Kudos to theologian James Anderson (blog) for significant correspondence – he’s intellectually honest, smart, tough-minded, and humble – a pleasure to discuss things with. Thanks also to my colleagues for enduring multiple drafts and re-writes.

In this paper, my main task is evaluating the mysterianism of James’s book. My view may be more nuanced that some would guess, based on my earlier work. I concede that in principle it can be reasonable to believe an apparent contradiction. I’m not optimistic about the actual prospects of having such beliefs, though.

It seems that James and I mostly disagree about the Bible, not about epistemology – he strongly endorsing, and me eschewing apparently contradictory interpretations of it regarding God and Christ.

The paper, especially the first part, has a lot to do with this long series here at trinities, though it is more focused.

I hope it’ll be a book chapter some day.

Not having seen the book, I can’t be sure what is going on here. Here are some options:

1. The writer is terribly uninformed.
2. The writer is feigning ignorance in a misguided attempt to instill delight and wonder into science.
3. The writers is feigning ignorance in an attempt to multiply “mysteries”. If there are a lot of “mysteries” (realities we don’t understand) in nature, then any theological mysteries will be unproblematic. Call this “innocence by association” apologetics.
4. The writer is ham-handedly trying to make a (controversial) Kantian point about science – that it only reveals how things appear and not how they really are.

I’d like to believe that 1 is unlikely. It could be that all of 2-4 are going on here. Either way, this is clearly educational malpractice, especially the “All anyone knows is that…” part.

Anyone out there have the actual book?

Congratulations to both debaters on a fight well fought.

Kudos to C. Michael Patton and Parchment and Pen for hosting the debate.

I hope you readers out there enjoyed my commentary on the debate. I sometimes got naggy or nerdy, and always expressed myself with typical lack of tact, but I tried to be helpful, and to show the helpfulness of philosophy and logic in thinking through these things.

In this last post in the series, a few concluding reflections on the debate.

Looking back on this debate, I see that I’ve ended up where I began: wondering what Bowman thinks the Trinity doctrine is. This, after all the debate was about whether or not the Bible teaches that.

Burke argued that the Bible teaches what I call humanitarian unitarianism (he calls it “biblical unitarianism”) – roughly, that the one God of Israel is the Father, whereas the Lord Jesus is a human being and his unique Son, and the Holy Spirit is God’s power. I understand what Burke argued for, and if it is true, then nothing that can claim to be an orthodox Trinity theory is true. But I don’t, in the end, understand Bowman’s view.

I flagged this issue at the start. As the debate wore on, I settled on the interpretation that each of the Three just is (is numerically identical to) God, and yet each of the three is not identical to either of the other two. I stuck with this interpretation, all the way to the bitter end. And yet, I never did like this interpretation - Bowman is a smart guy, and it is not charitable to interpret anyone, much less smart guys, as (even implicitly) contradicting themselves. Still, it seemed to best fit his claims, his lists of propositions he offered as definitions of the doctrine, and his defense of the apparent contradictoriness of the doctrine in the comments following Burke’s last post.

Why, then, does Bowman think of the “persons” as three something-or-others in some sense “in” God? These “persons”, he insists, are not selves (thinking and acting things, things each with a first person perspective on the world), because they are not things/entities/substances, and every self is a certain kind of entity. Bowman wants to say that God isn’t in this sense a “person”, though God is “personal” in that God “contains” three “persons”. What is such a “person”? He doesn’t know. I don’t either.

I might have guessed that Bowman is, like some theologians, a modalist – holding the “persons” to be ways God is, lives, or acts. (This is common – in eschewing “modalism” most theologians mean only to deny that the persons never overlap in time, or that they are merely appearances.)

But this interpretation doesn’t make sense either. It seems Bowman considers God to be a self, and Jesus to be a self. And, Jesus and God are one and the same (numerically identical). Same what? Same god, same divine self. That’s the point of all the divine titles, deeds, honors, etc. – those can only belong to the one god, God. If they belong to Jesus (as Bowman urges) that’s because God is who Jesus is. And yet, surely he assumes that Jesus just is the Son of God. But the Son of God is one of the three “persons” in God, and so is not a self, not a thinking and acting thing. I don’t get it. I wish I did.

You can argue till you’re blue in the face that the Bible teaches X. But if I don’t grasp what you mean by X, I can never be persuaded by you. Burke argued that the Bible teaches Y, and it is clear enough that if Y then not-X, and Y consists of claims A, B, and C, each of which I understand. Still working on X, though. Thus, Burke wins the debate, in my view.

I understand this much about Bowman’s position – he’s defending evangelical talk about God and Jesus. And thinking (sometimes?) of Jesus as just being God himself. And he holds that only his view remains faithful to the Bible – to all of it, and that this is the only humble view, whereas others proudly and unjustifiably discard some of what the Bible says.

But is it humble to rest in an apparently contradictory interpretation of the various texts? This comment by Bowman was telling:

As a debater, I could be pleased by the approach that you took to this debate, since in terms of the debate your approach has played into my hands. …Consistent with anti-Trinitarianism in all of its forms, over a third of your closing statement focuses on what you correctly describe as “the argument from reason.” In addition, four of the ten bulleted points articulating the superiority of Unitarianism to Trinitarianism with which you begin your closing statement are rooted in this argument from reason. Yet the debate is supposed to focus on which of our positions best reflects the teachings of the Bible.

Bowman thought that Burke had wasted much of his closing statement on concerns about what is consistent, as if this were irrelevant to interpreting the Bible. But normally, for all of us, Bowman included, that an interpretation is apparently contradictory is a weighty reason to avoid it. Why, then, accept it here? I think a factor in many people’s thinking is the idea that what Bowman was urging is the majority report of Christianity through the ages. There’s a kind of complacency that comes from being in the mainstream… or at least thinking you’re in the mainstream.

But the evangelical habit of putting things in terms of who “is God” is inherently unclear (because, oddly enough, of that innocent looking little word “is”) and does no justice to the rich history of debate on the status and relations between especially the Father and the Son of God. As we saw in round 5, 2nd & 3rd century guys thought Jesus was “divine” or shared the divine substance, but clearly distinguished between him and God, holding him to be lesser than God in several ways (power, glory, authority, time of existence, even goodness). Again, in the 4th c., as my co-blogger J.T. Paasch so clearly lays out, they didn’t identify Jesus and God. (See e.g. his concluding post.) True, evangelical spirituality involves thinking of Jesus as God, and evangelical apologists like Bowman speak out for “historic Christian orthodoxy”, but the realities of the catholic tradition are what they are, immovably laid down in black and white, and they refute the idea that the Bible clearly teaches that Jesus is numerically identical to God. But we should already have known that – some things are true of one, that are not true of the other!

Some people  have wondered what my view of all this is. Some point later this summer, I’m intending to do a series about the evolution of my views on the Trinity, so stay tuned if you’re curious.

But on one level, my view is that both Bowman and Burke believe in God, and endeavor to follow God’s Son, in all aspects of their lives, in community with other disciples. I assume then, that both are children of God, reborn, destined for eternal life with God and his people. Yes, they have conflicting theories about God and his Son and Spirit/spirit, and they interpret the Bible somewhat differently. I assume that God doesn’t view either as an idolater or unbeliever, and that he looks at each a good bit less harshly than each (sometimes) looks at the other. Someday, over a nice beer ale, we’ll be able to sit in a pub somewhere with Jesus at the table, and he can enlighten either Bowman or Burke (or both – their positions are contrary, not contradictory – both can’t be true, but logically, both could be false) about where they went wrong. At least one will be profoundly embarrassed, probably shed a tear, but Jesus will be gentle, and if there is a “winner” he won’t rub it in, and in ten or maybe ten thousand years perhaps it’ll largely be forgotten.

Don’t get me wrong – I’m not saying that both views are true (that’d be too much paradox for any of us), or that they are equally reasonable, or that this debate doesn’t matter, or that one’s views on the Trinity have no important practical consequences. I firmly deny all these things.

What I’m saying is that this is an argument between siblings, and so is not like the showdown between Elijah and the prophets of Baal. Our older brother, then, is at bottom a friend of both sides, and we should gladly follow him in this, whatever our theories may be. The contempt that so easily slips in – we should let it go. Argue on, brothers.

First, he tweaks his formula (here’s the previous version):

The doctrine of the Trinity is biblical if and only if all of the following propositions are biblical teachings:

1. One eternal uncreated being, the LORD God, alone created all things.
2. The Father is the LORD God.
3. The Son, who became the man Jesus Christ, is the LORD God.
4. The Holy Spirit is the LORD God.
5. The Father and the Son stand in personal relation with each other.
6. The Father and the Holy Spirit stand in personal relation with each other.
7. The Son and the Holy Spirit stand in personal relation with each other.

The only theological position that affirms all seven of the above propositions is the Trinity. However, each of these propositions finds affirmation in at least one or more non-Trinitarian doctrines.

I think the changes are verbal, not substantial. But he’s doing a couple of things here. First, he wants to show that he’s not presupposing any Trinity doctrine, but just inferring it from what the Bible clearly teaches. Thus, he makes the point that each of 1-7 is affirmed by at least one non-trinitarian theory. Second, he wants to show that his theory is most faithful to the Bible, of the available theories.

When I first saw this, I thought he was re-formulating to get around the problem that this theory is apparently contradictory. But I don’t think this is his aim, as at best, the contradiction is slightly papered over. If 5-7 are true, then f, s, and h must each be selves (capable of being in personal relations) and since by “personal relation” we assume Bowman means friendship with another (not with oneself), then f, s, and h must be three – none can be numerically identical to either of the others. And yet, 2-4 seem to say that each is numerically identical to one thing, the self who created (1). And things identical to the same thing, are identical to each other – ’cause they’re just one thing, after all. So, each of the three is and isn’t God; in my view, the battleship remains sunk.

BUT, to his credit Bowman puts up a manly and forthright defense of positive mysterianism (comment #3 here). He smacks down a misinterpretation of John 4:22, and makes the excellent point that it is irrational to dismiss a theory at the first sight of an apparent contradiction. One must be patient enough to work through things – oftentimes those contradictions turn out to be merely apparent.

Mind you, I don’t agree with positive mysterianism, and I’ve explained in gruesome detail what I think is wrong with it. Moreover, I think Bowman is mistaken in saying that catholic Christians have always held paradoxical views about God (e.g. in the NT “mysteries” have nothing to do with apparent contradictions), and he doesn’t seem to recognize the crucial difference between a belief which merely strikes one as implausible, and one which appears to be contradictory. Moreover, he attacks a straw men (that believable theological claims must be proven consistent, and that to believe that something is so one must understand how it is so). But he here expresses a view popular with a good many Christians, and with evangelicals in particular. And IF this defense is reasonable, then it is not enough to merely point out the apparent inconsistency of Bowman’s views. Point, Bowman.

In the rest of his closing statement, Bowman

• Gives a pretty fair summary of Burke’s biblical points.
• Insists that he’s shown his interpretations of the passages to be better, including some surprising ones, e.g. 1 Cor 8:6, which he reads to assert Jesus and the Father to be one self.
• Denounces as “slanderously false” Burke’s claim that trinitarianism somehow compromises the genuine humanity of Jesus. Although I think Bowman lost the debate about temptability, I think not enough in this debate has been said about the consistency or inconsistency of incarnation theories. Burke would need to show that on Bowman’s view of the incarnation (whatever that is), Jesus can’t be a man, or the right sort of man. Bowman points out in a comment (#7) that Burke hasn’t done enough to definitively show this.
• Objects to Burke’s claim that Jesus is the “literal” Son of God.
• Asserts that he creamed Burke re: Philippians 2.
• Ditto on John 1. I agree that Bowman points out some apparent inconsistencies in Burke’s position, but he seems blind to the difficulties of his own reading. (To wit: Isn’t Pr. 8 the background here, as well as some statements in the apocrypha about the non-literal incarnation God’s law? And what would it mean to say that the logos both is God and is with God? Burke has a natural answer here – Pr. 8:27, 30 And strangely, Bowman’s reading has “God” being applied, confusingly, in short order to the Father (“with God”) and to the Son (“was God”) and then quickly (v.2) back to the Father.)
• And the NT obviously teaches Christ’s existence before his conception. Plus, Bowman accuses Burke of quoting out of context “Mowinckel, who “shows that the Jewish ‘Son of Man’ was really (not ideally) pre-existent.” It seems that Dave was mistaken about Mowinckel’s overall position; but this sort of “gotcha” doesn’t advance the discussion, in my view, though it may delight partisans. On a close look, though, Burke didn’t say or imply that Mowinckel agreed with his overall view. It’s fair to point this out, but Burke has no obligation whatever to draw attention to the fact.
• Finally, Christ in various places receives “divine honors” and “divine names” – and not just in any old way, but in “religious contexts” (whatever those are!) which show that the disciples etc. took Jesus to be God himself. Religion scholar James McGrath shows up in the comments are pertinently asks what “religious” worship consists in, and what Bowman makes of an interesting OT text. (Comments 1, 10, 19, 67, 69)
• In a long, labored comment (#4) Bowman accuses Burke of deliberately distorting the “Athanasian” creed, when Burke says that it does and doesn’t teach three Lords. Bowman confidently pounces because the creed explicitly denies there are three Lords. Well, sure. But Burke wasn’t saying that the creed has an explicit contradiction (asserting “P” and asserting “not-P”) but rather that it is implicitly contradictory – explicitly saying there aren’t three, and yet implying that there are. I got Burke’s point. (More here.) Bowman should be slower to accuse his opponent of bad faith. Clear implicit contradictions are just as obviously false as explicit ones. Bowman also objects that Burke is begging the question, but Burke is only assuming self-evident truths, which one may reasonably assume in any context. Bowman needs to state and defend his controversial assumption of relative identity relations. Point Burke.
• In the rest of that long comment, Bowman tries to deduce the Trinity doctrine (understood paradoxically as above) from the Bible without using the word “person”. He asserts that the concept of a person is just the concept of “someone other than” one or more selves. (That can’t be right – the notion a solitary person/self isn’t contradictory.) In any case, as he reformulates “the” doctrine, he comes up with “There is one God, i.e. one divine Being, existing in three Persons… But now I notice that the word “Person” in the above statement cannot be identical in meaning to the word “Being” without resulting in a contradiction. Thus…” (he none too clearly asserts that in this context two things can be different “persons” but the same being). But why the sudden dislike for apparent contradictions? Embrace the mystery, my friend – don’t go rationalist on us at this late date.
• The comments on Bowman’s post are cantankerous and interesting. Bizarrely, at one point (#65) a Bowman partisan assures him that he should quit, that further discussion would be a waste of time (too many unitarians involved!) To his credit, Bowman discusses historical matters (#14-15, 63) and the objection about why the NT weren’t more up front with their views on the Trinity (#66 – to me, his answer is unsatisfying ). Points to Bowman for patient and thorough follow-through.

