Ably reviewed by Sean Finnegan. I would add a few philosophical comments:
- White, like many evangelicals, understands “the deity of Christ” as meaning that Jesus and God are numerically one, that is, numerically identical. He argues that various things the NT asserts about Jesus imply this. (e.g. He is worshiped, called “Lord.”) Conveniently, he ignores the many passages which assert or presuppose a qualitative difference between Jesus and God. He ignores these because it is self evident that things which ever (or even merely could) differ, can’t be numerically identical.
- White emphasizes the charge of “rationalism” vs. Navas. It’s unclear quite what that is supposed to be. Perhaps his main idea is that a “rationalist” ignores elements of divine revelation which are inconsistent with his theology.
- But if that’s what he means, then as I just observed – White is plainly a rationalist! Takes one to know one, evidently. 🙂 (Is he projecting his own double-think onto his opponent?)
- Sean’s point about choice of passages should be emphasized. Navas here fights White, as it were, on White’s home turf. To be fair, White should debate him again, taking the negative side, and letting Navas pick the five passages.
- White was sloppy on the topics of monotheism and worship. And he overuses the ad hominem and question-begging assertion that Navas is simply looking at the texts through unitarian blinders. Still, he is an able debater. As is Navas.
- This sort of debate can get tedious because of the focus mainly on the exegesis of texts. Those texts are, of course, the main evidence. But I think that both sides could have spent more time making their overall case – actually making explicit arguments, not only showing how various texts allegedly fit their respective views, and then going, see! This is, after all, a battle of theologies. If only reading the texts was going to solve this, well, it would’ve been resolved a long time ago. And it is clear – or at least, it is clear to me – that the theoretical arguments are really the locus of disagreement. e.g. Jesus is rightly worshiped, and only God can be rightly worshiped, therefore, Jesus just is God and vice-versa. (Even though they differ!) But that second premise is false, according to the New Testament. On carefully thinking through White’s traditional catholic arguments, see this. They do get a bit more into such argument in part 2.
- Relatedly, it strikes me that for White, focusing almost completely on (favorite) texts is a way of avoiding hard questions, like: isn’t White’s theology self-contradictory? (e.g. Jesus and the Father are both identical to God, but not to each other. God is and is not the ultimate source of the cosmos. God does and does not have a God above him.) If so, we can reject it as false. And we can see that there is a weighty reason to suspect his interpretations of the texts, on our assumption that what they teach is true, and so self-consistent. If he’s going to resist these inferences, he’ll need to say a lot more about how it can be rational to believe a clear, stable, apparent contradiction. It will not do to merely repeat that his view is (allegedly) based on all the texts.
- In light of 2nd and 3rd century catholic theology, it is amazing that White thinks it absurd (and/or “Gnostic”) that the Son is an intermediary between God and humans, who is less great than God / the Father. More on that theme in a forthcoming screencast and paper, but for now, see this series.
Related posts:
publications update
Sophronius: "the one God is a Trinity"
podcast 103 - Dr. Randal Rauser: Is the Atheist my Neighbor? Part 1
Trinity Monotheism Part 9: Some final thoughts and objections
Linkage: Alanyzing "trumping", or the "Theologian's Fallacy"
a new Trinity Meme
podcast 293 - Dr. Jo-Ann Brant on the Gospel According to John - Part 1
podcast 299 - Does the New Testament teach Trinity Monotheism? - with Dale Glover - Part 1
He is risen!
podcast 212 - Some Thoughts about God and Time
Mario,
If you can, could you please pop me a mail here: talkingdonkey1981@gmail.com. If you’re not on Dale’s blog anymore, we can still chat in private.
Thanks,
John and Jaco,
please let me know how can I oblige, even more than I have apparently already done … 😉
MdS
Villanovanus
“Enjoying the exchange between you and Jim- very edifying.!
Blessings
John
@ John [# 48, May 30, 2013 at 10:50 am]
What exactly, in “Jaco’s comments”, would you like to endorse?
MdS
Villanovanus,
I would like to endorse Jaco’s comments in post 45.
I have learnt a lot from your interchange !
Of course I’m dying to see how this matter is resolved!
Blessings
John
Jim,
stop beating about the bush: do you or don’t you affirm “relative identity” as a valid concept?
