Most Christians are (at least in theory, according to creeds and statements of faith promulgated by denominations) trinitarians, believers in a triune or tri-personal God, which they call the Trinity. But some have always been unitarians, believers in one God who is one perfect self, who does not in any way contain three selves or “persons.” Nowadays, these are a minority (again, going by official statements and membership rolls – I think the facts about Christians’ actual beliefs are more complicated than the official documents suggest).

In my view, before around fifth century, unitarians were always a majority. Of course, they didn’t call themselves “unitarians” – that term is of late 17th c. coinage – but arguably most of them were unitarians - for some arguments read this.

In any case, one can’t determine what is true by taking a vote. Truth may be unpopular. But also, it can be popular. So, who is right?

I propose that the following clear arguments provide a way forward. Which should we accept?

T1 The Father is not the Trinity
T2 The Trinity is God.
T3 Therefore, the Father is not God.

T1 The Father is not the Trinity.
U2 The Father is God.
U3 Therefore, The Trinity is not God.

“Is” here means numerical identity throughout. If x in this sense “is” y (in logic we write x=y) then x and y are one and the same, numerically one thing, numerically identical, and so x and y can’t ever differ in any way. The order doesn’t matter: it will be true that x=y just in case it is also true that y=x. And if it is false that x=y, then x and y are truly two – those terms name different things. To repeat: every “is” in these arguments is the “is” of identity. This is why we’re dealing with clear arguments. We’re not talking about some less close relation or association.

“God” here names Yahweh, the one true God asserted in the Hebrew scriptures.

Each argument is valid; in each case, if both premises were to be true, then the conclusion would also be true.

But we can’t consistently accept both arguments as sound. T2 conflicts with U3, and T3 conflicts with U2 (in both cases the pairs are contradictories – pairs such that one must be true and the other false).

So what to do?

Let us start on common ground. All sides should agree to T1. The reason is that if there is a Trinity - however you understand it – it differs from the Father. And so, it (or: he, they) can’t be one and the same thing as the Father, can’t be numerically identical to him. For example, no one thinks that the Father contains three persons (or “persons”), but on any understanding of the Trinity it (he, they) somehow contains or is composed of three persons (“persons”). So trinitarians should agree with T1. Whatever the relation between the Father and the Trinity it is, however close, however mysterious, we know that it can’t be identity, for it is self-evident that one and the same thing can’t differ from itself at one time (or in eternity).

• Do you think that the Father “is God” in some other sense? (e.g. is wholly composed of the divine nature, possesses the divine essence, is a part of the triune God, is a member of the group of divine persons who collectively are “God”) Fine. Still, you should agree with T1; T1 is consistent with such theories.
• For their part, unitarian Christians also agree with T1, because they think that the triune God is a hypothesized entity that does not actually exist. But if it did exist, it would differ from the Father, and so couldn’t just be the Father.

But having agreed on premise 1, we’re still stuck.

• If we accept T2, we’ll conclude that the first argument is sound. (So, we’ll take it as a reason to believe T3.)
• But if we accept U2, we’ll think the second argument is sound, and so gives us a reason to believe U3 (which, of course, conflicts with T2).

So far, this has all been easy – just logic, combined with a self-evident truth which everyone knows.

But now things get a little harder. You must ask: which do I have more reason to believe – T2 or U2?

I suggest that a good Christian should ask: WWJD? (What Would Jesus Do?). And our best information about that is in the New Testament. Does it explicitly teach either T2 or U2?

Surely not T2, for the simple reason that the writers of the NT have no concept of a triune or tripersonal God. If they had such a concept, it’d be easy for them to assign a term, a word or phrase, to express it, like “the Trinity” or “the triune God.” But they have no such term. At most, they speak in ways which are consistent with the existence of a triune God, and they occasionally speak in ways which kind of suggest such (at least, to some readers). (e.g. Matthew 28:19) If such a doctrine were explicitly taught, then we could just quote the verse. But we can’t. (For a long time, some considered 1 John 5:7 to be the needed verse, but no more; basically all have abandoned it, and rightly so.)

So a Trinity theory is going to be, in the best case, a doctrine of inference – one which is not stated by the sources, but which either logically follows from them, or doesn’t logically follow, but best explains them. Maybe the NT writers are committed to trinitarianism but don’t realize it. So, you can pick a Trinity theory, and see if it can either be derived from or best explain what is in the Bible. But while you’re doing that, back to our arguments.

Is U2 explicitly taught in the Bible? I think it is, at least once. But before I get to that, I don’t think any NT author thought it needed saying! Rather, it is constantly presupposed by every NT author, and according to all of them, by the Lord Jesus himself.

They all use “Father” (“our Father,” “my Father,” “our Father in Heaven”) as a term for the one God, Yahweh.  Check all the gospels on this score. And in almost all cases, “God” (“our God,” “my God” etc.) is supposed to refer to this same one. Particularly striking are the greetings in Paul’s letters (all of them, with the possible exception of Colossians) – he sends them blessings from “God our Father” or “our God and Father”, as well as from Jesus. In all these cases, “God” (Greek: “the god”) refers to Yahweh, the one true God of the Old Testament. And that term is being used co-referentially along with “Father” (etc.). This shows that the authors assume that God and the Father are one and the same, numerically one.

But is this same one also also referred to by “Jesus,” “the Lord Jesus,” and such?

No – they all assume that this one who is our God and Father is also the God and Father of Jesus. Hence Peter,

Blessed be the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ!  (1 Peter 1:3, ESV)

And John,

… our fellowship is with the Father and with his Son Jesus Christ. (1 John 1:3, ESV)

John isn’t being redundant here. (e.g. “I know Barak Obama! And also, I know the guy who was president of the USA in 2011!”) Rather, he’s asserting that Christian have personal relationships with God, and with the Son of God.