On the negative side, here’s Bowman’s final reply to McGrath re: worshiping Jesus as an agent of God:

…I agree that in a limited sense, the Israelite king (David or Solomon especially) functioned as God’s “agent” in that they ruled Israel on his behalf. I even agree that this motif establishes some precedent for the NT teaching that Christ rules from God’s throne. In the NT, however, what was a very limited, circumscribed agency with regard to the Israelite king is expanded to include Jesus Christ in the very identity of God.

In the last sentence Bowman repeats a confused trope from contemporary theology. But that’s not essential to his case; if Jesus just is (is numerically identical to) God, then we don’t need any talk of his being “in God’s identity”, whatever that might mean.

Though not every punch lands, Bowman fights hard and on many fronts in this round, and I’m awarding the round to him.

Score through all six rounds:

Bowman: 1
Burke: 3
draw: 2

Next time: some concluding reflections on the debate.

From reason: The Trinity doctrine, argues Burke, is inconsistent with itself. The “Athanasian” creed presents us with three, each of whom is a Lord, and yet insists that there is only one Lord. As some philosophers have pointed out, it is self-evident that if every F is a G, then there can’t be fewer Gs than Fs. So if every divine person is a god, then there can’t be fewer gods than divine persons. (Burke leaves out this: Why say that this creed presents us with three? Because each one differs from the others, having at least one feature the others lack.)

Since the Trinitarian Jesus is believed to be God, everything in Scripture which applies to God must necessarily apply to him.

Right. If the “two” are really one and the same, whatever is true of one must be true of “the other”. That is, nothing can differ from itself at any given time. Bowman does seem to identify Jesus and God, even while he thinks some things are true of one but not of the other. Point, Burke.

But note that many trinitarians to not identify Jesus and God. Almost no evangelical philosophers do, for instance, and arguably none to almost none of the ancient catholics do. Sharing a nature with isn’t the same as being numerically the same as, nor does the first obviously imply the second (unless the “nature” is a haecceity).

Unfortunately, this section features repeated distractions concerning words. Burke complains that “Trinitarianism requires unique definitions of words.” So what. Theories often require us to coin new definitions. Similarly, Burke demands evidence from the Bible that the word “person” should be used as trinitarians  use it. But the Bible doesn’t have rules about word definitions – at least not this one! Burke is trying to press the point that trinitarianism makes arbitrary and maybe inconsistent claims, and ones which ill fit the Bible, but these are not the ways to press points like that.

A more substantial point:

[Bowman] accepts the Trinity as “three persons”, when it suits him, but at other times he wants to count the three persons as one (ie. one Yahweh, or one Lord). He does this by effectively treating the three separate persons as a single unipersonal being, which is logically inconsistent…

I agree – it seems to me that like the rest of us, Bowman normally thinks of God as a magnificent self. But he doesn’t want four divine persons, so he sometimes thinks of God as… well, not a self, but some sort of thing which in some sense has three divine selves within it. But, Bowman finally addresses this in a comment in this last round… stay tuned.

From scripture: Mostly, Burke gives a good recap of his overall scriptural case. At one point, I think he goes too far:

Jesus and his apostles were adamant that everything people needed to know about him could be sourced directly from the OT. There was no “progressive revelation” about the Messiah; there was no new doctrine concerning his nature and identity; there was no change from OT to NT. (emphasis added)

I don’t think this is true. An important counterexample is Christ’s second coming, or the distinction between the first and second comings. I think it is a mistake to be hostile to any doctrine of progressive revelation. Why can’t something which is obscure later be made clear? e.g. what happens after death, how many times the messiah will come, how God will bring in people from all nations to his family. I think Burke rejects progressive revelation because he thinks it requires the later revelation to contradict the earlier. But the later might instead be correcting not what the earlier says or implies, but rather mistaken conclusions people are liable to draw from what it says and implies. e.g. that when one is all the way dead, one has ceased to exist

He effectively presses his point about Acts, which arguably conspicuously lacks any teaching of the “fully divinity” of Jesus or of any tripersonal God.

But where is the uproar [in Acts] against the notion of a Messiah who is also a God-man? Where is the backlash against a triune God? There is no such uproar; there is no such backlash; there is no outcry against Trinitarian concepts. On the Trinity and the deity of Christ, the preaching record and the Jewish response are both silent. In light of the Jews’ response to the Gospel message, this is inexplicable unless proto-Trinitarian doctrines were not preached at all. And if they were not preached, why weren’t they preached?

Irritatingly, this section has some scattershot charges – that trinitarians commit a lot of fallacies, that their readings of the Bible are convoluted, that their readings are marred by their love for their theory, which they always presuppose. This is just a fancy way of saying “look how ridiculous they are” – and it is about as effective as that charge. Best to stay on the subject at hand – the substance of Bowman’s case, not the alleged shortcomings of trinitarians in general.

In reiterating his case, I a few times noticed that he overstates it. Thus,

We saw that throughout the OT, God’s Holy Spirit is described as something that belongs to Him, like a property or a power. We saw that the NT follows this model exactly, without deviating in any way from OT teaching. There is no new revelation about the identity of the Holy Spirit.

This point can be argued, but it is too much to say that the “NT follows this model [of the Holy Spirit as an attribute] exactly”.

Then Peter said, “Ananias, how is it that Satan has so filled your heart that you have lied to the Holy Spirit and have kept for yourself some of the money you received for the land? Didn’t it belong to you before it was sold? And after it was sold, wasn’t the money at your disposal? What made you think of doing such a thing? You have not lied to men but to God.” (Acts 5:3-4, NIV, emphases added)

As I explained before, this usage of “the Holy Spirit” (as a singular referring term, referring to the Father) needn’t bother a unitarian. Overstating the case makes it easy for one’s opponent to reject it out of hand.

Moving on, Burke asks some pertinent questions:

Why did God allow His chosen people to believe He is only one divine person instead of three, right up until the Christian era? Why did He conceal His triune identity? What was the rationale behind this divine deception? When and where was the new revelation first made clear? Rob claims it is “implicit”, but why only “implicit”? All the other key apostolic doctrines are explicitly preached. How can divinely inspired church leaders fail to provide an explicit teaching of the triune God if that is what they genuinely believe? Jesus told his disciples that the Holy Spirit would lead them into all truth (John 16:13); why didn’t it lead them to Trinitarianism?

I believe that Bowman stonewalls on all these through the whole debate. (Have I missed any answers?) I assume his view is just that we can’t understand God’s ways. But if so, better he should say and defend that answer. He loses points by refusing to answer. The audience he’s used to may not think much of them, but this is a more mixed audience.

On to history: Burke argues that the earliest material is “biblical unitarian”, while much (most) 1st century catholic theologians are subordinationist unitarians. He holds that:

Historically, doctrine always develops from the minimal to the complex, evolving as it is exposed to new influences and adapting in response to perceived heresies. Thus, the simplest doctrinal statements are more likely to be the earliest and most authentic. It is therefore significant that the earliest Christian creedal statements are Unitarian.

Is trinitarian theology, or subordinationist unitarianism more complex than humanitarian unitarianism? Maybe (it may depend on which Trinity theory we have in mind – some professed trinitarians simply hold that there’s one god with three ways of living, and that at least as simple as biblical unitarianism, isn’t it?). Are the early statements unitarian? One might not want to say they are explicitly so – as they are not written in reaction to any Trinity theory – but rather that they are compatible with, and a good fit with unitarianism, as they seem to assume that God and the Father are numerically the same. But if Bowman is right, we would not expect them to be this way.

In his summation, Burke urges us to lay aside the docetic thinking which dogs trinitarianism and embrace a Jesus who really shared our lot. Further,

…Christianity began as a Jewish religion. …Biblical Unitarianism calls for a return to those Jewish roots. I urge you to rediscover Israel’s God; the God Whom Jesus himself worshipped; the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob — not the God of Justin Martyr, Arius, or Basil the Great.

Some will wonder what is so important about “getting back to our Jewish roots”? I mean, Judaism is a different religion, is it not?

More importantly, don’t these last three (or at least the last two – see below) also worship the god of Abe and Jesus? I think Burke oversells his theory, suggesting that unless you buy this, you may be worshiping another god. How likely is this, I wonder, for current day Christians?

Suppose I have a friend who thinks I (1) have huge muscles, (2) speak Chinese in addition to English, (3) love the New England Patriots, and (4) am half space alien. (He’s kind of a weird guy.) This friend is mistaken on all four counts – but he’s still my friend. These false beliefs about me may throw up somewhat of a barrier to our friendship, in certain situations. I’ll wish that he was better informed, but I’m not going to reject him for his false beliefs about me, even if he’s culpable for them. There are limits to this – it’s hard to see how I could be friends with someone who thought I was a wallaby, a donut, or a pair of socks.

Justin Martyr and Arius think, like Burke, that the one true god is the Father. So… they believed in Israel’s God, no? Even if they think he created the world by means of a newly formed, divine helper or two. (Basil is another case… if  I understand him, he identifies God with an ineffable, simple divine nature.)

Again, consider Bowman, if Burke is right. Bowman worships the Father, considering him to be the one true god. That he, if Burke is right, is confused about Jesus and the Holy Spirit, doesn’t take this fact away. Doesn’t Bowman love the things God loves, in particular, Jesus? Are Bowman’s beliefs inconsistent? If so, this isn’t a good thing, but it won’t prevent his worshiping God and serving him.

In sum, Burke recaps what has been a pretty strong case. But he makes some points which, though they delight the choir (other unitarians), either beg the question (assume what needs proving), or are not very relevant when debating a non-unitarian. These too aggressive reaches are a debating mistake; one thinks one is going in for the kill, but in reality, hostile and some neutral listeners tune out.

Next time: Bowman’s closing statement.

First, he reiterates that the Bible doesn’t explicitly talk of any triple-personed god, but instead calls the God of the Jews the Father. His Son is Jesus, and they stand in a hierarchy as two persons – the Son “under” the Father – over the realm of angels. He says that “Scripture never includes the Holy Spirit in this hierarchy”, but this begs the question – Bowman’s fifth round focused on passages which he thinks puts the Spirit at the top of the hierarchy alongside Father and Son. Again, I complain about the format of the debate, which forces the debaters to talk past one another.

Second, he cites numerous passages to show that his unitarian take on the Trinity is consonant with apostolic teaching – with their language but also with their concepts, to throw the burden on the trinitarian. About the triadic passages Bowman focuses on, he says only this: “all three were recognised as sources of apostolic authority… It is therefore natural that they appear together in ways which reflect this relationship…” Sources? Like, authorities (selves possessing authority)? I think this needs more spelling out, to make it clearly consistent with Burke’s other views, and to show that it is well-motivated. I read something interesting on this recently.

