Dale Tuggy

Dale Tuggy is Professor of Philosophy at the State University of New York at Fredonia, where he teaches courses in analytic theology, philosophy of religion, religious studies, and the history of philosophy.

2 Comments

  1. Joshua Harris
    May 21, 2015 @ 11:51 am

    Thanks for this interesting series of posts! I’m reading with interest.

    >>Imagine that there’s a necessary being, a self, with vast powers of intentional action. Now imagine that this being has an overwhelmingly strong motive to create another being, and no motives to not create such a being, and that nothing else exists which is able to thwart or prevent such an action.<>Aquinas makes this point somewhere; we want to say not that God is necessary through another, and also not that God is necessary for no reason (i.e. his necessity is a brute fact), but rather that God is necessary because of himself, in other words, that it is impossible for God to not exist because of something about God himself.Answering the first question is harder than it may appear. I’ll take a crack at in in my next post.<<

    Yes! The "something about God himself" is precisely that his essence and existence are identical!

  2. Thomas
    May 16, 2015 @ 6:16 pm

    In your example, it would seem that the creature composed of essence and existence only exists because of its causal dependence on something else. Even if one accepts that particular objection as cogent, don’t you give up the game anyway? Effectively you just distinction between something like intrinsic and extrinsic necessity. Creatures for whom essence and existence are different depend (necessarily) on an extrinsic efficient cause. Thus the dependence of creatures on God by virtue of his simplicity.