Jerry Walls: What is wrong with Calvinism? (Dale)

May 172013
 

Devastating.

I have long noted that Augustinian/Calvinist theology is unpopular among Christian philosophers, though many, like me, go through a Calvinist phase (when I was a sophomore and junior in college), before seeing its problems to be hopeless. Walls concisely and fairly sums up what Calvinism is all about, and then shows it to be profoundly problematic, focusing on philosophical problem rather than biblical ones.

I would add that many of us – many Christians who’ve studied analytic philosophy – are persuaded by the Consequence Argument that compatibilism about human freedom is false, and also that if compatibilism about human freedom were true, then J.L. Mackie would have a sound argument for atheism. Christians need to make the free will defense against that argument, and to do that, you must believe in libertarian freedom. (But, that’s the kind of freedom we all, or almost all, believe in anyway.)

Mysterianism, as Walls points out, is very important to being a Calvinist. They think that “The Bible teaches X” is an answer to any difficulty. But it isn’t – in particular, objections to the effect that the Bible doesn’t actually teach X, and/or that X seems to be a contradiction.

Judging just by a few things he says here, I assume that Walls is a “social” trinitarian; but I don’t think that detracts from his case. And note that God is a “he” throughout.

Note to young professors and grad students – this is how you give a presentation. Note what Walls does.

  • Simple but relevant slides. Not too many. No distractions.
  • Talks loudly, to the audience, moving around.
  • Touch of humor.
  • Knows what Continue reading »

Important new open access journal: The Journal of Analytic Theology (Dale)

May 122013
 

jatCongratulations to editors Oliver Crisp, Michael Rea, Trent Dougherty and Kevin Diller on the launch of an important new open access journal: The Journal of Analytic Theology.

What is “analytic” theology?

Good question. Roughly: theology done using the tools of contemporary (typically English-language) “analytic” philosophy.

What is that? Here’s one answer by a master practitioner. Also, this journal aims to “explore theological and meta-theological topics in a manner that prizes terminological clarity and argumentative rigor.” I assume that the topics will not be limited to Christian ones, although glancing through the names on the editorial board, I don’t recognize the names of anyone I know to be a non-Christian.

I’m sure this is going to be an important source both for philosophers and for theologians. The inaugural issue in fact features some interactions between the two.

It also features an interesting article by trinities contributor Scott Williams – congratulations, Scott! Maybe I’ll post a few comments or here on trinities soon.

Finally, kudos are due to the Center for the Philosophy of Religion at the University of Notre Dame and Baylor University for their support of this project. Their support is advancing the cause of Christian thought.

Love the logo. If they made another, they could talk about their official “logos.”

OK, I’ll stop.

One-self Trinity theories (Dale)

Mar 232013
 

I used to call these sorts Trinity theories of “modalism.” I still think that is not a bad description, so long as you specify that it is not by definition heretical or wrong.

But I now think “one-self” is a more neutral term, which even better describes the sort of theory.

The reasoning goes like this.

The Christian God must, after all is said and done, be Continue reading »

Credo House Ministries’ Inaccuracies about the Trinity and the Council of Nicea (Dale)

Mar 212013
 

Unimpressed-Mona-LisaI’ve blogged about these folks before. I do not enjoy criticizing apologists, because I think Christian apologetics is important. And the folks at Credo House Ministries seem like good-hearted and hard working Christians who are doing their best to help Christians love God with their minds. And I think Patton is an excellent blogger and writer.

But I feel compelled to correct some of their inaccurate statements about “the” doctrine of the Trinity. In this video, they want to correct the myth that “The Trinity” – by which they mean “the” doctrine of the Trinity, or rather, the widely accepted catholic creedal formulas -”was invented.”

Well, given that it is a doctrine which we’re talking about, a theory, which didn’t exist in BC times, of course it was “invented,” i.e first formulated and stated by some folks.

But it actually wasn’t in 325, at Nicea! That formula, as then understood, was consistent with Christian unitarian theology.

