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Here’s the argument discussed:
- Only God can forgive sins.
- Jesus forgave sins.
- Therefore, Jesus is God. (1,2)
The argument is plainly valid. (That is: if 1 and 2 were true, then 3 would have to be true too.)
But is it sound? (Are both premises true?) One might think so. A Christian, on the basis of the New Testament, must agree with 2. And isn’t 1 obviously true?
Not according to Jesus. Is he your teacher? If so, then you should not make the above argument. Even if 3 is true, the above will not be a sound argument, according to Jesus, because premise 1 is false.
Why? Check out the video above: John Schoenheit of biblicalunitarian.com hits the nail on the head, discussing Jesus’s relevant teachings. (See this too.) In short, God can and does authorize people to forgive sins on his behalf, including both Jesus, and disciples of Jesus. (One should relate this to the theme of Jesus as eternal high priest in Hebrews, and to the New Testament doctrine of the priesthood of believers; this is a priestly function.)
Bizarrely, many in catholic traditions agree with Jesus’s opponents’ assumption in Mark 2.
Let’s not ignore and contradict what Jesus says in a misguided attempt to defend him.
Rivers,
These are the critical verses of Philippians 2. I have indicated the key Greek words. For the verbs, I have indicated their Tense, Voice and Mood.
6 [Jesus] existing <[huparchôn – PAP] in the form [morphê] of God
did not regard [êgêsato – ADI] to be equal [things] to God
[as] something to be grasped [harpagmon – lit. robbery, booty],
7 but emptied [ekenôsen – AAI] himself
[by] taking [labôn – 2AAP] [on] the form [morphê] of a slave,
becoming [genomenos – 2ADP] in [the] likeness of humans,
and being found [euretheis – APP] as a man.
8 He humbled [etapeinôsen – AAI] himself,
by becoming [genomenos – 2ADP] obedient to the point of death
– even [death] on a cross!
9 As a result [dio kai] God exalted [huperypsôsen – AAI] him
and gave [echarisato – ADI] him the name
that is above every name …
(Philippians 2:6-9)
Tense: P=Present; A=Aorist; 2A= Second Aorist
Voice:A=Active; D=middle Deponent; P=Passive
Mood= Participle; I=Indicative
Hopefully you are not seriously suggesting that morphê (as “used in Philippians 2:6-8”) would mean “the form by which a person or thing strikes the vision”, or “external appearance” …
You have built an entire “dogma” on the weak assumption that, being huparchôn a Present Active Participle, it “need only refer” to the present time, relative to when Paul is writing.
You seem not to know that the Present Participle [here: huparchôn] is used for an action going on at the same time as the action of main verb [here: êgêsato, ADI, expressing past action from the POV of Paul]. Also, an Aorist Participle [here, respectively: labôn, genomenos, euretheis] may express (except for indirect discourse) any time (past, present, or rarely future) relative to the main verb(s) [here, respectively: êgêsato, ekenôsen, etapeinôsen]. Also, it is very common, in Greek, that a participle may be the equivalent of an entire relative clause, or of an adverbial clause in each of its varieties (final, consecutive, causal, conditional, concessive, adversative, temporal). Temporal being ONLY one of the possibilities. Here, the obvious use of the Present Participle huparchôn is concessive (“whereas he existed …”), and even adversative (“although he existed …”).
ALL the situation described in vv. 6-8 is set by Paul in the PAST. Verse 9 describes the PRESENT situation (already happened in the past, as seen by Paul, and now definitive) of Jesus Christ, AFTER his own resurrection and ascension. The logical, causal “bridge” between the PAST and the PRESENT is the phrase dio kai: “as a result” (or “therefore”).
Once again, so as to peddle your pet “dogma”, you have managed to butcher Greek grammar and logic, all in one.
Rose,
Paul didn’t speak of any “nature” or “dual nature” in Philippians 2:5-11. The word MORFE (form) used in Philippians 2:6-8 doesn’t not mean “nature.”
Another consideration is that Paul used a Present Active Participle to speak of Jesus “existing in the form of God” (Philippians 2:6). This need only refer to Jesus being “in the form of God” at the time that he was writing the letter (which was after he received his “body of glory”, Philippians 3:21, when he was “exalted”, Philippians 2:9-11).
When he spoke of Jesus Christ “emptying himelf” and “taking the form of a servant”, and “humbling himself” (Philippians 2:7-8), he used the Aorist tenses to indicate that he was speaking of things that Jesus did at a time in the past. We all understand that this took place during the time of his earthly ministry.
