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“God” in the Challenge argument

thinking gupStill waiting for substantial replies to my Challenge to evangelical “Jesus is God” apologists.

Some have worried that the meaning of “God” is somehow problematic here.

There is an ambiguity here, but it is deliberate, and is a virtue of the argument. You can take “God” here to be either the Father (as in the NT) or the Trinity (as in trinitarian traditions) – either way, I claim, you should agree that this is a sound argument.

the Challenge:

  1. God and Jesus differ.
  2. Things which differ are two (i.e. are not numerically identical)
  3. Therefore, God and Jesus are two (not numerically identical). (1, 2)
  4. For any x and y, x and y are the same god only if x and y are not two (i.e. are numerically identical).
  5. Therefore, God and Jesus are not the same god. (3,4)
  6. There is only one god.
  7. Therefore, either God is not a god, or Jesus is not a god. (5, 6)
  8. God is a god.
  9. Therefore, Jesus is not a god. (7,8)

And the argument doesn’t depend on any equivocation on the term “God.” To see that, let’s disambiguate it. Call this one Trinity-Challenge:

  1. The Trinity and Jesus differ.
  2. Things which differ are two (i.e. are not numerically identical)
  3. Therefore, the Trinity and Jesus are two (not numerically identical). (1, 2)
  4. For any x and y, x and y are the same god only if x and y are not two (i.e. are numerically identical).
  5. Therefore, the Trinity and Jesus are not the same god. (3,4)
  6. There is only one god.
  7. Therefore, either the Trinity is not a god, or Jesus is not a god. (5, 6)
  8. The Trinity is a god.
  9. Therefore, Jesus is not a god. (7,8)

If you’re a trinitarian, I claim that you should agree that this is a sound argument. A unitarian Christian, of course, will deny 8. Oddly enough, some who profess to be trinitarians will deny 8 too. But I’ll discuss those in a future podcast.

But what if we take “God” throughout to mean not the Trinity but the Father? Here’s the Father-Challenge argument:

  1. The Father and Jesus differ.
  2. Things which differ are two (i.e. are not numerically identical)
  3. Therefore, the Father and Jesus are two (not numerically identical). (1, 2)
  4. For any x and y, x and y are the same god only if x and y are not two (i.e. are numerically identical).
  5. Therefore, the Father and Jesus are not the same god. (3,4)
  6. There is only one god.
  7. Therefore, either the Father is not a god, or Jesus is not a god. (5, 6)
  8. The Father is a god.
  9. Therefore, Jesus is not a god. (7,8)

If you’re a unitarian Christian, you should agree that this is sound. Even some trinitarians will agree. Premises 1, 6, and 8 seem to enjoy very strong and obvious scriptural support. As to 2 and 4, they don’t seem to need any.

It’s hard to get people off their standard scripts! For example,

Surely he’s overlooking the Person-essence distinction.

How is that relevant? How might that help us decide whether or not this is a sound argument?

Or:

Surely, any unitarian is merely assuming that God is uni-personal.

Nope! Not in this argument.

Can’t “God” be used to refer to Jesus? Yes – I say this in the podcast, and give an uncontroversial NT example of it. But if “God” means Jesus throughout, then premise 1 will be obviously false; a thing can’t at one time differ from itself. So that’s not a very interesting argument; no Christian will think it sound.

Is”God” sometimes used for the Holy Spirit? Yes. We would then have the Spirit-Challenge argument. But I don’t propose to discuss that right now. In biblical lingo, “the Holy Spirit” or “the Spirit of God” etc. can be used, it seems to me, for God himself (aka the Father), for a power given by God, an exercise of God’s power, and even for Jesus. So that argument is just not as straightforward as the Jesus one. And in any case, whatever we make of the God’s spirit, my point in the challenge is that no one, trinitarian or not, should confuse together Jesus and the one God.