Back to U2, sometimes it very close to the surface; I mean, it is clearly asserted, though not explicitly so (it is clearly implied). Look, for example, at John 17:3 (ESV), in which Jesus is praying to God, that is, to the Father (see verse 1):

And this is eternal life, that they know you the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom you have sent.

WWJD? According to John he’d affirm U2. And I think we may take the author of the gospel of John to be teaching, asserting that the Father is the one true God here, though he doesn’t assert it in his own voice here.

The one place I know where it’s explicitly taught that the Father is numerically identical to the one God is in Paul’s discussion of Christians eating food offered to idols. While the peoples of the world believe in various gods and lords,

…yet for us there is one God, the Father, from whom are all things and for whom we exist, and one Lord, Jesus Christ, through whom are all things and through whom we exist. (1 Cor 8:6, ESV)

He Paul explicitly asserts that there is exactly one God, namely, the Father. To say this is, in part, to say that God and the Father are numerically one. What would Paul do? Affirm U2.

Take it from Jesus, John, and Paul (and the rest of the New Testament authors – check them yourself): U2 is true. And so given that T1 is true, we should accept the second argument as sound. To do this is to be a unitarian Christian. Some such also believe in a Trinity, in the sense that they believe Father, Son, and Spirit to be three cooperating selves, perhaps all in some sense divine – but they hold that the one true God is a member of the Trinity (the Father), not the whole Trinity. So they (e.g. Origen, Irenaeus, Justin, Clarke) believe in a Trinity but not in a triune God (so they are not trinitarians). Others, like me, would reject this sort of Trinity for various reasons, but in any case, we agree that that our second argument is sound, and that premise T2 is false (making the first argument unsound).

Unfortunately, when it comes to 1 Cor 8:6, some readers are confused by the fact that “the Lord” can be used to name the Father, and also Jesus. In Paul, when he’s not quoting the OT, it is normally the latter. (Nothing strange here; any name, term, or title can be equivocal – that is, can, in different contexts, refer to various beings.) But note that Paul here is presupposing here in this very sentence that the one God and the one Lord differ in some way. (“from… through whom”) So we can be sure that he’s not using the terms “God” and “Lord” co-referentially here; he’s rather assuming them to be non-identical, not numerically one.

As with all the other NT authors, for Paul Jesus and God are one (in will, purpose, and rule) but they’re not the same.

In principle, we ought to be able to give due weight to the available reasons that support a given view, even in the absence of actual defenders of the view who take those reasons as compelling. But in practice, the case for a view is apt to get short shrift in the absence of any actual defenders. The existence of actual defenders can serve to overcome our blindspots by forcefully reminding us just how formidable the case is for the thesis that they defend… But the case for a given view itself is no stronger in virtue of the fact that that view has actual defenders…

Thomas Kelly, ” The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement,” p. 31 (in pre-print).

At first this reminded me of a proverb I’ve often thought of when reading some catholic theologian who has evidently never put the slightest effort into understanding the overall case for unitarianism:

“The first to speak in court sounds right–until the cross-examination begins.”  Proverbs 18:17 (NLT)

But this is actually a different point than Kelly’s. A better courtroom analogy for Kelly’s point is:

When only one side in a court case has legal representation, that side usually wins.

And there there’s my fortune cookie version:

He who argues against no one never loses.

This cookie-saying is amusingly ambiguous. You can avoid losing by (1) never arguing with anyone, or (2) by arguing but against no one – i.e. against a straw man.

I often see trinitarian theologians do one or both. There is a whole lot of puffery going on – endless gassing about how central “the” doctrine is to every single issue in Christian theology, to marriage, to politics, etc. – which no one actually believes, mind you, but it sounds good and makes the theologian sound important. (He holds the key to everything – to EVERYTHING!!!) But of course the more basic issue is: is it true? ‘Cause if it isn’t, it is doubtful that it’ll be the key to understanding life, the universe, and everything. And yet more fundamentally, what is “it” – this doctrine of the Trinity which allegedly has been believed by all Christians everywhere, or nearly so? Until we know what “it” is, we can’t seek out evidence for and against it. The first thing, then, is to say just what “the” doctrine is, properly understood; this ought not be skipped. But it very often is.

Others, do sort of, briefly, argue, often against a favorite bogeyman like “the skeptic,” “the rationalist,” or “the anti-trinitarian.” Often this fictional character says: “No, I can’t believe this! It ain’t consistent!” And then the trinitarian makes some quick distinction which is supposed to show that it can’t be shown to be inconsistent. While relevant, this shows, in most cases, total lack of familiarity with actual unitarian Christian writings. Our whole beef is really, at bottom, that (1) the doctrine isn’t derivable from the Bible, and (2) is (at least in most forms – there are many Trinity theories) demonstrably inconsistent with the Bible. If your chosen theory is inconsistent, that’s bad too – but the preceding points are really the crux.

This is nothing new, folks – it’s been an issue since the Reformation, since some “anabaptists” discarded trinitarian theorizing as yet another Catholic add-on which was unjustified on biblical grounds. So, there’s really no excuse for people not knowing these arguments, especially if you are a seminary educated person. Time to put aside the fictional characters familiar from pop-apologetics, and interact with the best the other side can do. What, your seminary didn’t cover all this? Start here or here  or here then.

In this blog and in print, I’m trying to bring new attention to these arguments, and to formulate them in a most careful way. As to the print, I’m afraid that I’m very slow…

But I’m also going to a run a series of posts on debates between unitarians and trinitarians. Being a philosopher, I love debates, though I admit their limitations.