Can of worms #1: early catholic theology. The most famous of 2nd c. catholic theologians were subordinationists – they held that Jesus was “generated” by the Father through a mysterious act of will prior to the creation of the cosmos. Although they thought of this as the expression of God’s internal and eternal “word” or thought, this is incompatible with later orthodoxy, because the Son isn’t eternal, and is arguably not “fully divine” – as he exists because of something else – God. At times, they even call the Son “a second god”. Burke observes:

None of these early church fathers were Biblical Unitarians – but they weren’t Trinitarians either… even as late as the 4th c…. Christians were hopelessly confused… [even then] the Trinity was still not a fully established doctrine. …Rob is vague about the point at which he believes the church embraced true Trinitarianism, but I receive a general sense that he perceives an implicit Trinitarian Christology within the NT which quickly gave rise to fully-fledged Trinitarianism. …But the history of Trinitarianism… reveals an excruciating mess of debate, controversy, and confusion… How can Trinitarianism be the doctrine once preached by the apostles…? …It is contrary to reason, antagonistic to Scripture, and undermined by the record of history.

So Burke’s point is that trinitarianism can’t have been part of the apostolic message. How does Bowman respond to this blast? Tune in next time, in which I discuss his long response in a comment, and bring up some other relevant historical information.

Can of worms #2: Could a fully divine Jesus have been tempted? A fully divine being can’t sin. Bowman holds that Jesus is and has always been fully divine. So, there can never have been any possibility of Jesus sinning. But, counters Burke, the Bible says outright that he was tempted. And a being which can’t sin, can’t really be tempted. Saith Burke: “the statement ‘Jesus could be tempted but was not capable of sin’ is both self-refuting and utterly meaningless.” (BTW – he should stick with the first – that statement is not meaningless - apparently contradictory statements have meaning, which is how we can tell they are contradictory.) Moreover, the NT says that he could be tempted and could have sinned.

Bowman fires back in a lengthy comment, #18. He says some interesting things regarding this issue, but the gist is that Burke “confuses capability with moral capacity”. Jesus was capable or sinning, but never had any moral capacity to sin. Bowman here makes a move here akin to what compatibilists about human freedom say – that a choice being free doesn’t require ever having had an unconditional ability to choose otherwise, but only conditional abilities – one would have chosen otherwise had various other factors been otherwise. (Factors over which one never had any control!) This is worrisome – in my view compatibilism (about determinism and human freedom) has been refuted by van Inwagen’s famous “consequence argument”. Many philosophers would agree with me, although philosophers are heavily divided on this.

Suppose that tomorrow, a voice boomed from the heavens, “No more dynamite explosions!” And lo and behold, all dynamite in the world was, by the hand of God, rendered inert – incapable of exploding. Either God has changed the laws of nature, or he’s just determined to constantly intervene. For the time being, your dynamite collection is ruined. No more redneck fishing for you and your buddies.

But on a street corner, you’re seduced by the promise of a black market explosives dealer – “I promise, son, that I’ve got some explodable dynamite here.” You examine it – it really is dynamite, and purchase some. You find that it won’t explode. But the salesman says “I meant it had the capability of exploding – not the actual capacity of exploding. It has what it takes to explode were God to rescind his decision to disallow dynamite explosions.” You feel that you’ve been deceived, and you and your redneck buddies proceed to kick the salesman’s derrière - but the fact is, what he said was consistent. By “explodable” he meant only that in some possible, non-actual situations, this stuff gets set off – never mind that those situations are ones inaccessible to us (unless we change God’s mind).

Contrast this, though, with what Bowman is saying. Jesus is God. Are there any possible situations in which God sins? No. So, Jesus sinning is no more possible than it being true that 2 + 2 = 5 – Jesus exists no matter what, and is essentially perfect in every way. Bowman says

Jesus had the capability, physically speaking, of committing sins (e.g., he had a mouth and knew enough to lie; he had hands and was physically capable of stealing)…

But none of those, or even all put together are sufficient to make Jesus able to sin. That he has capacities which other beings might be able to sin with is irrelevant. God has these, but we (most of us) say that God can’t sin. (e.g. smiting power, which God shares with murderers) To say that a person can do X only if some contradiction is true (or if some absolutely impossible situation is actual) is just a way of saying that it is absolutely impossible for that person to do X. Bowman holds that Jesus can sin. But supposing Jesus to sin is, in his view, to suppose that a being which is essentially impeccable sins – which is a contradiction. Could, say, a ping-pong ball sin? By this sort of reasoning, sure! I has no actual capacity of sinning, but if it were a self with moral knowledge (which I take it is not possible for this little plastic globe) then it could. Could a potato perform a waltz? Sure – if it here a living human being. (But wait – that’s not possible…)

In short, Bowman is urging that we believe in abilities or powers or capacities which in principle can’t be exercised or realized – in philosophical lingo, such that in no possible world does the being in question actualize it. This, however, is absurd – the notion of an absolutely (or in principle) unrealizable potentiality. Such a thing isn’t a potentiality at all – we’re being urged to believe in a sort of property or characteristic – one which is and isn’t a potential for being a certain way. Let’s not dignify this with the title “paradox”; it is but a lowly contradiction, and one that in any other application we would all dismiss out of hand. Also, notice that this point has nothing to do particularly with theology. It is a serious cost if a theology needs such a questionable claim.

Bowman here urges a false dilemma – either his view of Christ is true, or (if Burke is right) Jesus might have at any moment sinned, thus imperiling God’s whole plan. But this is a mistake. Being able to sin at some time or other isn’t the same as being able to easily sin at any moment. Thus, nothing about Burke’s view commits him to a shaky, easy-to-fall-away Jesus. Nor is it obvious that Jesus or God would have to be 100% certain that Jesus would never sin – it depends on one’s theory of divine providence. Molinists and others would urge that they could be certain of that, even if Jesus was free to sin.

In his comment, Bowman helpfully formalizes the argument:

The anti-Trinitarian argument, superficially, looks unassailable:

P1. God cannot be tempted.
P2. Christ was tempted.
C. Therefore, Christ was not God.

Bowman argues that “being tempted” is equivocal. If it mains actually giving in to a temptation, that P1 is true but P2 is false. But if it means a certain feeling or quality of experience, then P2 is true but (I take it) P1 is false – God can experience that feeling. He urges that James 1:13 can be reading as having to do with giving into temptation.

Be that as it may, what if “tempting” is putting one into a situation in which one has the ability, in that situation, to as it were say yes to a desire to do something wrong? In that sense, Bowman must say that P2 is false. Problem is, this is the sense most readers are going to see in the texts talking of Christ being tempted. I suspect that his merely experiential sense of “being tempted” has been concocted to save his theology – can he point to any case in the Bible or anywhere in the ancient world where “being tempted” is merely experiential (i.e. it merely describes a certain felt quality of experience), and doesn’t imply some actual capacity for and actual pull towards sin?

Finally, Bowman probably holds, like I think most evangelicals, that after our glorification – after you and me are resurrected, and living in the presence of God in the new heavens and the new earth –  we won’t be able to sin. But if he grants this, he grants that a normal human may, by the action of God, be rendered incapable of sinning. So even if he’s right that Jesus was incapable of sinning, that doesn’t show or suggest that he was divine. Moreover, if he grants this, he can’t complain about the alleged weirdness or obscurity of Burke’s claim that Jesus was made able to completely avoid sin by the Holy Spirit. So, does he grant this – that a human may be rendered impeccable?

Next time: history.

To do this, he considers a dozen triadic passages, in which the Three are all mentioned together in quick succession. Last time, I mulled over his treatment of the “Great Commission”  passage. This time, a few others, and I take a crack at another explanation of this triadic language.

First, as I look at Bowman’s interpretations, some of them strongly suggest that he thinks that asserting the divinity of each just is asserting each to be numerically identical to God. I looked into this more last time, but briefly, this won’t fly, as it’ll make the persons identical to one another. So it is not clear, even if his expositions are right, that really support an orthodox Trinity theory.

Second, I reiterate that Bowman does a good job here, assembling a dozen important passages, in which it is impossible to ignore the triadic language. Suppose the doctrine of the Trinity is just this vague claim: “there are three co-equal persons in God”. If that is true, that would explain why these three are often mentioned together, in a way which can suggest they are on an equal footing. I said last time that any unitarian is obligated to explain these triadic statements in a way which is both compatible with unitarianism, and which is independently motivated (in can’t be that the only appeal of the reading is that it saves one’s theology).

Here’s Bowman’s treatment of one such text:

1 Corinthians 12:4-6

“Now there are varieties of gifts, but the same Spirit.
And there are varieties of ministries, and the same Lord.
There are varieties of activities, but the same God who works all things in all.”

The deliberate parallelism of these three lines practically speaks for itself. If a Jew unfamiliar with Christianity read these lines alone, he would certainly understand “the same Spirit,” “the same Lord,” and “the same God” to be three synonymous expressions for the same Creator. We know from the immediate context that the one whom Paul identifies here as “the same Lord” is Jesus (v. 3). Paul clearly attributes personhood to the Spirit, whose work of gifting believers Paul details in verses 7-10, concluding in verse 11, “But one and the same Spirit works all these things [panta tauta energei], distributing to each one individually just as he wills.” Paul here in verse 11 uses the same language for the Spirit’s working that he used in verse 6 for God’s working (“who works all things in all,” ho energ?n ta panta en pasin). Thus, Paul can speak interchangeably about what the Spirit, the Lord, and God do in relation to spiritual gifts, while still distinguishing the three from one another. We have here at the very least an implicit Trinitarianism.

Bowman is too confident here, in my view. He’s saying that a first century Jew would certainly read those three terms as co-referring. But if a first century Jew would assume some things true of one which are not true of the others, this isn’t so. “The Lord” here is Jesus – a man. And a Jew of that (or any) era would assume that neither God nor the Spirit of God are men. About the personhood of the Spirit – looking at v. 6 along with v. 11 suggests that the “Spirit” which distributes gifts at will just is God. But as I explained before, a unitarian can concede this (which is consistent with holding the Spirit-talk is sometimes about an aspect of God or action of God), and moreover, identifying the Spirit with God isn’t going to help the trinitarian get his three persons within God.

Still, what might a unitarian say about passages like these?

We can get a clue by looking at another passage: Ephesians 4:1-16 (read the whole thing). What is going on here? Paul is forcefully arguing for Christian unity. We know from the whole NT that there were considerable factionalizing forces the apostles fought against. Misguided loyalty to one apostle over others, Judaizers, teachers with “secret knowledge” foisting a holier-than-thou attitude towards those without knowledge, renegade prophets, big personalities. Here’s the crucial bit: “…There is one body and one Spirit—just as you were called to the one hope that belongs to your call—  one Lord, one faith, one baptism,  one God and Father of all, who is over all and through all and in all.” As Bowman notes, here is a seven-fold formula, in opposition to the more common threefold one.

So, here’s an alternate explanation which unitarians can offer – actually, any Bible reader can accept it, irrespective of their views on the Trinity: the threefold formulas are a shorthand, something like a slogan – one God, one Lord, one Spirit – asserting the unified nature of all Christian assemblies, or all Christians – they all worship one God, have been saved by one Savior, and sealed, empowered, etc. by one Spirit. They’ve got one hope, one baptism, and so on – they all stand on one footing as a new people, with Christ as their head. One could say it is a standard, short (but expandable) list of fundamental church-unifying factors. It doesn’t imply that the named factors are literally divine, or that the are the same in some metaphysical sense (i.e. equally divine). These statements are compatible with those claims, but don’t imply them. And if my reading is on track, one should not infer the “full divinity” of the listed factors, or their being in some sense “within” God or the divine nature.

But why focus on those three? “One God” unites Christians in excluding polytheists, or even monotheists who don’t worship the God of the Jews. “One Lord” unities Christians as standing behind one man, having one immediate boss (“Lord”) – Jesus – and so not divided among this or that teacher, prophet, apostle, etc. “One Spirit” – unites Christians as against those influenced by the spirits which in the apostolic view inspire, control, and oppress the non-Christian world. And it also prevents the elevation of one gift  over another – it’s all from one Spirit (or one spirit) – God (or God’s).

Mentioning these three, in that order, sort of re-iterates the story of the gospels and Acts. It is one God at work, first by sending his Son, then (after his Son’s resurrection and ascension) by sending his Spirit. So this triadic language is a way of encapsulating, as it were, this whole story of God’ work in these last days.

Will this explanation fly? Is this compatible with unitarianism? Yes. (And really, with any views on the Trinity.) Is it arbitrary? No – it seems well-motivated. Not every such passage is one where Christian unity is at the forefront, but Paul is much-concerned with Christian unity, and he needn’t be read as dropping hints that only a good bit later would be taken as implicit creedal trinitarianism. This unity doctrine, expressed by a triple slogan, seems to a common thread in all known apostolic teaching. Moreover, this explanation keeps us within a mid-1st c. thought world, in which (arguably) theories of divine triunity are as yet unknown, and in which the one God of Israel just is the Father of Jesus – not a complex of the Father and two others. This is an important virtue – letting the texts speak on their own terms, and not anachronistically reading our concerns back into them. Moreover, the explanation is charitable to the NT authors, and is simple.

It bears repeating that one can accept this explanation and be a trinitarian. One must just concede that these triadic formulas don’t imply your version of the Trinity doctrine. They might still be part of a broader set of data which you think your Trinity theory best explains.

