good definition should:

  1. Include the genus and a differentia.
  2. Not be too broad or too narrow.
  3. State the essential attributes of the concept’s referents.
  4. Not be circular.
  5. Not use negative terms unnecessarily.
  6. Not use vague, obscure, or metaphorical language. (p. 44)

What is a trinitarian?

Definition 1: someone who believes in a triune god.

This fails Continue reading »

Biddle: many “Gods” but one God (Dale)

Apr 212012
 

Here’s an interesting but tightly wound passage from John Biddle (1615-62) in a book from 1648:

Again, though he [Jesus] be a God, subordinate to the most high God, as having received his godhead, and whatsover he hath, from the Father; yet may not anyone thence rightly infer, that by this account there will be another God, or two Gods?  For though we may, with allowance of the scripture, say, that there are many Gods, yet neither will the scripture, nor the thing itself permit us to say, that there is another God, or two Gods, because when a word in its own nature common to many, has been appropriated, and ascribed to one by way of excellency (as that of God has been the Father), albeit this does not hinder us from saying, that there are many of that name, yet does it from saying, that there is another, or two, since that would be all one as if we should say, that there is another, or two most excellent (which is absurd),  for when two are segregated in this manner out of many, they claim excellency to themselves alike. Thus though some faithful man be a Son of God, subordinate to the chief Son of God Christ Jesus, yet may we not thereupon say, that there is another Son of God, or two Sons of God, (since that would be to make another, or two Sons of God by way of excellency, whereas there can be but one such a Son) howbeit otherwise the scripture warrants us to say, that there are many Sons of God. (A Confession of Faith Touching the Holy Trinity, According to Scripture, pp. 17-8,  in Firmin1691, language modernized and bold added)

He goes on to quote 1 Corinthians 8:4-6 and Hebrews 2:10.

What is Biddle’s argument here, and is it cogent? Discuss.

“Sabellianism Reconsidered” Considered – Part 6 (Dale)

Apr 192012
 

Switchfoot “are one”. But they are really just five dudes, not one.

Baber observes,

Typically, aggregates of Fs are not themselves Fs. A collection of cats is not itself a cat… an aggregation of persons is not a person. (p. 7, emphasis added)

Still, she thinks this needn’t preclude three gods from themselves being a god. Some sorts of things, it seems, can have other things of that same sort for parts, such as a Sierpinski Triangle. (p. 10) Maybe, then, gods are more like triangles like cats, in that groups of god can be (temporal) parts of a god. At least, we can’t rule out that this is possible.

How many temporal parts does God, on this theory have? There’s no reason to think it is exactly three. Continue reading »

LaBreeska’s right (Dale)

Apr 182012
 

(click for image credit)

LaBreeska Hemphill is right. Jesus isn’t God; he’s the Son of God.

God is a certain perfect self, the one both we and Jesus call “our Father” and “our God”. Jesus is a man – but by no means a mere man, to wildly understate the case. God is not a man, not, as C.S. Lewis would say, a Son of Adam.

She’s not a theologian. She’s just one in a long parade of Christians who closely examine the Bible, expecting to find taught there that Jesus is God, or that he’s divine, and instead find Jesus worshiping and praying to one he calls “the one true God”. She’s a unitarian Christian, aka a “biblical unitarian” or a “humanitarian unitarian”.

Unlike many Christian intellectuals, she assumes that trusting Jesus means accepting his theological teaching, even if that implies that certain catholic bishops and those loyal to their traditions  have been mistaken in some of their speculations.

Like nearly all traditional Christians, she assumes God to be a self. The Bible implies this straight up, throughout, to the dismay of some with other conceptions of God – e.g. those who hold that God is “Being” or an “Ultimate Concern”.

Some present day “social” theorists deny that God is a self, and may deride her reasons for rejecting Trinity doctrines, as it conflicts with their speculation that really, God is a group of selves, or is a composite self or quasi-self composed of three selves. But they prudently hide this view of theirs when in church; they dare not assert that it is a mistake to think God is a self. They mumble that God’s  a “personal” being (you know, composed of persons/selves). They dare not correct their friends who refer to God as “him” or “he”, insisting that God is an “it”.

LaBreeska doesn’t need to mumble. She speaks Continue reading »

“Sabellianism Reconsidered” Considered – Part 4 (Dale)

Apr 122012
 
The theory, then, is that God is an everlasting, temporally extended thing with three temporal parts, each of which is a god. But, they’re the same god as God. Yet as we saw last time, how can the Three be gods at all, as each exists at some times but not others?

Without going into the arguments for this controversial thesis, Baber appeals to the claim made by Derek Parfit and others, that “identity is not ‘what matters’ for survival”. (p.6) Thus, a future thing can count as my surviving, though it is not (numerically) identical to me.