Going back to Kelly, his point is that intellectual integrity requires seeking out the very best arguments for a position one is evaluating. Typcially, one finds these directly from the mouths or pens of those actually espousing the theory in question, and not in summaries, histories etc. written by hostile people. Of course, debaters don’t always make the best case, but if a debate is well done, we can always learn from it.

About this, philosopher William Lane Craig is right on the money.

The FSM is more than this, though. It is thought by many village-atheist-type young males (roughly 12-29) to be an oh-so-clever-and-naughty parody of monotheism in general, apart from any design-creation controversies.

The thing is, the FSM is not clever – only naughty – or at least, potentially so, if people care enough to be offended by it (which I do not recommend). Really, the only amusing thing about it is how amused these folk are with themselves, as they think they’ve somehow pulled the pants down on believers in God.

But the joke’s on them.

Here are two differences between God and the FSM: (1) Many of our greatest scientists and philosophers have believed in God (examples: Newton, Descartes) – either on the basis of one or more arguments or based on his being the best explanation for certain facts vs.  no such people re: the FSM, (2) countless seemingly sane people claim to have experiential evidence for the existence of God vs. none for FSM.

Now these facts don’t show that God exists or that it is reasonable to believe in God. But it does show that it is reasonable to investigate the existence of God and not give another two seconds of thought to the FSM.

Done.

A non sequitur (Latin for: “it doesn’t follow”) is an invalid argument, one in which the premises don’t imply the conclusion, that is, where one could consistently accept all the premises and yet deny the conclusion.

I recently stumbled upon this youtube video, The Trinity Explained (with Reason), featuring a supremely confident sounding young man. I watched amazed, as a torrent of non sequiturs ensued.

If only this fellow was as good at constructing arguments as he as at selecting pictures!

Here are most of them – not that in each case, the step starting with “Therefore” is not implied by the premises.

1. If unitarianism is true, God is more comprehensible than if trinitarianism is true.
2. God is not totally comprehensible and not fully explainable.
3. Therefore, unitarianism is false.

1. Unitarianism is true.
2. Therefore, God is no greater than a human being.

1. God is a spirit.
2. Angels are spirits.
3. Therefore, God is no greater than the greatest angel.

1. God created the angels.
2. God is greater than the angels.
3. Therefore, God is not (just) a spirit.

1. God is omnipresent.
2. Therefore, God is hyper-dimensional (exists in more than three dimensions).

1. Isaiah 40:28 is true.
2. Therefore, God exists in infinite dimensions.

1. A two-dimensional being would perceive a rotating cube as either contradictory or more than one object.
2. Therefore, humans can only think of the triune God as contradictory.

1. God is hyperdimensional.
2. Therefore, God is not a self.

1. We only need a tri-personal God, not one with more persons in him.
2. Therefore, God is only tri-personal.

1. A unitarian God couldn’t be all we need.
2. Therefore, it is false that there is a unitarian God.

But wait, there’s more. Most of the premises are (1) unargued for, (2) not obviously true (so they need to be argued for),  (3) not more evident than his conclusion, (4) not things his opponents would grant.

All in all, a big heap of argumentative rubbish. The best I can say is that he is trying to argue for his views, and that he is speaking clearly enough to be refuted. These are laudable virtues, and not everyone has them, but they don’t make up for the fact that he’s asserting a pile of invalid arguments. Not to worry – youtube can help: watch 1a, 1b, 1c, and 1d here.

Occasionally, he does hit on a valid argument, like this one towards the end:

1. God is omnipotent if and only if he is omnipresent.
2. A unitarian God can’t be hyperdimensional.
3. A being can be omnipresent only if it is hyperdimensional.
4. A unitarian God can’t be omnipresent. (2,3)
5. A unitarian God can’t be omnipotent. (1,4)

Yes, this is valid. IF 1-3 were true, then 4 and 5 would have to be true as well. Unfortunately, each of 1-3 has the four problems just mentioned. So the argument is worthless.

The moral of all this is: don’t commit this non sequitur:

1. The speaker seems very sure about what he or she is saying.
2. Therefore, the speaker is minimally competent in his or her subject matter.

or this one:

1. The speaker has given only worthless arguments for X.
2. X is false.

In both cases, 2 does not follow from 1!

Here’s the first, in which I ramble on about my own religious history and views about God, the Trinity, and Jesus.

Also: pacifism (I’m agin’ it. Perhaps the majority of conference goers, I think, were for it.) I wasn’t expecting that question – hence the rambling.

Thanks to Carlos Jimenez for filming, editing, and posting this. You can comment on the youtube page.

Better rambling below the fold…

So here’s the 2.0 version, submitted to you for criticism and comment:

• idolatry (def 1): the practice of honoring a representation or symbol as if it were a god or a person worthy of honor.

This is literal idolatry, which is the rule rather than the exception in the world’s religions – bowing, etc. to things like this Jain statue I photographed in Bombay. It was this sort of practice which was forbidden in the ten commandments:

You shall not make for yourself a carved image, or any likeness of anything that is in heaven above, or that is in the earth beneath, or that is in the water under the earth. You shall not bow down to them or serve them… Exodus 20:4-5, ESV

“Serve” here, I think, clearly signifies religious worship specifically. It is not clear, I think, that it is against any sort of respect for images, e.g. saluting a flag. But it is against the sort of image honoring typical of ancient near eastern religions.

Apart from this command, it seems to me, it is by no means obvious that the one God shouldn’t be worshiped by means of some object, be it representational or abstract. After all, millions, probably billions of people do this, either for some god or for the one God.