The implication is that Jesus had “the form of God” after he had “the form of a servant” and that the things that he was no longer characterized by the “form” in which he found himself while on earth. The use of the Present Active Participle in Philippians 2:6 does not suggest that Jesus was ever “existing in the form of God” before he was exalted after his death and resurrection.
@Dale,
Jesus has dual form while he was on earth ( even afterwards).
Jesus is ‘God in form.’ ~ Philippians 2:6
Jesus is ‘Servant in form.’ ~ Philippians 2:7
Jesus has ABILITY to know the day and the hour ( Mark 13:32) but God the Father alone possess AUTHORITY to know it ( Acts 1:7).
ABILITY – this stems from the nature of someone. It is what one can only do limited to his nature.
AUTHORITY – 1) the right to do something.2)The permission to act.
In Colossians 2:3 ( Post-resurrection), Jesus had ALL KNOWLEDGE. This is due to having been given ALL AUTHORITY in Matthew 28:19 ( Post-resurrection).
Thanks for the time, Dale!
“I’m not sure if you’re trying to saddle me with belief in an explicit or implicit (apparent) contradiction”
Implicit. I think that’s bad enough, epistemically speaking. Mysterians are almost by definition smart, reflective and thoughtful people, and rarely will go around asserting any explicit contradictions.
About your never thinking or believing not-F. I am willing to take your word for it. But I note that fairly often, we deceive ourselves about what we really think/believe. https://trinities.org/blog/?s=foolin%27&searchsubmit= Also, we have a remarkable ability to simply ignore things that follow from our firm and central beliefs. These are not a debating points – but I think it is a good and important ones.
“Anyway, there’s no need to debate about whether I believe sets of propositions that appear (merely, appear, I say) contradictory. I affirm it. ”
Once again, note the abstraction. “There are groups of propositions such that they appear contradictory and I believe them.” But I take it, you mean to agree that you affirm all of my group FIDO. I just point out the habit, so (humanly) necessary to being a positive mysterian.
“but even if it were true as a generalization, what does it show?”
That in practice, positive mysterianism requires some degree of double-mindedness. It’s a practical point, which merely brings out a practical – and I think spiritual – cost of the stance. One may think it is a cost well worth paying, of course.
Paul, always a pleasure discussing with you. If you write up anything on mysterianism, or a mysterian account of Trinity or Incarnation, let me know, and maybe you can do a guest post here, or even a series of them.
Dale, you’re keen to note I wanted to shift mystery to another MAC, because that shift, while not resolving the problem, makes getting a P and ¬P more difficult. So
P = Jesus knows all truths wrt his divine nature.
The negation of ‘P’ is, well, ¬(P)!
But *this* isn’t this negation of *P*
Q = Jesus failed to know a truth wrt his human nature
Now, mind you, I am not claiming that this resolves the paradox, but it’s meant to show that getting at the precise contradiction is more difficult than let on above. Perhaps a problem here is that I’m not sure if you’re trying to saddle me with belief in an explicit or implicit (apparent) contradiction. So the qualification about natures does at least this much: shows that they’re *different* proposition, and thus not an explicit contradiction.
Anyway, there’s no need to debate about whether I believe sets of propositions that appear (merely, appear, I say) contradictory. I affirm it.
I’m interested in your claims about what I’m committed to. You note that I think there is (or am warranted to think there is) an equivocation somewhere, and so I’m a mysterian. Okay, I’ll accept that (qualifying this with qualifications James has made to positive mysterianism).
But then if I’m warranted in believing that, how can you say I’m committed to your *derivation* of a (what I take to be) patently false conclusion, i.e., ¬(Jesus is divine). You asked, “How can you deny it?” That’s how: there’s an equivocation somewhere, and so any purported derivation using equivocal terms is fallacious, and thus the conclusion should not be believed.
About “closure,” I wasn’t fussing. It looked to me that you were hinging a claim on it. You wrote: “You must believe -P too, right? How could you not? If you firmly believe all three, you must notice that -P follows, and must believe that too.”
But now it seems like you’re not committing yourself an a priori principle, like closure, but to an *empirical* claim about “human nature” and, more specifically, that I “will, at least sometimes, think and believe -F.” Well, I have (since being a Christian) neither thought nor believed ¬F. So your claim about *me* is false. Second, I doubt your empirical claim about “human nature,” but even if it were true as a generalization, what does it show? Nothing about what I “must” or “should” believe, and that’s what we’re concerned with, right?
