Skip to content

Swinburne @ Biola

Richard Swinburne was a visiting fellow at Biola University’s Center for Christian Thought in the Fall of 2012. Here are the videos they’ve posted from that visit. Interestingly, they seem to have avoided the topic of Swinburne’s Trinity theory – at least, judging by the videos they posted. One has to wonder why. Maybe they just wanted to leave room to discuss the soul, about which… Read More »Swinburne @ Biola

Swinburne on analytic vs. continental philosophy

Here’s a gem of a passage from a little-read paper by Richard Swinburne, from this book. This is part of talk he gave at a 2001 conference in Moscow, Russia, co-sponsored by the Society of Christian Philosophers and the Russian Orthodox church. So he’s explaining the wider context of analytic philosophy to them. Sometimes, when we have to explain things to those outside the camp,… Read More »Swinburne on analytic vs. continental philosophy

Mark Edwards on Councils and the Trinity

“The” doctrine of the Trinity was established neither at Nicea (325 AD) nor at Constantinople (381 AD). In catholic lore, it is all supposed to hang on the then novel term homoousios – but it does not – that is, not only on that. This one catholic Trinity doctrine is in fact not a fully determinate doctrine at all, but only a template, a set… Read More »Mark Edwards on Councils and the Trinity

New Papers

I’ve just updated my homepage with a paper forthcoming in Faith and Philosophy, called “Hasker’s Quests for a Viable Social Theory.” My sincere thanks to editor Thomas Flint, and to that journal’s anonymous readers for their help. The paper critically examines the various discussions of William Hasker, a very accomplished Christian philosopher, and former editor of F&P, from whom I have learned much. I think… Read More »New Papers

Simplifying the Indiscernibility of Identicals

equals - greenI’ve posted quite a few times here before about identity, and about the principle often called “Leibniz’s Law” – the Indiscernibility of Identicals. This is often put:

Necessarily, for any x and any y, x is identical to y only if for any P, x has P if and only if y has P. (Compare, e.g. Colin McGinn, Logical Properties (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 4-7.

I agree with other philosophers that this has apparent counterexamples, if “P” can stand either for any predicate or for any property.

But in my view, the underlying metaphysical intuition – that a thing can’t at one time be and not be a certain way – is undeniable. (And of course, it has important theological implications.)

I would restrict the “P” above to intrinsic properties, if I believed in properties. But I don’t. So I’ve been putting the principle like this:

The Indiscernibility of Identicals: Necessarily, any A and B are identical only if they (1) never have differed, (2) don’t differ, (3) will not ever differ, and (4) could not differ.

This formula doesn’t import any assumptions about property-theory, either for or against. Rather, it uses only a primitive concept of differing, or being different – as to qualitative aspect or way of being, not as to number. I think this well captures the intuition and fundamental conviction noted above.

But it now strikes me that the formula is needlessly complicated. Why not just this?Read More »Simplifying the Indiscernibility of Identicals

Craig wins again

craig - that's your argumentThis post is a commentary on the Craig-Rosenberg debate. Most of my comments are in italics; factual reporting is in regular text.

In short, Craig undeniably wins. I felt bad for Rosenberg, and could hear naturalistic philosophers of religion face-palming throughout the debate.

Debaters: there’s a lot you can learn from here.

  • 8:00 The debate has judges? Yet no philosophers? Or rather, one who used to teach it?
  • 17:14 – Debate finally starts. C comes out hitting on all cylinders, with a clean argument for a self (an “unembodied mind,” “a consciousness,” or “person”) which exists a se (he hedges with talk of “a personal being”) (person etc. – before 24 min). (See comment re: 37:00 below.)
  • 25:30 It is clear that C has read some of Rosenberg’s work.
  • C keeps his arguments simple, short, and understandable – though philosphers and other pros might prefer more detail. But this is effective communication; he knows his audience. His pace is conversational, and not a word is wasted. It is clear that C has tailored his arguments to his opponent, even while using mostly his standard arguments – and he points out some of the most ridiculous things R has said follow from naturalistic atheism.
  • 28:00 – I don’t at all understand C’s comeback to the multiple cosmoi objection to the fine tuning argument. A rare mis-step in C’s debate performance.
  • 37:00 C: God “can be personally known.” Never mind that God is NOT literally a self/person, or C’s controversial Trinity speculations, which he habitually presents as “the” doctrine of the Trinity. But, this does nothing to hurt him in this debate.
  • 38:00 Rosenburg starts his case, and is hilariously rude. He falsely implies Read More »Craig wins again