 

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18 thoughts on ““God” in the Challenge argument”

  1. 1. God and Jesus differ.
    2.Things which differ are two (i.e. are not numerically identical)
    3.Therefore, God and Jesus are two (not numerically identical). (1, 2)
    4.For any x and y, x and y are the same god only if x and y are not two (i.e. are numerically identical).
    5.Therefore, God and Jesus are not the same god. (3,4)
    6.There is only one god.
    7.Therefore, either God is not a god, or Jesus is not a god. (5, 6)
    8.God is a god.
    9.Therefore, Jesus is not a god. (7,8)
    I’ll take a crack though I have a feeling you have this rigged from the get-go. First off, if we are talking about Trinitarian theology, the Son is God, the Holy Spirit is God, the Father is God and yet they are not three Gods but one God nor are they parts of God but each are wholly God. This is due to God’s indivisibility and his inifiniteness. So yes, God and Jesus differ if you take God to mean Father and while Jesus is not the Trinity, this does not mean he is not God because God is applied to all three together or to each one individually all of them being wholly God in the Triune Deity.
    Since 4 assumes that the faulty assumption in 1, 2, 3 (stemming from a failure to understand Trinitarian theology), there is no reason to explain why this is wrong. Likewise with number 5. The person of the Father is not the person of the Son but this in no way implies they cannot be one God in Triunity since God is infinite and beyond our world. Jesus is not the Trinity but this does not mean he is not God or if when invoked, the entire Trinity is not also invoked. He is fully God, infinite and yet become man without change–the infinite finite.
    6-9 turn God into a god. God is not a god but is God of gods making him as also beyond divine.

    1. Hi – thanks for the comment.

      “there is no reason to explain why [4] wrong.” Convenient. Trinitarians like Brower and Rea disagree, and offer an explanation of the falsity of 4. The thing is, 4 seems to be obviously true to most of us. So, if 4 is to be denied, we need a reason. You might say – here’s your reason – because the Trinity doctrine is true, and implies the falsity of 4. But many trinitarians do not agree – in analytic theology, *most* do not agree with that. Only the relative identity theorists do. So, it seems we need more than a gesture at “the” doctrine to proceed in denying 4. It looks like your response amounts to the fallacy of special pleading, until we have an independent reason to deny 4. Such reasons have been offered – see Brower and Rea – but they are controversial.

      8 does not imply that God is one of many. If you, e.g. were the last man on earth, it would still be true to say that you are *a* man. But you don’t need to criticize 6-9 if you’ve already denied 4.

  2. Pingback: Steve Bruecker’s able defense of the trinity at trinities.org | Badmanna's Blog

    1. And to be clear, the point is, if Jesus is a sufficient referent to the concept of God it is our philosophy of the identity of God that needs to change not the other way around, as saying “Jesus is God” is a referential problem not an identity problem. Furthermore, the traditional concept of God is abstract enough and transcendent enough to include an ontologically real, albeit subjective aspect of its identity. The condition of satisfaction to include such an ontoloigcally subjective category into the concept would be if we had an epistemically objective reason to say such a thing: which we do in Jesus and the Spirit. At least, if you’re an orthodox Christian that is. Tuggy’s argument ignores the sufficiency and the need to refer to God through and by Jesus, because the concept (Christian God) can’t be separated because Jesus is an onotologically subjective and essential aspect of whatever God is, biblically and revelatory speaking…

  3. Hi Dale
    Surely your premise 4 is exactly where the (sophisticated) trinitarian will disagree, is it not?
    They would say that the Father and the Son ARE the same god although they differ from each other.

    The (sophisticated) trinitarian might say eg that the Father and the Son ‘are the same god’ meaning that they share the divine substance, or that they are each realisations of the same divine ‘stuff’, or that they are each God but in different time intervals …
    In other words ‘X is God’ is not, for the trinitarian, a statement of numerical identity, but something else, like predication, participation …

    Have I missed something?