But let’s go through their video. Continue reading »

New Papers (Dale)

Feb 152013
 

paperI’ve just updated my homepage with a paper forthcoming in Faith and Philosophy, called “Hasker’s Quests for a Viable Social Theory.” My sincere thanks to editor Thomas Flint, and to that journal’s anonymous readers for their help.

The paper critically examines the various discussions of William Hasker, a very accomplished Christian philosopher, and former editor of F&P, from whom I have learned much. I think that more than anyone, he’s tried hard to make the “social” approach to the Trinity work – in which you say that the “Persons” of the Trinity really are persons, that is, selves, and then try to figure out how this is not going to be tritheism. In my judgment, Hasker does not succeed in coming up with a philosophically and theologically viable take on the Trinity. But judge for yourself, after you see the arguments.

Along the way I discuss Bill Craig’s (and J.P. Moreland’s?) social theory. This too seems like a dead end to me.

Social theorists’ most serious problem is not that they raise the hackles of many Christian philosophers, but rather that they contradict the New Testament. (e.g. Paul and John.) Maybe in a few days I’ll post a historical supplement to this paper – a part the journal compelled me to cut, which deals with Hasker’s misunderstandings of some patristic material.

I have other forthcoming papers which I’m not at liberty to publicly post yet. In “On Bauckham’s Bargain,” (forthcoming in Theology Today), I critically examine Richard Bauckham’s “christology of divine identity” – which has attracted so many evangelical apologists and theologians. I worked hard to make this paper communicate to non-philosophers, and I really hope it leads to some helpful discussion.

Another forthcoming publication is a slightly revised version of this talk, to be published here. I miss the pictures, but I think it is an important topic for all Christians to think carefully about.

Orthodox modalism (Dale)

Aug 012012
 

Consider this recent affair; to the relief of many evangelicals, this prominent leader has turned from the brink of damnable heresy. That is, he’s turned from Oneness Pentecostal theology (which is, in my experience, as clear as mud) to “Orthodoxy.” Christianity Today trumpets: “T.D. Jakes Embraces Doctrine of the Trinity, Moves Away from ‘Oneness’ View“.

“I began to realize that there are some things that could be said about the Father that could not be said about the Son,” Jakes said. “There are distinctives between the working of the Holy Spirit and the moving of the Holy Spirit, and the working of the redemptive work of Christ. I’m very comfortable with that.”

This is the indiscernibility of identicals (also here) in action. This is a valid inference : x and y have differed, so x and y are not numerically identical. So in his view, the Father is not the Son.

So far so good. But what sorts of things does he think the Father and Son are?

It seems: “manifestations.” Of what? God. So they are two manifestations of God.

So of course he asserts that he (the new trinitarian) and the Oneness folk “are saying the same thing.”

At this event Pastor Marc Driscoll grilled Jakes on catholic formulas, and Jakes said yes to them all, only qualifying – like a number of catholic theologians – that he doesn’t much like the term “person.” So as far as Driscoll and many viewers are concerned, he’s “orthodox.”

But Jakes’ misreading of 1 Tim 3:16 is revealing – he thinks that the one God – conceived as a self (I’m interpreting here) manifested in the life of Jesus – so that the self operative there in that life is simply God. “Jesus” is the mode of God’s manifesting in this way, including, presumably, a real human being.  Of course, Jesus, aka the Son isn’t the Father; they are two different modes of God, ways God is. (He says “manifests” but since he agrees that the Trinity is eternal, he must have in mind something intrinsic to God rather than a relation to creatures.)

Just as Jakes has said before:

I believe in one God who is the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit. I believe these three have distinct and separate functions — so separate each has individual attributes, yet are one. I do not believe in three Gods. …Though no human illustration perfectly fits the Divine, it is similar to ice, water and steam: three separate forms, yet all H20. Each element can co-exist, each has distinguishing characteristics and functions, but all have sameness…. (link and emphasis added)

For Jakes, God just is a certain great self, who eternally lives in three ways. It seems he is a noumenal, eternally concurrent FSH modalist.