“meta-homiletics issues”? 🙂
Your changes to my examples introduce complications regarding time, truth, and the def of omniscience. But let’s go back to mine, slightly expanded:
F. Jesus is fully divine.
I. There was a time when (1) something was true, and (2) Jesus didn’t know it.
D. If anything is fully divine, it is essentially omniscient.
O. If something is essentially omniscient, there never is a time, while it exists, that it does not know something which is true (at that time).
I think I, D, and O are true. Thus, I deny F.
If you affirm F and I, given that you must also accept D and O, your views straightforwardly imply -F. Now you want to fuss about closure, but my point is a simple one: given human nature, and that you believe those all of FIDO, you will, at least sometimes, think and believe -F. Thus, one who recommends FIDO to you, is in effect (whether they realize it or not) recommending double-mindedness. Talking to ordinary believers, I have found such re: the Trinity – and very clearly so, but let me stay on subject.
In part of your comment, it sounds like you deny I. You think he “knew all in his divine nature.” Whatever that means, it would follow that he knew it (full stop) – this “divine nature” is his, and not some other knower in addition to him. Compare: Paul hit Steve with his fist -> Paul hit Steve. Paul understood Steve with his mind -> Paul understood Steve. Paul, in his capacity to judge bands, judges that King’s X > Motorhead. -> Paul so judges. Paul, qua man, likes women -> Paul likes women.
What happened to the mysterianism? Mind you, I think you’d be right to avoid it. But maybe you mean to only shift the mystery to this inconsistent triad:
Whatever someone knows with/in a nature of theirs, they know.
Jesus knows all with/in his divine nature.
There’s something Jesus fails to know.
(If you want to fuss about times, just preface with: there has been a time such that at that time all three of these were true.)
If you just live with this, and say there must be an equivocation *somewhere* (which if discovered, would show the three to be compatible), then you’re a mysterian.
If you deny the third – logically, you solve the problem, but you go against two gospels. If you deny the first – that, arguably, is an ad hoc move. You need to motivate this denial, by saying more about knowing something in/with a “nature.”
Note that qualifying the third doesn’t help at all: There’s something Jesus fails to know *in his human nature*.
Hi Dale,
On paradox
Interesting stuff here. First, I’d like to make a qualification. I may have misunderstood you. I read you saying that we must believe P and ¬P to be the claim that paradoxes are *explicit* (merely apparent) contradictions. With James, I’d say the paradoxical doctrines are *implicit* (merely apparent) contradictions. But since they are MACs, then *at some point* there’s going to be something that *looks like* X and ¬X (where ‘X’ is a meta variable).
Okay, on to your remarks. Let me make some changes to your examples:
P = Jesus is omniscient (i.e., where this means, for simplicity, Jesus knows all true propositions).
Q = Jesus did not know at least one true proposition.
You think there’s an implicit contradiction here, such that by adding an (obviously) true metaphysical truth, we can get our contradiction. Now, you claim that P entails, implies, (?) ¬Q. And you seem to think it does so straight away. So, allowing double negation, you say we get ¬P, and thus I have to believe P and ¬P. But that’s not obviously correct (and I may be parting ways with James here, I’ll have to ask him what he thinks). Here’s some reasons why.
1. I’m not entirely sure P and Q imply an inconsistency. There’s nothing contradictory about these claims:
c1: Dale knows all truths.
c2: Dale does not know all truths.
At a minimum, the truths known in c1 and c2 would have to be known *at the same time*, and *in the same sense.” So, the ‘alls’ would have to quantify over the same set of propositions {T}, and you’d have to know all truths in {T} at time t and not know a truth in {T} at time t, where t = t. If c1 were true on 6/16/2000 at 5:30 pm, and c2 were true on 6/16/2013 at 5:30 pm, there doesn’t seem to be a contradiction.
Okay, now suppose that P presupposes that Jesus is fully divine, the second person of the trinity. If the second person of the trinity is fully divine, he may be timeless. Thus, he never knows a proposition at a time. So it’d be false to say that Jesus knows everything in {T} at time t, and Jesus does not know everything in {T} at time t, where t = t.
But at the end of the say, this is just a hiccup, for I’d have to now deal with: Jesus is timeless and not timeless. And this would involve me in affirming a paradox, I say.