    1. Hi David. I quite agree with you, I’m not comfortable with 4 here and also share your thoughts on the other things you say. Trinitarians (please mind the capital T ;)) don’t need more than one example of a Triune God, because there is only one. Where doubt should be given due airtime is on actual Scriptural support. Here I think many of us agree on darned-near-if-not-absolutely-zero. Although something as incomprehensible (and beautiful?) as the Triune God escapes me, and Dale and maybe you also are not happy with folk playing the mystery card (and I’m not), I can’t discard it if God reveals it in his word. The triune mystery needed outlining within the authoritative inspired canonical period. Unfortunately, it wasn’t. Hence my argument that it should never be considered as more than an interpretation, with inherent advantages and dangers.

    2. Yes – that some sophisticated trinitarians assume the truth of 4.

      There’s nothing ill-formed about attributing godhood/deity/being a god to someone – so no, they can’t object that there’s some sort of logical error in 5-9.

      Part of what I’m up to, David, is this. Most trinitarians don’t understand what’s up with the relative identity people, why they’re doing that. There are driven to it by concerns to make the Trinity coherent. I’m pressing people with this argument to get them to develop their views – there are not a lot of ways out here! I’m happy if some people move towards relative identity trinitarianism, because I think it faces this devastating problem – conceptually, no god is god over himself. And yet, in the NT, the Father the Son’s God. Thus, they can’t be the same god. But that’s precisely what the relative identity trinitarian wants to say.

      1. Thanks Dale

        I wonder what sophistical ‘Latin’ Trinitarians (IOliver Crisp? Scott Williams?) could say about 4.
        What would they say about ‘X is the same God as Y’?
        Would they understand it as ‘the divine essence that X has is the same divine essence that Y has’?
        If so, that would give them a reason to reject 4, wouldn’t it?

        What would sophisticated ‘Social’ Trinitarians (WL Craig?) say?
        Would they accept 4, but say that only the Trinity is a god, and neither the Father nor the Son are gods?
        If so, your argument would fall flat, wouldn’t it?

        1. I’m not sure what the “Latins” would say… I would like to ask those two gents, and also Brian Leftow. I *think* Leftow could accept the Trinity-Challenge as sound. As to the Father-Challenge, I’m not sure

          I think some medieval philosophers are all tied in knots about identity – so maybe some would not agree to 2. Others – perhaps Abelard? – would challenge 4.

          I take it that Bill Craig would just accept the argument as sound! Swinburne and Hasker, I think, have to deny 6 in the arguments, and 8 in the Trinity argument. Rea for sure denies 4, as do other relative-identity folks.

          1. Thanks
            That is interesting
            (Craig does not mind the argument being sound, does he, because it does not disturb his position?)
            I look forward to more developments!

  4. Greetings,

    Could you explain 4 a bit more? I’m still a bit confused about what it means.

    Let’s say that it was possible to prove that Jesus and the Father are numerically identical. What would the proof look like?
    Let’s say that it was possible to prove that Jesus and the Father are NOT numerically identical. What would that look like?

    I’m having a hard time trying to figure out if I should affirm 4 or not.

    A few places my mind goes as I try to figure this out:
    1. Clark Kent is the only Superman, and Superman is the only Superman, but Clark Kent is not identical to Superman.
    2. Dale Tuggy as of 1/1/16 is the only Dale Tuggy, and Dale Tuggy as of 2/1/16 is the only Dale Tuggy, but Dale Tuggy as of 1/1/16 is not identical to Dale Tuggy as of 2/1/16.
    3. This blog comment is the only thing I’m seeing right now (assuming I’m sitting really close to my monitor), and my monitor is the only thing I’m seeing right now (assuming I’m sitting really close to my monitor), but this blog comment is not identical to my monitor.

    That being said, maybe I should affirm 4. I look forward to your explanation. Thanks!

    1. Sure. One way to paraphrase 4 is this: things can’t be the same god without being the same being. This is just an instance of what seems an obvious general truth that things can’t be the same some-kind-of-thing unless they’re the same being. e.g. Paul and Saul can’t be the same man unless they’re the same (i.e. numerically identical).