Back to scoring: Bowman needs to show that his explanation of these triadic passages is the best. He hasn’t tackled one like that sketched above. And his own explanation at best seems to require a troublingly vague formulation of “the” Trinity doctrine. And at worst, his explanation implies that anything like a mainstream current Trinity doctrine is false, as it simply identifies all the persons and God, and doesn’t show how the former in some sense compose the latter. Still, he gains some points simply by facing an important sort of objection, and for forcefully presenting important phenomena which demand explanation, and for which he arguably has one. How will Burke’s round 5 compare?

[Burke:] “This week I hope Rob will show Biblical evidence for the essential relationship formulae of Trinitarianism:
1. Father = ‘God’, Son = ‘God’ and Holy Spirit = ‘God’
2. ‘God’ = Father + Son + Holy Spirit  . . .

[Bowman] I have already responded to this argument of yours. Your demand that I must prove these two statements “independent of each other” is an absurd demand calculated to place an unreasonable burden on me that you know cannot be met.

As you know, Dave, if statement #1 is true, and if there is only one God (one single eternal divine being), then statement #2 follows. However, you and I already agree that there is only one eternal divine being. Therefore, I do not need to argue for this premise of the doctrine of the Trinity.

Gentlemen, forgive me, but this is confused. We must clarify the meaning of “=” here. I believe that Bowman means  numerical identity in 1. (I’m not sure – I think  his position forces him to be unclear about this – but let that pass.) Let us, then, add the extra premise Bowman mentions (as being held in common). We then get this:

f=g & s=g & h=g

(x)(y) (Dx -> (Dy -> x=y))   [For any x and any y, x is divine only if, if y is divine, then it just is x.]

The first premise is trouble, because it implies f=s=h.

But what to make of “‘God’ = Father + Son + Holy Spirit”. What does the “+” signify? One may (and some will) think of it as the combination of parts, or some kind of conjunction of different things. But this would shift the meaning of “=”. Numerical identity is a one-to-one (actually, always a reflexive) relation – never one-to-many. So if the right hand side is read to mean some kind of conjunction, addition, or combination, then the “=” cannot mean identity. It might mean something like “consists of”, “is a whole constituted by”, or something like that. But whatever it means, it does not logically follow from 1 & 2.

But this interpretation makes 2 irrelevant to 1. It may be that Bowman is thinking this:

Df & Ds & Dh    [Father is divine and Son is divine and Spirit is divine. (This "is" of predication, not the "is" of identity.)]

(x)(y) (Dx -> (Dy -> x=y))

From these, there is no reason to think any interpretation of “g = f+s+h” follows. (First we’d have to clarify the meaning of this latter claim, and then we’d have to add one or more premises, until we had a valid and sound argument.)

But this follows: f =s=h. As Homer Simpson would say: D’oh! Homework for interested readers. Why exactly is this something Bowman can’t accept? (There is more than one reason, I think.) Comment at will.

Bowman then retreats to familiar ground:

What you are really trying to do here is to claim that unless I can show some Bible verses in which the word “God” specifically refers to the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit together, my case for the doctrine of the Trinity fails.

But that is a red herring. All we need is a seemingly sound argument, for a conclusion with which Bowman agrees, and which is arguably trinitarian! Instead Bowman brings back his apparently inconsistent set of five claims; we’ve looked at those before. Insofar as they seem inconsistent, the argument will not seem sound.

Jesus is MELTING!

Looking for a present for that theology geek in your life?

Wear your modalism in t-shirt form.

(Why is this modalism?)

Is this one also modalistic? Discuss. This one surely is.

“Social” trinitarians may prefer this one.

And: for your skate-boarding needs.

Something for paradox lovers and fans of non-standard logics (explanation). Similarly, for people who also like Escher.

Fan of the multiple personality analogy? Look no further.

Here’s the definition of the Council of Chalcedon (sort of) in shirt form.

Then there’s a glaring theological non sequitur, in mug form. And another one, this time on a shirt.

Babies too. People who need help with spelling. Even anti-trinitarians can get in on the action. Happy little monkeys. And people with non-standard “trinities”.

Props to the commenter who can discern the intended message of this one. Or this one. Or this one.

And there’s wearable proof (-texts) that Jesus is God. Lastly, if Jesus just is God, and it was God who miraculously impregnated Mary, then… (Please, no complaints – I’m just the messenger.)

Wasn’t that a fun bit of time wasting? The internet and capitalism rule.

(PS – None of these sellers are affiliated in any way with trinities, nor do I or we get any cut of the $ – this post is just for our mutual amusement.)

In the end of his pre-emptive rebuttal, Bowman attributes this argument to unitarians:

1. The Bible contains no progressive revelation concerning God.
2. The OT does not reveal the Holy Spirit as a distinct divine person.
3. Therefore, the NT does not reveal the Holy Spirit as a distinct divine person.

I suspect that some current day unitarians do endorse this argument. (Does Burke?) Christians of any stripe who believe in any sort of Hell, in souls, or that the NT more clearly reveals the character of the Father, would probably reject 1. For these sorts of reasons, I reject it myself. In my view progressive revelation is different from the Islamic idea of “abrogation” (later Quranic verses contradicting and cancelling out or over-ruling earlier ones). Progressive revelation doesn’t involve contradiction of something earlier asserted, but rather clarifying something previously unclear, and contradicting things one might have inferred from what was formerly asserted. But back to Bowman.

Bowman opines that the OT unclearly hints at the Spirit being a distinct divine person, but he wants to say that this truth is only first clearly revealed in John 14-16. I think this puts him far off of patristic exegesis, btw – but maybe that’s a good thing.

The real meat of Bowman’s case is his exegesis of the books of John and Acts. His first positive argument is essentially this. Jesus promised that after leaving, he’d send “another Paraclete” – another helper, comforter. This implies that Jesus was the church’s first Paraclete. If Jesus was the first Paraclete, then doing that job requires being a self. Therefore, the Holy Spirit is a self. Moreover (and I’m not sure what this adds to the case) “The descriptions of the Paraclete in John pervasively describe the Holy Spirit in terms that echo what the Johannine writings say about the Son…” (original emphasis)  I guess in Bowman’s view God adds a bunch of hints in – that this “holy spirit” is really, really like Jesus.

Bowman admits that just because something is truly described in personal terms, it doesn’t follow that it is a self. His examples: the Bible “speaks” to us, and Jesus’ miracles “testified” to him. He concedes that this weakens the trinitarians’ case for the personhood of God’s Spirit.

However, take these and the other elements of what John 14-16 says about the Holy Spirit cumulatively in the context of the narrative in which one person, the Son, is leaving and before he goes promises to send someone like him, the Holy Spirit, in his stead, and the argument really becomes irrefutable.

Irrefutable? I don’t get it. Story time.

The day had come. Pa had to leave on the cattle drive. Ma, junior, and Sally stood outside the ramshakle cabin, looking at the ground, unsure of what to say, and weighed down with the prospect of the lonely months ahead. Pa’s horse was already saddled, and it stood calmly facing the rising sun. Pa spoke.

“I’m goin’, but you know I’ll really be with ya. I’ve left a friend with you. He’ll remind you of me. He’ll make you feel safe at night. If you want, he’ll even sleep in your bed. And if any rough types or Injuns come around, he’ll yell at them till they high tail it away. He’ll make you strong, and he won’t leave you night or day till I come back. If you go on a trip, he’ll ride shotgun with you.”

With a kiss for Ma, and a hair tussles for Junior and Sally, Pa mounted and rode slowly away. Returning to the warmth of the cabin, Ma found a pistol on the table.

Ma was not compelled by Pa’s plethora of personalizations to consider the Colt single action revolver to be alive.

In another argument, Bowman says that starting in Acts, we see the Holy Spirit “appear as a named actor or participant in the biblical narrative”, just as we’d expect if He really was a self, newly revealed as such by Jesus towards the end of his ministry. The Spirit says things, gives directions. It/he is “poured out”, but in the Bible people can be said to be “poured out”, and it/he “fills” people, but Satan is said to “fill” people’s hearts as well (5:3).

Bowman sums up:

We have, then, compelling evidence in the NT, especially in John and Acts, that the Holy Spirit is a divine person, distinct from the Father and the Son. This means that Unitarianism is incompatible with the NT. Given that the Holy Spirit is either God himself or an aspect of God’s being, the evidence that he is a person distinct from the Father shows that the Trinitarian understanding of the Holy Spirit best accounts for the NT teaching.

This last part is typical Bowman – arguing that the NT straight up logically implies his view, but also urging, as if he’s aware that the first part isn’t too clear, that his view is the best explanation of what is in the NT (explicitly and implicitly). If the first works, the second is unnecessary, and if the second works, the first is misguided. In any case, what to make of his case?

It is not clear to me that a unitarian must take the flat-footed approach Bowman is attacking – they needn’t read all holy-spirit-talk in the NT as referring to a power or expression of power. Thus, John Wilson:

For if the holy spirit is not, in every instance in which the term is used, merely the power or agency of God, or his influence on the human mind, or his miraculous gifts, but frequently the Almighty being himself – surely this being can be no other than the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, unless clearly mentioned in the Bible as a a person distinct from AND EQUAL to the Father, – a point which is readily assumed by Trinitarians, but has never yet been proved. (p. 326 original emphases)

Wilson here puts his finger on the weakest part of Bowman’s case – sure, if sometimes “the Holy Spirit” refers to a person, why think it is a person other than God, that is, the Father? After all, it is never portrayed as enjoying a personal relationship with God, or as being a servant of God, like Jesus. It doesn’t really have a proper name. And whose spirit is it? God’s. (Acts 2) Conceptually, persons have or are spirits, but selves or persons are not the spirits of other selves. And in the Bible, God is a self.

What evidence does Bowman present that the Spirit is a self distinct from the Father/God? So far as I can see, only this: the parallelism between Jesus and the Spirit in John 14-16 – both Jesus and the Spirit are “from the Father”, and given by him. The unitarian will simply read this as God sending his power, as a number of passages say.

Is this not the sort of flexible spirit-talk we see in the OT? Did this not guide the NT writer’s usage of it? It is a little suspicious how Bowman rushes past the whole issue of OT lingo, seeing as it would have largely provided the tradition in which the NT writers were working.

Again, if Bowman is right, that at the end of Jesus’ ministry, God introduced a third divine agent, the lack of interest in this agent is striking, and cries out for explanation. As countless unitarians have pointed out, the Holy Spirit is never an object of worship in the NT (not what we’d expect, if he’s just been revealed as a divine person, co-equal with the other two), and as historians point out, there was relatively little speculation about the metaphysical nature of the Holy Spirit in early church history. Again, specialists have pointed out a “binitarian” structure to early Christian worship. Not what we’d expect, if Bowman is right.

This last is another case where Catholics have an answer, but Bowman doesn’t. Viewing the early catholic movement as holding the apostolic mantle and anointing, they think that the co-equal divinity of the Spirit was only revealed some time around the run up to the council of Constantinople in 381. Of course, the unitarians can explain these things too.

Bowman seems to think that the sheer prominence of the Spirit throughout Acts somehow confirms his views about the doctrine of John. But unitarians have an explanation as well – that when Jesus ascended, the disciples were given a qualitatively now sort of access to God, resulting in their being filled with his spirit, able to hear God’s voice (and Jesus’ voice as well), and to work miracles by this power active in them.

Finally, there is a striking fact about Christians’ personal experiences down through the ages. If you read around, you’ll find a number of instances, going back to Paul, in which Christians have experienced the risen Jesus. This is fairly rare, though. Much more common than this, is Christian experience of the presence, power, and filling of the Holy Spirit. But they take the presence of the Holy Spirit to just be the presence of God – not of someone else, as in the case of Jesus. It is a distinct sort of presence – not at all like the presence of God one reads about it Isaiah or Revelation, e.g. of God’s throne room. But it is of him, and not of one of his two associates or subordinates. That is how the recipients of these experiences describe them. Are these reports not a better fit with the unitarian view?

In sum, I think Bowman shows that sometimes the NT authors are thinking of “the Holy Spirit” as a self, and he gives a very careful and detailed case, properly conceding some points that unitarians have long insisted on, but which other catholic theologians have been loathe to admit.  But he doesn’t show that the NT writers think Spirit is a self in addition to God, or that it is one which is co-equal to the Father. A position not on the table, but of interest, is one like that of early modern unitarian John Biddle, who held the Holy Spirit to be an agent subordinate to the Father. This too is an explanation that must be weighed along with the trinitarian and humanitarian unitarian ones. Before it is weighed, it isn’t clear which is the best explanation.

In a way, Bowman has put all his eggs into two baskets here – John and Acts. But as my comments above bring out, there are a number of wider issues – conceptual, historical, experiential – that seem relevant and important.

Still unresolved is the problem dogging Bowman’s whole performance in this debate – isn’t his position self- inconsistent? He seems to hold that Jesus just is God – and also, some things are true of one which are not true of the other. These can’t both be true. And also, the Holy Spirit is God – and again, some things are  true of one which are not true of the other. And this third person differs from Christ as well – even though both just are God.  Are we heaping up inconsistencies here?

