Important new open access journal: The Journal of Analytic Theology (Dale)

May 122013
 

jatCongratulations to editors Oliver Crisp, Michael Rea, Trent Dougherty and Kevin Diller on the launch of an important new open access journal: The Journal of Analytic Theology.

What is “analytic” theology?

Good question. Roughly: theology done using the tools of contemporary (typically English-language) “analytic” philosophy.

What is that? Here’s one answer by a master practitioner. Also, this journal aims to “explore theological and meta-theological topics in a manner that prizes terminological clarity and argumentative rigor.” I assume that the topics will not be limited to Christian ones, although glancing through the names on the editorial board, I don’t recognize the names of anyone I know to be a non-Christian.

I’m sure this is going to be an important source both for philosophers and for theologians. The inaugural issue in fact features some interactions between the two.

It also features an interesting article by trinities contributor Scott Williams – congratulations, Scott! Maybe I’ll post a few comments or here on trinities soon.

Finally, kudos are due to the Center for the Philosophy of Religion at the University of Notre Dame and Baylor University for their support of this project. Their support is advancing the cause of Christian thought.

Love the logo. If they made another, they could talk about their official “logos.”

OK, I’ll stop.

Linkage: Sokal Hoax 2.0 (Dale)

Mar 082013
 

id-rather-like-you-to-know-youve-been-trolled.jpgEvery philosophy student and every theology student should know about the original Sokal hoax. Here’s the best reflection on its important lessons. (Dr. Boghossian later expanded the discussion in this book.)

Now a philosopher has pulled a similar hoax; this time it’s a naturalistic atheist vs. the Association for Reformational Philosophy. The story is at Jerry Coyne’s blog, Why Evolution is True. (Never mind that this particular post provides no such reason. :-) ) Coyne notes,

This shows once again the appeal of religious gibberish to the educated believer

True – for some. But Continue reading »

New Papers (Dale)

Feb 152013
 

paperI’ve just updated my homepage with a paper forthcoming in Faith and Philosophy, called “Hasker’s Quests for a Viable Social Theory.” My sincere thanks to editor Thomas Flint, and to that journal’s anonymous readers for their help.

The paper critically examines the various discussions of William Hasker, a very accomplished Christian philosopher, and former editor of F&P, from whom I have learned much. I think that more than anyone, he’s tried hard to make the “social” approach to the Trinity work – in which you say that the “Persons” of the Trinity really are persons, that is, selves, and then try to figure out how this is not going to be tritheism. In my judgment, Hasker does not succeed in coming up with a philosophically and theologically viable take on the Trinity. But judge for yourself, after you see the arguments.

Along the way I discuss Bill Craig’s (and J.P. Moreland’s?) social theory. This too seems like a dead end to me.

Social theorists’ most serious problem is not that they raise the hackles of many Christian philosophers, but rather that they contradict the New Testament. (e.g. Paul and John.) Maybe in a few days I’ll post a historical supplement to this paper – a part the journal compelled me to cut, which deals with Hasker’s misunderstandings of some patristic material.

I have other forthcoming papers which I’m not at liberty to publicly post yet. In “On Bauckham’s Bargain,” (forthcoming in Theology Today), I critically examine Richard Bauckham’s “christology of divine identity” – which has attracted so many evangelical apologists and theologians. I worked hard to make this paper communicate to non-philosophers, and I really hope it leads to some helpful discussion.

Another forthcoming publication is a slightly revised version of this talk, to be published here. I miss the pictures, but I think it is an important topic for all Christians to think carefully about.

“Sabellianism Reconsidered” Considered – Part 8 (Dale)

Apr 222012
 

In this last post in this series, I want to put out a few critical reactions to Baber’s “Neo-Sabellian” Trinity theory.

My thanks to Harriet for this piece and for her interaction with us here.

No doubt, she’ll argue back; and she will probably say something about how her views have changed since she wrote this piece.

So, in no particular order:

  1. I agree with her that it’s suspicious if some philosophical theory should appeal to us only or mainly because it’ll help us in theology. I also agree with her that it’s interesting to at least try to come up with what is in some sense an acceptable Trinity theory which uses only metaphysical doctrines we have other reasons to believe.
  2. Again, I think it is a good aim to produce an intelligible (seemingly consistent) Trinity theory, assuming some such theory is called for. I think she’s correct to complain about the severe obscurity of traditional claims about “eternal generation” and “procession”.
  3. Picky point: I think “Neo-Sabellian” is a misnomer. It’s “Neo” all right, but Continue reading »

“Sabellianism Reconsidered” Considered – Part 7 (Dale)

Apr 202012
 

Time for the old Spanish Inquisition. Will she survive The (self-administered) Rack?