Suppose (I’m stealing this thought experiment from Richard Swinburne) some mad scientists, such as Pinkie and the Brain, are going to cut my brain in half, and put the left half in one body, and the right in another. The body which gets the left half will be tortured to death, while the body getting the right half will be given lifetime passes to all NFL games and a lifetime supply of good beer. If I’m to undergo this experiment, I want to know which of these resulting people will be (numerically identical to) me: the unlucky one, the lucky one, or neither.

Baber (following Parfit) wants to say that depending on how exactly the resulting people are related to me, both may count as the continuation of or survival of me. Specifically, she suggests that psychological continuity is enough – it is enough that the later people have the same or nearly the same beliefs, desires, and so on that I have.

I don’t think this is right, but back to the Trinity: In her view, the god which is a God-stage (temporal part of God) called the Father would, just before the Incarnation, be mistaken to think Continue reading »

“Sabellianism Reconsidered” Considered – Part 3 (Dale)

Apr 112012
 

To continue Baber’s attempt to retool Sabellianism:

Suppose your car, named KITT, has temporal parts. KITT, then is the sum of, the whole composed of these parts. (KITT at t1, KITT at t2, KITT at t3, KITT at t4…etc.) Further, Baber urges each of these car-stages (temporal parts of a car) is itself a car. So, e.g., KITT at t3 is just as much a car as the whole KITT. But now, suppose David Hasselhoff is driving KITT on, say, Easter. He’s actually, on this metaphysics, driving two cars, for KITT on Easter is a different car than KITT (the sum of KITT-stages).

Not to worry, argues Baber. We simply need a concept of “tensed identity”. This is not numerical identity as normally understood, but is rather the relation between KITT and KITT at Easter, such that they “count as one”. (p.5) Thus, Baber suggests that if we believe in temporal parts, the thesis of “tensed identity” is a “plausible way to avoid over-population.” (p. 5)

Back to God. She’s exploring the idea that God is a whole composed of three temporal parts Continue reading »

A Lesson in Christological Rhetoric (Dale)

Apr 082012
 

You say that you want to argue for a “high” christology, for something widely considered to be a mainstream Christian understanding of Jesus. My advice is: be careful - if you say too much, you’ll open yourself up to refutation, and your claim will appear implausible, or too contentious and theoretical, or you’ll at least invite questions you have no intention of answering. How, then, to state your thesis?

“Jesus is God himself“? Sounds heretical (suggests they’re the same person, and not merely the same being, and that the Son and Father are the same person). Plus, sounds a bit too strong.

“Jesus has the divine nature“? What’s a divine nature? Who knows? Help! Is there a metaphysician in the house? You don’t want to go there – legions of nature-theories are lurking in the shadows, nipping and growling at one another, and at you.

“Jesus is a member of the Trinity“? Good and vague – but it raises that whole Trinity issue. Better to sidestep that one.

“Jesus is included in the identity of God.” Mysterious, but not in a good way. Plenty unclear, but sounds too high-falootin’, too academic – like something Brian McLaren would write. Too newly minted. You can retreat to this if need be – you can name-drop a famous scholar or two here – but whatever you do, don’t lead with it.

“Jesus is God“?

Mmm… good and vague. Powerfully simple, pithy. Close – but too much like the first statement above.

You may believe all of the above – but you don’t want to say any of those claims, unless you have to.

Here’s a better way: Continue reading »

“Sabellianism Reconsidered” Considered – Part 2 (Dale)

Apr 052012
 
President Bush, President Reagan, President Carter, President Ford, President Nixon
What is this adequate Trinity theory called “Sabellianism”, according to Baber? It is what I’ve called serial, non-essential FSH noumenal modalism - each “person” of the Trinty is a mode of God, a way God is during a period of time. None of these overlap (serial), they supervene on God’s intrinsic features (noumenal), and they are non-essential – if God hadn’t created, there would have been no time, and so no temporal parts to his life.
So the theory is that the one God is an everlasting self with three temporal parts, the Father (up to the time of the Incarnation?), the Son (during the earthly life of Jesus, ending at Pentecost?) and the Holy Spirit (Pentecost and after?). So the three “persons” of the Trinity are in fact person-stages of the one divine person/self, but they are also persons as well.

Following an ancient tradition of mocking modalists as “patripassians”, she seems to think the biggest or the main problem with modalism is that it identifies the Father and the Son. (pp. 1, 3) On her modalist theory, they are temporal parts (person-stages) of one being, but they are not numerically identical – they are different temporal parts of God. As she observes, on this theory, “There is… no time at while f=s.” (p. 3) Thus, her theory doesn’t identify any of the persons with one another, or with God for that matter.

