Dale Tuggy

Dale Tuggy is Professor of Philosophy at the State University of New York at Fredonia, where he teaches courses in analytic theology, philosophy of religion, religious studies, and the history of philosophy.

4 Comments

  1. Ian Spencer
    September 12, 2008 @ 11:51 pm

    I should add that I’m actually inclined towards the view that it is precisely *A-theoretic* views of time that are incompatible with libertarian freedom and/or moral responsibility(I’ve been developing various arguments to show this for various versions of the A-theory, presentism included – I’m delivering a version of one of these actually at the upcoming Eastern APA meeting for the phil time society).

  2. Ian Spencer
    September 12, 2008 @ 11:48 pm

    Thanks for the clarification Dale. I guess I simply have no idea how a B-theoretic view all on its own could be incompatible with libertarian freedom without sneaking in some A-theoretic assumption (that is, without already assuming that the tensed treatment of some temporal phenomena – agency, say – is the correct one) or making an assumption an indeterministic, arrow-of-time-respecting B-theorist ought to reject anyway. As someone whose primary work is in philosophy of time, if you’ve got a plausible B-theory and you reject determinism, I see nothing to stop anyone from having an unconditional ability to choose or do otherwise. Certainly, nothing follows directly from the B-theory one way or another, once it is properly understood (which, from my reading, most A-theorists do not – indeed, many B-theorists don’t understand it completely either). I think it ultimately comes down to whether you’re inclined to the A-theory – something I’m sure we won’t agree upon!

  3. Dale
    September 11, 2008 @ 7:07 am

    Hi Ian,

    It’s very easy to “make them compatible”. Just go for some sort of compatibilist theory, or be a confused libertarian. The latter, I think, is the more popular route among recent Christian philosophers (e.g. Craig, Plantinga). No “no future” assumption – in some sense there are at least some future facts – just the firm conviction that freedom requires an *unconditional* ability to (sometimes) choose or do otherwise. I am now committed to presentism, and was implicitly back then. I think B-theory views are incompatible with libertarian freedom.

  4. Ian Spencer
    September 9, 2008 @ 5:44 pm

    Not to steer things into a tangent, but I was wondering what, philosophically speaking, made you come to think freedom and foreknowledge are incompatible. It would seem to me pretty easy to make them compatible. Of course, to do that you can’t be a presentist or growing block-er – if my own free actions do not ground God’s knowledge of them, I would agree that they couldn’t be free. Was there some “No Future” assumption behind this move to open theism? If so, I would say you gave up on the compatibility of foreknowledge and freedom far to easily (of course, I’m a bit biased here – I have very definite views on the philosophy of time)!