How Trinity theories conflict with the New Testament (Dale)

May 172012
 

Most Christians are (at least in theory, according to creeds and statements of faith promulgated by denominations) trinitarians, believers in a triune or tri-personal God, which they call the Trinity. But some have always been unitarians, believers in one God who is one perfect self, who does not in any way contain three selves or “persons.” Nowadays, these are a minority (again, going by official statements and membership rolls – I think the facts about Christians’ actual beliefs are more complicated than the official documents suggest).

In my view, before around fifth century, unitarians were always a majority. Of course, they didn’t call themselves “unitarians” – that term is of late 17th c. coinage – but arguably most of them were unitarians - for some arguments read this.

In any case, one can’t determine what is true by taking a vote. Truth may be unpopular. But also, it can be popular. So, who is right?

I propose that the following clear arguments provide a way forward. Which should we accept?

T1 The Father is not the Trinity
T2 The Trinity is God.
T3 Therefore, the Father is not God.

T1 The Father is not the Trinity.
U2 The Father is God.
U3 Therefore, The Trinity is not God.

“Is” here means numerical identity throughout. If x in this sense “is” y (in logic we write x=y) then x and y are one and the same, numerically one thing, numerically identical, and so x and y can’t ever differ in any way. The order doesn’t matter: it will be true that x=y just in case it is also true that y=x. And if it is false that x=y, then x and y are truly two – those terms name different things. To repeat: every “is” in these arguments is the “is” of identity. This is why we’re dealing with clear arguments. We’re not talking about some less close relation or association.

“God” here names Yahweh, the one true God asserted in the Hebrew scriptures.

Each argument is valid; in each case, if both premises were to be true, then the conclusion would also be true.

But we can’t consistently accept both arguments as sound. T2 conflicts with U3, and T3 conflicts with U2 (in both cases the pairs are contradictories – pairs such that one must be true and the other false).

So what to do?

Let us start on common ground. All sides should agree Continue reading »

Arguing against no one (Dale)

May 162012
 

Princeton philosopher Thomas Kelly in a paper on the epistemology of disagreement (i.e. what the reasonable response when we find the people just as smart and informed etc. as us disagree on some important matter):

In principle, we ought to be able to give due weight to the available reasons that support a given view, even in the absence of actual defenders of the view who take those reasons as compelling. But in practice, the case for a view is apt to get short shrift in the absence of any actual defenders. The existence of actual defenders can serve to overcome our blindspots by forcefully reminding us just how formidable the case is for the thesis that they defend… But the case for a given view itself is no stronger in virtue of the fact that that view has actual defenders…

Thomas Kelly, ” The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement,” p. 31 (in pre-print).

At first this reminded me of a proverb I’ve often thought of when reading some catholic theologian who has evidently never put the slightest effort into understanding the overall case for unitarianism:

“The first to speak in court sounds right–until the cross-examination begins.”  Proverbs 18:17 (NLT)

But this is actually a different point than Kelly’s. A better courtroom analogy for Kelly’s point is: Continue reading »

Craig on Flying Spaghetti Monster Mockery (Dale)

May 142012
 

The “Flying Spaghetti Monster” was born as an inept parody of intelligent design arguments.

About this, philosopher William Lane Craig is right on the money.

The FSM is more than this, though. It is thought by many village-atheist-type young males (roughly 12-29) to be an oh-so-clever-and-naughty parody of monotheism in general, apart from any design-creation controversies.

The thing is, the FSM is not clever – only naughty – or at least, potentially so, if people care enough to be offended by it (which I do not recommend). Really, the only amusing thing about it is how amused these folk are with themselves, as they think they’ve somehow pulled the pants down on believers in God.

But the joke’s on them.

Here are two differences between God and the FSM: (1) Many of our greatest scientists and philosophers have believed in God (examples: Newton, Descartes) – either on the basis of one or more arguments or based on his being the best explanation for certain facts vs.  no such people re: the FSM, (2) countless seemingly sane people claim to have experiential evidence for the existence of God vs. none for FSM.

Now these facts don’t show that God exists or that it is reasonable to believe in God. But it does show that it is reasonable to investigate the existence of God and not give another two seconds of thought to the FSM.

Done.

King of the Non Sequitur (Dale)

May 132012
 

The word is “Therefore…” When you are making a deductive argument, this means that what you are about to say logically follows from (is implied by) what you have just said. That is, if the former part were to be true, what you’re about to say must also be true.