First, Burke argues that Jesus’ messianic roles as atoning sin-offering, priest, redeemer, and Davidic king, do not require him to be divine, and further, that the first and last of these require that he is not God. I take it Burke’s point is that they require Jesus to be a human, and that no human is divine. Flag: In this context, the point is question-begging. Bowman no doubt affirms Chalcedon, according to which Jesus has both a divine and a human nature.

Next, Burke has a nice discussion of the Jewish habit, well attested in the NT and in other ancient writings, of talking about what God has predestined as already existing in heaven. This affects what one considers the natural reading of passages like John 17:5 (NIV) “And now, Father, glorify me in your presence with the glory I had with you before the world began.” Burke nicely sketches the line of thought behind this habit – what is predestined is as good as done, so what is future is moved back, as it were, to the past or present – to a time which is “too late” to avoid. He gives a vivid example from Paul of talking about a future event as present: “And God raised us up with Christ and seated us with him in the heavenly realms in Christ Jesus…” (Eph 2:6, NIV)

What is the significance of this? If Burke is right – and this is an interpretive point I’ve seen a number of commenters make, especially outside of polemical contexts – then Bowman can’t simply point to talk of Jesus’ pre-existence, but must also argue that the phenomenon at hand is not in the passage in question. I think Bowman’s best bet would be to concede many examples of this, and retreat to the view that this doesn’t explain all of the pre-existence implying talk in the NT, e.g. Jesus’ statements that he’s come down from heaven, etc.

In the section after this, Burke argues:

Rob has yet to address the Bible’s exclusive emphasis on Jesus’ humanity. He will say he accepts the humanity of Jesus in addition to his alleged deity, but Scripture says nothing of this position.

Flag: begging the question – it is the very matter at issue, whether or not the Bible asserts the divinity of Jesus. Bowman must concede the Bible’s (contra docetism) strong emphasis on the humanity of Jesus, but he need not concede any such “exclusive” emphasis.

And yet, it is striking that the preaching about Jesus in Acts is how it is – it is not what one would expect from a Christian who holds that a crucial point of faith is the “full divinity” of Jesus:

Men of Israel, listen to this: Jesus of Nazareth was a man accredited by God to you by miracles, wonders and signs, which God did among you through him, as you yourselves know. This man was handed over to you by God’s set purpose and foreknowledge; and you, with the help of wicked men, put him to death by nailing him to the cross. But God raised him from the dead… God has raised this Jesus to life, and we are all witnesses of the fact. Exalted to the right hand of God, he has received from the Father the promised Holy Spirit and has poured out what you now see and hear. …Therefore let all Israel be assured of this: God has made this Jesus, whom you crucified, both Lord and Christ.” (Acts 2: 22-36, NIV, emphases added)

Bowman’s position here differs from the Catholic one, and it seems to me that they have a principled reply to this, whereas Bowman does not. In his view, the Bible rather obviously implies, or can only be understood as teaching, the divinity of Jesus. Consequently, the apostles all did believe this. It would be surprising, then, to see them preach as above. In contrast, the Catholic holds that Mother Church, as much as the apostles, is an instrument of divine revelation, and the divinity of Jesus simply hadn’t been clearly revealed at this point. So perhaps the apostles held to a “primitive” (adoptionist?) christology, whereas later generations of inspired thinkers – bishops, mostly – came to full belief in the divinity of Jesus. I note in passing that Burke doesn’t address this sort of response. (Fair enough – his debate partner isn’t offering it.)

Next, Burke asks: “Why is Jesus never accused of claiming to be God throughout his trial?” Well, it is murky precisely how his trial went, and precisely what the charges were. There’s a suggestion of “blasphemy” but it is unclear to me what the contemporary Jewish concept of that was. Some insist that it must be a response to claims to divinity, while others hold it to be much broader, and could be raised at anyone as it were treading on God’s territory. Bowman assumes the first view, Burke the second. Myself, I see no easy way forward; what do scholars of NT era Judaism say about this?

Burke is right that apparently, Jesus several times denied some sort of equality with God. Trinitarians acknowledge this. Burke says:

The standard response claims he was “denying equality of rank, not equality of nature.” But Jesus had not been accused of claiming equality with nature. Ontology is not at issue here. The Jews had been outraged by Jesus’ apparent usurpation of God’s divine authority and privileges. His defence makes no sense in any other context. (original emphasis)

Flag: begging the question. We need a reason for thinking that ontology is not an issue here, not a mere assertion. I think this connects with the “blasphemy” issue. If it can be shown that Jews of the period, in particular, the Pharisees, had a habit of throwing a “blasphemy” charge at people who merely claimed divine anointing, inspiration, empowerment, etc., then it may be more plausible to read things as Burke does. (Given the Jewish idea of God, would they have likely entertained that this Jewish man before them was him?) But if a “blasphemer” was normally someone claiming to be God, or to have a divine nature, etc. then the point goes to Bowman.

Burke insists that on his view, Jesus was “literally” the Son of God, but not on Bowman’s traditional (small “c”) catholic christology. Why? If I understand him – Burke doesn’t clearly say why – it is because fathering is being part of the cause for a thing’s coming into existence. So a human mom and dad jointly cause junior to exist. And if mom is a Clampitt, and dad is a Mullet, then junior is a descendant of both the Clampitts and the Mullets. Now Jesus is according to the Bible a descendant of David and of God. And so both Mary and God must be causes of Jesus’ coming into existence.

This is an interesting take on the issue – a development of the point in Luke that Jesus will be called “Son of God” because of the miracle wrought by God in Mary’s body.

The traditional catholic view is that Mary supplied the human nature – rational soul and body – which was united to the divine nature. Given this, I’m not sure why Burke demands that Bowman say what on his view it means to say that Jesus is the “Son of David” and “Son of God”.

What does it take to be the “literal father” of someone? It doesn’t strictly require intercourse, as a sperm donor may be a baby’s father. I take it, one must be the source or cause of the sperm which fertilized the egg. So I guess Burke is presupposing an account of just what happened in Mary – she supplied the egg, the spirit of God supplied the sperm. At first I thought that what Burke really wanted to say was that his view better makes sense of why the metaphor of Fatherhood and Sonship is apt when it comes to God and Jesus. But on reflection, no, I guess he is insisting on literal fatherhood of Jesus by God.

Burke may be presupposing that nothing is human unless it exists in some sense because of Adam. That is – something is a genuine human only if its causes can be traced back through Adam. This is somewhat plausible, but is by no means obvious. Take a subordinationist christology where the pre-existing logos takes the place of the human soul in Jesus. Is it obvious that such a being (ancient soul embodied in normal human body) wouldn’t be a human? I don’t think so – but this may be because I don’t think it is obvious whether dualism or physicalism is true. Does Burke, like some of the older Socinians and some present day biblical unitarians, hold that the Bible teaches physicalism about human beings? If not, what is the origin of the soul? If it is generated, as in Bill Hasker’s “emergent dualism” by the body, that’d fit well with his approach. But why think a human must have a soul generated in that way?

This is also relevant to the issue of Jesus dying. Suppose dualism is true. If so, perhaps when I die, my soul continues to exist while my body ceases to live. Burke holds that on the traditional account Jesus couldn’t die. But why not – the divine nature would still exist, but the human nature – or just the body part of it – ceases to function. What’s the problem? Is he presupposing the controversial premise that dying is ceasing to exist?

The trinitarian can agree with Burke’s account of the virginal and miraculous conception of Jesus. But not with the claim about existence and explanation above. The trinitarian view is that the Son would have existence whether or not there had ever been any humans.

The traditional view is that all it takes to be human is to have a human nature (which amounts to having a body and a rational soul). And Jesus has got one. Burke has a philosophical disagreement with this, not merely a biblical one.

On atonement, Burke agrees with the catholic view that to be a proper sacrifice Jesus had to be human. But he doesn’t agree that the sacrifice victim must also be divine.

A couple of traditional reasons for this latter claim are (1) Jesus had to be divine so he could divinize humanity, and (2) Jesus had to be divine because humans’ sins made an infinite stockpile of guilt, which could only be “paid for” by an infinitely valuable sacrifice, which can only a divine one.

It isn’t clear to me what either Burke or Bowman would say to these.

Burke briefly argues that Bowman’s account is contradictory: Jesus could and couldn’t be tempted. Jesus is seen, and is God, but God is never seen. Jesus dies and is also eternal. (As I remarked above, this last one isn’t obviously inconsistent – the point needs arguing.)

Finally, a methodological point from my last post. Burke falls into the same trap as Bomman – of thinking that we can proof-text our way through this dispute. We cannot. Both catholic and humanitarian christologies explain what the scriptures say about Jesus. The question is: which best explains the evidence. Burke and Bowman both realize this, which is why they are at pains to show that their interpretations are non-arbitrary. But equally, both attempt to deduce their position from the texts. In truth, the texts don’t obviously support either view over the other. But this is not to say that neither theory is better than the other. One theory may be a much better explanation than the other; while it has not been shown which it is, in my view Bowman should be worried that his theory seems to be sporting a fatal wound (inconsistency).

In my last post I said that Bowman was focused on explaining the following:

• Jesus is called “Lord” (Gr. kurios) in the NT, and kurios is the Greek translation (in the widely used ancient Septuagint translation) for YHWH in Hebrew.
• Statements and predictions about about YHWH / God in the OT are repeatedly applied to Jesus in the NT.
• The NT implies that prayer to Jesus is a good thing.
• Paul and the author of Hebrews say that Jesus created “all things”.
• Paul says that Jesus is “equal to” God.
• Paul says that all will confess that Jesus is the kurios.
• Jesus has been “exalted to the same level as” God.
• The Son is described as doing a lot of things God is elsewhere described as doing.
• The NT implies that the Son is properly worshiped.

I think I know what Burke would say to a lot of these – a lot of the answers will have to do with the idea that Jesus is an agent who works on behalf of God. But I think the fourth issue and Philippians 2 are pressing, in part because Bowman has pressed them.

This round is not easy to call, but I’m calling it a draw. Bowman has addressed a broad range of phenomena, and yet has not rebutted the very serious charge that his theory is multiply self-contradictory. Burke has rebutted some of the important pre-existence proof texts, and has properly pointed out the focus of the NT on the humanity of Jesus, and has raised the important issue of atonement. He shows that those holding a humanitarian christology can affirm most of what all sides agree the Bible says about the messiah. But he’s begged the question on some core issues, and seems to rely on some controversial philosophical theses about what is essential to human beings and about death, which may or may not be defensible – and which may arguably be beyond the scope of this debate – they meant, I think, to keep it to the Bible.

Score:
Bowman: 0
Burke: 1
draw: 2

In round 3, Bowman ignores these fundamental conceptual difficulties for his position, and soldiers on with exegesis, multiplying words. His interpretive comments are thoughtful and well-motivated, but not always to the point, as Bowman insists on things Burke would surely agree with.  As he goes, commentary style, through each verse, I’ll try to extract his actual argument.

But first, a story. I have a theory about how the light in my fridge turns on and off. I’ve noticed that when the door is almost shut, it goes off just before it’s all the way closed, and that when I open the door, it seems the light is immediately on. My theory is that a there is a gnome who lives in my fridge. Most of the time he sleeps – maybe, somewhere over by the eggs – not sure. But when he hears the door being opened, he very quickly leaps up and pushes the unfindable light switch. He mills around until one shuts the fridge, then pushes that button again. Then he resumes his slumber. And, by the way, he is a non-existent gnome – he’s kind of unusual that way. Truly, gnomes are mysterious creatures.

Note that my theory does explain what it is supposed to – why the lights are on always and only when the door is open. It also explains why, if look around the fridge, I can’t find this gnome. And it also explains why I can’t find the switch he presses – it is, after all, an unfindable one.

If I harped on the considerable merits of this theory, and you had no better theory to rest your mind in, mine could seem pretty impressive. Still, it is a bad theory – we want not only one which explains what we observe, but also one which is true. And my story can’t be true – it is contradictory. It says the gnome doesn’t exist, and yet that he performs those tasks implies that he does. This is a deal-breaker. And even ignoring it, when we get a competing explanation on the table, it’ll turn out that my theory is not the best explanation of what we observe. The competing explanation by the frig repairman is going to slay mine on grounds of simplicity alone. We might also worry about that odd switch I posited, but I’ll leave that aside.

Now to the Bowman. What are his phenomena to be explained? Something like these:

• Jesus is called “Lord” (Gr. kurios) in the NT, and kurios is the Greek translation (in the widely used ancient Septuagint translation) for YHWH in Hebrew.
• Statements and predictions about about YHWH / God in the OT are repeatedly applied to Jesus in the NT.
• The NT implies that prayer to Jesus is a good thing.
• Paul and the author of Hebrews say that Jesus created “all things”.
• Paul says that Jesus is “equal to” God.
• Paul says that all will confess that Jesus is the kurios.
• Jesus has been “exalted to the same level as” God.
• The Son is described as doing a lot of things God is elsewhere described as doing.
• The NT implies that the Son is properly worshiped.

