God and his Son: the Logic of the New Testament – conference presentation (Dale)

Nov 032012
 

Here’s a video of my May 2012 talk in Atlanta, “God and his Son: the Logic of the New Testament.” Many thanks to Sharon and Dan Gill, who filmed, edited, and posted it on their fine website, 21st Century Reformation.

The characteristic thesis of unitarian Christianity (aka Biblical Unitarianism, Christian Monotheism) is that the Father of Jesus just is the one God, Yahweh, and Jesus is someone else.

This is assumed in this passage:

Jesus said to her, “Do not cling to me, for I have not yet ascended to the Father; but go to my brothers and say to them, ‘I am ascending to my Father and your Father, to my God and your God.’ (John 20:17, ESV)

Actually, it is consistently assumed in the entire New Testament – there is no difference between authors on this score. But here, it is especially close to the surface, as it were.

And it is explicitly asserted in these:

When Jesus had spoken these words, he lifted up his eyes to heaven, and said, “Father, the hour has come; glorify your Son that the Son may glorify you, since you have given him authority over all flesh, to give eternal life to all whom you have given him.  And this is eternal life, that they know you the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom you have sent. (John 17:1-3, ESV)

Therefore, as to the eating of food offered to idols, we know that “an idol has no real existence,” and that “there is no God but one.” For although there may be so-called gods in heaven or on earth—as indeed there are many “gods” and many “lords”—  yet for us there is one God, the Father, from whom are all things and for whom we exist, and one Lord, Jesus Christ, through whom are all things and through whom we exist. (1 Cor 8:4-6, ESV)

The waters have been muddied by evangelical and Catholic apologists arguing for “the deity of Christ,” and by some big name theologians like Bauckham and Wright arguing that in the last passage Paul “inserts Jesus into the Shema.” In this talk, after I give a quick logic lesson, I discuss how logic helps us to think clearly about these three passages.

You’ll have to watch the video to find out why the Lord is face-palming. :-) Hint: it has to do with an often-misread piece of scripture.

Here’s the screencast version, which I did when I got back from the conference.

Further thoughts on Swinburne’s God-talk (Dale)

Aug 222012
 

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In this 2010 post I reacted to an interview by social trinitarian Richard Swinburne. My concern was that Swinburne has a theory on which the Trinity is not itself a person, but in answer to the question “Is God a self?” He answers affirmatively. What gives?

Recently a reader e-mailed me with this link (thanks, Anthony). If you look at around 14 minutes, you’ll hear him make abundantly clear that he thinks God is a self, that he just is a certain perfect person. From the official transcript:

In the view of all that is the theory that theism, the theory that there is a God, is that a  simple explanation of the universe? …God is supposed to be a personal being. What is a person? A person is a being with certain powers to move their arms or whatever, certain beliefs and certain purposes which are formed by their desires so they have inclinations to do things, desires, powers and beliefs. We are persons in that sense but we of course have finite powers, God is supposed to be limitless in his power. We have some beliefs true, some false and plenty of things we do not have beliefs about. God is supposed to have all true beliefs to help be omnipotent and omniscient and God is supposed to be perfectly free in the sense that he is not in anyway influenced by desires. We have some desires which influence us and on the other hand we see certain things as good to do and that influences us. But we have views about what is worth doing which are quite out of line with our desires to do things and therefore we are subject to irrational desires. God is supposed not to be subject to irrational desires and in that sense he is perfectly free hence being omniscient he will see what is good and having no inclination to do anything else if you recognise  something as good you have an inclination to do it. So he will inevitably do what is good.