Second, I’d say that you’re getting some mileage out of some vagueness. For full disclosure, I’d rather say that Jesus is omniscient with respect to his divine nature and not omniscient with respect to him human nature. This takes some of the sting out of your attempt to draw out an easy contradiction. With James, though, I don’t think this (helpful) distinction dissolves *all* the paradoxical implications, but I think you need to get more precise to make them stick.
Third, you ask how I can believe these propositions (‘I’ stands for ‘incarnation proposition’, ‘M’ for ‘metaphysical addition’):
I1: Jesus is omniscient with respect to his divine nature, and thus knows all truths.
I2: Jesus was ignorant of at least one truth.
M1: If Jesus was omniscient with respect to his divine nature, then he was not ignorant of at least one truth.
but then, at the same time, reject ¬(I1), got by DN and MT. You ask, “You must believe [¬(I1)] too, right? How could you not? If you firmly believe all three, you must notice that [¬(I1)] follows, and must believe that too – at least, sometimes! So given human nature, recommending all three amounts to recommending belief in [¬(I1)] too.”
I see two problems with this:
A: You got a lot of things going on here, a veritable potpourri of epistemic, doxastic, and deontic ( at least if ‘must believe ‘p” means ”ought’ to believe ‘p”) logics! You seem to think some things are closed under entailment that I’d deny. Second, I wonder what logic you think best models our doxastic goings on. Speaking for myself here, I think paraconsistent logics do. If that’s right, your argument that I must believe ¬(I1) would be fallacious.
B. But let’s leave that latter point aside, for there’s a more general reply. How could I avoid believing the conclusion of your derivation? Well, your derivation only succeeds if all the terms are used univocally throughout the derivation. But if something like James’ RAPT model is correct, then I can be warranted in believing that there’s an unarticulated equivocation going on, and if that’s right, I can (rationally) resist the derivation.
On unprincipled preaching
I guess I can see why the situation you describe strikes you as “unprincipled.” It doesn’t strike me that way, though. But I think this may (partly) come down to some differences between us over meta-homiletics issues. At all events, I’m not sure I agree that there is a church wide (non-conscious) attempt to cover up what you call the “incompatibility claim.” First, I’m not sure any laymen believe the incompatibility claim as you’ve out it. For they know it’s *false* to say that ¬(Jesus did not know some things) or that ¬(Jesus increased in wisdom). If they asserted that in the unqualified way you’ve presented it, they’d cause an uproar—for all the well-trained 5 yr. old needs to do is say, “But pastor, what about Luke 2:52?”, for instance, “Did you just say that Luke 2:52 is *false*?”
Second, you mentioned the context was a “Christmas sermon.” That hardly seems the appropriate time to take the major divergence and make sure you let everyone know, “God became man, but if we believe this, how can we believe that Jesus grew in wisdom since God is omniscient?” That strikes me as an entirely different sermon! Indeed, one that, to be done properly, would be mentally challenging for a good portion of the congregation. However, I have heard many a pastor at least *mention* the paradox, and they usually appeal to some “dvine nature/human nature” distinction, which seems fine for their purposes, considering they’re preaching on a different topic.
Now, you may have misread me. I did not mean to say (or imply) that I think we need to “protect the laymen from metaphysics.” I also did not mean to say (or imply) that we can (always) preach a metaphysics-free sermon (though the van Fraassian/OLP demon in me sometimes wishes this were so!). I just think it’d be difficult to preach the topic to a large majority of congregations, the way the topic needs to be preached. Moreover, if mysterianism is correct, isn’t calling the doctrine a mystery enough? After all, the laymen got the truth. Indeed, I’d wager that *many* laymen believe that the incarnation, trinity, or even (libertarian) freedom and foreknowledge are paradoxes or mysteries. They probably believe this, in large part, because so many ordinary preachers take this route. Sure, they may not express it in the sophisticated way someone like Anderson does, but do they need to? Here we may have another meta-level divergence, viz., over theories of knowledge, warrant, rationality, etc.
Best,
Paul
“I don’t think we must believe what looks like P & ¬P”
The form, as I discuss in my paper, is usually:
P
Q
If P then -Q.
Let’s take an example from James.
P = Jesus is fully divine.
Q = There are some things Jesus has not known.
Of course, they seem incompatible; whatever is fully divine is omniscient. That is supported by both Bible and reason, and I’ll wager it is something you actually believe.
By with that, given Q, it follows immediately that not-P.
Now I know, you may just deny Q. That would resolve this one. But let me go on the assumption you believe Q and the incompatibility premise.