But my point is not to throw rocks at Jakes. Rather, my point is Continue reading »

How Trinity theories conflict with the New Testament (Dale)

May 172012
 

Most Christians are (at least in theory, according to creeds and statements of faith promulgated by denominations) trinitarians, believers in a triune or tri-personal God, which they call the Trinity. But some have always been unitarians, believers in one God who is one perfect self, who does not in any way contain three selves or “persons.” Nowadays, these are a minority (again, going by official statements and membership rolls – I think the facts about Christians’ actual beliefs are more complicated than the official documents suggest).

In my view, before around fifth century, unitarians were always a majority. Of course, they didn’t call themselves “unitarians” – that term is of late 17th c. coinage – but arguably most of them were unitarians - for some arguments read this. (Update: or this series.)

In any case, one can’t determine what is true by taking a vote. Truth may be unpopular. But also, it can be popular. So, who is right?

I propose that the following clear arguments provide a way forward. Which should we accept?

T1 The Father is not the Trinity
T2 The Trinity is God.
T3 Therefore, the Father is not God.

T1 The Father is not the Trinity.
U2 The Father is God.
U3 Therefore, The Trinity is not God.

“Is” here means numerical identity throughout. If x in this sense “is” y (in logic we write x=y) then x and y are one and the same, numerically one thing, numerically identical, and so x and y can’t ever differ in any way. The order doesn’t matter: it will be true that x=y just in case it is also true that y=x. And if it is false that x=y, then x and y are truly two – those terms name different things. To repeat: every “is” in these arguments is the “is” of identity. This is why we’re dealing with clear arguments. We’re not talking about some less close relation or association.

“God” here names Yahweh, the one true God asserted in the Hebrew scriptures.

Each argument is valid; in each case, if both premises were to be true, then the conclusion would also be true.

But we can’t consistently accept both arguments as sound. T2 conflicts with U3, and T3 conflicts with U2 (in both cases the pairs are contradictories – pairs such that one must be true and the other false).

So what to do?

Let us start on common ground. All sides should agree Continue reading »

Arguing against no one (Dale)

May 162012
 

Princeton philosopher Thomas Kelly in a paper on the epistemology of disagreement (i.e. what the reasonable response when we find the people just as smart and informed etc. as us disagree on some important matter):

In principle, we ought to be able to give due weight to the available reasons that support a given view, even in the absence of actual defenders of the view who take those reasons as compelling. But in practice, the case for a view is apt to get short shrift in the absence of any actual defenders. The existence of actual defenders can serve to overcome our blindspots by forcefully reminding us just how formidable the case is for the thesis that they defend… But the case for a given view itself is no stronger in virtue of the fact that that view has actual defenders…

Thomas Kelly, ” The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement,” p. 31 (in pre-print).

At first this reminded me of a proverb I’ve often thought of when reading some catholic theologian who has evidently never put the slightest effort into understanding the overall case for unitarianism:

“The first to speak in court sounds right–until the cross-examination begins.”  Proverbs 18:17 (NLT)

But this is actually a different point than Kelly’s. A better courtroom analogy for Kelly’s point is: Continue reading »

Defining the concept of a unitarian (Dale)

Apr 242012
 

Last time I offered a definition of the concept of a trinitarian.

This time, I will try to define the concept of a unitarian.

Many definitions of this concept are unacceptably polemical.  It is unacceptable to define a unitarian as an anti-trinitarian.  This violates requirements 3 and 5 – it doesn’t tell us what a unitarian is, but only what a unitarian is against.  And this is part of a common slashing rhetorical strategy which I have recently mentioned.  For the same reasons we must reject defining the concept unitarian as one who “denies the Trinity” or “has heretical beliefs about the Trinity,” etc. Equally, it is unacceptable to define a unitarian as one who holds the correct or biblical view about Jesus and God. Whether or not that’s so, it’s trying to sneak an argument for a thesis into a pseudo-definition of that thesis.

One common definition is,

Definition 1: someone who believes in exactly one unipersonal God.

I think this is on the right track, but the term “unipersonal” is obscure, and so this definition violates requirement 6 (and possibly also 3).

I have been working with this definition of the concept:

Definition 2: someone who believes that the one God just is (is numerically identical to) the Father.

I now think that this isn’t quite right.