A non sequitur (Latin for: “it doesn’t follow”) is an invalid argument, one in which the premises don’t imply the conclusion, that is, where one could consistently accept all the premises and yet deny the conclusion.

I recently stumbled upon this youtube video, The Trinity Explained (with Reason), featuring a supremely confident sounding young man. I watched amazed, as a torrent of non sequiturs ensued.

If only this fellow was as good at constructing arguments as he as at selecting pictures!

Here are most of them – not that in each case, the step starting with “Therefore” is not implied by the premises.

1. If unitarianism is true, God is more comprehensible than if trinitarianism is true.
2. God is not totally comprehensible and not fully explainable.
3. Therefore, unitarianism is false.

1. Unitarianism is true.
2. Therefore, God is no greater than a human being. Continue reading »

What is idolatry? (Dale)

May 102012
 

In a recent public presentation I tried to define two concepts of idolatry, but I wasn’t quite happy with either of them.

So here’s the 2.0 version, submitted to you for criticism and comment:

  • idolatry (def 1): the practice of honoring a representation or symbol as if it were a god or a person worthy of honor.

This is literal idolatry, which is the rule rather than the exception in the world’s religions – bowing, etc. to things like this Jain statue I photographed in Bombay. It was this sort of practice which was forbidden in the ten commandments:

You shall not make for yourself a carved image, or any likeness of anything that is in heaven above, or that is in the earth beneath, or that is in the water under the earth. You shall not bow down to them or serve them… Exodus 20:4-5, ESV

“Serve” here, I think, clearly signifies religious worship specifically. It is not clear, I think, that it is against any sort of respect for images, e.g. saluting a flag. But it is against the sort of image honoring typical of ancient near eastern religions.

Apart from this command, it seems to me, it is by no means obvious that the one God shouldn’t be worshiped by means of some object, be it representational or abstract. After all, millions, probably billions of people do this, either for some god or for the one God.

But very often in the New Testament, it is not the above concept which is in view. Instead, they have in mind Continue reading »

Patton’s problem with Apologists (Dale)

May 072012
 

(click for image credit)

I recently stumbled upon a great post by Michael Patton that just about perfectly expresses how I’ve felt about Christian apologists since growing past teenagerhood.

In part:

This is the problem that I have with some apologists (those who defend the faith). Don’t get me wrong, I believe very much in apologetics and also love many apologists. But very rarely do I find a reasonable apologist. Most are very hardened because they are committed first to defending their particular position, not so much to learning.

Read the whole thing. He also has done a similar post recently.

I would add: apologists too often fall into mere rhetorical violence: hyperbole, attacking a straw man, verbal aggression, smug, acid condescension, simply repeating oneself more loudly, insults, poisoning the well, and so on. And this is leaving aside poorly constructed arguments. Sadly, debates between philosophers (one or both of whom may be atheists) are nearly always ”cleaner” (more reasonably and respectfully conducted) than your average debate between a Christian apologist and anyone else.

I’m always reminded of what James says: Continue reading »

Speaking at 2012 Theological Conference in Atlanta, Georgia (Dale)

May 012012
 

I’m heading to Atlanta to give two presentations at the 2012 Theological Conference:

  • Who Should Christians Worship?
  • God and His Son: The Logic of the New Testament

Stay tuned for video links.

Seems it’s going to be hot there…

Update: Had a great time there. Folks who heard me talk may be interested in seeing some highlights from this blog, or misc. books. My thanks to the Buzzards for their organization and hospitality, and to the Gills for filming it all.

Copan answers: Who created God? (Dale)

Apr 302012
 

“Well, who created God, then?” Many an atheist has lobbed this one, supposing it to be a devastating objection in question form.

In reply, Christian philosopher Paul Copan knocks this one out of the park.

Well played, sir. I would add a few points:

One of the perfections a perfect being is supposed to have is aseity – existing but not because of anything else. God by definition has this. The physical cosmos, it seems, could not. It seems that no physical object could exist independently of anything else (a se – Latin for “through itself”). Any physical object owes its existence to some cause or causes, and will go out of existence if conditions cease to be favorable.

So there is nothing arbitrary in the believer in God demanding to know what caused the physical cosmos to come into existence, while not demanding to know what caused God to exist. Given the sort of being God is supposed to be (perfect, so a se) it is a contradiction to suppose that God is caused to exist. (X caused an essentially uncausable being to exist.)  The question/demand/objection I started this post with is based on ignorance of what sophisticated monotheism is. It’s too bad that some well known recent atheist writers have propagated this mistake.