Thanks,
MdS
Hi MdS,
Per the first of comment 45:
Sorry that I did not clarify this earlier, but you twisted the context of my statements in comments 8 and 37. My statements in those comments never claimed that relative identity is invalid. Can you understand the context of those statements?
Peace,
Jim
@ James Goetz [# 41, May 21, 2013 at 11:15 am]
First, and for the umpteenth time, you have repeatedly written that “relative identity” is an “invalid concept” (#8, #37). So, if you were at all consistent, you should simply stop altogether using that concept. Of course, you may be even more drastic, and say that “absolute identity” is equally an invalid concept, at least when referred to real entities in the real world.
Second, I have made sufficiently clear (see #13) that:
• Identity is “the relation each thing bears to itself and to no other thing”. So, when we say that two things are identical, we are really saying something different, viz. that they differ in name only and that they are really one and the same.
• From the above, it immediately follows that identity is and can ONLY be absolute.
So, it is a perfect waste of time to speak of “A and B [which] are different compositions”: identity is ONLY “the relation each thing bears to itself and to no other thing”.
Third, I have patiently explained that identity can be extended also to the relation a thing changing in time bears to itself, provided we consider it through its entire life-story, from initial time t1 to end time t2. Is there something still unclear about that?
MdS
No sarcasm. I really enjoy the exchange. I’m also looking forward to your reply to James Goetz.
Sarcasm much? 😉
Fascinating robust discussion. Keep it coming, guys…
Hi MdS,
Per your questions in comment 40:
Carefully consider the implications of admitting P2 (A and B are different compositions). The composition of material things changes from one moment to the next. Likewise, the absolute identity of any material thing exists at any given point in time while the absolute identity ceases to exist from one moment to the next. In this same vein, a system of logic based on absolute identity, presumably Leibniz’s Law (LL), falls apart from one moment to the next.
I also explained that the A = B and B = C syllogism requires qualification of absolute identity.
I also clarified that all of my statements are within the context of the formula for relative identity, so I never disagreed with myself.
If one admits to the accuracy P1 and P2 but refuses an attempt to reconcile them, then one evades the reality that they need reconciliation or one concedes that parts of the world are hopelessly contradictory.
Blessings,
Jim
@ James Goetz [# 39, May 19, 2013 at 10:36 pm]
What logic “appears to evade reality”? What “logical system based on absolute identity falls apart from one moment to the next”?
You have repeatedly written that “relative identity” is an “invalid concept” (#8, #37). Now you complain about the “categorical rejection of relative identity”. Try to agree at least with yourself …
MdS
Hi MdS,
Per comment 38:
You admit the accuracy of P1 and P2 while you say that they are contradictory and it is senseless to use them in the same argument. This logic appears to evade reality. One could avoid evasion of reality if one reconsiders the importance of the logical system based on absolute identity that falls apart from one moment to the next. So far, nobody has presented a strong case for the exclusive use of absolute identity and the categorical rejection of relative identity.
Blessings,
Jim
@ James Goetz
P1 affirms the identity of A and B; P2 denies the identity of A and B: they are contradictory, so it is senseless to uses them as part of the same “argument”.
MdS
Hi MdS,
If I correctly understand you, you presume:
P1. A is identical to B and vice versa.
P2. A and B are different compositions.
P3. Relative identity is invalid.
However, P1 and P2 together exemplify relative identity.
Blessings,
Jim
I would reverse what you call a “paradox”: while the simplest objects, elementary particles, according to Quantum Theory, “cannot be regarded as individual objects”, or anyway, “such objects are indistinguishable in a sense which leads to the violation of Leibniz’s … Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles” (see SEP > Identity and Individuality in Quantum Theory), it is the identity of complex, living conscious beings to themselves (in spite of some sophistications on Personal Identity) that I find more intuitively obvious …
… at least until someone can reproduce two identical individual humans in a superposition of quantum states … 😉
MdS
Hi MdS,
Per comment 34 part 2:
Thank you for clarifying those points about your model of continuity of identity over time.
Given that physical entities including biological entities constantly change over time, I see no basis for your presumption that A is absolutely identical to B unless you are referring to a paradoxical essence that is absolutely identical over time.