In the final part of her article “Sabellianism Reconsidered”, Baber turns to theological objections. To wit:

  • The account renders it impossible for the Son to pray to the Father. But the NT says this happened.
  • The account denies that each Person of the Trinity is himself eternal, and has eternally born relations to the other two Persons. (pp. 8-9, paraphrased)

Her answers? Jesus, like his contemporaries, was not a trinitarian. That is, he didn’t realize  that the God to whom he prayed had temporal parts which were gods. Or even if he did, he didn’t intend to teach any trinitarian doctrine. Thus, he addressed not the Father, but God, as “Father”. (p. 10) Thus the term “Father”, in Jesus’ context, referred to God, while nowadays (post 380 CE?) it refers to the Father, the (temporally) first Person of the Trinity.

In response to the second objection, she notes that “a notion of timeless, metaphysically necessary causation Continue reading »

Religious Disagreement (Dale)

Apr 162012
 

Just got back from Killeen Chair Conference on Religious Disagreement. Kudos to Tomás Bogardus (soon to be of the University of St. Thomas in Minnesota) and St. Norbert College for a great conference.

This has been a hot topic in epistemology. Put in the most simple terms: if I think P is true, and then find out that someone at least as  intelligent and informed as me thinks P is false, must I then withhold about P (neither believe that it is true, nor believe that it is false)? My answer is: not necessarily.  See here for some seminal papers; readers of this blog will probably be most interested in the last two pieces – by eminent Christian philosophers van Inwagen and Plantinga. I agree with the thrust of both, although philosophers agree now that more should be said.

To those who want to delve into the epistemology, I’ll just opinionate that I think Michael Bergman is on the right track. Also, see important recent and forthcoming work by Nathan King (religious disagreement) and Thomas Kelly (disagreement in general). Another important player, who I also think is generally on track, is my former classmate Jennifer Lackey (disagreement in general).

Young Christian philosopher Andrew Moon also gave a good paper at the conference. Happily, he recently gave a twenty-minute, popular-audience-level talk on the epistemology of religious disagreement as a part of my department’s Young Philosophers  Lecture Series. Check it out!

“Sabellianism Reconsidered” Considered – Part 4 (Dale)

Apr 122012
 
The theory, then, is that God is an everlasting, temporally extended thing with three temporal parts, each of which is a god. But, they’re the same god as God. Yet as we saw last time, how can the Three be gods at all, as each exists at some times but not others?

Without going into the arguments for this controversial thesis, Baber appeals to the claim made by Derek Parfit and others, that “identity is not ‘what matters’ for survival”. (p.6) Thus, a future thing can count as my surviving, though it is not (numerically) identical to me.

Suppose (I’m stealing this thought experiment from Richard Swinburne) some mad scientists, such as Pinkie and the Brain, are going to cut my brain in half, and put the left half in one body, and the right in another. The body which gets the left half will be tortured to death, while the body getting the right half will be given lifetime passes to all NFL games and a lifetime supply of good beer. If I’m to undergo this experiment, I want to know which of these resulting people will be (numerically identical to) me: the unlucky one, the lucky one, or neither.

Baber (following Parfit) wants to say that depending on how exactly the resulting people are related to me, both may count as the continuation of or survival of me. Specifically, she suggests that psychological continuity is enough – it is enough that the later people have the same or nearly the same beliefs, desires, and so on that I have.

I don’t think this is right, but back to the Trinity: In her view, the god which is a God-stage (temporal part of God) called the Father would, just before the Incarnation, be mistaken to think Continue reading »

“Sabellianism Reconsidered” Considered – Part 1 (Dale)

Apr 032012
 
Three modes, one mentally ill self.
Dr. Harriet Baber (aka H.E. Baber) teaches philosophy at the University of San Diego, and has been active for many years in the Society of Christian Philosophers. She’s published a number of papers on gender, philosophy of religion, metaphysics, and other topics. I met her in the 1990s at an SCP conference in California, and I have always found her to be funny, smart, and independent-minded. And judging by her website theme, I gather she likes to do shots of… some sort of grass juice. :-) More relevantly, I believe she’s a lifelong Episcopalian.
Here I want to review her provocative “Sabellianism Reconsidered” (Sophia 41:2, Oct 2002, 1-18.)