There is trouble here, by the way, for some Trinity theories (hint: eternal generation). See here if you’re interested.

Defining the concept of a Christian unitarian (Dale)

Apr 242012
 

(click for image credit)

Thanks to reader Mike Gant  for his question about my last post.

As of now I think I’ve got a solid definition of the concept unitarian: someone who believes that the one God just is (i.e. is numerically identical to) a certain self and not to any other self.

But I then tried to define the more specific concept of a Christian unitarian: someone who believes that the one God just is (i.e. is numerically identical to) a certain self, namely the Father, and not to any other self.

But this is not a good definition. Mike asked: what about ancient friends of God like Moses and Abraham?

D’oh! The above definition makes them Christian unitarians. Thus, it is too “broad” or “wide.” Continue reading »

Defining the concept of a unitarian (Dale)

Apr 242012
 

Last time I offered a definition of the concept of a trinitarian.

This time, I will try to define the concept of a unitarian.

Many definitions of this concept are unacceptably polemical.  It is unacceptable to define a unitarian as an anti-trinitarian.  This violates requirements 3 and 5 – it doesn’t tell us what a unitarian is, but only what a unitarian is against.  And this is part of a common slashing rhetorical strategy which I have recently mentioned.  For the same reasons we must reject defining the concept unitarian as one who “denies the Trinity” or “has heretical beliefs about the Trinity,” etc. Equally, it is unacceptable to define a unitarian as one who holds the correct or biblical view about Jesus and God. Whether or not that’s so, it’s trying to sneak an argument for a thesis into a pseudo-definition of that thesis.

One common definition is,

Definition 1: someone who believes in exactly one unipersonal God.

I think this is on the right track, but the term “unipersonal” is obscure, and so this definition violates requirement 6 (and possibly also 3).

I have been working with this definition of the concept:

Definition 2: someone who believes that the one God just is (is numerically identical to) the Father.

I now think that this isn’t quite right.

First the definition is arguably too narrow.  Continue reading »

Defining the concept of a trinitarian (Dale)

Apr 232012
 

I woke up this morning, and realized that there is a problem with how I’ve been defining the concept of a unitarian.  In this post, I will attempt a definition of the concept of a trinitarian, after reviewing what is required of a good definition. Next time, I’ll try to define the concept of a unitarian.

According to the textbook I have used for years in my critical thinking class, a good definition should:

  1. Include the genus and a differentia.
  2. Not be too broad or too narrow.
  3. State the essential attributes of the concept’s referents.
  4. Not be circular.
  5. Not use negative terms unnecessarily.
  6. Not use vague, obscure, or metaphorical language. (p. 44)

What is a trinitarian?

Definition 1: someone who believes in a triune god.

This fails Continue reading »

“Sabellianism Reconsidered” Considered – Part 8 (Dale)

Apr 222012
 

In this last post in this series, I want to put out a few critical reactions to Baber’s “Neo-Sabellian” Trinity theory.

My thanks to Harriet for this piece and for her interaction with us here.

No doubt, she’ll argue back; and she will probably say something about how her views have changed since she wrote this piece.

So, in no particular order:

  1. I agree with her that it’s suspicious if some philosophical theory should appeal to us only or mainly because it’ll help us in theology. I also agree with her that it’s interesting to at least try to come up with what is in some sense an acceptable Trinity theory which uses only metaphysical doctrines we have other reasons to believe.
  2. Again, I think it is a good aim to produce an intelligible (seemingly consistent) Trinity theory, assuming some such theory is called for. I think she’s correct to complain about the severe obscurity of traditional claims about “eternal generation” and “procession”.
  3. Picky point: I think “Neo-Sabellian” is a misnomer. It’s “Neo” all right, but Continue reading »

“Sabellianism Reconsidered” Considered – Part 7 (Dale)

Apr 202012
 

Time for the old Spanish Inquisition. Will she survive The (self-administered) Rack?

In the final part of her article “Sabellianism Reconsidered”, Baber turns to theological objections. To wit:

  • The account renders it impossible for the Son to pray to the Father. But the NT says this happened.
  • The account denies that each Person of the Trinity is himself eternal, and has eternally born relations to the other two Persons. (pp. 8-9, paraphrased)

Her answers? Jesus, like his contemporaries, was not a trinitarian. That is, he didn’t realize  that the God to whom he prayed had temporal parts which were gods. Or even if he did, he didn’t intend to teach any trinitarian doctrine. Thus, he addressed not the Father, but God, as “Father”. (p. 10) Thus the term “Father”, in Jesus’ context, referred to God, while nowadays (post 380 CE?) it refers to the Father, the (temporally) first Person of the Trinity.