But very often in the New Testament, it is not the above concept which is in view. Instead, they have in mind something which is by definition a sin:

• idolatry (def 2): the sin of honoring something or someone other than God in disobedience to God.

Unless excused  by ignorance, this is the sin Christians believe that idolaters typically commit in their idolatry (in the first sense, definition 1). Prime examples would be the sinful Jewish kings preceding the Babylonian captivity.

Christian preachers are fond of this extended concept. Often, they denounce celebrity worship, covetousness (Colossians 3:5), or too much attachment to one’s own theory as “idolatry.” None of these is literal idolatry (def 1) but any of these satisfies the 2nd concept of idolatry.

If def 2 is correct, here are some interesting consequences:

• It doesn’t necessarily matter who you intend to worship using the idol. Arguably, in Exodus 32, the Hebrews meant to worship Yahweh by means of the golden calf. Despite this intention, it was a big sin, due to the command they’d received, quoted above.
• God has exalted Jesus to his right hand, or to his throne – to a position of honor. Hence, as we’ve seen, it is appropriate to worship Jesus. And no, it is not idolatry, for it is in obedience to his and our God.

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Sir Anthony Buzzard is the author of a number of books, including the 2007  Jesus Was Not a Trinitarian.

Interesting title, no?

Some Christians will think it true but trivial.

Others, against the evidence, assert it to be false.

Others will urge that he is implicitly but not explicitly a trinitarian, i.e. that his beliefs entailed it, though he did not believe it.

I agree with with Buzzard, though, that it is both true and important. According to the gospels, Jesus’ beliefs included the numerical identity of the one true God with his heavenly Father, and we should assume him to be self-consistent on this subject, so he did not also think that the one true God is numerically identical to this: Father+Son+Spirit. (Things identical to the same thing must also be identical to each other.)

But isn’t Jesus worshiped in the New Testament? And doesn’t that show that he is God himself?

No – I agree with the substance of this recent video by Buzzard:

and this one:

I would add that in Revelation 5, the “worship” offered to both God and to Jesus is plainly fully religious worship, and not some other, lesser sort of honoring.

My recent public presentation was on a similar theme. Stay tuned for videos of the conference and screencast versions.

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I recently stumbled upon a great post by Michael Patton that just about perfectly expresses how I’ve felt about Christian apologists since growing past teenagerhood.

In part:

This is the problem that I have with some apologists (those who defend the faith). Don’t get me wrong, I believe very much in apologetics and also love many apologists. But very rarely do I find a reasonable apologist. Most are very hardened because they are committed first to defending their particular position, not so much to learning.

Read the whole thing. He also has done a similar post recently.

I would add: apologists too often fall into mere rhetorical violence: hyperbole, attacking a straw man, verbal aggression, smug, acid condescension, simply repeating oneself more loudly, insults, poisoning the well, and so on. And this is leaving aside poorly constructed arguments. Sadly, debates between philosophers (one or both of whom may be atheists) are nearly always ”cleaner” (more reasonably and respectfully conducted) than your average debate between a Christian apologist and anyone else.

I’m always reminded of what James says:

Understand this, my dear brothers and sisters: You must all be quick to listen, slow to speak, and slow to get angry. Human anger does not produce the righteousness God desires…

If you are wise and understand God’s ways, prove it by living an honorable life, doing good works with the humility that comes from wisdom.  But if you are bitterly jealous and there is selfish ambition in your heart, don’t cover up the truth with boasting and lying.  For jealousy and selfishness are not God’s kind of wisdom. Such things are earthly, unspiritual, and demonic. For wherever there is jealousy and selfish ambition, there you will find disorder and evil of every kind.

 But the wisdom from above is first of all pure. It is also peace loving, gentle at all times, and willing to yield to others. It is full of mercy and good deeds. It shows no favoritism and is always sincere. And those who are peacemakers will plant seeds of peace and reap a harvest of righteousness. (James chapters 1, 3 NLT)

If you’re doing Christian apologetics, and it doesn’t look like this, you’re not doing it right!

• Who Should Christians Worship?
• God and His Son: The Logic of the New Testament

Stay tuned for video links.

Seems it’s going to be hot there…

Update: Had a great time there. Folks who heard me talk may be interested in seeing some highlights from this blog, or misc. books. My thanks to the Buzzards for their organization and hospitality, and to the Gills for filming it all.

In reply, Christian philosopher Paul Copan knocks this one out of the park.

Well played, sir. I would add a few points:

One of the perfections a perfect being is supposed to have is aseity – existing but not because of anything else. God by definition has this. The physical cosmos, it seems, could not. It seems that no physical object could exist independently of anything else (a se – Latin for “through itself”). Any physical object owes its existence to some cause or causes, and will go out of existence if conditions cease to be favorable.

So there is nothing arbitrary in the believer in God demanding to know what caused the physical cosmos to come into existence, while not demanding to know what caused God to exist. Given the sort of being God is supposed to be (perfect, so a se) it is a contradiction to suppose that God is caused to exist. (X caused an essentially uncausable being to exist.)  The question/demand/objection I started this post with is based on ignorance of what sophisticated monotheism is. It’s too bad that some well known recent atheist writers have propagated this mistake.

There is trouble here, by the way, for some Trinity theories (hint: eternal generation). See here if you’re interested.

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As of now I think I’ve got a solid definition of the concept unitarian: someone who believes that the one God just is (i.e. is numerically identical to) a certain self and not to any other self.

But I then tried to define the more specific concept of a Christian unitarian: someone who believes that the one God just is (i.e. is numerically identical to) a certain self, namely the Father, and not to any other self.

