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Chad McIntosh

Chad McIntosh is a PhD student in Philosophy at Cornell University.

Surrejoinder on Divine Deception

I dropped two nukes on Dale’s divine deception argument in two previous posts, which I dubbed Fat Boy and Little Man, respectively. From the ashes Dale returned desperate and feeble fire. Out of respect for my worthy friend foe, I now respond with some a fallout clean up and hereafter promise ceasefire. Dale’s Response to Little Boy In answer to my skeptical theist response to… Read More »Surrejoinder on Divine Deception

Dale’s Divine Deception Dilemma

Central to Dale’s divine deception argument against Social Trinitarianism (ST) is the following analogy. Little orphan Annie is one day adopted by a man named Fred who claims to be her father. Fred lovingly raises Annie over the years, but for unknown reasons will not see her in person. But, at long last, Fred finally does meet her. Much to her surprise, however, Annie meets… Read More »Dale’s Divine Deception Dilemma

Farewell to Tuggy’s Divine Deception Argument

In “Divine Deception, Identity, and Social Trinitarianism” Dale argues that if Social Trinitarianism (ST) were true, the Father, Son, and Spirit would be guilty of a blameworthy act of deception. But because the Father, Son, and Spirit are ex hypothesi morally perfect, ST must be false. By offering a moral objection to ST, Dale’s argument has the lovely virtue of sidestepping the tired tri-theist objections… Read More »Farewell to Tuggy’s Divine Deception Argument

Yet More Theories of the Trinity

In my recent paper on the Trinity (discussed by Dale and I here and here) I distinguish two ways a thing can meet sufficient conditions of personhood. One way is to behave, function, or perform in such a way as to meet those conditions. So if a robot or group, for example, became morally responsible or rational in virtue of function alone, it would thereby… Read More »Yet More Theories of the Trinity

Is “Supports” Intelligible?

Building on the substance dualist view that our own individual substance/soul supports one mind (i.e., person), Williams, Craig, and Hasker propose models of the Trinity according to which a single trope of divinity—a divine substance/soul—supports three minds (i.e., persons) in like manner. Craig relies on this claim to flesh out how three persons can be said to compose one being, and Hasker relies on the… Read More »Is “Supports” Intelligible?