In response to the second objection, she notes that “a notion of timeless, metaphysically necessary causation Continue reading »

“Sabellianism Reconsidered” Considered – Part 6 (Dale)

Apr 192012
 

Switchfoot “are one”. But they are really just five dudes, not one.

Baber observes,

Typically, aggregates of Fs are not themselves Fs. A collection of cats is not itself a cat… an aggregation of persons is not a person. (p. 7, emphasis added)

Still, she thinks this needn’t preclude three gods from themselves being a god. Some sorts of things, it seems, can have other things of that same sort for parts, such as a Sierpinski Triangle. (p. 10) Maybe, then, gods are more like triangles like cats, in that groups of god can be (temporal) parts of a god. At least, we can’t rule out that this is possible.

How many temporal parts does God, on this theory have? There’s no reason to think it is exactly three. Continue reading »

“Sabellianism Reconsidered” Considered – Part 5 (Dale)

Apr 172012
 
To be omnipotent, Baber says, “is to be able to do [directly, by fiat] any action… including actions at times other than” the time at which one is omnipotent. (p.6)
But consider, say, the action of miraculously inflicting some person with a headache on 1/1/2015. It seems that the Father, on this theory, couldn’t do that, as he wouldn’t exist then (having been superseded by the Son and the Spirit) – at least not directly. Thus, it seems he wouldn’t be omnipotent. But then, he wouldn’t be a god, or fully divine, as the theory requires. Likewise, the Son would not have the ability to create the world, as he existed only c. 1-33 CE.

But, if I follow her compressed reasoning here (p.7), the reasoning just given is mistaken. God is, at any time, able to bring about anything at that time. He’s able to do this because of his temporal part (e.g. the Father) which exists at any given time. (Or if we’re talking about stretches of time, it could be 2-3 parts.) But each God-temporal-part is also omnipotent, in that for all its career, it can do any action, at the earlier or later gods which count as the same god as it, have the same sort of power during their careers. So, take the Son. He’s omnipotent, because (1) during his life he can do any action, (2) at times later than his life, the Holy Spirit can do any action, and the Holy Spirit counts as the continuing existence of the Son, and for parallel reasons, (3) before the Son’s life, he ought to be thought of as pre-existing as the Father, who during all of his career, could do any action. “The Persons, therefore, are as omnipotent… as [God] is.” (p.9) Thus, she holds, her third condition is satisfied – each of the Persons is wholly divine.

Next time: But is the Trinity God?

Religious Disagreement (Dale)

Apr 162012
 

Just got back from Killeen Chair Conference on Religious Disagreement. Kudos to Tomás Bogardus (soon to be of the University of St. Thomas in Minnesota) and St. Norbert College for a great conference.

This has been a hot topic in epistemology. Put in the most simple terms: if I think P is true, and then find out that someone at least as  intelligent and informed as me thinks P is false, must I then withhold about P (neither believe that it is true, nor believe that it is false)? My answer is: not necessarily.  See here for some seminal papers; readers of this blog will probably be most interested in the last two pieces – by eminent Christian philosophers van Inwagen and Plantinga. I agree with the thrust of both, although philosophers agree now that more should be said.

To those who want to delve into the epistemology, I’ll just opinionate that I think Michael Bergman is on the right track. Also, see important recent and forthcoming work by Nathan King (religious disagreement) and Thomas Kelly (disagreement in general). Another important player, who I also think is generally on track, is my former classmate Jennifer Lackey (disagreement in general).

Young Christian philosopher Andrew Moon also gave a good paper at the conference. Happily, he recently gave a twenty-minute, popular-audience-level talk on the epistemology of religious disagreement as a part of my department’s Young Philosophers  Lecture Series. Check it out!

A Tale of Two Tattoos (Dale)

Apr 142012
 

I love philosophy majors. The best of them almost always develop a nerdy and warped sense of humor – and I mean that in the best way. :-)

These two young ladies, recent alumnas of our department, decided to get complementary tattoos. (Sober, they swear!)

In each case, the tattoo artist left off the two initial universal quantifiers: AxAy (I can’t find the symbol codes for the upside down A representing the universal quantifier – so please imagine those A’s upside down.) They would read: For any x whatsoever and for any y whatsoever…

Now to the tattoos. “F” is supposed to be, either a predicate or a property. On the right tattoo (wrist) the right, closing parentheses is just out of view.