But this is not a good definition. Mike asked: what about ancient friends of God like Moses and Abraham?

D’oh! The above definition makes them Christian unitarians. Thus, it is too “broad” or “wide.” My intent was to distinguish, say, a native American or Hindu unitarian from a Christian unitarian. The definition I offer above does that, but it doesn’t exclude Jews who either (1) never heard of Christianity or (2) disavow Christianity from being “Christian” unitarians.

To try again then: I think what I offered was a definition of the concept of an Abrahamic unitarian. Again: someone who believes that the one God just is (i.e. is numerically identical to) a certain self, namely the Father, and not to any other self. This formula uses a Jesus-specific term (“the Father”) but I think an equivalent definition could be given using any name or title that refers to the same being that “the Father” does in Jesus’ usage. So an equivalent definition would be: someone who believes that the one God just is (i.e. is numerically identical to) a certain self, namely YHWH, and not to any other self.

Christian unitarians, of course, are also Abrahamic unitarians. And so are Jews – at least, Jews who think God to be a great self, and not a force, an ineffable mystery, or a who-knows-what. The main concepts I’m talking about would be related like this:

So far, so good. What then, must be added to the concept of an Abrahamic unitarian to get the more specific concept of a Christian unitarian?

Here’s a New Testament inspired suggestion: the characteristic or defining thesis of a Christian is believing that Jesus is God’s messiah, the anointed one, the Christ. Thus, a unitarian Christian would be defined as an Abrahamic unitarian who accepts the this one true God’s Messiah is the man Jesus.

One may worry that this is still too wide. Does it count Muslims as “Christian unitarians”? One might think so – they claim that Allah (the God) is none other than the one worshiped by Abraham. And the Qur’an says ten times that Jesus is al-masih, “the messiah.” (See van Gorder’s No God but God, pp. 131-4)

But I think the definition is not too wide, for the reason that all Muslims reject the claim that Jesus is God’s messiah as Christians understand that, as “the Lamb of God who takes away the sins of the world” and who even now serves as an intermediary between God and humankind. Also, to accept him as God’s deliverer is to accept his leadership over you, to take Jesus as your Lord, your boss. No Muslim does that; for all the compliments they pay Jesus, they live their lives by the Hadith, the Qur’an, and the traditional interpretations of these.

Does it allow Jehovahs Witnesses? I think so. Mormons? Possibly – not unless they are monotheists; one must be that to be any sort of unitarian.

Any counterexamples to this definition?

Last time

This time, I will try to define the concept of a unitarian.

Many definitions of this concept are unacceptably polemical.  It is unacceptable to define a unitarian as an anti-trinitarian.  This violates requirements 3 and 5 – it doesn’t tell us what a unitarian is, but only what a unitarian is against.  And this is part of a common slashing rhetorical strategy which I have recently mentioned.  For the same reasons we must reject defining the concept unitarian as one who “denies the Trinity” or “has heretical beliefs about the Trinity,” etc. Equally, it is unacceptable to define a unitarian as one who holds the correct or biblical view about Jesus and God. Whether or not that’s so, it’s trying to sneak an argument for a thesis into a pseudo-definition of that thesis.

One common definition is,

Definition 1: someone who believes in exactly one unipersonal God.

I think this is on the right track, but the term “unipersonal” is obscure, and so this definition violates requirement 6 (and possibly also 3).

I have been working with this definition of the concept:

Definition 2: someone who believes that the one God just is (is numerically identical to) the Father.

I now think that this isn’t quite right.

First the definition is arguably too narrow.  Suppose there’s a native American who believes in the Great Spirit and conceives of this as the one God.  It seems that this person should count as a unitarian, but he would be excluded by definition 2.

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But it is also too broad, for it will include some Christian trinitarians. Consider someone who thinks that the one God is numerically identical to the Father, and also to the Son, and to the Spirit.  That is, someone who looks at the traditional Trinity shield and reads every occurrence of “is” there (in the Latin chart here: “est”) as expressing numerical identity.

This theory is demonstrably incoherent (self-inconsistent).  But never mind that.  The point is that this person should not count as a unitarian.  In short, it is not sufficient for being a unitarian that one accepts the identity of the Father and the one God.

Definition 3: someone who believes that the one God just is (i.e. is numerically identical to) a certain self and not to any other self.

I think this is right.  Any objections?

Since identity is a 1 to 1 relation (it is incoherent to suppose that one thing is identical to more than one thing) the last clause may seem superfluous.  But since a unitarian is by definition not a trinitarian, I think the clause is necessary.

Note that this definition requires a unitarian to be a monotheist, and also the sort of monotheist who considers God to literally be a self, that is, a subject of thought and intentional action.  There are of course some people in every supposedly monotheistic tradition who think that God is only metaphorically a self, that is, somewhat like a self.  These folks often think that we get all of our concepts from sensory experience, and so the concept of a self just is the concept of the human animal.  I don’t think this is correct; there is a more abstract concept of a self which does not imply being a human being.  In any case I think this restriction is correct; unitarians think that God is a certain magnificent, perfect self.  And so some Christians, some Jews, and some Muslims will be unitarians, but others in those groups will not, for instance those under the sway of neoplatonic philosophy, who think that God is ineffable (such as to not satisfy any concept we have), or “Being itself,” or The Good, or The One, etc.

Building on this definition of unitarian, a Christian unitarian would be defined as: someone who believes that the one God just is (i.e. is numerically identical to) a certain self, namely the Father, and not to any other self. 