Bowman’s theory, as I read it last time, is that the Son, Jesus, just is (is numerically identical to) God – they are one being, and indeed one self (any self just is a certain intelligent being). Thus this time,

The Son has God’s names, sits on God’s throne, receives worship from God’s most glorious creatures, performs God’s works, and will rule over God’s kingdom forever and ever. Frankly, if this is not the LORD God himself, it is a second God, and we must conclude that the writer is teaching ditheism. (emphasis added)

This theory indeed explains all of the above phenomena.
But when the theory is more fully spelled out, it’ll turn out that on Bowman’s own views, there are some things true of Jesus that are not true of God, and vice-versa. (e.g. sending his only Son, being obedient to God in all things, wanting – during the period when Jesus prayed in the Garden – Jesus to be crucified, being tri-personal, having been raised to the right hand of God – it doesn’t matter how they differ, but only that they differ in at least one way.) It logically follows that Jesus and God and not numerically one. Hence, Bowman will be committed to their being identical, and to their not being identical. But no one wants a demonstrably false explanation; for all its weaponry, this battleship is sunk – not by the enemy sub, but by the captain.

(Sidenote: the FSH modalism Bowman seemed to gesture at in round 1 would get him out of this – but would land him in equally hard problems.)

In his exegesis, Bowman is sometimes tempted to imply that the passage in question just obviously implies – nay, explicitly says – that Jesus is God. I suspect this may be because he’s not very familiar with unitarians’ exegesis of, e.g. Phil 2 (most people are not – indeed, most theologians, apologists, and Christian philosophers are not). But in his better moments, he realizes that he’s not, in the end, forwarding a sound deductive argument for the deity of Jesus, but rather an inference to the best explanation, the best explanation of what the biblical writers say, assuming them to be inspired. He really agrees with Burke, and with most sensible Christians, that theories about Jesus and God should be based on the totality of evidence. And being a reasonable fellow, Bowman sees the futility of proof-text wars.

Is Bowman’s the only explanation? No – Burke has one. Is Bowman’s the best? If I’m right that it is contradictory, it just can’t be – unless all the available contradictions are contradictory, and Bowman’s is somehow better. “Best” in this case won’t mean worthy of belief, though, for nothing which is on the whole obviously false is reasonable for us to believe!

I do think that Bowman shows that given the way they are normally translated and read, the burden is on the humanitarian unitarian (i.e. a Christian who holds Jesus to be a human, to not be divine, and that Jesus existed no earlier than his miraculous conception) to give plausible, well-motivated, non-arbitrary readings of Philippians 2 and Hebrews 1 (and Colossians 1) which don’t say or imply that:

1. The Son of God created the heavens and the earth.
2. The Son existed long before his conception in Mary.

Can Burke do this? And moreover, how does his theory compare?

In the end, “clarity” and “obscurity” are usually subjective judgments that reflect the beliefs of the interpreters more than they inform us about the texts themselves.

I suspect this is going too far, but this isn’t flag-worthy. Yet it will come back to haunt him.

Bowman then argues that we should focus on the most relevant passages, he says, to “the identity of Jesus Christ”. I think he means, the metaphysical status of Jesus. The eight passages he names are certainly important ones, and I agree that any responsible unitarian should pony up plausible, non-arbitrary readings of all of them.

Next, he tells us that

This post will address the texts in Matthew and John, along with an excursus on two texts in John that anti-Trinitarians claim deny that Jesus is God. (emphasis added)

As the whole positive case that the Bible implies the deity of Jesus is in the book (and later in this debate?), Bowman here chooses to play defense.

Let’s take his texts in turn.

• Mt 28:16-20 – Bowman insists that what some disciples doubted was whether or not Jesus should be worshiped. This, to me, is an oddball reading, inserting our theological concerns into the passage. One would think what they doubted was that they were seeing Jesus – evidently he was far off initially, and then in v. 18 he comes closer. Flag: Bowman is flat wrong to assert that “Nothing in the context suggests that what some doubted was… that it was Jesus whom they saw.” If Jesus was God, how could all authority have been given to him (by God)? Bowman wants to say that the incarnate Jesus had humbled himself and so had to be given authority, but I take it this ignores the difficulty. If God, by virtue of his essential attributes, necessarily has all authority, then he can’t lack it, and so can’t receive it from another. It is unclear what Bowman’s answer to this would be. Regarding the seeming baptismal formula, as Bowman reads it, here “Jesus… identifies himself… as the Deity to whom each disciple is to commit himself”. Eh…? Does Bowman really think this is the obvious meaning of the text? Is he that unable to imagine other readings? (I say a few relevant things here.) If so, this tells us more about Bowman, than about the text. Finally, according to Bowman v. 20 says that Jesus is omnipresent - and I assume his point is that only God is omnipresent. But this is too quick – Jesus had a body, so in some sense, he was here (e.g. Galilee) and not there (e.g. Samaria). He’s still got one, albeit a transformed one. Note that it is the risen, glorified Jesus which is in some sense wherever his followers are – but God is supposed to be essentially (and so always) omnipresent. It will have to be, if Jesus is God, that he has always been omnipresent – but now we’re back to the embodiment issue. This is just too quick. And why exactly couldn’t even a creature be in some sense omnipresent, through, say the action of God? Finally, Bowman urges that all this confirms his reading of Mt 1:23, that the author means in calling Jesus “Immanuel” that Jesus is God. Yet again, a draw, bordering on question-begging or special pleading – Burke has explained why it is not arbitrary to read “Immanuel” as not implying that.
• John 1 – Bowman can’t get himself to take a unitarian reading of John 1, like that of Anthony Buzzard, seriously. He’s stuck thinking that they are simply overlooking the obvious meaning of v. 1-3. It is not clear to me that he understands their reading. Briefly, it is this. The Word / Logos is a divine attribute, mildly personified. (Compare: Lady Wisdom’s speech in Proverbs 8.) It’s always been around, and is not someone other than God (v.3), though it is “with” him (v.2) – with him as an attribute is with what has it. By it/him God made all. It is this which “became incarnate” in the man Jesus. (v.14) Basically at v. 14, the subject switches from God’s Wisdom to Jesus the expression or embodiment of it. Whatever the merits of this reading, it seems consistent, and the tie-ins with Proverbs 8 make it far from ad hoc. In contrast, Bowman offers the sketch of a reading which is apparently contradictory and the start and at the end of the chapter. Bowman appeals to paradox (apparent contradiction) but doesn’t quite say what this is. (Doing that would sink his reading.) Evidently the starting paradox is this: the Word just is God (v.2) and is “with God” (v. 3) even though nothing can be properly said to be “with” itself. While he glosses this as the Father being with the Son (seemingly consistent) evidently, as each just is God, that’s where the paradox arises. So: f = g, s = g, and yet f ≠ s. This is indeed an apparent contradiction. But it is also a real one, and demonstrably so (transitivity of =). Insisting on a controversial textual reading in 1:18, Bowman finds the same contradiction there. Poor John – so confused! Flag: by the principle of charity, an inconsistent reading should be avoided if at all possible, and Bowman has not even come close to showing that his is the best of all available  readings.
• John 20:26-31 – Bowman asserts that “in biblical language ‘my God’ can only refer (on the lips of a faithful believer) to the Lord God of Israel.” This of course is precisely what unitarians deny, and Bowman merely asserts it here. If “god” applies more widely than only to God, why not “my god”?  Flag: begging the question. Also, Bowman mocks as “tortured” the reading that Thomas here refers dually to Jesus (Lord) and the Father (God). I agree with Bowman that on grammatical grounds this reading is less likely, but I don’t think it is mockable – it seems to have been a slogan in the first century that Christians serve, as Paul says, one God and also one Lord. (1 Cor 8:6) – also share one baptism, one spirit, and one “body”. Bowman detects the same paradox as above, and again seems to think that this is not a liability of his reading. He subtly helps himself to some of the old qua-nonsense: qua human Jesus honors and worships God, but qua divine Son he does not. I don’t have the patience now to parse what this might mean; let it suffice to say that this talk seems to just thinly paper over the contradiction that Jesus does and doesn’t worship God, or does and doesn’t have a God. This all, to Bowman, is simply a humble acceptance of what the text clearly says “tensions” and all – declining to rationalistically explain its contents away.
• John 10:22-39 -  Bowman, like many readers, insists that Jesus’ Jewish interlocutors, who’ve been portrayed as stupidly misunderstanding him in several previous incidents, surely got it right that he was claiming to be, or to be in some sense “equal to” God. Surely those guys couldn’t have misunderstood Jesus. Jesus, Bowman says, doesn’t here deny that he’s God. That’s right. What he denies, is that it is blasphemous to claim that he’s the Son of God, for even lesser men are called by a stronger title – “gods”! Burke’s treatment makes sense of Jesus’ argument here; as far as I can see, Bowman’s doesn’t. Bowman wants to read “The Father and I are one” as an allusion to the Shema – i.e. they are one god. (This again, probably following Jesus’ opponents.) This, even though Jesus seems assume his distinctness from God in the preceding verse. I guess if Bowman is right, God gave the “sheep” to himself, and even though Father and Son are “in” each other, they just are each other. And of course, they are not (as some things are true of one, which are not true of the other). John, after all, loves paradoxes.
• Finally, another favorite unitarian proof text: John 17:1-5. Bowman reads this is if Jesus were asserting that the Father is divine. He then spins, surely, this is consistent with it also being true that Jesus is divine. Sure, but that’s not what is going on here – Jesus is not talking about the Father here. He’s addressing the Father, and says to him among other things that he, the Father, is “the only true god”. Whether this means that the Father is numerically identical to God/Yahweh or that the Father is the only divine being seems not to matter. If the Father is either one, then anyone else is not – the Father is the only one. And in addressing the Father second person, Jesus is presupposing that the Father, the one true god, is someone else – someone other than Jesus. Bowman reads this text, in the end, as assuming that the Son is not the Father, but each of them is identical to God (and so, it follows that each is identical to the other. If A = C, and B = C, then A = B.) But of course, they differ. Again, John, as Bowman reads him, is the great self-contradictor.
  

While Bowman would think that an evident contradiction would doom, say, a Buddhist or a Jehovah’s Witness to humiliating defeat, when it is his contradiction, apparently it is a sign that he’s onto some profound truth. Flag: special pleading.

I previously wondered what precisely Bowman thinks “the” doctrine of the Trinity is. I’m now inclined to think that at least sometimes he holds it to be no more or less than this inconsistent tetrad of claims (they can’t all be true – from the truth of any 3, it follows that the 4th is false).

1. f = g
2. s = g
3. h = g
4. f ≠ s ≠ h

If this is what the Trinity doctrine is, Christianity’s enemies can rest easy, for it is demonstrably the case that 1-4 are not all true. Atheists, Muslims, Jews, take note – you can cite Bowman for support. Sure, he can insist that the contradiction is merely apparent, but this is about as convincing as the mighty Oz howling “Ignore the man behind the curtain!”

Ironically, Bowman seems to think these texts are really, really clear (despite his warning above) – so clear that he can rest in an evidently contradictory reading of them. Sorry, but a really clear contradiction is an interpretation buster – unless you are prepared to admit that the author is simply confused. Evident inconsistency is evident falsehood.

While round 1 was a draw, all things considered, I’d have to call round 2 slightly in favor of  Burke. He lays out a broad if incomplete case, and effectively rebuts some of the other side’s proof-texts for the divinity of Christ, whereas Bowman essentially says “the positive case is in the book”, and then gives his readings of about 5 central texts. Burke ignores some of the tough problems for his unitarian christology, but Bowman ends up at several crucial junctures assuming that his (implicitly contradictory) readings are rather obviously correct. Staking all on a few texts, he seems to hand Christianity’s opponents a big gift on a platter.

Thus, my score so far:
Bowman: 0
Burke: 1
draw: 1

Update: in comments on Rob’s post, Dave says a lot more. In #6 he explains the meaning of the Greek words translated “worship” etc, and thus why he’s unconvinced by this argument: Jesus must be fully divine because he is properly worshipped. In comments #7-10 he says a lot more about the unitarian reading of John 1 I briefly explain above, and in #10 he addresses Jesus being called “theos” is John 20. Along the way he appeals to some serious scholars, including the super heavyweight Dunn, who it seems has a new book, not yet available in the US, on the issue of whether Jesus was worshiped in NT times. In #11-12 he revisits John 17 and other passages, highlighting the idea that Jesus is a special agent, acting on God’s behalf. In #10 he pleads:

Please consider if a non-paradoxical answer may be more likely!

It’s all worth a careful read.

1. There is one (true, living) God, identified as the Creator.
2. This one God is the one divine being called YHWH (or Jehovah, the LORD) in the Old Testament.
3. The Father of our Lord Jesus Christ is God, the LORD.
4. The Son, the Lord Jesus Christ, is God, the LORD.
5. The Holy Spirit is God, the LORD.
6. The Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are each someone other than the other two.