So this is a very simple kind of person unlike us who are complicated persons in being mixtures of desires for the bad, perception to the good, limited powers and so on. He is a simple person in the sense of my definition. He is one person, he has only got three properties, he has got an infinite degree of each or rather, as I have described it so far, two properties and one absence of a property. That is to say he does not have desires for irrational ends. (p. 5)

“God” here, given his own trinitarian speculations, can’t be the Trinity. In my post linked above,  I lay out this inconsistent triad: Continue reading »

Orthodox modalism (Dale)

Aug 012012
 

Consider this recent affair; to the relief of many evangelicals, this prominent leader has turned from the brink of damnable heresy. That is, he’s turned from Oneness Pentecostal theology (which is, in my experience, as clear as mud) to “Orthodoxy.” Christianity Today trumpets: “T.D. Jakes Embraces Doctrine of the Trinity, Moves Away from ‘Oneness’ View“.

“I began to realize that there are some things that could be said about the Father that could not be said about the Son,” Jakes said. “There are distinctives between the working of the Holy Spirit and the moving of the Holy Spirit, and the working of the redemptive work of Christ. I’m very comfortable with that.”

This is the indiscernibility of identicals (also here) in action. This is a valid inference : x and y have differed, so x and y are not numerically identical. So in his view, the Father is not the Son.

So far so good. But what sorts of things does he think the Father and Son are?

It seems: “manifestations.” Of what? God. So they are two manifestations of God.

So of course he asserts that he (the new trinitarian) and the Oneness folk “are saying the same thing.”

At this event Pastor Marc Driscoll grilled Jakes on catholic formulas, and Jakes said yes to them all, only qualifying – like a number of catholic theologians – that he doesn’t much like the term “person.” So as far as Driscoll and many viewers are concerned, he’s “orthodox.”

But Jakes’ misreading of 1 Tim 3:16 is revealing – he thinks that the one God – conceived as a self (I’m interpreting here) manifested in the life of Jesus – so that the self operative there in that life is simply God. “Jesus” is the mode of God’s manifesting in this way, including, presumably, a real human being.  Of course, Jesus, aka the Son isn’t the Father; they are two different modes of God, ways God is. (He says “manifests” but since he agrees that the Trinity is eternal, he must have in mind something intrinsic to God rather than a relation to creatures.)

Just as Jakes has said before:

I believe in one God who is the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit. I believe these three have distinct and separate functions — so separate each has individual attributes, yet are one. I do not believe in three Gods. …Though no human illustration perfectly fits the Divine, it is similar to ice, water and steam: three separate forms, yet all H20. Each element can co-exist, each has distinguishing characteristics and functions, but all have sameness…. (link and emphasis added)

For Jakes, God just is a certain great self, who eternally lives in three ways. It seems he is a noumenal, eternally concurrent FSH modalist.

But my point is not to throw rocks at Jakes. Rather, my point is Continue reading »

Metatheology with Baber (Dale)

Jul 262012
 

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Thanks to all you excellent commenters! I can’t always keep up.

I see my friend philosophy professor Harriet Baber has been on there asking some provocative questions like some kind of Socratic gadfly. :-)   I thought they deserved a post. The quotes here are from her comments.

WHAT pre-existed: the 2nd Person of the Trinity or Christ?

Orthodox / catholic-kosher answer: both. The 2nd person of the Trinity is assumed to be personally identical to (and so, identical to) the man Jesus.

What if I hold that the Trinitarian Person was pre-existent but became a human at some time in the late 1st century BC so that, in effect, Christ is a proper temporal part of the 2nd Person of the Trinity. Does this make me an adoptionist?

To all the non-philosophers out there; she is applying the recent metphysical doctrine of temporal parts here, thinking of, e.g. a self as extended across or spread out over time, rather than lasting (entire) though time. In current day metaphysicians’ lingo, people perdure rather than endure. So in this case the one Christ would be that whole four-dimensional, event-like thing, with the early part being the pre-human logos and the latter part being the human Jesus – but as I’m using the terms here (this is tricky – there are no standard terms here) the logos and Jesus would be temporal parts of the one Christ.