Note that there is nothing about christology here; I think this is also correct.  Trinitarians are often sloppy about defining their thesis, sometimes equating it was the idea that Christ is divine, or that Christ is as divine as the Father.  But trinitarianism and unitarianism are in the first instance theses about the one God.  Is Christ in some sense divine?  That is a further question.  All trinitarians will answer affirmatively, but so will some unitarians.

Some Christian unitarians past and present define their thesis as the claim that Christ as a human nature but not a divine nature – that is, they define a unitarian has what I have called a humanitarian unitarian (what is nowadays often called a “biblical unitarain”), understood as implying that Jesus existed no earlier than his conception. But this definition is plainly too narrow.  There have been a number of famous unitarians, including Biddle, Clarke, Worchester, Emyln, Origen, and Arius, who have thought that Christ existed before his conception and in some sense had a divine nature.  In short, the definition of a unitarian should be neutral on the matters of the divinity of Christ and the “pre-existence” of Christ.

One may object to definition 3 that it makes Oneness Pentecostals unitarians, and so is too broad.  I think the definition does include them, because they assumed that the Father and Jesus are one and the same self.  This position is patently incoherent, because by their own lights (as well as by ours) some things are true of the Father that are not true of Jesus, and vice-versa.  But even though it is incoherent, I think it is a type of unitarianism, and also, Christian unitarianism.

What about other Christian modalists?  Recall that the point of such theories is to reduce the number of divine selves down to one, either God or the Father, the other “persons” been modes of him, ways he is. They would satisfy definition 3 of the concept of a unitarian, but interestingly, whether or not they satisfy my definition of Christian unitarianism depends on what sort of modalist they are. If they think that the one God is a self, and that “Father,” “Son,” and “Spirit” name modes of that one divine self, then they do not agree that the one God is the same self as the Father, for they don’t think the Father is a self at all! Rather, something like a personality or mode of living – but in that case, they are not unitarians, but trinitarians (see the final definition in my last post). Ever heart of Barth or Rahner? Modalists? Yes. Sabellian modalists? No. Unitarians? No. (So, not Christian unitarians either.) Trinitarians? Yes. All as it should be.

Similarly, by this definition many evangelical Christians are unitarians (and also Christian unitarians), as they think that Jesus and the Father are one and the same self (and perhaps the Holy Spirit too).  But again, this is correct – they are indeed unitarians (perhaps inconsistent ones, if they also agree to some trinitarian theory).  This unitarianism is in fact bemoaned by many a trinitarian theologian – it is usually put as the complaint that many Christians are “practically unitarian.”

Finally, I note that I don’t see anything polemical here. Unitarianism is not being defined as the truly biblical view, or has correct, orthodox, etc. Neither is it being defined as mere Trinity-theory-denial or a view held by “cults,” etc. When it comes to inter-Christian disputes about “the Trinity,” both friend and foe should accept this definition of the concept of a unitarian, as well as this concept of a unitarian Christian.

I’ve defined, I hope rightly, the concepts unitarian and trinitarian – these define such people in terms of their beliefs. Equally well, we would have definitions of types of Trinity theories rather than types of believers; the corresponding “isms” would be:

• unitarianism: that the one God just is (i.e. is numerically identical to) a certain self and not to any other self.
• Christian unitarianism: that the one God just is (i.e. is numerically identical to) a certain self, namely the Father, and not to any other self.
• trinitarianism: that the one God in some sense eternally consists of three ontologically equal “persons,” namely, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit.

According to the textbook I have used for years in my critical thinking class, a good definition should:

1. Include the genus and a differentia.
2. Not be too broad or too narrow.
3. State the essential attributes of the concept’s referents.
4. Not be circular.
5. Not use negative terms unnecessarily.
6. Not use vague, obscure, or metaphorical language. (p. 44)

What is a trinitarian?

Definition 1: someone who believes in a triune god.

This fails criteria 2 and 6.

2 – The definition is too broad, that is, it lets things into the category which do not belong there. One might be a Hindu who believes in many gods, and one of these many gods is a triune god.  But this person would not be a trinitarian.

6 – The definition is obscure because of the term “triune” – which would seem to mean just, somehow or other triple or threefold.

In addressing 2, we should ask have to tighten up the definition.  It is not a trinitarian by definition a Christian?  I think not.  There have been scholars, admittedly, cranks, who have argued that ancient Jews including the authors of the Jewish Bible, were trinitarians.  This thesis, while patently false, is not false by definition.  So no, that is not the right way to define our term.

Yet we still need a definition which will exclude the sort of Hindu mentioned above.  I suggest that a Trinitarian is supposed to be by definition monotheistic.  Let us also specify the way in which the god is supposed to be triple or triune.

Definition 2: someone who believes that the one God in some sense consists of three “persons.”

The term “persons” has quotes around it to signify that this God in some sense contains three items called “persons.” Whether or not they are literally persons (i.e. selves) is left as an open question.  The definition must be vague in this way to encompass all the sorts of trinitarians out there.

But I think something has still been left out – the definition is still too broad.  Suppose that this one God was originally just the Father, and then sometime later, he created the Son and Spirit “within himself,” so that he now consisted of three persons.  Definition 2 would allow someone believing this to be a trinitarian.  But that is not correct.  This person does not believe that the three “persons” are “ontologically equal” – since the first is the creator of the second and the third.

As with “person” there is some vagueness in the term “ontologically equal” – and yet, I think this is correct – this is the idea actual trinitarians have in mind.