Blessings,
Jim
@ James Goetz
[m] Mine was not a question on the embryology of Siamese twins and/or (more specifically) on “mammalian bodies with multiple heads”. The whole point, once again, is that Cerberus is a dog with three heads, IOW a monster, which is not inconceivable, in fact it is even possible and there are even real cases of such monsters. Likewise the “trinitarian god” is a (well, yes) monster (yikes!), but it is not inconceivable. Personally (beside finding it inconsistent with the Scripture), I sincerely hope that such monster, the “trinitarian god” is not real, that it is not the case.
[n] See my comment #31 for Jaco, in particular his quoted b and my comment b. Briefly, when speaking of the “trinity”, the word “substance” (which is the direct translation of the Greek ousia) is NOT a “mass term”, does NOT mean “stuff”, or “continuous substance”, BUT either “particular entity belonging to a class” (primary substance) or the “class (=universal) to which the particulars belong” ” (secondary substance). In the case of God (be it the God of Scripture or the “trinitarian God”), because there is only one, the “particular entity belonging to the class God” coincides with the “class (=universal) to which the particular entity, God, belong”.
Having clarified the above, whichever of the three heads you consider, it is always the same Cerberus. Likewise, whichever “person” you consider, it is always the same “trinitarian god”.
Finally, and once again, the only parallels that are missing from the Cerberus-analogy, when compared with the Nicene-Constantinopolitan (and traditional-orthodox) model of the “trinity” are the s.c. “processions” (respectively “generation of the son” and “spiration of the spirit”), but then, Calvin was quite ready to minimize/ignore them, so as to insist on the absolute equality (aseity, autotheotes) of the three “persons” (see his Institutes, Book I, Chapter 13).
No, it means considering A and B (which is presumed absolutely identical to A, that is one and the same as A) at every single instant t included between t1 (beginning of existence) and t2 (end of existence).
MdS
MdS, per comment 31:
Does A(t)=B(t) and t1 < t < t2 imply some type of simultaneous existence of t1 and t2?
Blessings,
Jim
Hi MdS,
Per comment 22:
MdS said:
And how, pray tell, would a dog with three heads (or a human with three heads, for that matter) be discernible from triplet sharing the same body, and having only three separate heads? (Other than by mere verbal convention, I mean.)
My reply:
All cases of mammalian bodies with multiple heads (human or non-human) are identical siblings who/that never completely separated unlike normal identical siblings. By the way, term “identical” in the case of normal identical siblings means they existed as an identical zygote (fertilized egg) or up to an identical early embryonic stage. In some cases of conjoined twins, some organs are identical. For example, the Hensel twins have an identical reproductive system.
MdS said:
Don’t forget that Cerberus is an analogy for the “trinity”, but, AFAIAC, it is a very strong one, as I have already suggested at the above comment #21 (body “substance”; heads “persons”; Cerberus “trinitarian god”).
My reply:
Some of the substance of the Cerberus is undivided, and that undivided substance is a good comparison to the Trinity. But the heads and necks of the Cerberus and most real multi-headed mammalian bodies are divided, and that divided substance is a misguided comparison to the Trinity that many social Trinitarians nonetheless appreciate.
MdS said:
The only parallels that are missing from the Cerberus-analogy, when compared with the Nicene-Constantinopolitan (and traditional-orthodox) model of the “trinity” are the s.c. “processions” (respectively “generation of the son” and “spiration of the spirit”), but then, Calvin was quite ready to minimize/ignore them, so as to insist on the absolute equality (aseity, autotheotes) of the three “persons” (see his Institutes, Book I, Chapter 13).
My reply:
See my previous sentence.
“t1? and “t2? are two instants in time, respectively the beginning and the end of the history of A (presumed identical to B).
A(t) means “entity A at the (generic) instant in time t”
The symbol “<" means "less than", so “t1 < t < t2" means "time included between the beginning and the end (of the history of A)”
MdS
[a] I assume that by the expression “same picture painted throughout history” you are referring to (one of the many versions of) the s.c. “shield of the trinity”. Now, while the “shield of the trinity” is geometrically accurate, it doesn’t really clarify what are, respectively, the “substance” and the “persons”. In fact, with the central circle marked as “God” (or Deus), it seems to suggest a “quaternity”, rather than a “trinity”. OTOH, and once again, if you establish these correspondences …
• Cerberus = = “trinitarian god”
• whole body of Cerberus (including the 3 heads) = = whole “substance” [NOTE] of the “trinity” (including the 3 “persons”)
• 3 heads of Cerberus = = 3 “persons” of the “trinity”
… you have a model of the “trinity”, whose only limit is that it doesn’t account for the “processions”. But then, again, neither does the “shield of the trinity”.