I don’t know, Harriet, whether or not this makes you an adoptionist; I suggest we lay aside Continue reading »

Linkage: Is God Perfect? (Dale)

Jul 212012
 

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Three Christian philosophers on perfect being theology, tradition in philosophy going back to the great medieval philosopher Anselm of Canterbury (d. 1109), but really, as Leftow has shown, back to Augustine, Plato, and the Christian Bible.

First, a great interview (click the thin blue button) with Oxford philosopher Brian Leftow by Robert Lawrence Kuhn, for the PBS should Closer to Truth.

I did not know that Leftow was an open theist! As an open theist, he holds that God is not the all-determining puppet-master of the cosmos (or if you don’t like that metaphor, the novelist who writes every last word of her novel), but rather that he allows free creatures some leeway to control how things turn out. Consequently, when it comes to some aspects of “the future,” he must wait to see how things turn out, and then he freely responds to these new developments.

I wonder how this coheres with Leftow’s view that God is timeless?

One quibble: at the very end, he says that the concept of perfection is “presupposed in the attitude of worship.” I disagree. Worshiping is honoring. A person may worship God and it have never occurred to her whether or not God is perfect. But I agree with Leftow that the Bible implies that God is perfect, and that this is a fundamental truth on the basis of which we are to reason about how God must be.

In another interview, Oxford philosopher Richard Swinburne explains why belief in a perfect God doesn’t imply that the cosmos God made is perfect. And why even though there can’t be a greatest possible cosmos, there can be a perfect being. And: isn’t it easier to believe in an imperfect God? (No.)

Note that at the very end he allows that it is coherent to worship a being who is less than perfect.

In a third interview, philosopher J.P. Moreland analyzes divine perfection as the greatest possible being – the greatest being there could possibly be. This does entail that we can do some things God can’t do. Can a perfect being be courageous? In one sense, Moreland argues, yes, but in another sense no. Does making good things make God better or greater? No. His life is enriched by having made good things, but he doesn’t need them, and they don’t make his life better. Moreland too believes in a temporal God (at least, given that he creates) who causally interacts with beings in his cosmos.

At the end Moreland gives an interesting argument God’s deserving our complete or full worship implies that God can’t improve. I don’t think this argument is sound, though I agree with his conclusion. Here’s why – suppose God were super-duper good, and worthy of more worship than all humans put together could ever give him – yet, suppose he were not perfect, as good as a being could possibly be. It would not follow that we should withhold part of our worship, giving say 90% rather than 100%. So, given that God deserves all we’ve got, as it were, with no reservations, it doesn’t follow from that, that he’s perfect.

Note that all three, so long as we’re in this sort of discussion, think of God as a perfect self – a who, a being which is the subject of mental states, who has a first person point of view – not a lifeless thing or even a group, gang, or family of selves.

Finally, a dissenting voice, theologian-philosopher Philip Clayton. He holds that this way of thinking is too limited. He urges that a more fundamental concept that applies to God is infinity, or being without limits of any sort, an “Infinite One” (aka “the Divine”) implying pantheism or monism, or both. Sort of the one inconceivable unity which somehow lies behind all (appearance of?) complexity – like Brahman or the Tao. Religion like this, I think, has always been a rival to any sort of monotheism, though it is often presented as a deeper version of it. One doesn’t properly approach such a thing with worship, which is a self-to-self attitude, but rather via philosophical reasoning, perhaps punctuated by some fleeting, ineffable, non-cognitive episodes of consciousness. On this view, the worshiper of God (the perfect self) is intellectually and spiritually shallow, stuck, as it were, in the kindergarden of theology, and ultimately mistaken.

It is an interesting question how both views, diametrically opposed, can be found within what we think of as a single tradition – Christianity, Judaism, Islam, Hinduism – even Buddhism. I think a large part of the answer is that it is only small pockets of intellectuals who adopt the “infinite” sort of view, and that by accepting traditional language and practices, they sort of hide their disagreement from other people in the religion. But note that not all intellectuals do adopt it; our first three here are firmly in the perfect self camp.