But the definition is still too broad.  Suppose a person thought that the one god consisted of Elvis, Bill Clinton, and Weird Al.  This person would not be a trinitarian, but they would satisfy the above definition.  So too would a Hindu monotheist who thought that the one God consisted of Brahma, Vishnu, and Shiva.  But this is not correct; trinitarianism has to do with the being or beings called by the names “Father,” “Son,” and “Holy Spirit” in the Christian tradition.  So let’s try again.

Definition 3: someone who believes that the one God in some sense consists of three ontologically equal “persons,” namely, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit.

This definition is almost there.  But consider the kind of theory explored by Harriet Baber in our recent series here at trinities.  This was a type of serial modalism in which the one God has temporal parts, in sequence, Father (creation till Jesus), Son (Jesus’ earthly life), and Spirit (post-ascension).  These three would be ontologically equal, each being a temporal part of or stage of God.  But trinitarianism is supposed to be by definition incompatible with any sort of serial modalism.  So we must insert the word “eternally.”

Definition 4: someone who believes that the one God in some sense eternally consists of three ontologically equal “persons,” namely, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit.

This definition seems correct to me.  I don’t see how it violates any of the six criteria for defining a concept.  What do you think?

Interestingly, I did not have to use any creedal language.  This was by design.  Some trinitarians happily embrace the term homoousion, but others take the view that such terms are theoretical constructions, and while they may have served well that Christians of the fourth century (or whenever), they may not be suited to our present-day world view.  Is this controversial?  Yes!  But I think those inclined towards the traditional language should nonetheless accept definition 3; they themselves count the people I’m talking about as trinitarians.

This is not a stipulative definition, that such as defining the concept of poverty as having a yearly income less than $15,000.  Rather, it is an attempt to specify the contours of a concept which is often employed.  A trinitarian is by definition supposed to not be any sort of (1) unitarian, (2) “Arian,” (3) Jew or Muslim, (4) serial modalist (“Sabellian”). I think the above does all this.

Finally, note that there is nothing polemical in this definition.  It should be accepted by Catholics, Muslims, Protestants, Jews, atheists, “biblical unitarians,” Jehovah’s Witnesses, Greek Orthodox believers – in short, anyone.  It does not stand as a shorthand for an argument; it is a neutral basis for rational discussion.

 Update: I think Definition 4 is still too vague, specifically the term “ontologically equal.” I think the idea is always that they are in some sense equal in their divinity. Now that term “divinity” is plenty vague, but I think it is vague in the right way; various Trinity theories understand it differently. So now I suggest:

Definition 5: someone who believes that the one God in some sense eternally consists of three equally divine “persons,” namely, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit.

My thanks to Harriet for this piece and for her interaction with us here.

No doubt, she’ll argue back; and she will probably say something about how her views have changed since she wrote this piece.

So, in no particular order:

1. I agree with her that it’s suspicious if some philosophical theory should appeal to us only or mainly because it’ll help us in theology. I also agree with her that it’s interesting to at least try to come up with what is in some sense an acceptable Trinity theory which uses only metaphysical doctrines we have other reasons to believe.
2. Again, I think it is a good aim to produce an intelligible (seemingly consistent) Trinity theory, assuming some such theory is called for. I think she’s correct to complain about the severe obscurity of traditional claims about “eternal generation” and “procession”.
3. Picky point: I think “Neo-Sabellian” is a misnomer. It’s “Neo” all right, but it isn’t clearly Sabellian. It seems, and here I’m assume the standard view about what is historically murky, Sabellius’s concern was to preserve the uniqueness of the God, as one divine person. He then, it is thought, reduced or as it were demoted each “person” of the Trinity to being a way that this one God acts or appears for a certain period of time. In contrast, Baber’s “persons” are not mere modes or appearances of the one divine substance/thing. Rather, they are things and persons in their own right (given four-dimensionalist views of such things), and are God’s (temporal) parts. Perhaps a better name would be a four-dimensionalist Trinity theory? She tries to secure monotheism not by minimizing the status of the persons, but rather by the doctrine of “tensed identity”. Think that as I define “modalism,” this theory isn’t modalist about any of the Persons of the Trinity. But that’s just terminological issue.
4. But this brings me to a more serious point. As someone who dabbles in the black arts of metaphysics himself, for perfectly non-theological reasons, I don’t think that four-dimensionalism about physical objects is true, or could even possibly be true, about God or anything else. I don’t believe there are any such things as temporal parts or “tensed identity” relations. And I’m firmly convinced that idenity is what matters to survival – as convinced as I am about anything in philosophy. Also, that psychological similarity or sameness is not enough to guarantee that some future person will be the continuation of me. I know that Baber and others, indeed, some of the top people in the field disagree with me about all this. But as best I can tell, the “philosophical cost” of her proposal is high indeed, even though it bring in only theories which enjoy non-theological motivations, for some theorists.
5. How is this consistent with her insistence that Christianity ought not be thought committed to “any large-scale metaphysical system or to any philosophical doctrines”? The doctrine of temporal parts seems pretty large scale to me…
6. Another, related problem: people not trained in philosophy simply can’t understand this theory, at least without great difficulty. But then, can it be required of them that they should believe this? I thought a Trinity doctrine was supposed to be a required one.
7. Is this supposed to be the doctrine propounded, e.g. in the 4th or 14th centuries? Surely, it cannot be; the theory of temporal parts was unknown in those times.
8. I can’t see how monotheism has been upheld here. There’s one everlasting god, but this god is in her view composed of other at least three other gods, which are the first god’s temporal parts. Each of these four is a god, and none of them is identical to any of the other three. Thus, I count (at least) four gods on her theory. She would reply that I ought to count them all as one god, but I just don’t see any reason for that policy. Maybe I’m missing something here; perhaps I really don’t understand what “tensed identity” is supposed to be.
9. She agrees that “an aggregate of persons is not a person”. I don’t know if she means by “person” human or self. I think it is true either way. But if it is true about selves, and a divine person just is a certain self, then it’ll be true for divine persons as well, which is to say, for gods. In other words, it seems that an aggregate of gods isn’t itself a god. If she grants our intuitions about cats and humans, and even about generic selves (persons), then does she not grant that a core claim of this theory seems false?
10. The account founders on the personal relationship during his earthly life between Jesus and the Father. Saying that “Father” in that context refers to God doesn’t help. Try to envision this: circa 25 CE, there’s a thing (God) being friends with his own temporal part (the Son). But the Son is all there is to God at that time. For the whole span of Jesus’ life, there is no divine “other” for Jesus to love, obey, pray to, and so on. But this, this theory just isn’t consistent with a central theme of the New Testament.
11. According to the New Testament, at some times, the Father and Son differ, in what she would call their basic properties (properties had because of how things are at that time). But if so, they are distinct, and it can’t be that the Son is all there is to the Father (the Trinity) at that time when they differ. E.g. At some time circa 33 CE the Father wanted Jesus to be crucified, and Jesus didn’t want Jesus to be crucified.