Santa vs. Arius, round 2

Now that I’m actually looking for it, I see that this stuff is very popular on Catholic websites and blogs. Here it is – the same version I mentioned last time in comic form. Excellent epistemologist and apologist Tim McGrew responded on Facebook to my previous post: Of the 318 bishops that Athanasius (and Eusebius in his Chronicon) say were present, I can find names… Read More »Santa vs. Arius, round 2

Did Santa punch out Arius?

If memes are to be believed, yes. Santa (Nicholas, Bishop of Myra) punched Arius himself in the face, at the famous council of Nicea, no less. But – I hate to tell you – memes are not always to be believed. This one’s been making the rounds online for a few years. Even Catholic philosophy professors are getting in on the fun. And it is… Read More »Did Santa punch out Arius?

You’re another!

You’re another” – that’s what tu quoque means – it’s the name of an informal fallacy, often called a fallacy of relevance. For example, if I argue that your theory is self-contradictory, suppose you retort that my theory is too. Well, so…? It’s irrelevant to the point that the first theory mentioned is self-contradictory (so, self-refuting).

Cornell grad student Chad McIntosh argues that if the social trinitarian God – or rather: the three divine persons  posited by clear “social” Trinity theories – would be deceivers, then so would the perfect self in whom I believe, being a unitarian Christian. So granting that an ST is implausible, for similar reasons unitarian Christian theology is implausible (because it has a perfect being doing what appears a wrongful deception).

Is this a defense of ST?

I’ve already argued in that paper than a Swinburne-type ST implies what looks like wrongful deception by at least one of the three divine persons. This hasn’t been disputed.

I don’t grant that if God is a single self, then Read More »You’re another!

God and his Son: the Logic of the New Testament – conference presentation

Here’s a video of my May 2012 talk in Atlanta, “God and his Son: the Logic of the New Testament.” Many thanks to Sharon and Dan Gill, who filmed, edited, and posted it on their fine website, 21st Century Reformation. The characteristic thesis of unitarian Christianity (aka Biblical Unitarianism, Christian Monotheism) is that the Father of Jesus just is the one God, Yahweh, and Jesus… Read More »God and his Son: the Logic of the New Testament – conference presentation

Buddhist positive mysterianism

Positive mysterianism: it’s not only for Christians. And I very much doubt it was Christians who first hit upon the strategy… In any case, here’s an example from fourth century India: Our only grounds for speculating about Mainstream responses to Mahayana thought are the objections that the Mahayanists address in the own writings. In some cases, the Mahayanists argue against the objections, in others they… Read More »Buddhist positive mysterianism

Further thoughts on Swinburne’s God-talk

In this 2010 post I reacted to an interview by social trinitarian Richard Swinburne. My concern was that Swinburne has a theory on which the Trinity is not itself a person, but in answer to the question “Is God a self?” He answers affirmatively. What gives? Recently a reader e-mailed me with this link (thanks, Anthony). If you look at around 14 minutes, you’ll hear… Read More »Further thoughts on Swinburne’s God-talk

Orthodox modalism

The standard orthodox formulas admit of a “modalistic” or one-self interpretation.

Metatheology with Baber

(click for image credit)

Thanks to all you excellent commenters! I can’t always keep up.

I see my friend philosophy professor Harriet Baber has been on there asking some provocative questions like some kind of Socratic gadfly. 🙂  I thought they deserved a post. The quotes here are from her comments.

WHAT pre-existed: the 2nd Person of the Trinity or Christ?