Brian Leftow: Philosophers and Christians as dogs and cats (Dale)

Jul 202012
 

Ran across this great opening paragraph from philosopher Brian Leftow today:

I’m a philosopher because I am a Christian. To many intellectuals, this probably sounds like saying that I am a dog because I am a cat. Dogs hate cats, and otherwise polite philosophers have said to my face, with vigor, that “Christian philosopher” is a contradiction in terms. Cats are not fond of dogs, either. Christian friends have often reminded me that Luther call reason a whore. Well, reason is a whore. It will serve any master who can pay its price. But a whore was first to the empty tomb on the day of the Resurrection. Reason will serve God if given the chance; philosophy can be a work of Christian service. And Christian belief (I want to suggest) is far more a help than a hinderance to serious intellectual work. (Brian Leftow, “From Jerusalem to Athens,” in God and the Philosophers, emphasis and link added.)

I’m not sure he’s right about Mary, but it’s a great line. :-)

It’s a great essay – he tells the story of his transition from secular Jew to Christian, and philosophizes about philosophizing as a Christian.

Buzzard’s textual arguments against Jesus’ pre-human existence – Part 4 (Dale)

Jul 162012
 

In this recent video, Sir Anthony makes various relevant points. As I said in part 1 of this series, his linguistic argument against “pre-existence” is not his only one. At 3:11ff he gives a version of the linguistic argument I’ve been criticizing. It seems to me that the title of this video is false. To have been “begotten of God” I think, just means to be the Son of God – “begotten” neither means nor uncontroversially implies having been caused to come into existence.

I completely agree with him, by the way, that the NT strongly and repeatedly warns against any teaching that Jesus is not a real human being. But as we’ll see, we Christians disagree about what it is to be a real human being. And what it is to be a real human being is a philosophical question, and one not definitively settled by the Bible.

At 1:29-1:51 Sir Anthony says, basically, that it is doubtful that a human can exist as a non-human before its human existence, i.e. before its conception. At 4:21-38 he seems to make the stronger assertion that any human must come to exist in his or her mother’s womb.

Of course, there are test-tube conceived babies. I think he means
Continue reading »

Buzzard’s textual arguments against Jesus’ pre-human existence – Part 3 (Dale)

Jul 152012
 

Do you think that you pre-existed your conception?

Me neither.

True, there are cultures which pre-suppose this. But most of the human race, including ancient Jews, assumes that getting parented involves getting brought into existence some time between the sexual union and birth. You, the younger human being, exist because of what your parents did. This, I suggest,  is the default human assumption. You exist because of them.

Abe and Sarah did what married folk do. Because of this (with some sort of miraculous fertility assist from God) Isaac came to exist. When? Opinions vary as to the exact time, but certainly before birth, and  no earlier than union of sperm and egg – that’s what most of us think.

So Matthew and Luke don’t mention any pre-human existence for Jesus. They do assert that he’s the human son of Mary who was “begotten” – seemingly, conceived (as most translations have it) by the power of God. And as Buzzard emphasizes, for this reason, the angel says, the child will be called the Son of God.

What? Isn’t he called that because he has the divine nature, because he is one essence with the Father? Well, that’s not what it says. Would Luke have said it somewhere if he’d believed it? We would think so. So, this is a problem for the theological heirs of the fourth century catholic “fathers”. But it is not, on the face of it, a problem for humanitarian unitarians.

The elephants in the room Continue reading »

Buzzard’s textual arguments against Jesus’ pre-human existence – Part 2 (Dale)

Jul 142012
 

Buzzard complains at length about Platonizing “fathers” insisting that the New Testament teaches the “eternal generation” of the Son, citing the Lewis Carrol passage here. (pp. 260ff) I think he’s right to do so; the exegetical crimes of the “fathers” are legion. But in the end, I think Buzzard goes a bit too far.