First the definition is arguably too narrow.  Continue reading »

“Sabellianism Reconsidered” Considered – Part 6 (Dale)

Apr 192012
 

Switchfoot “are one”. But they are really just five dudes, not one.

Baber observes,

Typically, aggregates of Fs are not themselves Fs. A collection of cats is not itself a cat… an aggregation of persons is not a person. (p. 7, emphasis added)

Still, she thinks this needn’t preclude three gods from themselves being a god. Some sorts of things, it seems, can have other things of that same sort for parts, such as a Sierpinski Triangle. (p. 10) Maybe, then, gods are more like triangles like cats, in that groups of god can be (temporal) parts of a god. At least, we can’t rule out that this is possible.

How many temporal parts does God, on this theory have? There’s no reason to think it is exactly three. Continue reading »

A Lesson in Christological Rhetoric (Dale)

Apr 082012
 

You say that you want to argue for a “high” christology, for something widely considered to be a mainstream Christian understanding of Jesus. My advice is: be careful - if you say too much, you’ll open yourself up to refutation, and your claim will appear implausible, or too contentious and theoretical, or you’ll at least invite questions you have no intention of answering. How, then, to state your thesis?

“Jesus is God himself“? Sounds heretical (suggests they’re the same person, and not merely the same being, and that the Son and Father are the same person). Plus, sounds a bit too strong.

“Jesus has the divine nature“? What’s a divine nature? Who knows? Help! Is there a metaphysician in the house? You don’t want to go there – legions of nature-theories are lurking in the shadows, nipping and growling at one another, and at you.

“Jesus is a member of the Trinity“? Good and vague – but it raises that whole Trinity issue. Better to sidestep that one.

“Jesus is included in the identity of God.” Mysterious, but not in a good way. Plenty unclear, but sounds too high-falootin’, too academic – like something Brian McLaren would write. Too newly minted. You can retreat to this if need be – you can name-drop a famous scholar or two here – but whatever you do, don’t lead with it.

“Jesus is God“?

Mmm… good and vague. Powerfully simple, pithy. Close – but too much like the first statement above.

You may believe all of the above – but you don’t want to say any of those claims, unless you have to.

Here’s a better way: Continue reading »

Scott Williams’s new paper: Henry of Ghent on Real Relations and the Trinity (Dale)

Mar 262012
 

Congratulations to Scott Williams, trinities contributor and newly minted Oxford University PhD in Theology,  on his forthcoming paper:

 ‘Henry of Ghent on Real Relations and the Trinity: The Case for Numerical Sameness Without Identity’, in: Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie Médiévales 79.1 (2012), will be published.

Here is his abstract:

I argue that there is a hitherto unrecognized connection between Henry of Ghent’s general theory of real relations and his Trinitarian theology, namely the notion of numerical sameness without identity.
This last notion can be traced back to Aristotle, and pops up through the middle ages: the basic idea is that an x and y can differ, and so fail to be identical, and yet be “numerically one”. Myself, I deny that there’s any such relation, but some disagree, most notably Mike Rea and Jeff Brower. Here’s a relevant 2007 post featuring Billary.
Theories of real relations… well, Scott should get on here and explain that one! Medieval theories of relations are best left to the specialists. :-)

Craig, White, and Cerberus (Dale)

Mar 182012
 

First, I suggest we stick with “SER-ber-us” because pronouncing it “Ker-ber-us” fills some people’s  heads with images like these. And we can all agree, that is not a good thing. :-)

Last time, I mentioned Bill Craig’s recent public assertion of his Cerberus analogy for the Trinity. Here’s a remix by an Islamic apologist, with snickering commentary by Reformed Christian apologist James White.

I take it White is not a “social” theorist like Craig, but rather a negative mysterian (refusing to assign much intelligible content to the doctrine) – like those Dallas Theological Seminary folks. In that video linked above, he just asserts that Craig doesn’t know what he’s talking about.

