Dale Tuggy

Dale Tuggy is Professor of Philosophy at the State University of New York at Fredonia, where he teaches courses in analytic theology, philosophy of religion, religious studies, and the history of philosophy.

3 Comments

  1. James Goetz
    January 13, 2011 @ 12:04 pm

    James said, “I’m happy to confirm that I have no aspiration to merge with the divine in some trans-rational meditative experience. I doubt my wife would be very supportive of that sort of thing, at least while there remain uncompleted DIY projects.”

    Perhaps you’re misinterpreting the possibilities; it might make you a better carpenter.:)

  2. Dale
    January 11, 2011 @ 4:56 pm

    James,

    If it were up to me, I’d award you an honorary degree in Humor. 🙂

    “Rational Resistance”… yeah, it conjures up images of valiant Frenchmen fighting NAZIs. Rhymes with “National Resistance”.

    I’m now thinking that “Rationalizing Resistance” is better – such folk are not necessarily rational, all things considered, but “rationalizing” in the sense of finding a reason or reasons why paradoxes should be endured intact.

    I need to think more about the intrinsic badness thing. If it is epistemically bad for beliefs to be apparently contradictory, I think that those beliefs could still overall be epistemically good. Compare: pain is intrinsically bad. Yet a certain pain can be part of an experience which is overall good – e.g. eating hot salsa.

    Now get back to those DIY projects, you lazy man!

  3. James
    January 11, 2011 @ 11:03 am

    So I’m a member of the Rational Resistance movement? I guess I can live with that. 🙂

    But perhaps Reasoning Resistance would be even better, since it maintains the “-ing” pattern and avoids any hint of rationalism. (You know all about me and rationalism.)

    I’m happy to confirm that I have no aspiration to merge with the divine in some trans-rational meditative experience. I doubt my wife would be very supportive of that sort of thing, at least while there remain uncompleted DIY projects.

    I’m less sure about the differences you identify between my position and Kierkegaard’s. It’s true that I don’t revel in paradox and that I view theological paradox as a prima facie problem to be addressed (or at least, a limitation that we’re justifiably motivated to try to overcome). And I’ll admit I don’t have any profound desire to suffer, doxastically or otherwise!

    Still, I’m not so sure that I see paradox as intrinsically epistemically bad. For all I know, prelapsarian Adam was faced with theological paradoxes as a result of his cognitive finitude; likewise for glorified saints. So I’d prefer to say that paradoxes per se are neither good nor bad, epistemically speaking; what matters is whether the beliefs in question are epistemically warranted, all things considered.

    BTW, I’m also an ardent alliterationist.