The “word ‘beget‘,” he says, “is deprived of its actual meaning.” (p. 260) A page later:

The word “beget” had a perfectly easy meaning: to originate, to procreate, to cause to come into existence.” (p. 261)

I would say: let’s be careful here. If I understand correctly, the core meaning of the verb gennao is to become the parent of a child, to procreate, whether as father or mother.

Does this necessarily imply bringing into existence? Arguably not. If it did, then a sentence like this would be a self-contradiction (like married bachelor, square circle, or Jewish pope): “Sarah and Abraham begat Isaac, and when they did, Isaac’s soul moved from heaven down into Sarah’s womb.” Who would say such a thing? Well, a bloke like Origen, who believed in the pre-human-existence of all humans (i.e. their rational souls). And what if, for reasons known only to him, God first created Isaac’s soul, and then, say, five years later made those of Sarah and Abe. And later, Sarah and Abe beget (become the parents of) Isaac. Here, the one begotten would be older than the ones who begot him.

Now I’m not telling you to believe these things, or that the scriptures teach them. Rather, my sole point is Continue reading »

Buzzard’s textual arguments against Jesus’ pre-human existence – Part 1 (Dale)

Jul 132012
 

Let’s pretend that this shows Jesus at the age of 3 months. Does the New Testament teach that no more than 12 months before, Jesus came into existence (for the first time), that is, in philosopher’s lingo, that he was generated?

Sir Anthony Buzzard has argued that the New Testament teaches exactly that, and explicitly so. There’s been a boiling discussion of this argument by our intrepid commenters on this post.

I think this issue deserves some posts. In the past I’ve never been sure I’ve quite understood his argument, and so have never taken a position on it. I’m going to think through it in this series of posts.

Let us first note that the truth and reasonableness of this humanitarian unitarian christology doesn’t stand or fall with this exegetical argument. There may be other textual, theological, or philosophical reasons to hold that Christ did not exist before his human life, i.e. before his conception. It is clear to me, in fact, that this argument is not Sir Anthony’s only reason for this view. (See e.g. comment #2 in the discussion linked above.)

Second, let’s note that it is a very strong or bold argument. Continue reading »

Dale Tuggy interviewed by J. Dan Gill (Dale)

Jun 072012
 

I had the pleasure of meeting J. Dan Gill  recently in Atlanta. He’s a retired pastor in Nashville, Tennessee, but is very active with his wife Sharon in promoting what many call “biblical unitarianism,” what he calls a “One God” theology. (I prefer “unitarian Christianity” or “Christian unitarianism.”) He came to these views back in the 80s after rejecting “Oneness” Pentecostal theology. He’s an insightful speaker and Bible interpreter, always in pursuit of his dream “of seeing Christians pursue original / authentic Christianity together.”

He does a great  job here, interviewing me about my background, Philosophy, the evolution of my views, and so on. Downloads are available on the version posted on his website, 21stcr.org.

God and his Son: the logic of the New Testament (Dale)

Jun 042012
 

Below are links to my new screencast lecture, God and his Son: the logic of the New Testament. It is based on a talk I gave in May 2012 in Atlanta, Georgia. An actual video of that talk has been posted at the 21st Century Reformation website. I wasn’t reading from a script, so the versions are a bit different.

Part 1:

Part 2: Continue reading »

Who Should Christians Worship? (Dale)

May 302012
 

Here’s a screencast version of a talk I gave in Atlanta at the 2012 Theological Conference sponsored by the Atlanta Bible College. My thanks to the hosts and audience there for a good discussion.

This version is a bit longer, and I’ve tweaked my definitions of idolatry, I hope making them more accurate.

I believe an actual video of my talk will eventually be posted at the 21st Century Reformation website. The Atlanta version is more conversational and has film of me talking, and I believe it will include the Q&A that followed. I will post links when they are available.