      There is no simple procedure for proving some a and some b to be numerically identical, or rather, for determining that an author identifies some “a” with some “b”. Generally, though, we’ll see that the author swaps the names “a” and “b” freely, and doesn’t seem to attribute any difference at one time to them. I discuss the matter a little more here http://trinities.org/dale/deception.pdf

      Proving that a and b are not = is easy. Just find one time at which they have differed or even just could differ – that decisively proves them to be two, as a thing can’t at one time be and not be some way. So when reading a text, if that author has two characters differ (at a time), we can be sure that he thinks them to be two.

      About your examples.
      1 – Kent, in the story, is identical to Superman. It is Kent himself, in the costume, who occasionally flies around, etc.
      2 – Yes, one and the same man changes through time. My premise 2 allows for that. See the explanation in the post and podcast.
      3 – You’re seeing the blog comment through, by means of the monitor. You’re not seeing them in exactly the same sense.

      I hope that helps!

  5. Hi everyone. Regarding Unitarians on the Holy Spirit, please see here for what I take to be a radical swing in unitarianism stance since early Christian unitarianism: http://faithandscripture.blogspot.fr/2016/02/unitarians-on-holy-spirit.html

    It’s interesting to me that there were lurking some quite significant differences between Dale’s and my own perspective, which has taken me somewhat by surprise as I have found my own views so much affected by his own. So on his challenge, while I continue to disagree with premise number 6, particularly on the grounds of the dynastic household model presented by Dr. Heiser, who I feel certain would also disagree with premise 6, here I disagree with premise 4 in terms of validity. There is nothing that would require God to follow this. The weakness of the argument of the Trinitarians – that is, the capital T Trinitarians – is quite simiply they cannot REQUIRE that Christians believe in the Triune God for the simple reason that it is very hard to prove that the earliest Christians believed this. Triune God theories are interpretations. They are not necessarily wrong, although I suspect that they are (without knowing how those awesome three are connected), but the strongest argument cannot be developed through stage 4, as it rests on the assumption that the unique and supreme God cannot suspend this earthy logic. 6 remains unchanged, thus its problems also remain unchanged, and Isaiah does not resolve it, because if we understand Yahweh as the supreme elohim, truly presiding over the great council, then we can confidently understand the Deutronomy shema as stating that there is no other God who holds that supreme rank other than Yahweh.

    Does this make sense?

  6. Regarding your Father and Jesus reformulation. Premise 4, “For any x and y, x and y are the same god only if x and y are not two,” is unsubstantiated and premise 5 does not follow.

    Let’s put it in human terms.

    1. A Father and a Son differ.
    2. Things which differ are two (i.e. are not numerically identical)
    3. Therefore, a Father and a Son are two (not numerically identical). (1, 2)
    4. For any x and y, x and y are Human only if x and y are not two (i.e. are numerically identical)
    5. Therefore, a Father and a Son are not human. (3,4)

    or you could say….

    1. A Father and a Son differ.
    2. Things which differ are two (i.e. are not numerically identical)
    3. Therefore, a Father and a Son are two (not numerically identical). (1, 2)
    4. For any x and y, x and y are the same person only if x and y are not two (i.e. are numerically identical).
    5. Therefore, a Father and a Son are not the same person. (3,4)

    The relationship between persons and humanity is not exactly the same as persons and the trinity but the point should be clear none the less.

    I would suggest we properly address the biblical data first before trying to create an argument to refute it lest we attack straw men.

    1. “Premise 4, “For any x and y, x and y are the same god only if x and y are not two,” is unsubstantiated and premise 5 does not follow.”

      5 follows from 3 and 4 – not from 4 alone.

      Is 4 “unsubstantiated”? I think it is self-evident. But anyway, your first premise 4 is not at all like mine, as mine involves identification, and yours merely description (being human).

      Your second argument, I think is sound, but I don’t see how this is relevant to criticizing my arguments.

      “I would suggest we properly address the biblical data first before trying to create an argument to refute it lest we attack straw men.”

      These arguments are trying to force you to think, to reason clearly about Jesus and God. I know it’s tempting to go back to familiar exegetical arguments, but that temptation should be resisted for now. The question is, is the argument sound or not. You’ve protested about 4 – but do you actually deny 4? Why exactly should we think 4 is false?

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