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Defining the concept of a unitarian

Last time I offered a definition of the concept of a trinitarian.

This time, I will try to define the concept of a unitarian.

Many definitions of this concept are unacceptably polemical.  It is unacceptable to define a unitarian as an anti-trinitarian.  This violates requirements 3 and 5 – it doesn’t tell us what a unitarian is, but only what a unitarian is against.  And this is part of a common slashing rhetorical strategy which I have recently mentioned.  For the same reasons we must reject defining the concept unitarian as one who “denies the Trinity” or “has heretical beliefs about the Trinity,” etc. Equally, it is unacceptable to define a unitarian as one who holds the correct or biblical view about Jesus and God. Whether or not that’s so, it’s trying to sneak an argument for a thesis into a pseudo-definition of that thesis.

One common definition is,

Definition 1: someone who believes in exactly one unipersonal God.

I think this is on the right track, but the term “unipersonal” is obscure, and so this definition violates requirement 6 (and possibly also 3).

I have been working with this definition of the concept:

Definition 2: someone who believes that the one God just is (is numerically identical to) the Father.

I now think that this isn’t quite right.

First the definition is arguably too narrow.  Read More »Defining the concept of a unitarian

Defining the concept of a trinitarian

I woke up this morning, and realized that there is a problem with how I’ve been defining the concept of a unitarian.  In this post, I will attempt a definition of the concept of a trinitarian, after reviewing what is required of a good definition. Next time, I’ll try to define the concept of a unitarian.

According to the textbook I have used for years in my critical thinking class, a good definition should:

  1. Include the genus and a differentia.
  2. Not be too broad or too narrow.
  3. State the essential attributes of the concept’s referents.
  4. Not be circular.
  5. Not use negative terms unnecessarily.
  6. Not use vague, obscure, or metaphorical language. (p. 44)

What is a trinitarian?

Definition 1: someone who believes in a triune god.

This failsRead More »Defining the concept of a trinitarian

“Sabellianism Reconsidered” Considered – Part 8

In this last post in this series, I want to put out a few critical reactions to Baber’s “Neo-Sabellian” Trinity theory.

My thanks to Harriet for this piece and for her interaction with us here.

No doubt, she’ll argue back; and she will probably say something about how her views have changed since she wrote this piece.

So, in no particular order:

  1. I agree with her that it’s suspicious if some philosophical theory should appeal to us only or mainly because it’ll help us in theology. I also agree with her that it’s interesting to at least try to come up with what is in some sense an acceptable Trinity theory which uses only metaphysical doctrines we have other reasons to believe.
  2. Again, I think it is a good aim to produce an intelligible (seemingly consistent) Trinity theory, assuming some such theory is called for. I think she’s correct to complain about the severe obscurity of traditional claims about “eternal generation” and “procession”.
  3. Picky point: I think “Neo-Sabellian” is a misnomer. It’s “Neo” all right, butRead More »“Sabellianism Reconsidered” Considered – Part 8

Biddle: many “Gods” but one God

Here’s an interesting but tightly wound passage from John Biddle (1615-62) in a book from 1648: Again, though he [Jesus] be a God, subordinate to the most high God, as having received his godhead, and whatsover he hath, from the Father; yet may not anyone thence rightly infer, that by this account there will be another God, or two Gods?  For though we may, with… Read More »Biddle: many “Gods” but one God

“Sabellianism Reconsidered” Considered – Part 7 (Dale)

Time for the old Spanish Inquisition. Will she survive The (self-administered) Rack?

In the final part of her article “Sabellianism Reconsidered”, Baber turns to theological objections. To wit:

  • The account renders it impossible for the Son to pray to the Father. But the NT says this happened.
  • The account denies that each Person of the Trinity is himself eternal, and has eternally born relations to the other two Persons. (pp. 8-9, paraphrased)

Her answers? Jesus, like his contemporaries, was not a trinitarian. That is, he didn’t realize  that the God to whom he prayed had temporal parts which were gods. Or even if he did, he didn’t intend to teach any trinitarian doctrine. Thus, he addressed not the Father, but God, as “Father”. (p. 10) Thus the term “Father”, in Jesus’ context, referred to God, while nowadays (post 380 CE?) it refers to the Father, the (temporally) first Person of the Trinity.