Part 1:

Part 2: Continue reading »

How Trinity theories conflict with the New Testament (Dale)

May 172012
 

Most Christians are (at least in theory, according to creeds and statements of faith promulgated by denominations) trinitarians, believers in a triune or tri-personal God, which they call the Trinity. But some have always been unitarians, believers in one God who is one perfect self, who does not in any way contain three selves or “persons.” Nowadays, these are a minority (again, going by official statements and membership rolls – I think the facts about Christians’ actual beliefs are more complicated than the official documents suggest).

In my view, before around fifth century, unitarians were always a majority. Of course, they didn’t call themselves “unitarians” – that term is of late 17th c. coinage – but arguably most of them were unitarians - for some arguments read this. (Update: or this series.)

In any case, one can’t determine what is true by taking a vote. Truth may be unpopular. But also, it can be popular. So, who is right?

I propose that the following clear arguments provide a way forward. Which should we accept?

T1 The Father is not the Trinity
T2 The Trinity is God.
T3 Therefore, the Father is not God.

T1 The Father is not the Trinity.
U2 The Father is God.
U3 Therefore, The Trinity is not God.

“Is” here means numerical identity throughout. If x in this sense “is” y (in logic we write x=y) then x and y are one and the same, numerically one thing, numerically identical, and so x and y can’t ever differ in any way. The order doesn’t matter: it will be true that x=y just in case it is also true that y=x. And if it is false that x=y, then x and y are truly two – those terms name different things. To repeat: every “is” in these arguments is the “is” of identity. This is why we’re dealing with clear arguments. We’re not talking about some less close relation or association.

“God” here names Yahweh, the one true God asserted in the Hebrew scriptures.

Each argument is valid; in each case, if both premises were to be true, then the conclusion would also be true.

But we can’t consistently accept both arguments as sound. T2 conflicts with U3, and T3 conflicts with U2 (in both cases the pairs are contradictories – pairs such that one must be true and the other false).

So what to do?

Let us start on common ground. All sides should agree Continue reading »

Arguing against no one (Dale)

May 162012
 

Princeton philosopher Thomas Kelly in a paper on the epistemology of disagreement (i.e. what the reasonable response when we find the people just as smart and informed etc. as us disagree on some important matter):

In principle, we ought to be able to give due weight to the available reasons that support a given view, even in the absence of actual defenders of the view who take those reasons as compelling. But in practice, the case for a view is apt to get short shrift in the absence of any actual defenders. The existence of actual defenders can serve to overcome our blindspots by forcefully reminding us just how formidable the case is for the thesis that they defend… But the case for a given view itself is no stronger in virtue of the fact that that view has actual defenders…

Thomas Kelly, ” The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement,” p. 31 (in pre-print).

At first this reminded me of a proverb I’ve often thought of when reading some catholic theologian who has evidently never put the slightest effort into understanding the overall case for unitarianism:

“The first to speak in court sounds right–until the cross-examination begins.”  Proverbs 18:17 (NLT)

But this is actually a different point than Kelly’s. A better courtroom analogy for Kelly’s point is: Continue reading »

Craig on Flying Spaghetti Monster Mockery (Dale)

May 142012
 

The “Flying Spaghetti Monster” was born as an inept parody of intelligent design arguments.

About this, philosopher William Lane Craig is right on the money.

The FSM is more than this, though. It is thought by many village-atheist-type young males (roughly 12-29) to be an oh-so-clever-and-naughty parody of monotheism in general, apart from any design-creation controversies.

The thing is, the FSM is not clever – only naughty – or at least, potentially so, if people care enough to be offended by it (which I do not recommend). Really, the only amusing thing about it is how amused these folk are with themselves, as they think they’ve somehow pulled the pants down on believers in God.

But the joke’s on them.

Here are two differences between God and the FSM: (1) Many of our greatest scientists and philosophers have believed in God (examples: Newton, Descartes) – either on the basis of one or more arguments or based on his being the best explanation for certain facts vs.  no such people re: the FSM, (2) countless seemingly sane people claim to have experiential evidence for the existence of God vs. none for FSM.