[NOTE] For the problem you seem to have with the use of the word “substance” (Greek ousia), see next.
[b] The problem, here, is that you are assuming that the word “substance” used in the “trinitarian god” is a “mass term”, as though the “substance” of the “trinity” was some sort of “continuous substance” (like oil or soap), somehow “filling” the “persons”. But in the Greek language, in which the doctrine of the “trinity” was originally formulated, the word ousia, in its philosophical, metaphysical use, in particular in Aristotle, can mean two rather different things (see his Categories):
1. Primary substance is that which cannot be predicated of anything or be said to be in anything. Hence, this particular man or that particular tree are substances. Later in the text of hisCategories, Aristotle calls these particulars “primary substances”, to distinguish them from …
2. … secondary substances, which are universals (= classes) and can be predicated.
For example, Socrates is a primary substance, while man is a secondary substance. Man is predicated of Socrates, and therefore all that is predicated of man is predicated of Socrates.
So, what is the “trinitarian god”? Well, it is, at the same time, a “primary substance” (because it is a concrete instance of the category “god”), AND/BUT also a “secondary substance”, because the class “god” is constituted by one and only one instance.
In the Cerberus analogy, Cerberus is a “primary substance” (because it is a concrete instance of the category “three-headed-dog”). IF we make the further assumption that Cerberus is unique, then Cerberus is also a “secondary substance” (because the class of “three-headed-dogs” has only one concrete instance: Cerberus).
So, once again, the “Cerberus analogy” is a good model of the “trinity” (except for the “processions”)
[c] First, I trust (hope …) that my answer [b] above will have clarified the ambiguous meaning of the word “substance”, while excluding once and for all its use in the sense of “mass term” (or “continuous substance”), when applied to the “trinity”.
Second, I take good note that (as apparently Dale does, BTW) you use the word “self” as synonym of “person”. Let me remind you that the “Cerberus analogy” is what it is: an analogy. Therefore it should be rather obvious that, while it is legitimate to attribute to a spiritual entity like God (and even to the “trinitarian god”) consciousness and person(s), nobody (I hope) would attribute consciousness and/or person(s) to a dog, whether with one or three heads. So, for the sake of clarity, let’s omit “selves” and “consciousnesses”, and consider ONLY the correspondences indicated at my above reply [a].
[d] My point is precisely that the “Cerberus model” is NOT a “contradictory construct” of the “trinity”, BUT is logically valid and sound. I leave it to you (or someone else) to prove otherwise (once again, with the caveat that the “Cerberus analogy” does NOT satisfactorily model the “divine processions” of the “trinity”.
As for the “use”, I consider a rather relevant consequence of the validity and soundness of the “Cerberus model” of the “trinity” that the problems with the “trinity” are NOT logical/conceptual, BUT rather lack of scriptural support.
[e] Once again, I trust (hope …) that my answer [b] above will have clarified the ambiguous meaning of the word “substance” (primary vs secondary), while excluding once and for all its use in the sense of “mass term” (or “continuous substance”), when applied to the “trinity”.
[f] If one believes in the possibility/existence of “spiritual substances” (once again, in the Aristotelian sense of ousia, NOT in the sense of “mass term” or “continuous substance”), then the God of the Scripture (and even the unscriptural “trinitarian god”) belongs to that class. (But I have no idea what your parenthetical comment would mean …)
[g] See my relative comment #29 of May 17, 2013 at 10:17 am
MdS
The “Cerberus analogy” is perfectly compatible with the first 7 propositions (“doctrine [of the “trinity”] in narrow sense”) quoted at page 1 of the above essay. More, it is perfectly apt to illustrate them. Check.