Many metaphysicians, she knows, reject the theory of temporal parts, and the perdurance theory of how a thing can “last” through time.

But moving on, is this theory monotheistic? She urges,

All we need to capture the spirit of monotheism is the doctrine that at any time there is exactly one God. (3)

Huh? She draws an analogy with US Presidents; at any given time, there’s one one.

But imagine this: Continue reading »

“Sabellianism Reconsidered” Considered – Part 1 (Dale)

Apr 032012
 
Three modes, one mentally ill self.
Dr. Harriet Baber (aka H.E. Baber) teaches philosophy at the University of San Diego, and has been active for many years in the Society of Christian Philosophers. She’s published a number of papers on gender, philosophy of religion, metaphysics, and other topics. I met her in the 1990s at an SCP conference in California, and I have always found her to be funny, smart, and independent-minded. And judging by her website theme, I gather she likes to do shots of… some sort of grass juice. :-) More relevantly, I believe she’s a lifelong Episcopalian.
Here I want to review her provocative “Sabellianism Reconsidered” (Sophia 41:2, Oct 2002, 1-18.)

Her starting point is this argument:

1. There is only one God.
2. The Father is God.
3. The Son is God.
4. Therefore, the Father is the Son. (p. 1) Continue reading »

It’s just gotta be true… (Dale)

Mar 242012
 

<gossip>Once some years ago, I was hanging out with a group of Christian philosophers, and the subject of the Trinity came up. One person,  a well known philosopher, firmly remarked that “It’s just gotta be modalism.”

I recently shared this story with a Christian philosopher friend. In response, he told me that more recently, he was hanging with a group of Christian philosophers, and one (who is at least as respected as the aforementioned – which is to say, very) opined firmly that Christians should just admit to being tritheists and defend tritheism. </gossip>

My friend and I got a big laugh out of this.

Neither philosopher, by the way, has published yet on this topic. But maybe we’re in for a bumpy ride!

The more I think about this, though, the less funny I think it is. There’s nothing new under the sun, says my darker self. And I recall the words of the dearly departed Christian philosopher William Alston,

It is a well known fact, amply borne out by the history of the discussion of the topic, that as soon as one goes beyond the automatic recital of traditional creedal phrases one inevitably leans either in the direction of modalism – the “persons” are simply the different aspects of the divine being and/or activity – or tritheism – there are really three Gods, albeit very intimately connected in some way. (“Swinburne and Christian Theology,” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 41 (1997) , p. 54).

Well, if that’s so, maybe there’s a problem with those traditional creedal phrases! (For his part, Alston rested with a very unsatisfying appeal to mystery.)

I tremendously respect all three of these people – Alston and the two nameless ones – but I dare say that none of the three has fully enough explored all the options.

How not to conduct theological dialogue (Dale)

Mar 222012
 

A poor exchange. Read it first – then my comments.

Where do I start?

  • The unitarian behaves poorly. Pretending to ask questions, he instead puts forward objections. This is disrespectful. And it makes the compliments at the start seem disingenuous, which is obnoxious.
  • But Bill serves it back, by sarcastically labeling the thing “Muslim objections…” Cute.
  • Are these objections “simple-minded”? No, not really. What they are, are objections to Jesus being the same self as, and so identical to God.  They are objections from the indiscernibility of identicals. And they do apply to one-self understandings of the Trinity.
  • But the unitarian, not having done his homework, lobs them at Craig, to whom they do not apply. ‘Cause Craig thinks that God Continue reading »

Craig, White, and Cerberus (Dale)

Mar 182012
 

First, I suggest we stick with “SER-ber-us” because pronouncing it “Ker-ber-us” fills some people’s  heads with images like these. And we can all agree, that is not a good thing. :-)

Last time, I mentioned Bill Craig’s recent public assertion of his Cerberus analogy for the Trinity. Here’s a remix by an Islamic apologist, with snickering commentary by Reformed Christian apologist James White.

I take it White is not a “social” theorist like Craig, but rather a negative mysterian (refusing to assign much intelligible content to the doctrine) – like those Dallas Theological Seminary folks. In that video linked above, he just asserts that Craig doesn’t know what he’s talking about.

This (that he’s a negative mysterian) in confirmed by this follow up video.  (Or at his blog.) In the name of just sticking with what the Bible says, he just Continue reading »

Worship and Revelation 4-5 – Part 9 – Song of the Lamb (Dale)

Mar 132012
 

When discussing Revelation 4-5 earlier in this series, I looked backwards and forwards through the book, to get a comprehensive view of this author’s theology and christology.

But I overlooked something, namely this interesting little tidbit, in another throne room scene, in an interlude between some smiting.