Now these facts don’t show that God exists or that it is reasonable to believe in God. But it does show that it is reasonable to investigate the existence of God and not give another two seconds of thought to the FSM.

Done.

King of the Non Sequitur (Dale)

May 132012
 

The word is “Therefore…” When you are making a deductive argument, this means that what you are about to say logically follows from (is implied by) what you have just said. That is, if the former part were to be true, what you’re about to say must also be true.

A non sequitur (Latin for: “it doesn’t follow”) is an invalid argument, one in which the premises don’t imply the conclusion, that is, where one could consistently accept all the premises and yet deny the conclusion.

I recently stumbled upon this youtube video, The Trinity Explained (with Reason), featuring a supremely confident sounding young man. I watched amazed, as a torrent of non sequiturs ensued.

If only this fellow was as good at constructing arguments as he as at selecting pictures!

Here are most of them – note that in each case, the step starting with “Therefore” is not implied by the premises.

1. If unitarianism is true, God is more comprehensible than if trinitarianism is true.
2. God is not totally comprehensible and not fully explainable.
3. Therefore, unitarianism is false.

1. Unitarianism is true.
2. Therefore, God is no greater than a human being. Continue reading »

What is idolatry? (Dale)

May 102012
 

In a recent public presentation I tried to define two concepts of idolatry, but I wasn’t quite happy with either of them.

So here’s the 2.0 version, submitted to you for criticism and comment:

  • idolatry (def 1): the practice of honoring a representation or symbol as if it were a god or a person worthy of honor.

This is literal idolatry, which is the rule rather than the exception in the world’s religions – bowing, etc. to things like this Jain statue I photographed in Bombay. It was this sort of practice which was forbidden in the ten commandments:

You shall not make for yourself a carved image, or any likeness of anything that is in heaven above, or that is in the earth beneath, or that is in the water under the earth. You shall not bow down to them or serve them… Exodus 20:4-5, ESV

“Serve” here, I think, clearly signifies religious worship specifically. It is not clear, I think, that it is against any sort of respect for images, e.g. saluting a flag. But it is against the sort of image honoring typical of ancient near eastern religions.

Apart from this command, it seems to me, it is by no means obvious that the one God shouldn’t be worshiped by means of some object, be it representational or abstract. After all, millions, probably billions of people do this, either for some god or for the one God.

But very often in the New Testament, it is not the above concept which is in view. Instead, they have in mind Continue reading »

Patton’s problem with Apologists (Dale)

May 072012
 

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I recently stumbled upon a great post by Michael Patton that just about perfectly expresses how I’ve felt about Christian apologists since growing past teenagerhood.

In part:

This is the problem that I have with some apologists (those who defend the faith). Don’t get me wrong, I believe very much in apologetics and also love many apologists. But very rarely do I find a reasonable apologist. Most are very hardened because they are committed first to defending their particular position, not so much to learning.

Read the whole thing. He also has done a similar post recently.

I would add: apologists too often fall into mere rhetorical violence: hyperbole, attacking a straw man, verbal aggression, smug, acid condescension, simply repeating oneself more loudly, insults, poisoning the well, and so on. And this is leaving aside poorly constructed arguments. Sadly, debates between philosophers (one or both of whom may be atheists) are nearly always ”cleaner” (more reasonably and respectfully conducted) than your average debate between a Christian apologist and anyone else.

I’m always reminded of what James says: Continue reading »

Speaking at 2012 Theological Conference in Atlanta, Georgia (Dale)

May 012012
 

I’m heading to Atlanta to give two presentations at the 2012 Theological Conference:

  • Who Should Christians Worship?
  • God and His Son: The Logic of the New Testament

Stay tuned for video links.

Seems it’s going to be hot there…

Update: Had a great time there. Folks who heard me talk may be interested in seeing some highlights from this blog, or misc. books. My thanks to the Buzzards for their organization and hospitality, and to the Gills for filming it all.

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