You must believe -P too, right? How could you not? If you firmly believe all three, you must notice that -P follows, and must believe that too – at least, sometimes! So given human nature, recommending all three amounts to recommending belief in -P too.
I can tell you, I have heard this particular pair (P, Q above) emphatically preached in an evangelical church. But they absolutely steered clear of the incompatibility claim, though it is something they would wholeheartedly and centrally affirm in another context. (The context here was Jesus as a baby – it was a Christmas even sermon.)
Do you see why this strikes me as unprincipled? Does it strike you that way?
About protecting the laymen from metaphysics. Is this such a case? I thought that all three claims above were part of theology, and explicitly taught in the Bible.
I don’t see any principled way to circumscribe matters of metaphysics anyway. Yes, I don’t want to encumber the gospel with anything stumbling block that is unnecessary. For example, I would never insist, on pain of disfellowship, on dualism or presentism, though I think both are true. Yet, even to interpret the text, we need some assumptions about personal identity, moral realism, the reality of time and the cosmos, assumptions about testimony, and countless other matters. In short, we need common sense; but that overlaps with “metaphysics”.
Dale, I’d say that I’m more motivated by truth and faithfulness than sweet smelling doctrines. But if we’re going to go with that analogy, I will admit the foul smell but add this caveat: It smells better than the other options.
Now, I don’t think we must believe what looks like P & ¬P, so that may account for why you’re plugging your nose. But I deny that smell comes from me! No one should believe “P & ¬P.”
I also wonder why you think there’s an attempt to cover things up. I assert the creedal formulations, and I think you believe there’s a good case to be made that they lead to (apparent) contradictions of the implicit sort, i.e., when we add other (extra biblical) claims to the mix. The apparent contradictions arise when, say, we bring in views about the nature of identity, or the metaphysics of personhood. Should we talk about those things to laymen? Are we duty bound to say, “We’ve preached the entire counsel of God, but let’s take a digression into the nature of identity and show you how conceptually taxing these doctrines really are.” So, I contend that everything we *should* preach *is* preached, and each element *is* preached just as strongly.
I agree we must use rightly what we’ve got. We disagree at a meta-level. I think that sometimes it *is* the proper use of what we’ve got to affirm paradoxical (in James’ sense) doctrines. You have said belief in paradox is acceptable as a last resort. Yes, and we’re at a last resort. When an interpretation comes along that saves both rationality and orthodoxy, I think any sensible mysterian would gladly embrace it. Until then . . .
17. Nice.
I would’ve picked 42, based on the work of Saint Douglas Adams. :-p
But seriously, I doubt that number has much to do with it; I suspect that clarity, recalcitrance, continuity are more important. Maybe also whether the subject falls within the purview of “common sense.”
“I think I give more weight to creeds and confessions than you do” I don’t know whether that’s so, actually.
Obviously, we won’t solve this in comments. I note, though, that your comments so far illustrate my point that mysterianism is best left in the abstract. If you just put out all the apparent contradictions and display them, it doesn’t smell so sweet. And it only smells sweet when those are shoved into the background – or, so it seems to me.
If you really think that we must believe (what looks like a) P & -P, then one should get out there and stoutly assert both P and -P, not stick to higher-order defenses. But this in fact never happens. So, if P = “Jesus is fully divine” and -P = “Jesus is not fully divine” mysterians in point of fact running around asserting P, and sort of holding -P behind their back. But *in their own view* that is not where the best evidence compels them – they ought to equally believe and preach both, and as strongly.
My view, I think, doesn’t require any very confident assessment of human reason. It’s just that we must use rightly what little we’ve got. Also, one should question the assumption that a mysterian stance best fits with humility, or with modesty about our epistemic powers. It in fact, to be reasonable, requires some pretty hard to justify claims, e.g. that God *could not* have revealed the matters at hand to us without giving us strong evidence for an apparent contradiction. Really? How might one know that, I wonder?
Hi John,
If tradition actually contradicts logic (whatever that means) and is not supported by scripture, then tradition is wrong.
Nothing I said implies that tradition is a “warm, comfortable hole” for me, and that it bears the argumentative weight you think I’m placing on it.
Even Dale has said that one must think twice when rejecting a near consensus of church history. Tradition bears *some* weight for Dale. Well, I just think it is more weighty than Dale does.
We should admit, though, that scripture is understood within a tradition. Nuda scriptura is false. And so is solo Scriptura. I think the proper view of tradition is somewhere between what Dale thinks of it and what Catholics think of it.