And I saw what appeared to be a sea of glass mingled with fire—and also those who had conquered the beast and its image and the number of its name, standing beside the sea of glass with harps of God in their hands. And they sing the song of Moses, the servant of God, and the song of the Lamb, saying “Great and amazing are your deeds, O Lord God the Almighty! Just and true are your ways, O King of the nations! Who will not fear, O Lord, and glorify your name? For you alone are holy. All nations will come and worship you, for your righteous acts have been revealed.” (Rev 15: 2-4, ESV, emphasis added)

Song of the Lamb? Why is that there? Continue reading »

Worship and Revelation 4-5 – Part 8 – Objection: I Will Not Give My Glory to Another (Dale)

Mar 122012
 


The extraordinary early American minister Noah Worcester (1758-1837) fought in Battle of Bunker Hill, made shoes, taught school, served in the New Hampshire legislature, campaigned unsuccessfully for pacifism, and in his spare time, wrote some really interesting philosophical theology. (In my lingo, he’s a subordinationist unitarian.)

Here are some of his thoughts on the subject of worshiping Jesus.

That the Son of God is to regarded as an object of DIVINE HONORS, is so plain from the Scriptures, that it seems extraordinary that it should even have been denied by any one who has admitted the Bible as a rule of faith and practice. …We have express declarations of the will of God. “The Father judgeth no man, but hath committed all judgment to the Son, that all men should HONOR the SON even as they honor the Father.” This is a sufficient warrant for men to give DIVINE HONORS to the SON of God. Angels have their warrant also; for “When he bringeth in his ONLY BEGOTTEN into the world, he saith, Let all the angels of God WORSHIP HIM.” (Noah Worcester, Bible News: Or, Sacred Truths Relating to the Living God, His Only Son, and Holy Spirit, p. 128, bold added)

I agree.

Worcester proceeds to carefully work through many arguments in this chapter with sure-footed common sense and deep familiarity with the Bible. I thought his answer to a common objection to worshiping the Son was especially interesting:

It may still be thought, that if the Son be not the self-existent God, but has been exalted by God as an object of Divine honors, then God has given his glory to another, contrary to his own word. …

[In reply,] Continue reading »

Reformed Christian Philosopher Converts to Hinduism (Dale)

Jan 252012
 

Given my scholarly interests in Hinduism, I had to post a link to this story about the conversion of a Reformed Christian philosopher to a form of Hinduism.

Pictured here are Krishna and his lover Radha. I take it that in Sudduth’s form of Hinduism Krishna is an avatar of Vishnu. Other Hindus consider Krishna to be the high god himself.

There is much art celebrating the love of these two.

The story for me was a bit spoiled when I watched a documentary in which a Hindu, Indian man explained that (at least on some versions) Radha is married to another, and is Krishna’s aunt. Perhaps some would object that I’m not looking at it metaphysically enough.

In another famous episode, Krishna charms a bunch of cow-herding ladies.

I’m curious to read more about Sudduth’s conversion. How does one get from Calvin’s all-determining triune deity to Vishnu? I wonder if it is by way of fairly mainstream trinitarian modalism…

Myself, as I read Sudduth’s interesting narrative of his conversion I’m not sure where, i.e. with what sort of Christianity, he was starting from. I too have taught the Gita in an academic setting, but I have not had experiences like this:

Around 4:20am (Friday morning) September 16th, I woke suddenly from a deep sleep to the sound of the name of “Krishna” being uttered in some way Continue reading »

two scholars on the concept of monotheism (Dale)

Nov 272011
 

At the blog The Time Has Been Shortened, interviews with Dr. Nathan MacDonald and Dr. Michael S. Heiser.

I read most of MacDonald’s Deuteronomy and the Meaning of ‘Monotheism’. I found it helpful, but had some fundamental disagreements with it. Those another time.

The two have very different views of the OT & the issue of monotheism. To oversimplfy, MacDonald thinks that for a long time, Jews were polytheistic, then they became monotheists of a sort and changed older polytheistic OT texts to fit their new views. In contrast, Heiser thinks that all along they believed YHWH to be unique, although many could be called “elohim.” This is a very interesting disagreement, but  I won’t join the fray here.

Just a couple of comments.

Yes, monotheism is the belief that there there exists exactly one god. This sounds silly to say, but this has been denied repeatedly as of late.

Contra MacDonald’s first answer in the interview, the only real unclarity in this is what counts as a god, i.e. the concept of godhood.

The important issue here is the idea of monotheism, not the word “monotheism.” Yes, it is a fairly recent term, but I would argue, a helpful one – at least, once we make clear what is meant by the term “god.”

Heiser says, 

I don’t care for the modern definition as someone who accepts the Judeo-Christian canon.

Eh… how would accepting the authority of the Bible tell you that “monotheism” is or is not a helpful term? Continue reading »

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