Even proposition no.11 (“What [the] Father is, such is the Son and such the Holy Spirit”) can be modelled with the “Cerberus analogy”:
“What Cerberus1 is (a dog with three heads), such is Cerberus2 and such Cerberus3”
Once again, the “Cerberus analogy” is NOT suited to model the additional 3 propositions (no. 8 through no. 10) that make up the “doctrine in wider sense” and that, as can be easily seen, are essentially the Nicene-Constantinopolitan (and traditional-orthodox) model of the “trinity” (directly derived from the Nicene-Constantinopolitan Creed), viz. the s.c. “processions” (respectively “generation of the son” and “spiration of the spirit”). But then, as already remarked, Calvin was quite ready to minimize/ignore them, so as to insist on the absolute equality (aseity, autotheotes) of the three “persons” (see his Institutes, Book I, Chapter 13).
I will add here that the Nicene-Constantinopolitan formulation (NOT the “one ousia in three hypostases” of the Cappadocians) retains some subordinationist “flavor”, which was NEVER eliminated in EO Christianity, whereas it was forced out of the doctrine of the “trinity”, in Western Christianity, ONLY with Peter Lombard …
“For since one and most high certain thing is the Divine Essence, if the Divine Essence has begotten the Essence, the same thing has begotten its very self, which entirely cannot be; but rather the Father alone has begotten the Son, and from the Father and the Son the Holy Spirit proceeds.” (Sentences, Book 1, Distinction 5, Chapter 1)
… eventually sanctioned (in even more “essentialist” and “egalitarian” form that Peter Lombard himself had) by the 4th Lateran Council (1215):
“But we, with the approval of the holy and general council, believe and confess with Peter (Lombard) that there is one supreme entity, incomprehensible and ineffable, which is truly Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, together (simul) three persons and each one of them singly.” (The Canons of the Fourth Lateran Council, 1215, Canon 2 (“On the error of abbot Joachim”, @ fordham.edu)
Calvin, who so thoroughly attacked the Roman and “popish” doctrine in nearly all aspects, with his radically egalitarian “trinity”, peculiarly and unreservedly retained the most scholastic product of the Medieval Church, viz. the doctrine of the “trinity” of Peter Lombard and of the 4th Lateran Council.
MdS
Hi John,
Per comment 19:
John said:
But doesn’t ‘three consciousnesses’ denote three persons?
My reply:
Yes.
John said:
Are not the conjoined legs and organs no more than common user facilities?
Isn’t it something like a computer connected to several facilities –
-i.e. printers, scanners etc.?
Am I being over-simplistic?
My reply:
That sounds correct to me as long as the facilities are integral to the persons.
Blessings,
Jim
Hi MdS,
Per comment 20:
Sometimes I am slow to understand equations. I understand that “A” and “B“is the entity; “t1” and “t2” are time coordinates, but I am not sure what you mean by “A(t)=B(t)” and “t1 < t < t2." Also, what specifically does "<" mean?
Blessings,
Jim
@MdS
Why do you say it’s a strong analogy? I just think it’s a different version of the same picture painted throughout history. You might want to be clearer on what you make of the analogy. I’m interested to hear your thoughts.
The issue I have with it is that a numerical modifier (=”body”) is used as a mass term (=”substance”). Since substance is unrelated to number, then three distinct persons and beings chained at the ankle would still be “one substance.” I think the necessity of a one-bodied mythological character would then be unnecessary…
I have no reason to consider it otherwise (i.e. “self” in the same sense of “person”). The second part of the question had me thinking a bit. While I don’t see any conceptual difference between the two clauses (unless you might want to show where you do see a difference), I find it hard to understand how you understand “body” to be synonymous to “self” synonymous to “substance.” Identical twins have identical genomes but distinct bodies, distinct selves but identical substance. Grafting the two bodies will reduce the number of bodies to one, but there would still be two selves.
Sure. I just wonder how many seemingly contradictory constructs could be thought out and centuries spent on trying to reconcile the contradiction at some level. It could be an amusing excercise for logicians. But what’s the use?
Just a question. What forces us to understand “God” as a mass term(=”substance”) and not a numerical modifier (=”a god”). Wouldn’t “spirit” be a substance too? (I know in that case all kinds of other members would share in that substance…)
Jaco
What do you think about that summary on Cartwright’s book?