This (that he’s a negative mysterian) in confirmed by this follow up video.  (Or at his blog.) In the name of just sticking with what the Bible says, he just Continue reading »

Is the Pope a Modalist? (Dale)

Dec 312011
 

First, a few clarifications. By “modalist” I do not mean “Sabellian” or “monarchian.” (Those ancient catholics probably did hold to various forms of modalism, but the term is not a historical one, and can refer to other views which probably no ancient person held.) Nor do I mean modalism by definition to be heretical relative to orthodox/catholic creeds. What I mean is that at least one of these – Father, Son, Spirit – is a mode of the one God, in some sense a way that God is. That last phrase is deliberately ambiguous.

In his recent Christmas sermon the Pope said:

In all three Christmas Masses, the liturgy quotes a passage from the Prophet Isaiah, which describes the epiphany that took place at Christmas in greater detail: “A child is born for us, a son given to us and dominion is laid on his shoulders; and this is the name they give him: Wonder-Counsellor, Mighty-God, Eternal-Father, Prince-of-Peace. Wide is his dominion in a peace that has no end” (Is 9:5f.). … A child, in all its weakness, is Mighty God. A child, in all its neediness and dependence, is Eternal Father. …

God has appeared – as a child. It is in this guise that he pits himself against all violence and brings a message that is peace. (emphases and link added)

This last phrase, X has appeared as S, is ambiguous. It could mean Continue reading »

two scholars on the concept of monotheism (Dale)

Nov 272011
 

At the blog The Time Has Been Shortened, interviews with Dr. Nathan MacDonald and Dr. Michael S. Heiser.

I read most of MacDonald’s Deuteronomy and the Meaning of ‘Monotheism’. I found it helpful, but had some fundamental disagreements with it. Those another time.

The two have very different views of the OT & the issue of monotheism. To oversimplfy, MacDonald thinks that for a long time, Jews were polytheistic, then they became monotheists of a sort and changed older polytheistic OT texts to fit their new views. In contrast, Heiser thinks that all along they believed YHWH to be unique, although many could be called “elohim.” This is a very interesting disagreement, but  I won’t join the fray here.

Just a couple of comments.

Yes, monotheism is the belief that there there exists exactly one god. This sounds silly to say, but this has been denied repeatedly as of late.

Contra MacDonald’s first answer in the interview, the only real unclarity in this is what counts as a god, i.e. the concept of godhood.

The important issue here is the idea of monotheism, not the word “monotheism.” Yes, it is a fairly recent term, but I would argue, a helpful one – at least, once we make clear what is meant by the term “god.”

Heiser says, 

I don’t care for the modern definition as someone who accepts the Judeo-Christian canon.

Eh… how would accepting the authority of the Bible tell you that “monotheism” is or is not a helpful term? Continue reading »

On Numerical Sameness / Identity / “Absolute” Identity (Dale)

Jul 202011
 

I’ve been reading some stuff about identity and relative identity lately, in the process of writing something on relative identity versions of trinitarianism. This post is to share some good finds.

In his excellent entry “Relative Identity“ veteran logican and philosopher of language Harry Deutsch says about the best that can be said for relative identity theories – that maybe, arguably, they solve or help to solve various metaphysical problems. See his sections 2 and 4 for these. His section 5 is a penetrating analysis of Geach’s very hard to follow arguments.

Deutsch’s point of view is very different from that held by most philosophers. For this, see chapter 1 of Colin McGinn’s Logical Properties. (NDPR review.) This is more or less  the “orthodox” view that most philosophers hold, atheist or theist, trinitarian or not. I largely agree with it, except for its Platonic aspect. I uphold the logic of identity as McGinn understands it, but do not want to commit to the existence of abstracta like relations. I think the truthmaker of a sentence like “Dubya just is George Bush” is going to be a concrete object, the ex-president himself. In this, I’m in the minority; most philosophers find abstracta indispensible.

Another place one can start is Harold Noonan‘s excellent “Identity” entry. He’s an excellent philosopher, and the piece has many virtues; in particular, see his section 2 on Leibniz’s Law vs. substitutivity principles.