Her starting point is this argument:

1. There is only one God.
2. The Father is God.
3. The Son is God.
4. Therefore, the Father is the Son. (p. 1) Continue reading »

On Numerical Sameness / Identity / “Absolute” Identity (Dale)

Jul 202011
 

I’ve been reading some stuff about identity and relative identity lately, in the process of writing something on relative identity versions of trinitarianism. This post is to share some good finds.

In his excellent entry “Relative Identity“ veteran logican and philosopher of language Harry Deutsch says about the best that can be said for relative identity theories – that maybe, arguably, they solve or help to solve various metaphysical problems. See his sections 2 and 4 for these. His section 5 is a penetrating analysis of Geach’s very hard to follow arguments.

Deutsch’s point of view is very different from that held by most philosophers. For this, see chapter 1 of Colin McGinn’s Logical Properties. (NDPR review.) This is more or less  the “orthodox” view that most philosophers hold, atheist or theist, trinitarian or not. I largely agree with it, except for its Platonic aspect. I uphold the logic of identity as McGinn understands it, but do not want to commit to the existence of abstracta like relations. I think the truthmaker of a sentence like “Dubya just is George Bush” is going to be a concrete object, the ex-president himself. In this, I’m in the minority; most philosophers find abstracta indispensible.

Another place one can start is Harold Noonan‘s excellent “Identity” entry. He’s an excellent philosopher, and the piece has many virtues; in particular, see his section 2 on Leibniz’s Law vs. substitutivity principles.

The best thing I’ve ever read on identity and relative identity is Continue reading »

Classifying Mormon Theism – a paper by Carl Mosser (Dale)

Jun 302011
 

Carl Mosser teaches theology at Eastern University in Pennsylvania.

I recently read, and profited much from his “Classifying Mormon Theism.“ Check it out.

It’s part of a book dedicated to the work of the unique Mormon philosopher of religion David Paulsen.

Mosser’s paper is of interest for several reasons:

First, is Mormonism a sort of polytheism, monotheism, or what? You’ll have to read the paper to get Mosser’s answer. But here’s a teaser: “It is inappropriate to classify Mormonism as a polytheistic religion. To do so conveys highly misleading connotations.” (p. 23, emphasis added)

Second, what is monotheism anyway? What is a god?

Third, how did the ancients, including the authors of the Bible use “God” and related terms? For example, how was the Greek theos used? And how does this compare to our usage?

I don’t think I agree with all of Mosser’s conclusions; but there is a lot going on here, and there is much that is useful.

 

 

 

Congratulations to J.T. Paasch (Dale)

Jan 262011
 

Congratulations to trinities contributor J.T. Paasch on his “Arius and Athanasius on the Production of God’s Son”, which has come out in the most recent issue of the prestigious philosophy of religion & philosophical theology journal, Faith & Philosophy (Vol. 27, No. 4, October 2010, pp. 382-404)

Hey JT – do you have a preprint posted online anywhere?

Here is JT’s abstract, to whet your appetite:

Arius maintains that the Father must produce the Son without any pre-existing ingredients (ex nihilo) because no such ingredients are available to the Father. Athanasius denies this, insisting not only that the Father himself becomes an ingredient in the Son, but also that the Son inherits his divine properties from that ingredient. I argue, however, that it is difficult to explain exactly how the Son could inherit certain properties but not others from something he is not identical to, just as it is difficult to explain the precise way that a statue inherits certain properties but not others from the lump of bronze it is made from.

Also, check out his blog Boring Things.

Reply to Hasker re: My Divine Deception Arguments (Dale)

Jan 142011
 

After my 2004 piece in which I gave three arguments against “social” trinitarianism, I had the privilege of being taken to Hask refuted twice by the excellent veteran Christian philosopher William Hasker.

This last summer, I finally got around to replying. I wrote a long piece and sent it to Religious Studies, who had published my original article and one of Hasker’s replies. They generously agreed to take it – it seems, they’d about had a belly full of social Trinity discussions – but only on the condition that I cut it way back. So I  took out the axe and hacked off 2/3 of it.

I hope to use some of this other material elsewhere – it gets into some really interesting early modern material, tries to further negotiate the divide between Hasker and I, and delves more into the issue of defining monotheism.

My reply, then, is short and sweet tart. I stick pretty closely to Hasker’s arguments.

My thanks to Bill for a lot of very helpful correspondence, on this, and on other papers we’ve (separately) written. It turns out that Religious Studies also granted him a short reply to my reply in that same issue – but you’ll have get that counter-punch from him or wait until the March 2011 issue comes out.

Update: the issue is now out – I got the hard copy at the end of March 2011.

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