Orthodox / catholic-kosher answer: both. The 2nd person of the Trinity is assumed to be personally identical to (and so, identical to) the man Jesus.

What if I hold that the Trinitarian Person was pre-existent but became a human at some time in the late 1st century BC so that, in effect, Christ is a proper temporal part of the 2nd Person of the Trinity. Does this make me an adoptionist?

To all the non-philosophers out there; she is applying the recent metphysical doctrine of temporal parts here, thinking of, e.g. a self as extended across or spread out over time, rather than lasting (entire) though time. In current day metaphysicians’ lingo, people perdure rather than endure. So in this case the one Christ would be that whole four-dimensional, event-like thing, with the early part being the pre-human logos and the latter part being the human Jesus – but as I’m using the terms here (this is tricky – there are no standard terms here) the logos and Jesus would be temporal parts of the one Christ.

I don’t know, Harriet, whether or not this makes you an adoptionist; I suggest we lay aside Read More »Metatheology with Baber

Is God Perfect?

Three Christian philosophers on perfect being theology, tradition in philosophy going back to the great medieval philosopher Anselm of Canterbury (d. 1109), but really, as Leftow has shown, back to Augustine, Plato, and the Christian Bible. First, a great interview (click the thin blue button) with Oxford philosopher Brian Leftow by Robert Lawrence Kuhn, for the PBS should Closer to Truth. I did not know that Leftow was… Read More »Is God Perfect?

Brian Leftow: Philosophers and Christians as dogs and cats

Ran across this great opening paragraph from philosopher Brian Leftow today: I’m a philosopher because I am a Christian. To many intellectuals, this probably sounds like saying that I am a dog because I am a cat. Dogs hate cats, and otherwise polite philosophers have said to my face, with vigor, that “Christian philosopher” is a contradiction in terms. Cats are not fond of dogs,… Read More »Brian Leftow: Philosophers and Christians as dogs and cats

Jesus: not an entirely fictional character

Eminent Bible scholar Dr. Craig Keener argues that yes, the man Jesus existed; Jesus is not an entirely fictional character.

Big news, huh? 🙂

I’ve followed this issue from afar from a while, but just can’t get myself to take this point of view (that Jesus never existed) seriously. To anyone very much acquainted with the relevant sources, it is obvious that there was a Jesus – whatever you think about his miracles, his claims, his status as Son of God, etc.

It is so obvious that one of our more important critics of traditional Christianity and the Bible, textual scholar and historian Dr. Bart Ehrman, has recently penned a book refuting Jesus-never-existed claims. See this long interview with fellow scholar Dr. Ben Witherington here.  (HT: triablogue)

And here is Ehrman on NPR. And The Huffington Post. And the Washington Post. And Religion Dispatches. (He gets a lot of press!)

Honestly, don’t spend too much time on this – it is at bottom a conspiracy theory. But credit to Ehrman and Keener; if one can muster the energy to take it seriously, it brings out the strength of the evidence for a historical Jesus.

It will be more interesting when he wades into more christological territory, into the matter of the historical Jesus’ self-understanding and public teaching about himself. In the Witherington interview linked above he saysRead More »Jesus: not an entirely fictional character

Buzzard’s textual arguments against Jesus’ pre-human existence – Part 4

In this recent video, Sir Anthony makes various relevant points. As I said in part 1 of this series, his linguistic argument against “pre-existence” is not his only one. At 3:11ff he gives a version of the linguistic argument I’ve been criticizing. It seems to me that the title of this video is false. To have been “begotten of God” I think, just means to… Read More »Buzzard’s textual arguments against Jesus’ pre-human existence – Part 4

Buzzard’s textual arguments against Jesus’ pre-human existence – Part 3

Do you think that you preexisted your conception? Me neither. True, there are cultures which presuppose this. But most of the human race, including ancient Jews, assumes that getting parented involves getting brought into existence some time between the sexual union and birth. You, the younger human being, exist because of what your parents did. This, I suggest,  is the default human assumption. You exist because of them. Abe and Sarah… Read More »Buzzard’s textual arguments against Jesus’ pre-human existence – Part 3