The best thing I’ve ever read on identity and relative identity is Continue reading »

Cross-Cultural Dialogue: Theologian and Philosopher (Dale)

Jun 152011
 

A while back I posted on a short, popular piece by Biola theologian Fred Sanders. He’s now responded. I’m going to continue the conversation, I hope shedding light on the differing assumptions and methods of present-day academic theologians and philosophers. I agree with Fred that responses-to-responses are usually boring. Here’s a greater crime: a (long) response to a response to a response. :-P

I guess what set me in motion was his claim, which struck me as unreasonable, that it’s a good thing that there’s no “Trinity verse” in the Bible – i.e. one which explicitly and clearly  states the doctrine.

In fact, up until I think some time in the late 19th c., trinitarians thought they had something pretty close: Continue reading »

The Standard Opening Move (Dale)

Apr 022011
 

Is the Trinity contradictory? In reply to such a charge or query, there’s a standard opening move employed by trinitarians who have some training in logic, be they theologian, philosopher, or apologist. (I’ve seen this by all three sorts.) It goes like this:

“We’re not saying that God is exactly one A and exactly three A’s. That would be a contradiction. We’re saying that God is one A and three B’s. Where’s the contradiction?”

On the face of it, this is a good and reasonable reply to the charge that the doctrine of the Trinity includes or implies a contradiction (and so is false). In general, we must be careful with facile charges of contradiction; often, such claims are easily rebutted.

But it is only an opening move, and it is a shallow one, as I’ll explain. In fact, it leaves you as exposed as our friend with the raised leg here.

Suppose you say that right now there are ten on the field, and also exactly two on the field. By this, you mean ten players and two teams. This is consistent.

How about ten bugs and two players. No problemo.

Now suppose you say that there are now ten players on the field and exactly two human beings? That is not consistent, for each player just is a certain human being.

Thus, the sort of logical point I made at the outset of this post works sometimes, but sometimes it fails. It all depends on what the terms are, and how they are related.

But does this work or not, in the case of the Trinity?

With creedal Trinity claims, as often understood, A = divine being, and B = divine person Continue reading »

Linkage: Ignored Analytic Theology (Dale)

Feb 182011
 

Over at Aporetic Christianity Paul has a worthy post on a major new tome of systematic theology, which he says whiffs it on the contributions of analytic philosophers of the last 40 years or so.

I posted on this very phenomenon back in 2008.

I agree with all the examples Paul gives of philosophers / analytic theologians whose work should not be ignored by any serious investigator – not because they’re my peeps – but because their work is disciplined, insightful, well motivated, clearly argued. In short, it has things you want if you’re serious about getting to the truth of the matter.

Why do systematic theologians do this?

Maybe there’s no deep answer. Maybe: (1) they’re not familiar with this large genre, (2) philosophy is hard, (3) they can ignore it – a portion of the intended audience won’t notice. They won’t get any letters protesting the ignoring of Plantinga, Craig, van Inwagen, or Leftow.

To those of us who are philosophically literate, in most cases philosophy-ignoring work just isn’t going to answer our questions. It’s not a matter of style, taste, or preference – but of substance. This is hard to convey to people who aren’t so trained. Here’s an analogy. Imagine you’re a Continue reading »

Linkage: Feudin’ Christian Philosophers & Theologians (Dale)

Jan 172011
 

Over at Aporetic Christianity, Paul M. has a long but interesting and perceptive post on the hostility he’s encountered in some Reformed circles towards analytic theology. (See his whole post if you’re wondering what “analytic theology” is.)

A sample:

Not only is philosophy shunned as speculative and troublesome, many Reformed… disparage some of the tools those in this discipline specialize in utilizing. Logic and analytical rigor are shunned and not trusted. …Theologians and philosophers each do their own thing, neither mining the work of the other. Theologians find the philosophers speculative and often unorthodox. Philosophers find the theologians unclear, dogmatic (in a negative sense), and holding to beliefs based on faulty reasoning and supported by poor argumentation. This state of affairs is odd considering how many theologians of the past made use of continental philosophy.

Past and present, I would say. Check out the whole post. It’s mildly depressing, but to be expected – humans, and academics, are territorial creatures. If only Bugs could mediate this feud – we could all “bow to the gent across the hall”.

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