I also don’t think I hold to any *real* contradictions, or anything “unintelligible.” If you want to know my position, see this:
http://www.amazon.com/Paradox-Christian-Theology-Paternoster-Theological/dp/1556352719/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1371121572&sr=8-1&keywords=paradox+in+christian+theology
Hi Paul
What happens if your tradition contradicts all logic – and is not supported by scripture?
It’s very comfortable to live in a warm ‘womb’ called tradition – but what if tradition has it wrong?
My problem is that men have created something which is unintelligible – and then declare the whole thing to be ‘a mystery’.
Man-made constructs cannot be ‘mysteries’.
God is a ‘mystery’
Blessings
John
Hi Dale, 17 apparent contradictions is my limit. After 17, I go for a more charitable reading. 🙂
Apparent contradictions right in front of you, then back to interpretation, right. But here’s the rub: what do you do when what you think is the correct the interpretation fails to succumb to any rational analysis that saves rationality and orthodoxy? I don’t think that such a (temporary?) failing is an indefeasible defeater for holding that the interpretation that leads to the paradox is the correct one. i also think we (may) differ on the data we need to account for. That is, I think I give more weight to creeds and confessions than you do. That’s the tradition I’m in. I think that tradition is right. And it seems you think that tradition suffers from incoherence, or a (implicit) denial of the creedal statements one purports to be defending. So it seems you have a lot of sympathy for my view given the truth of the antecedents of the conditionals I think are true. I also don’t think the matter can be solved by charity. I think there very well may be (are!) truths that beings like us may not be able (now, or perhaps ever) to *demonstrate* or *model* their consistency according to rules of logic. Peter van Inwagen hints at something like this in his intro to Metaphysics. He says perhaps we suck at doing metaphysics. So I guess I’m willing to believe that some things are *true* even if I can’t provide a consistent model for how all the truths rationally hang together. But, I think I can be warranted in thinking that *there exists* such a model, even if in the mind of God. And at this stage, I don’t think the points you’ve raised, specifically to James, undercut that stance.
Hi John,
Thanks for the comment.
To say a thing is divine can mean either that (1) it is a divinity, that is, a god, or that (2) it is somehow associated with a god. cf. “royal” or “human” “Deity” can be a noun, meaning a god, or it can be an adjective, meaning that quality all gods have, that makes them gods. I think you’re night – to say that Christ “has deity” is, either way, going to imply that he is a god. (And so if there’s only one, that he’s the one god.) And yes, he can be “divine” with being a god, just as the scriptures are divine, or a prophet is truly divine (i.e. really on a mission from God.)
I think sometimes “deity” can be used in the same sense as the second def of “divinity”. Evangelicals talk, interchangeable, about the “divinity of Christ” or the “deity of Christ”. In so doing, they sort of suggest both that Christ is closely associated with God, and that Christ is God himself.
It’s a convenient ambiguity; if someone objects to one, you just switch to the other. “What, are you an Arian” (for saying Christ is merely associated with God). “No – I mean the *full* divinity, the true deity of Christ.”
“What? Are you saying that the one God just is his own Son?”
“No, I admit that God is different that God’s Son. I was just saying that they’re both divine.”
“and I *am* a mysterian”
>:-/ On the one hand, I understand the view. But on the other: how many apparent contradictions have to pile up, before one considers a more charitable reading of the scriptures?
I mean, mysterianism seems best when left in the abstract. When all the apparent contradictions are right in front of you though… back to the interpretation task, right? We must not’ve got something right! There gets to be something… anti-intellectual about the mysterian stance after a while. BTW, I don’t think I’ve said this in print, or even to James, but I was a *huge* mysterian back in the day, when an undergrad. Foreknowledge and freedom, Trinity, Incarnation – whatever. Mysteries all around. And if you don’t happily accept that, you must be arrogant – you must think you should be able to understand everything. And God, I thought, probably reveals stuff this way on purpose, just to challenge us to be humble. Obviously, I’ve softened that stance quite a bit. What really softened me was considerations of charity, in reading the Bible, or anything else. It is precisely recalitrant apparent contradictions that force us to make hard choices in interpreting an author… Again, I just can’t think God is a trickster. He’s concerned, yes, about arrogance and over-confidence in human reason, but not enough to actively trip us up; we wants us to understand, he wants to self-reveal.
All.
I have long held the view that there is a difference in being ‘divine’ and being ‘deity’
As far as I can understand ‘divine’ means ‘of God’ – while ‘deity’ means ‘God” or ‘a god’
So I can agree that Christ was ‘divine’ but not’ deity’.