@ Jaco [#24, May 17, 2013 at 4:24 am]
[a] The Cerberus analogy is, once again, an analogy, but a strong analogy. See my comment #22. Why don’t you take issue with my comment, if you have problems with it?
[b] How is this an objection to the “Cerberus analogy”? A human (or a dog, for that matter) “with with no arms and legs” still has a body (= “substance”) and a head (= “person”).
[c] It all depends whether you use the word “self” in the same sense as “person” or not. Again what (other than mere verbal convention/decision) distinguises the phrase “one body/self/substance with three heads/consciousnesses/persons” from “three heads/consciousnesses/persons sharing the same body/self/substance”?
[d] This is a perfectly legitimate question, but it has nothing to do with the logical validity and soundness of the “Cerberus model” of the “trinity”. (BTW, my personal opinion is that the “trinity” has no foundation in the Scripture, but is a projection on the Scripture).
MdS
I do not see how the Cerberus analogy will bring us any closer to solving the logical problems with the Trinity.
And taking the analogy of human triplets sharing some vital body part: how are the individuality or the ontological distinction of three distinct humans chained by the heels any different from a conjoined triplet? Since, according to the trinity, there are fewer beings than persons, can we say that there are fewer humans in the case of a conjoined triplet than there are persons? And if so, does physiological composition numerically alter ontology? If not, then a conjoint triplet will be three humans and three persons nevertheless. If physiological composition numerically alter ontology, then is someone with no arms and legs less human than someone with all their limbs, while still being fully personal?
I am of the contention that multiple, distinct consciousnesses are actually distinct ontologies and distinct selves. No degree of relational arrangement can change this numerical distinction.
And finally, are these analogies compatible with what we are presented in the bible? Are these true or false analogies? And if we talk about GOD in the trinitarian sense and refer to the biblical God, are we or are we not equivocating?
Just my thoughts.
O yes, check ou this article: http://leongeerdink.nl/wp-content/uploads/2009/09/Summary-Cartwright.pdf
A more accurate model would be a network of three computers such that the system requires (“essentially”) all three computers.
MdS
And how, pray tell, would a dog with three heads (or a human with three heads, for that matter) be discernible from triplet sharing the same body, and having only three separate heads? (Other than by mere verbal convention, I mean.)
Don’t forget that Cerberus is an analogy for the “trinity”, but, AFAIAC, it is a very strong one, as I have already suggested at the above comment #21 (body “substance”; heads “persons”; Cerberus “trinitarian god”).
The only parallels that are missing from the Cerberus-analogy, when compared with the Nicene-Constantinopolitan (and traditional-orthodox) model of the “trinity” are the s.c. “processions” (respectively “generation of the son” and “spiration of the spirit”), but then, Calvin was quite ready to minimize/ignore them, so as to insist on the absolute equality (aseity, autotheotes) of the three “persons” (see his Institutes, Book I, Chapter 13).
MdS
“To clear up all ambiguity: just as Cerberus is a single dog with three consciousnesses, so God is a single spiritual substance or soul with three self-consciousnesses.” — Trinity Monotheism Once More: A Response to Daniel Howard-Snyder, by William Lane Craig
And how, pray tell, would that affect the question of the identity, of the oneness of “substance” (?body) and of the threeness of “persons” (?heads) for the God (?Cerberus)?
MdS
Identity over time is really the problem of how to deal with the identity of changing entities. Again, in a nutshell, the identity of entities changing over time must include time. So, if we have the history of an entity called A that exists from t1 to t2, it will be identical to B if A(t)=B(t), for t1 < t < t2.
MdS
Jim
But doesn’t ‘three consciousnesses’ denote three persons?
Are not the conjoined legs and organs no more that ‘common user facilities?
Isn’t it something like a computer connected to serveral facilities –
-i.e. printers, scanners etc.?
Am I being over-simplistic?
Every Blessing
John
“To clear up all ambiguity: just as Cerberus is a single dog with three consciousnesses, so God is a single spiritual substance or soul with three self-consciousnesses.” William Lane Craig
However, multi-headed (polycephaly) vertabrates are conjoined twins. The most common multi-headed vertebrates are turtles and snakes while farm show attractions occasionally contain multi-headed sheep, cattle, and cats. There are also conjoined human twins that share a single ribcage such as the Hensel twins who are easy to find on the web. In the case of such conjoined humans, a multi-headed body is clearly two humans sharing a single body. Most people do not call the conjoined human twins a multi-headed human. At this angle, Cererbus is conjoined triplet dogs with three dog heads and three dog consciousnesses that share a single body trunk and four legs.