One of the tattoos says something nearly all philosophers agree is true (a rarity!) while the other is held to be false by many. Here’s your homework, dear reader: Continue reading »

“Sabellianism Reconsidered” Considered – Part 4 (Dale)

Apr 122012
 
The theory, then, is that God is an everlasting, temporally extended thing with three temporal parts, each of which is a god. But, they’re the same god as God. Yet as we saw last time, how can the Three be gods at all, as each exists at some times but not others?

Without going into the arguments for this controversial thesis, Baber appeals to the claim made by Derek Parfit and others, that “identity is not ‘what matters’ for survival”. (p.6) Thus, a future thing can count as my surviving, though it is not (numerically) identical to me.

Suppose (I’m stealing this thought experiment from Richard Swinburne) some mad scientists, such as Pinkie and the Brain, are going to cut my brain in half, and put the left half in one body, and the right in another. The body which gets the left half will be tortured to death, while the body getting the right half will be given lifetime passes to all NFL games and a lifetime supply of good beer. If I’m to undergo this experiment, I want to know which of these resulting people will be (numerically identical to) me: the unlucky one, the lucky one, or neither.

Baber (following Parfit) wants to say that depending on how exactly the resulting people are related to me, both may count as the continuation of or survival of me. Specifically, she suggests that psychological continuity is enough – it is enough that the later people have the same or nearly the same beliefs, desires, and so on that I have.

I don’t think this is right, but back to the Trinity: In her view, the god which is a God-stage (temporal part of God) called the Father would, just before the Incarnation, be mistaken to think Continue reading »

“Sabellianism Reconsidered” Considered – Part 3 (Dale)

Apr 112012
 

To continue Baber’s attempt to retool Sabellianism:

Suppose your car, named KITT, has temporal parts. KITT, then is the sum of, the whole composed of these parts. (KITT at t1, KITT at t2, KITT at t3, KITT at t4…etc.) Further, Baber urges each of these car-stages (temporal parts of a car) is itself a car. So, e.g., KITT at t3 is just as much a car as the whole KITT. But now, suppose David Hasselhoff is driving KITT on, say, Easter. He’s actually, on this metaphysics, driving two cars, for KITT on Easter is a different car than KITT (the sum of KITT-stages).

Not to worry, argues Baber. We simply need a concept of “tensed identity”. This is not numerical identity as normally understood, but is rather the relation between KITT and KITT at Easter, such that they “count as one”. (p.5) Thus, Baber suggests that if we believe in temporal parts, the thesis of “tensed identity” is a “plausible way to avoid over-population.” (p. 5)

Back to God. She’s exploring the idea that God is a whole composed of three temporal parts Continue reading »

“Sabellianism Reconsidered” Considered – Part 2 (Dale)

Apr 052012
 
President Bush, President Reagan, President Carter, President Ford, President Nixon
What is this adequate Trinity theory called “Sabellianism”, according to Baber? It is what I’ve called serial, non-essential FSH noumenal modalism - each “person” of the Trinty is a mode of God, a way God is during a period of time. None of these overlap (serial), they supervene on God’s intrinsic features (noumenal), and they are non-essential – if God hadn’t created, there would have been no time, and so no temporal parts to his life.
So the theory is that the one God is an everlasting self with three temporal parts, the Father (up to the time of the Incarnation?), the Son (during the earthly life of Jesus, ending at Pentecost?) and the Holy Spirit (Pentecost and after?). So the three “persons” of the Trinity are in fact person-stages of the one divine person/self, but they are also persons as well.

Following an ancient tradition of mocking modalists as “patripassians”, she seems to think the biggest or the main problem with modalism is that it identifies the Father and the Son. (pp. 1, 3) On her modalist theory, they are temporal parts (person-stages) of one being, but they are not numerically identical – they are different temporal parts of God. As she observes, on this theory, “There is… no time at while f=s.” (p. 3) Thus, her theory doesn’t identify any of the persons with one another, or with God for that matter.

Many metaphysicians, she knows, reject the theory of temporal parts, and the perdurance theory of how a thing can “last” through time.

But moving on, is this theory monotheistic? She urges,

All we need to capture the spirit of monotheism is the doctrine that at any time there is exactly one God. (3)

Huh? She draws an analogy with US Presidents; at any given time, there’s one one.

But imagine this: Continue reading »

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