IF God was a trinity then the second person of a trinity is NOT God – since there are some things about one which are not true for the other. Is this correct?
Is it a bit like saying that “Coke’ is a beverage – but a beverage is not Coke?
Wold appreciate your thoughts
Blessings
John
Hi Dale,
Yes, you’ve got my meaning of ‘non-derivatively forgiving’ right.
I’m inclined to agree with both P1 and P2, but it’d take some work defending the crucial premise, i.e., P2.
There’s interesting issues surrounding your comments about “Jesus is God.” Because here’s a ‘problem’ for the trinitarian:
a. Jesus is the second person of the trinity.
b. The second person of the trinity is God.
c. Jesus is God.
Even your retooling invites problems for trinitarians. Suppose Jesus is a fully divine person. Trinitarians also believe that the Father is a fully divine person. And they also believe that there is only *one* God.
No doubt this stirs up a mare’s nest of conundrums, er, paradoxes, and I *am* a mysterian (suitably defined, of course). 😉
Hi Paul, thanks for the comment. So, non-derivatively forgiving, is forgiving a sin but not by authority granted by another.
Then I would say that 1 is true, but 2 is false.
You?
I note that the conclusion, for a trinitarian, should be unwelcome. It would strictly identify Jesus and God, which can’t by right, whether by “God” we mean the Father, or the triune God.
But the argument could perhaps be retooled so that 1 was something like “Only a fully divine person can non-derivatively forgive a sin” and 3 was “Jesus is a fully divine person.” Still have the problem with 2 though, in my view.
The argument should go:
1. Only God can non-derivatively forgive sins.
2. Jesus non-derivatively forgave sins.
3. Therefore, Jesus is God. (1,2)
This shifts the focus to (2) rather than (1). Apologies if this was mentioned above.
@ Dale [#4, June 8, 2013 at 7:51 am]
Good for you, but what Schoenheit writes …
“No verse of Scripture says that “only God can forgive sins.” That idea came from their tradition. The truth is that God grants the authority to forgive sins as He pleases. He granted that authority to His Son and, furthermore, to the apostles.”
… is misleading, to say the least. While there is no doubt, from the OT, that YHWH God forgives sins (see, again, Ps 130:4), no one, before Jesus (not even John the Baptist) affirmed his authority to forgive sins, and backed it up with miraculous evidence, and explicitly delegated that authority to the Apostles (the Twelve …).
All we know is that Paul was granted a vision of the resurrected Christ, which led him to a radical conversion. All the rest is mere speculation. And Paul’s insisted claim to be an “apostle” (and his rather plaintive moaning against the “super-apostles” – see 1 Cor 11:5) is a spectacular case of self-appointment. (Peter fixed unambiguously the essential requirement for being an apostle, an appointed witness –pre-post resurrection– by the Lord Jesus, at Acts 1:21-22)
As the footnote appended to 1 Peter 2:9 NET says …
“This verse contains various allusions and quotations from Exod 19:5-6; 23:22 (LXX); Isa 43:20-21; and Mal 3:17.”
… but the inference that “believers generally” have received the same prerogatives that Jesus explicitly bestowed ONLY on the Apostles (the Twelve …) is scripturally groundless.
MdS
“pace Schoenheit”
No, any Christian, including me and Schoenheit, would agree. That was never at issue.
Yes, Jesus did ought to have, and did, supply miraculous evidence to back up his claim to be the Messiah and Son of God.
No, this doesn’t create any problem about Paul. He too was called by Jesus, post-resurrection.
” where does it say (or imply), in the Scripture, that Jesus would have given the authority to forgive sins to “believers generally”?”
Implied at 1 Peter 2:9.
@ Dale [#3, June 6, 2013 at 4:44 pm]
That depends entirely on what I have gone at great length to clarify, and namely, whether or not you agree that:
• Forgiving sins is indeed (pace Schoenheit) a “peculiar prerogative of God”, YHWH, the Father Almighty. That He can delegate it to His Son Jesus and (through him) to others, does not change the prerogative.
• Unless Jesus had provided some (miraculous) evidence in support of his “authority on earth to forgive sins”, his claim that he, as the Son of Man “has authority on earth to forgive sins” would have been nothing but an arbitrary and void claim, to be treated in accordance with Deut 18:22.
