Don’t ask me what this doctrine means… I only believe it.
Last time we briefly explored Redirection, the first of our four ways to respond to apparent contradictions in theology.
The response of Restraint is a little more reasonable. This person realizes that a certain way of understanding, say, the doctrine of the Trinity, seems inconsistent. The Christian walking the path of Restraint declines to endorse that way of understanding the Trinity, or any other clear formulation. “Sure, if it meant X, then it would seem contradictory… but maybe it doesn’t mean X.”
The Restrained believer neither affirms nor denies X, exercising Restraint . He declines to say precisely what the great Doctrine in question is, because (he says) he doesn’t know what it is supposed to be. Of course, he’ll say he’s committed to the truth of whatever it is that’s supposed to be expressed by the traditional formulas of the Doctrine, and he doesn’t rule out that others who are holier and/or more informed have understood it – not just endorsing words, but also grasping the truths they express.
The main thing to say about Restraint is that it’s perfectly reasonable as an initial move, but nowhere to pitch camp. It is only a way of stalling. Stalling is often reasonable; no one has time to look into every difficulty, and we have a lot more to do than develop our theological thinking. The Restrained believer is saying that he believes, hopes, or is somehow committed to certain sentences expressing truth, but isn’t aware of what that truth is.
Fair enough. One should be spurred on, though, by three concerns. First, some people have claimed to discern various important truths in those sentences. So, one should seek to find the same. Second, the sentences in question could be fool’s gold – it could be that they really express only falsehood. One needs to rule this out, to avoid forming false beliefs. Third, maybe the sentences express nothing – maybe they are unintelligible, non-understandable. If so, whatever their value, they won’t be a means of believing, thinking, or expressing truths. Again, this needs to be ruled out.
So while Restraint is initially an expression of intellectual humility (one doesn’t just jump to dismiss a doctrine at the first sign of a problem), eventually it becomes an irresponsible stance, for the three reasons just given.
(In my “Unfinished business of Trinitarian theorizing” I more specifically address some kinds of Restraint about the Trinity in particular. (pages 3, 24-7 in this preprint version).)
Next time: Restraint and “implicit faith”.
Technorati Tags: Restraint, mystery, apparent contradiction, paradox, theological paradox, intellectual humility
Pingback: trinities - Dealing with Apparent Contradictions: Part 7 - Resolution by Rational Reinterpretation (Dale)
Pingback: trinities - Dealing with Apparent Contradictions: Part 5 - Aquinas on Implicit Faith (Dale)
Hi Matthew,
Thanks for the comment. It seems to me that the issue of God is infinitely more important than whether or not current physics is (mostly? nearly?) true. So what if I form false beliefs about physics (unless, of course, I’m a physicist, or am designed bombs or something). But false beliefs about God may thwart or hinder my most important relationship – with God. And it could affect what religious group I join, how I spend a good portion of my income, my sex life, where I school my kids, etc. I take it this is why you’re not moved by my reasons for moving away from the stance of Restraint about theological difficulties.
I know it’s fashionable among mainstream analytic philosophers to defer to scientists, but I’m very wary of that. I see many scientists (1) so wrapped in practical concerns that they’re not too worried about the truth or rationality of their views, (2) propounding metaphysical claims based on current theories, not realizing the giant non sequiturs they’re committing. And more disturbingly, the more developed my own philosophical views are, the more I hold views which physicists tend to assume are false. E.g. presentism, theism, libertarian free will, dualism. So I’m wary of treating them as experts in any truly philosophical (or theological) matters. Finally, (3) some form of moderate non-realism about scientific theories is far from crazy. The more history of science you know, then more this point gets drilled into you.
I’m in many ways in agreement with your post and I’ve run similar kinds of arguments. I do have a worry and I’m curious as to how you’d address it.
It looks like I have restraint with regards to lots of things that I say about physics. I believe that the sentences I utter about quantum mechanics express truths, truths that some people have found quite important, but I can’t profess to understand or be able to explicate the theories (doctrines) that underlie these things that I express. However, I feel confidant that I can point you to someone who can explain the truths expressed by my utterances. The thing is, I don’t feel at all motivated by any of your three reasons to inquire more into matter, and further, it seems perfectly reasonable for me not to pursue inquiry. So, what is it that distinguishes the religious case from physics?
Pingback: trinities - Dealing with Apparent Contradictions: Part 4 - Restraint and Implicit Faith (Dale)
Comments are closed.