“To clear up all ambiguity: just as Cerberus is a single dog with three consciousnesses, so God is a single spiritual substance or soul with three self-consciousnesses.”
Yet they try to have it both ways. I don’t have the quotes in front of me, but it seems that sometimes they think of the “persons” not as sets of mental events owned by or in the one divine self (God) but rather as so many selves, which indeed, Father and Son must be, to enjoy a personal relationship.
Hi MdS,
Per comment 13:
I appreciate those SEP articles. In the case of your view of absolute identity, do you have a coherent view of absolute identity over time?
Blessings,
Jim
John,
yes, I believe that the notion of (absolute) identity, as applied to the three “persons” of God, is instantiated in Modalism, but, in my opinion, also in Moreland’s and Craig’s “Trinity Monotheism” which, AFAIAC, is nothing but Calvin’s notion of the “trinity” (Institutes, Book I, Chapter 13) taken to the logical consequence of the “Cerberus model”.
In William Lane Craig’s own words:
“To clear up all ambiguity: just as Cerberus is a single dog with three consciousnesses, so God is a single spiritual substance or soul with three self-consciousnesses.” — Trinity Monotheism Once More: A Response to Daniel Howard-Snyder, by William Lane Craig
MdS
Villanovanus
Thanks so much!
I will read the papers you suggest.
The thing that immediately springs to mind is ‘modalism’ – is that valid?
Blessings
John
John,
I have not written anything specific on the subject of identity, nor of “relative identity”.
You may find these articles at SEP useful, Identity and Relative Identity, but you have to read them critically.
As for my own thought, in a nutshell it is this:
• Identity is “the relation each thing bears to itself and to no other thing”. So, when we say that two things are identical, we are really saying something different, viz. that they differ in name only and that they are really one and the same.
• From the above, it immediately follows that identity is and can ONLY be absolute.
MdS
Villanovanus
Have you written anything on the subject of ‘relative identity’ ?
If not, perhaps you could suggest where I could look?
(kept simple of course!!)
Blessings
John
@ James Goetz [#8, May 13, 2013 at 1:56 am]
ABI [if A = B, then A is identical to B] ia NOT a “syllogism”. More modestly, “A is identical to B” is (nothing but) an explanation (or interpretation) of the formalism “A = B”. One could have said equally well, for instance, “A equals B”, without ever mentioning identity, let alone the mythical animal “relative identity”.
As for your parenthetical “(x and y are the same F but x and y are different Gs)”, it is entirely evident that it is part of the very definition of “relative identity”, which, once again, is a manifest oxy-moron.
MdS
All
I must apologise for giving you a ‘link’ which does not work!
The only way I can access this site is to “Google” ” Angelfire The Trinity Delusion” and then click on the scripture I wish to access.
The Kingdom Ready web-site has also an excellent ‘data bank’ – although I find the Angelfire site to be more exhaustive.
Blessings
John
Dale
I listened, with great interest to this podcast.
I agree with Finnegan that for much of the debate White kept Navas ‘on the back foot’.
I also fully concurr with you that it is the Trinitarians who are the rationalists – twisting and turning to try and make scriptures ‘fit’ their doctrine. The truth is after all, so simple.!!
Navas did an admirable job – but the scriptures selected by White were not ‘meaningful’ in the overall debate.
In fact NO scripture selected -even if ‘won’ by White can possibly ‘override’ the import of Christs own words
in Mark 12 v 29 and John 20v17!.
The first scripture reviewed (John 12v41) showed White as a more experienced debater and to be honest Navas did not match White on several points.
Unitarians have some good points to make regarding John 12v41 and I have found the ‘data bank’ contained in
http://www.angelfire.com/space/thegospeltruth/trinity/verses/jn12_41.html to be extremely well researched.
As the author comments:
“The immedate context is about disbelief. Even though the man Jesus had done many signs, they did not believe him.
And so John indicates this is the fulfilment of Isaiahs prophesies .