For these reasons, I think Baber’s effort at rational reconstruction of trinitarianism is a swing and a miss. I you love the theory of temporal parts, you may be more sympathetic, but I still think some of the other points above would present serious difficulties.

What say you, dear readers?

Again, though he [Jesus] be a God, subordinate to the most high God, as having received his godhead, and whatsover he hath, from the Father; yet may not anyone thence rightly infer, that by this account there will be another God, or two Gods?  For though we may, with allowance of the scripture, say, that there are many Gods, yet neither will the scripture, nor the thing itself permit us to say, that there is another God, or two Gods, because when a word in its own nature common to many, has been appropriated, and ascribed to one by way of excellency (as that of God has been the Father), albeit this does not hinder us from saying, that there are many of that name, yet does it from saying, that there is another, or two, since that would be all one as if we should say, that there is another, or two most excellent (which is absurd),  for when two are segregated in this manner out of many, they claim excellency to themselves alike. Thus though some faithful man be a Son of God, subordinate to the chief Son of God Christ Jesus, yet may we not thereupon say, that there is another Son of God, or two Sons of God, (since that would be to make another, or two Sons of God by way of excellency, whereas there can be but one such a Son) howbeit otherwise the scripture warrants us to say, that there are many Sons of God. (A Confession of Faith Touching the Holy Trinity, According to Scripture, pp. 17-8,  in Firmin1691, language modernized and bold added)

He goes on to quote 1 Corinthians 8:4-6 and Hebrews 2:10.

What is Biddle’s argument here, and is it cogent? Discuss.

In the final part of her article “Sabellianism Reconsidered”, Baber turns to theological objections. To wit:

(click for image credit)

LaBreeska Hemphill is right. Jesus isn’t God; he’s the Son of God.

God is a certain perfect self, the one both we and Jesus call “our Father” and “our God”. Jesus is a man – but by no means a mere man, to wildly understate the case. God is not a man, not, as C.S. Lewis would say, a Son of Adam.

She’s not a theologian. She’s just one in a long parade of Christians who closely examine the Bible, expecting to find taught there that Jesus is God, or that he’s divine, and instead find Jesus worshiping and praying to one he calls “the one true God”. She’s a unitarian Christian, aka a “biblical unitarian” or a “humanitarian unitarian”.

Unlike many Christian intellectuals, she assumes that trusting Jesus means accepting his theological teaching, even if that implies that certain catholic bishops and those loyal to their traditions  have been mistaken in some of their speculations.

Like nearly all traditional Christians, she assumes God to be a self. The Bible implies this straight up, throughout, to the dismay of some with other conceptions of God – e.g. those who hold that God is “Being” or an “Ultimate Concern”.

Some present day “social” theorists deny that God is a self, and may deride her reasons for rejecting Trinity doctrines, as it conflicts with their speculation that really, God is a group of selves, or is a composite self or quasi-self composed of three selves. But they prudently hide this view of theirs when in church; they dare not assert that it is a mistake to think God is a self. They mumble that God’s  a “personal” being (you know, composed of persons/selves). They dare not correct their friends who refer to God as “him” or “he”, insisting that God is an “it”.

LaBreeska doesn’t need to mumble. She speaks straightforwardly.

“That don’t sound raiht.” Indeed. (Being a southerner myself, I am allowed to comment on her accent. ) Second favorite quote: “Now this is a subject without end.”

Keep walking in the light, LaBreeska.

This has been a hot topic in epistemology. Put in the most simple terms: if I think P is true, and then find out that someone at least as  intelligent and informed as me thinks P is false, must I then withhold about P (neither believe that it is true, nor believe that it is false)? My answer is: not necessarily.  See here for some seminal papers; readers of this blog will probably be most interested in the last two pieces – by eminent Christian philosophers van Inwagen and Plantinga. I agree with the thrust of both, although philosophers agree now that more should be said.

To those who want to delve into the epistemology, I’ll just opinionate that I think Michael Bergman is on the right track. Also, see important recent and forthcoming work by Nathan King (religious disagreement) and Thomas Kelly (disagreement in general). Another important player, who I also think is generally on track, is my former classmate Jennifer Lackey (disagreement in general).

Young Christian philosopher Andrew Moon also gave a good paper at the conference. Happily, he recently gave a twenty-minute, popular-audience-level talk on the epistemology of religious disagreement as a part of my department’s Young Philosophers  Lecture Series. Check it out!