First, I take good note that you agree that the authority to forgive sins, that Jesus had on earth from YHWH, the Father Almighty, was delegated to the Apostles ONLY through Jesus (which, for instance, would leave Paul in a rather disputable position, at least according to what the Scripture explicitly says …).
Second, where does it say (or imply), in the Scripture, that Jesus would have given the authority to forgive sins to “believers generally”?
Third, this may not be “the place to get into the issue of ‘apostolic succession'”, but that depends, to a large extent, on your reply to the above question.
MdS
Mario,
You’ve gone on at great length, as if critiquing my post, but it seems you wholly agree with the main point.
“given to them by Jesus”
Sure. God gave him the authority, and the authority to “deputize” others, so to speak, that is, to give others the authority. And yes, he did this to the apostles (and in my view, to believers generally). I leave aside the Catholic interpretation, because even on it, my point holds – people other than God (e.g. an authorized leader in Mother Church, in their view) can forgive sins. This is not the place to get into the issue of “apostolic succession.”
So, is premise no. 1 (“Only God can forgive sins”) false, and, consequently the argument unsound (if not even false)?
Let’s see.
In the accompanying note to the video on Mark 2:7 at biblicalunitarian.com, we read:
“On several occasions the Lord Jesus told the Pharisees that their doctrine was wrong. Mark 2:7 records an instance where this was the case. There is no verse of Scripture that says, “only God can forgive sins.” That idea came from their tradition. The truth is that God grants the authority to forgive sins as He pleases. He granted that authority to the Son and, furthermore, to the apostles. John 20:23 records Jesus saying to them: “If you forgive anyone his sins, they are forgiven.” If the Pharisees were right, and only God can forgive sins, then God, Jesus and the apostles were all God, because they all had the authority to forgive sins. ”
So, is it really the case that there is no verse of Scripture that affirms that forgiving sins is a peculiar prerogative of God? I believe there is at lest one:
But [there is] forgiveness with You, That You may be feared. (Ps 130:4 – NKJV)
Besides, in front of the resistance and scandal of the Pharisees, does Jesus think or say something like, “If you are willing to believe that I have the power and authority (exousia) to forgive sins, good, otherwise, your bad!”? Not in the least! This is how he replies …
8 Now immediately, when Jesus realized in his spirit that they were contemplating such thoughts, he said to them, “Why are you thinking such things in your hearts? 9 Which is easier, to say to the paralytic, ‘Your sins are forgiven,’ or to say, ‘Stand up, take your stretcher, and walk’? 10 But so that you may know that the Son of Man has authority on earth to forgive sins,” – he said to the paralytic –11 “I tell you, stand up, take your stretcher, and go home.” 12 And immediately the man stood up, took his stretcher, and went out in front of them all. They were all amazed and glorified God, saying, “We have never seen anything like this!” (Mark 2:8-12 – NET)
… NOT ONLY with words, BUT with the miracle in support of his “authority on earth to forgive sins”.
More, the authority that the Apostles received of forgiving sins (John 20:23 – see also Matt 16:19; 18:18) was clearly given to them by Jesus, by the resurrected Jesus, “exalted … to His right hand as Leader and Saviour” (Acts 5:31; 13:38). BTW, that Jesus bestowed the authority to forgive sins on the Apostles is crystal clear from the above cited verses, and only Protestants (some? many?) find it “obscure”, simply because they see it as a support to the Catholic doctrine, grounded on the plain interpretation of John 20:23 and Matt 16:19;18:18, and on the transmissibility of this authority from the Apostles to their successors.
Al the above being premised, can we amend Premise no.1 and modify the entire argument so that it is not only valid, but also sound? I believe we can. Here it is:
1a1. God has the peculiar prerogative that he can forgive sins. (Ps 130:4)
1a2. There is nothing in the Bible that says that this peculiar prerogative cannot be bestowed by God on others.
2a1. Jesus, the Son of Man, manifestly had “authority on earth to forgive sins” (Mark 2:1-12).
2a2. Jesus manifestly bestowed the authority and power to forgive sins upon the Apostles (Matt 16:19;18:18; John 20:23).
3a. Therefore, only God, and Jesus, and those authorized by God and Jesus can forgive sins. (1a1, 1a2, 2a1, 2a2)
Does the above argument conclude or exclude that Jesus is God? Neither …
… but one thing is clear: without the supporting evidence of his miracles, Jesus’ claims to authority would be arbitrary and void, which is perfectly in line with the OT criteria, Deut 18:22, complemented by Deut 13:1-4.
MdS
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