Jesus responds by teaching on seeing and believing – to see Jesus is not to see Jesus but to see the Father
Throughout the Gospel of John , Jesus explains that he was at one with the Father in the works he did in the Fathers name.
People saw the Father at work in Jesus. Even further, John said “though he had performed so many signs before them , they were not believing in him (v37).
We are told in the scriptures that these signs were done by God the Father at work in Jesus
John 14:10 , Acts 2:23 etc.
The author makes many important points
In Isaiah 6 we see YHWH sitting on his throne – and it seems that in theTrinitarians mind YHWH sitting on the throne is not the Triune God, not God the Father, but simply Jesus.
They say that “metal sharpens metal’ and debates such as this can only get better and better.!
The good news is that while Navas can only learn to ‘sharpen’ his debating skills and his undertanding of Trinitarian nonsense (and ‘red-herrings’,) White is stuck with a finite pool of scriptures with which to rebut him.
In the end, the truth will win!
Every Blessing
John
Hi MdS,
Per comment 5:
Actually, one can see that the syllogism ABI exemplifies relative identity while rejecting the validity of the concept of relative identity. In that case, the choices follow:
1. ABI and the respective classical syllogism are wrong.
2. ABI is correct and exemplifies relative identity, which is an invalid concept.
Blessings,
Jim
Hi Abel, the first words of the blog post “Ably reviewed” are underlined, which is identical to the link for the debate. Jim
Hi
Perhaps someone can help me? -Where can I find the Navas vs White debate?
Yours Sincerely
Abel
Of course, one first has to accept the very validity of the concept of “relative identity” (a parturition of the mind of the 20th-century English philosopher Peter Geach).
I don’t.
It is a manifest oxy-moron.
MdS
Hi John,
Per that you do not understand “… how two different characters with different respective shapes can be nevertheless identical.”
I will try to restate it this way: The letter “A” is a character with a shape that is distinct from the letter “B” while A = B. Does that help to make the statement clearer? If that is not clear, then the rest of it based on that statement is irrelevant.
Blessings,
Jim
Hi Jim
I don’t understand your statement –
“… how two different characters with different respective shapes can be nevertheless identical”
Surely
If A = B and
B=C then
A = C
Surely
If God is the Father
And The Father is NOT the Son
Then The Son is NOT GOD
Am I missing something?
Every Blessing
John
Hi Dale,
If I may, I have no direct comment about the Patrick Navas versus James White debate, but I have comments about a statement of yours.
Dale says that the following statement is contradictory:
“Jesus and the Father are both identical to God, but not to each other.”
My Reply:
The above statement of yours appears unclear to me. For example, I suppose that statement means or at least implies the following:
“Jesus and the Father are both identical to God, but distinct from each other.”
If I misinterpreted you, then pardon me. But if I correctly interpreted you, then consider the following syllogism that I call “ABI”: if A = B, then A is identical to B. Do you agree or disagree with syllogism ABI?
If one disagrees with ABI, then that indicates disagreement with the following classical syllogism: if A = B and B = C, then A = C.
Alternatively, if one agrees with ABI, then one agrees that A and B are two distinct characters with different respective shapes while A and B are nonetheless identical. Likewise, two distinct characters can be identical to each other. In this case, ABI exemplifies the formula logic of relative identity (x and y are the same F but x and y are different Gs).
The choices follow:
1. ABI and the respective classical syllogism are wrong.
2. ABI is correct and exemplifies relative identity.
Blessings,
Jim
(I hope my HTML tags are correct.)
As usual there are (at least) three main problems with Dale (I am getting repetitive, but, maybe, … repetita iuvant):
1. He claims to be a “humanist unitarian”, but then, somehow, he considers the existence of “subordinate gods” compatible with unitarianism and therefore, a fortiori, with monotheism.
2. He refuses the (co-eternal, co-equal, tri-personal) “trinity”, but then he is perfectly happy with some alleged “pre-existent christ”, as though it was not evident that, historically, this is a step towards the full-fledged doctrine of the “trinity”.
3. He simply ignores the Arian controversy as THE crisis, in response to which the full-fledged doctrine of the “trinity” was at last established, as a compromise between the new-Nicenes and the semi-Arians.
MdS
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