When a philosopher sees this, he quotes that great thinker, Bill Clinton: “It depends on what the meaning of ‘is’ is.” 1 is clear – that is the “is” of existence. 2 is clear – that is the “is” of identity (aka absolute, Leibnizian, or numerical identity). But 3-6 are mushy.

• One option would be to read the “is”s is 3-5 and the “are” as involving identity (affirmed in 3-5, denied in 6). This would be straight up inconsistent. From f = g, s = g, and h = g, it logically follows that f = s = h – but on this reading, this last thing is denied in 6.

• Another option, which I doubt Bowman has in mind, would be to read 3-6 as involving only relative identity. 3-5 would say that the various persons are the same being as God, but 6 would say that no two of them are the same person as each other. This might sound like just what the doctor ordered, but one has to be an uber-sophisticate in logic and metaphysics to pull this off. 2 still seems to involve non-relative identity (numerical sameness, not relativized to a kind). Normally, we understand relative identity talk as really involving absolute identity. “Dubya is the same person and George W. Bush.” This implies that Dubya is a person, Bush is a person, and Dubya = Bush. So if the Father and Son are the same god, this would mean that the Father is a god, the Son is a god, and the Father = the Son. D’oh! A relative identity theorist either has to argue that there’s no such thing as absolute identity (=) or specify how it relates to relative identity relations.
• If I had to guess what he’s thinking, I would guess, based on some things he says about the term “person”: as follows. 2 does involve the concept of identity. 3-6 involve modes of this thing mentioned in 1 & 2. Bowman thinks the Father is a mode of God, a way God is. And so on for the Son and Spirit. And these are three different modes (6). In short, the Trinity doctrine is that a perfect self, God, exists eternally in three different modes, perhaps personalities, or something like personalities.

Bowman then:

• Flies the evangelical flag – inerrancy, sola scriptura.
• Denies not “hyper-Biblicism” (no doctrine is authoritative unless explicitly spelled out in the Bible).
• Heads off the lame-o anti-trinitarian argument that we ought not use any non-biblical language. (Flag – surely this is a straw man in this debate, as is the previous claim above.)
• Argues that the Shema is consistent with unitarian and trinitarian theology. The latter, I think, is unclear. And I don’t think he takes a stand on precisely how he thinks that passage should be understood.

Then, a crucial point:

I could discuss other proof texts that Biblical Unitarians and other non-Trinitarians cite as proof that God is a unipersonal being, but the result will be the same in each case: such texts typically prove that God is a single being but do not address the specific Trinitarian claim that God is a unipersonal being. Non-Trinitarians typically argue, for example, that it is obvious from the pervasive use of singular pronouns for God (I, he, him, his, you [sing.]) throughout the Bible that God is only one person. This argument would be sound if by “person” we meant an individual being. However, in Trinitarian theology, a divine “person” is not an individual being, because God is one being, not three. The doctrine of the Trinity cannot be refuted by assuming that it is false; and this is what non-Trinitarians do when they assume that a person can only be an individual being.

Flag – no, two flags.

• First, Bowman still doesn’t clarify what he means by “person”. Hence, it is not clear what claims he will be arguing is implied by the Bible.
• Second, how is the trinitarian definition of “person” relevant to interpretation of the Hebrew word for “him”, “his” etc. as used by an ancient Jew? I don’t see any fallacious question-begging here by the other side. Suppose you were trying to figure out the views of some local Jedis – what they think this “Force” thingee is. Do they call it “it”, or “him”, or “her”. If one of the latter two, they are assuming it is a self. As Ricky Ricardo would say, Bowman has a lot of ‘splainin’ to do. (This, by the way, was not a problem for early catholic theologians, as like NT writers, they identified the one God with the Father of Jesus – which I assume Bowman does not.)

Finally, Bowman beats the mysterian drum. He argues that because God can’t be completely understood, we’ll run into apparent contradictions in thinking about him.

Flag – that doesn’t obviously follow – apparent non sequitur fallacy here. And his examples not having to do with the Trinity don’t seem apt.

He confesses, then, that there are “logical difficulties” in his view – that is, apparent contradictions. If so, then my guess above must be wrong, for it is apparently consistent. But Bowman doesn’t tell us what these are.

Flag – if you admit that your view is apparently contradictory, please say where exactly – this will help us to understand your view! He darkly hints that in 6 above “person” has “a somewhat different connotation as compared to its use for human beings”. I don’t think he means to say “connotation”… but in any case, how do these meanings of “person” differ? I the mundane realm, a person is a self, a thinking thing, a substance with intelligence and will, roughly speaking. What, in contrast, is a divine “person”?

He then inveighs against “approaches to Scripture that a priori disallow all mystery, paradox, or incomprehensibility”. Flag – isn’t this a red herring (an irrelevance, mere distraction)? Is there some reason to think that Burke does this? I assume that Bowman and Burke both agree that apparent inconsistency and unclarity and not good things in a theory, but bad things, and that they should not be lightly allowed.

I am concerned here only to plead that non-Trinitarians not dismiss the doctrine of the Trinity, or any other doctrine, merely because it is difficult to understand. In the context of this debate, I am anticipating and arguing against a priori objections that amount to saying that the Trinity cannot be true regardless of what the Bible may say.

Flag – Straw man? Red herring? Even poisoning the well? He pins all of the above of on unitarian author Donald Snedeker. Well, never mind that – you’re debating Burke here, and Snedecker ain’t Burke.

Of course, if what is meant by “the Trinity doctrine” really is contradictory, then no, it can’t be true, no matter what any person or book says. But, is it? That is, is the trinitarian doctrine under debate here consistent or not? If I really knew what Bowman had in mind, I could venture a firm opinion.

I thought the point here was to expound his positive views and background assumptions. Instead, he’s fired off a lot of rounds, it seems to me, prematurely and haphazardly. Settle that happy trigger finger down, Cowboy!

Richard starts off with the point that for the Persons of the Trinity, unlike the case of any other persons, there is “individuality without plurality” – each is what it is without any plurality of any kind – and “unity without inequality” – I’m not sure what he means by this second phrase. (p. 396)

In contrast, any other person, such as you or me, can be “unequal to himself”, in that we can become greater or lesser over time. (e.g. I’m smarter and morally better now than when I was 14.) And persons like us have multiple properties (we’re not simple). (p. 396) And of a human person, say Barak Obama, we can say that “his power alone is dissimilar to itself… [since] one thing is easy for him, another is difficult and a third is impossible.” (p. 397)

Then he says, “one and the same nature… in one respect is less, in another it is greater, and [so is]… dissimilar and unequal to itself.” (p. 397) So, the same point he made about persons, can also be made about natures. Thus,

…where there is no true simplicity, true equality cannot exist. However in that Trinity, nowhere is anything dissimilar to itself nor is it unequal to any other in anything. (p. 397)

I assume that by “true equality” he means qualitative sameness/equality in the highest degree. Normally, when we call some X and some Y “qualitatively the same” we allow that they differ somewhat (e.g. two golf balls from the same package). But not here – the Father and Son don’t differ in their intrinsic properties, and so are as qualitatively the same as two things could possibly be. (This is just begging to be objected to, but I’ll pass it by.)

After this, he quotes the “Athanasian” creed on the equality of the Persons, and triumphantly ends with one more quote from that creed:

Behold now we have proved by open and manifold reasoning how true that is which we are commanded to believe, namely, that we venerate “one God in Trinity and Trinity in unity.” (p. 397, emphasis added)

I’ll end with just a few observations about our whole Richard series:

• Richard has not persuaded me, by any of his arguments, that a perfect being must be tri-personal, or even that a perfect being must enjoy reciprocated love of an equal. It seems to me possible that perfect being lacks that good, and is nonetheless happy, and perfectly benevolent.
• It’s also clear  that Richard has no way to get his arguments (supposing they worked) to stop at three. Unlike Swinburne, he doesn’t even seem aware that he needs to show only three in addition to at least three. He leaves things at the latter.
• If your view of the Trinity is incompatible with the classical doctrine of divine simplicity – and if you call yourself a “social” trinitarian, it probably is, then Richard is not your ally, as he assumes the truth of the doctrine.
• As I explained last time, I don’t think his views on the Trinity are self-consistent. He needs the Persons to intrinsically differ from each other, and yet he insists, so as to remain orthodox, and to avoid tritheism, that they do not. Thus, he  needs to appeal to mystery – this self-inconsistency must just be due to the greatness of the subject-matter. It isn’t that he’s trying to have it both ways… He repeatedly sounds (e.g. in ch. 9, 10, 24) what I call negative mysterian notes, but rather half-heartedly – his Anselmian zeal is little cooled by such points.
• Another apparent inconsistency: he crucially appeals to the notion of cooperation. But if X and Y cooperate in a work, they do it together, and each makes his own contribution. Each, that is, exercises his own power. Cooperation involves two exercises of power, to bring about one effect (or various parts of one effect). And yet, given Richard’s views on simplicity, there is between the Persons of the Trinity one power, and so one exercise of power in any alleged case of “cooperation”. Which is to say, it isn’t really cooperation. It’ll just be the action of one god.

Certainly one and the same substance is not something greater or lesser, better or worse than itself. Therefore, [there are no inequalities among members of the Trinity] since one and the same substance is certainly in each. …for this reason any two persons [in the Trinity] will not be something greater or better than any one person alone; nor will all three taken together be more [great?] than any two or any one alone by himself… (p. 396)

I take it that in the first sentence here that by “substance” he’s referring to the divine nature, saying that it can’t be greater than itself. That’s hard to argue with. He then argues that no person can be greater than any other. There’s an assumption here that greatness is solely a function of a thing’s nature. I’m not sure why we should accept that. Why not other intrinsic properties as well? One might think, e.g. it is greater to be the Father than it is to be the Son, hence even though they share the divine nature, one might think that the Father is greater than the Son. The inference from X and Y have the same substance to X and Y are the same in greatness, seems invalid. But if we make a valid argument, by adding the premise that greatness is a function solely of essence, we have valid argument, but then, why accept the premise? Why think the argument to be sound?

Maybe he doesn’t need the premise though. Working as he is in an Augustinian tradition of Trinity theories, he may be assuming that each Person has no intrinsic properties other than the divine nature – not only is the divine nature simple, but it is the only component of each Person, so that each person is simple as well. If this is what he’s assuming, we’d get a valid argument, like this:

1. Greatness is a function of a thing’s intrinsic properties.
2. The Persons have no intrinsic properties beyond the divine nature.
3. The Persons share one and the same divine nature.
4. Therefore, the Persons do not differ in greatness.

The idea here is that the Persons are three because of extrinsic relations – e.g. Fatherhood is not some extra ingredient or component in the Father. Instead, it’s just a way that… the divine nature relates to itself? This in my view is highly problematic, but that’s matter for a different post.

I assume he’s not arguing that Father and Son can’t differ in greatness because they are numerically identical. That would make the argument valid – as nothing can’t be greater than itself, and Father and Son are one thing, therefore, neither is greater than the other. But if they are numerically one, then they can’t differ in any way, as nothing can differ from itself. And Richard assumes that Father and Son differ. So, this must not be how he’s arguing.

Finally, he ends with a blow on the mysterian trumpet:

Now observe how incomprehensible is that coequality of greatness from every viewpoint and in every respect in that Trinity where unity does not lack plurality and plurality does not go beyond unity! (p. 396)

I’m not sure what to make of all of this. One could read into it relative identity theories, or the Rea-Brower constitution theory, which invokes the dubious concept of “numerical sameness without identity”. On the other hand, there is the appeal to “incomprehensibility”. Is this a nod towards the apparent inconsistency of his views?

It seems to me that Richard doesn’t think the Persons of the Trinity to be identical (numerically the same), even though he thinks them to not differ in any component (in all one of them – as the only component in each is one and the same divine nature). They are three agents/persons/selves, and they must be three, for his arguments about love to even get one inch off the launchpad. Now add in his point that the three of them share a nature. It doesn’t obviously follow that they are one because of this share component – why can’t three things share a nature? It may, per the above argument, suffice to make them equal.

But how can they then be in personal relationships with one another?

• If X and Y “share perfect love”, then X has the property of loving Y, and of being loved by Y.
• And Y has the property of loving X, and of being loved by X.
• But solely because of their sharing perfect love, unlike Y, X doesn’t have this property – being loved by X. Thus, X and Y differ, both intrinsically (in the acts of loving) and relationally (their receiving the other’s love).
• Thus, there must be more to both than just the divine nature – there must be some extra component. So, the person must each be simple, and yet none of them can be.

Is that the mystery (apparent inconsistency)? Or in the quote above just a habitual flourish? Or is there another way to read all of this?

Happy April Fools Day!

(A link for those confused about the subject line.)

Daniel sort of asks me a few questions:

…it would make an interesting discussion as to whether or not the definition we have of “traditional Christianity” on our About Page suggests or encourages [modalism].

Here’s the relevant part of the statement, part of the policy that only real Christians are allowed to blog on their site:

What Theologica Bloggers Believe

… I believe God to reveal himself as three eternal persons: Father, Son and Holy Spirit.

Yep – sounds modalist to me; I mean, that’s how many or most will understand it. There’s one being, a person (“himself”) who has “revealed himself as” three eternal persons. This part is extra unclear – are the persons only ways God appears? Or both appears and is? Lives? Three ways he self-reveals? Events involving him? Parts of the one god? You’ll never know. But it looks like some form of eternally concurrent FSH modalism. Nothing unusual here – this is the norm in evangelical circles. If you’re a real Christian, in the eyes of many, you are a modalist. I find it interesting – and disturbing – that this is considered “that which has been believed everywhere, always and by all [real Christians]“.

Daniel also says,

I’d also love to hear how, if you were told to define “historical Christianity”, how you would word a definition of the Trinity.

“Historical Christianity” is just a rhetorical term used by evangelical apologists to dismiss or marginalize their theological opponents with one easy stroke, as (to use a Muslim term) “innovators”.

In other words, there’s no such thing. What there are, are more and less popular, connected, related, historical streams of theologizing by various people claiming to be Christians. One can talk about mainstream approaches, of course, and I often call that small-c “catholic” theology – that rough core of theology which is been fairly stable through the history of Catholicism, and which is shared by most Protestants and the Orthodox churches. What is my definition of that, concerning the Trinity? On one level  the creeds.

But these don’t express any one way of thinking about the Trinity. As best I can tell, they give rise to three main approaches: mysterianism, modalism, and something like this (this last, in my experience, never among the laity, but only among sophisticates educated in medieval Catholic theology). And among those versed in recent theology, some “social” approaches – but again, very rarely among the laity.

Among American evangelicals, I believe FSH modalism (or SH modalism) to be the main approach. This is a bummer, as any kind of Son-modalism is ruled out by the New Testament to which evangelicals pledge their allegiance!

There’s a tension here: Theologica’s founder and maintainers, I suppose, don’t want to be responsible for sponsoring dangerous heresy – hence the rule noted above. And yet, they do want a fully open and respectful discussion. I applaud their aim of respectful argument (so often lacking in theological discussion!), and I especially enjoyed this post about Words that Don’t Prove Your Point. Some relevant parts:

Sounds like you’ve been reading X’s heretical garbage.
This has nothing to do with what the person is saying. …

Calvin, Luther, Piper and Joel Olsteen would say you’re wrong.
Ooooh: they’re big and famous and agree with you but, sorry bro, that doesn’t mean your position is right. If there’s equally famous people that disagree with your position then what you’re doing is pretty much name-dropping uselessness.

The majority of Church History would disagree with you so you can’t be right.
Okay, that’s pretty interesting information but it still doesn’t prove the argument wrong. Just because the majority of any group holds a certain position it doesn’t make it right or wrong: it just makes it popular. Now true, the Spirit of God was working throughout Church history but there’s no possible way that you or I can say “Yes, this is most definitely the Hand of God” without some sure sign of heaven.

This last part is a little flip, but I agree with the basic point – that the bolded words don’t constitute an unassailable argument. (I think that they can in some cases be a fairly strong argument.)

But then, why partially exclude (purported) Christians who hold non-mainstream views? I’m guessing that their justification is more a practical than a theoretical one – they want the site to have a catholic focus, and don’t want to have to worry about every Jehovah’s Witness who might become ensconced there.

On the second one, I’m pretty sure, they meant “Osteen”.

And I’m also sure that he’d agree with everything in my post here – and that settles it!

All right, back to reading X’s heretical garbage…

Ed thinks I’m misreading the controversial passage. I don’t think he’s made his case, and I also think he’s also missing the epistemic point I was making.

• By “tradition” I meant whatever beliefs the Hierarchical Church asserts to be mandatory for Catholics. I’m well aware that Catholics don’t consider all widespread Christian, even Catholic traditions mandatory.
• Loyola’s discussion is not merely about the infallibility of the Church’s judgement or pronouncements. It does assume that, but the notorious passage occurs as a rule for the proper formation of beliefs. So Loyola is on the topic of individual epistemology – he’s giving a rule which in his view will lead us only to correct beliefs. So in my view Ed is mistaken when he asserts that “What is at issue [in the black is white passage] is the epistemological status of the Church’s pronouncements themselves.”
• Is Loyola’s claim hyperbole? It’s a short and pithy – excellent writing. And it is hypothetical, as the Church has not said (yet ) said that black is white. I take it that Loyola picked a case involving sense perception, because he had in mind to defend a controversial claim that seems to be contradicted by sense perception. Ed takes it to be obvious hyperbole because Loyola would be assuming, in Ed’s words, that the “Church does not claim special expertise or authority in purely secular matters”, I take it, like color perception. I’m not sure what Ed is confident that color perception is and must be a “purely secular matter”, or why he think Loyola assumes the believer to be in a position to specify where the Church’s authority to pronounce ends. While Ed would like the quote to be mere hyperbole, I’m not sure that it is. But I don’t think it matters, if Loyola’s point really is that authoritative church teaching trumps the (apparent) sense perception that the thing the priest is putting in your mouth is just a wheat product, and not a human body.
• I’m not sure that Loyola has in mind disputes about transubstantiation. That is plausible, but in any case, I disagree with his implicit claim that Church testimony should trump any other evidence. I see no hint of exceptions, and no hint that this can be confined to “spiritual” matters – however that might be spelled out.
• Now about one’s senses deceiving one: I agree with Ed that this is not a very helpful metaphor for understanding what is supposed to be going on, according to Catholics, with consecrated-wafer perceptions. We have to distinguish epistemic seemings from mere visual (etc.) sensations. These two, I think, have only recently been clearly separated by philosophers – see the paper “What are Seemings?” here by my colleague Andy Cullison. Here’s one way to see the distinction. Suppose there was an alien race, populated in part by little creatures called “Oogs” that look just like the white disk above. Now, imagine that an inhabitant of this planet (not an Oog, but some other inhabitant of that planet) with eyes like ours comes to earth and attends a mass. He’ll have the same visual sensations of the wafer that we will, yet it will not epistemically seem to him that there’s a wafer before him. Instead, it seems to him that the priest has captured one of the inhabitants of his home planet – he’ll think, “They eat Oogs here!” and take pity on the (imagined) little victims. The point of this example is (only) that sensory seemings and epistemic seemings can come apart, and are different. This is not easy to recognize, as normally they go together. But see Andy’s paper for more or this distinction.
• Now imagine two friends attending a mass, and observing wafer consumption – call them Believing Bob and Doubting Dan. Perceptually, their sensations are the same. But they, both being humans, are not like the alien above – it seems to each, and it seems equally strongly to each, that the things being put in mouths by the priest are (merely) little flat breads. They possess equal evidence for this claim. And yet, Bob sincerely says, “What each communicant eats is in fact the body of our Lord”, while Dan says, “As best I can tell, Jesus has not been eaten here.” How can this be? I think it is helpful to imagine how each would evaluate the following inconsistent tetrad:

1. Whatever the Catholic Church requires its members to believe is true.
2. The Catholic Church requires its members to believe that a properly consecrated wafer is the whole body of Jesus.
3. That wafer in the priest’s hand has been properly consecrated.
4. That wafer in the priest’s hand is just a wafer.

• Bob and Dan are equally aware that these four can’t all be true. From any three of them, it follows that the remaining one is false. (Go ahead – try it out – I’ll wait…)
• Moreover, Dan and Bob agree on this – that 2, 3, and 4 each seem to be true. Further, they both agree that they each seem strongly, and about equally strongly to be true. The difference is that because 1 seems true to Bob, Bob dismisses the seeming that 4 is true. He’s aware of it, but ignores it, as in his mind it has been trumped. Herein lies the rub.
• Suppose we rate strength of seemings from one to four, with four being the strongest – the way, e.g. 1+1=2 seems true to us. Now, let’s use a crude bar graph, made with X’s. Bob and Dan agree, then, in how 2-4 strike them. Let’s leave 1 open for the moment.

1. ?
2. XX
3. XX
4. XX

• We could go three X’s all the way down, but the point is that 2-4 are roughly on a footing, as far as strength of seemings goes. The strength isn’t maximal, but it is significant.
• As concerns 1, to Dan, it simply doesn’t seem true. So he believes 2-4, and denies 1.
• But Bob does believe 1 – it strikes him as true. How much so? Surely not with the strength of 1+1=2. At most, 1 will seem true at the next highest level.

1. XXX
2. XX
3. XX
4. XX

• But if this is how things seem to Bob, he is going against reason in his belief in transubstantiation. If the above is how things seem to him, he’ll have to suspend judgement about which of 2-4 are true. He ought to think, of course, that at least one of them is false. But he can’t tell which.
• What Bob needs, to reasonably believe in this instance of the Eucharistic Mystery, is for 2 & 3 to seem more strongly than 4 does, like this:

1. XXX
2. XXX
3. XXX
4. XX

• Here is a reasonable belief in the Catholic doctrine in question. If any one of 1-3 changes, so that it seems less strongly to Bob than does 4, Bob “falls out of” this epistemic situation – he’s then believing in spite of how things on reflection seem to him.
• Now back to my rotten wafer example. Here, I think that my friend Ed misses the point (see the end of his post). Yes, if the Bible clearly asserted that all Volkswagens were really poached eggs (sporting the non-essential features of a German car) then given our perceptions, or rather, our total evidence, understood as seemings, we would be unable to reasonably believe the Bible to be inerrant.
• The point is this. These kinds of seemings – ones resulting from multiple, close up, steady, firm sensations, are not easily trumped. Given habit and I suppose other factors, this is easier to see with hypothetical examples, hence my use of them. In any case, when this is recognized, Bob’s epistemic situation may switch to this:

1. XXX
2. XXX
3. XXX
4. XXX

• or to this

1. XX
2. XXX
3. XXX
4. XXX

• Now if I understand him, Ed would say: “But I’m not like Bob. You see, to me, it doesn’t seem that we’re in the presence of a mere bread product. I’m careful about what I infer from sensory sensations, and it only seems to me that I’m in the presence of the ‘accidents’ of bread – whiteness, brittleness, disc-shape, etc.”
• Ed has a point. If 4 turns out not to seem true at all, or to seem more weakly the each of 1-3, then indeed, his belief in the Eucharistic miracle is reasonable. Moreover, I assume that he’s accurately reporting his belief.
• But we can rule out the first scenario just given – I think that Ed should agree that it does seem to him that the wafer is just a wafer – he does feel the push to believe that, although in the case described he does not believe it. Suppose the priest turned to him and said “When you weren’t looking, someone handed me this wafer, which they just brought in – it hasn’t been consecrated at all.” In this situation, Ed would immediately form the belief that the thing in the priest’s hand was mere bread. Why? Because that’s how it has seemed to Ed all along, only before this surprising turn of events, this seeming was trumped by the seemings of 1-3 above. Take away 3, and now 4 is no longer ignorable, no longer trumped.
• So I think Ed ought to concede to 4 having at least two X’s – that is, that it seems true in the situations we’re assuming, and fairly strongly, and not minimally so. Now go back to the original, more normal scenario (where the priest doesn’t make the surprising statement). If this is right, does 1 really seem to be true more strongly than 4 does?
• Frankly, for a host of reasons 1 doesn’t seem to me to be true.
• But if 1 did seem true to me, I’d be worried that upon careful reflection, it  seems true more strongly than does 4.

(click for image credit)

St. Ignatius Loyola (1495-1556) founded the Jesuit order and authored a famous book of Spiritual Exercises. There, in a list of rules for correct belief, we have this:

Thirteenth Rule. To be right in everything, we ought always to hold that the white which I see, is black, if the Hierarchical Church so decides it, believing that between Christ our Lord, the Bridegroom, and the Church, His Bride, there is the same Spirit which governs and directs us for the salvation of our souls. Because by the same Spirit and our Lord Who gave the ten Commandments, our holy Mother the Church is directed and governed. (emphasis added)

What occasioned this rule was likely the objection, common among 16th-19th c. Protestants, to the Catholic doctrine of transubstantiation, to the effect that we are more sure, on the basis of sense perception, that the consecrated wafer is just a wafer, than we are (based on Church testimony) that it is really the body of Jesus. God wants us, they would urge, to trust the senses he gave us, and believable miracle-claims let us do this.

I don’t see this sort of objection nowadays. I’m not sure why it went out of style.  In any case, Loyola’s answer is clear - tradition ought to trump even a clear, close-up sensory perception. One would think, then, that it would also trump a strong intuition of falsehood – as when a set of claims appears self-inconsistent.

But even Loyola’s sense claim seems unreasonable. Suppose, contrary to fact, that Mother Church had long, strongly asserted that uneaten, consecrated wafers never rot. Then, you’re cleaning up the church, and find a wafer than you remember the priest dropping during Mass some months ago. It is rotten – covered with bread mold. You can feel, smell, and see the rot. Surely, you can (and will) reasonably believe that the wafer is rotten.