In response to the second objection, she notes that “a notion of timeless, metaphysically necessary causationRead More »“Sabellianism Reconsidered” Considered – Part 7 (Dale)

“Sabellianism Reconsidered” Considered – Part 6 (Dale)

Switchfoot “are one”. But they are really just five dudes, not one.

Baber observes,

Typically, aggregates of Fs are not themselves Fs. A collection of cats is not itself a cat… an aggregation of persons is not a person. (p. 7, emphasis added)

Still, she thinks this needn’t preclude three gods from themselves being a god. Some sorts of things, it seems, can have other things of that same sort for parts, such as a Sierpinski Triangle. (p. 10) Maybe, then, gods are more like triangles like cats, in that groups of god can be (temporal) parts of a god. At least, we can’t rule out that this is possible.

How many temporal parts does God, on this theory have? There’s no reason to think it is exactly three. Read More »“Sabellianism Reconsidered” Considered – Part 6 (Dale)

LaBreeska’s right

LaBreeska Hemphill is right. Jesus isn’t God; he’s the Son of God. God is a certain perfect self, the one both we and Jesus call “our Father” and “our God”. Jesus is a man – but by no means a mere man, to wildly understate the case. God is not a man, not, as C.S. Lewis would say, a Son of Adam. She’s not a theologian.… Read More »LaBreeska’s right

“Sabellianism Reconsidered” Considered – Part 5 (Dale)

To be omnipotent, Baber says, “is to be able to do [directly, by fiat] any action… including actions at times other than” the time at which one is omnipotent. (p.6) But consider, say, the action of miraculously inflicting some person with a headache on 1/1/2015. It seems that the Father, on this theory, couldn’t do that, as he wouldn’t exist then (having been superseded by… Read More »“Sabellianism Reconsidered” Considered – Part 5 (Dale)

A Tale of Two Tattoos (Dale)

I love philosophy majors. The best of them almost always develop a nerdy and warped sense of humor – and I mean that in the best way. 🙂

These two young ladies, recent alumnas of our department, decided to get complementary tattoos. (Sober, they swear!)

In each case, the tattoo artist left off the two initial universal quantifiers: AxAy (I can’t find the symbol codes for the upside down A representing the universal quantifier – so please imagine those A’s upside down.) They would read: For any x whatsoever and for any y whatsoever…

Now to the tattoos. “F” is supposed to be, either a predicate or a property. On the right tattoo (wrist) the right, closing parentheses is just out of view.

One of the tattoos says something nearly all philosophers agree is true (a rarity!) while the other is held to be false by many. Here’s your homework, dear reader:Read More »A Tale of Two Tattoos (Dale)

“Sabellianism Reconsidered” Considered – Part 4

The theory, then, is that God is an everlasting, temporally extended thing with three temporal parts, each of which is a god. But, they’re the same god as God. Yet as we saw last time, how can the Three be gods at all, as each exists at some times but not others?

Without going into the arguments for this controversial thesis, Baber appeals to the claim made by Derek Parfit and others, that “identity is not ‘what matters’ for survival”. (p.6) Thus, a future thing can count as my surviving, though it is not (numerically) identical to me.

Suppose (I’m stealing this thought experiment from Richard Swinburne) some mad scientists, such as Pinkie and the Brain, are going to cut my brain in half, and put the left half in one body, and the right in another. The body which gets the left half will be tortured to death, while the body getting the right half will be given lifetime passes to all NFL games and a lifetime supply of good beer. If I’m to undergo this experiment, I want to know which of these resulting people will be (numerically identical to) me: the unlucky one, the lucky one, or neither.

Baber (following Parfit) wants to say that depending on how exactly the resulting people are related to me, both may count as the continuation of or survival of me. Specifically, she suggests that psychological continuity is enough – it is enough that the later people have the same or nearly the same beliefs, desires, and so on that I have.

I don’t think this is right, but back to the Trinity: In her view, the god which is a God-stage (temporal part of God) called the Father would, just before the Incarnation, be mistaken to think Read More »“Sabellianism Reconsidered” Considered – Part 4

“Sabellianism Reconsidered” Considered – Part 3

To continue Baber’s attempt to retool Sabellianism:

Suppose your car, named KITT, has temporal parts. KITT, then is the sum of, the whole composed of these parts. (KITT at t1, KITT at t2, KITT at t3, KITT at t4…etc.) Further, Baber urges each of these car-stages (temporal parts of a car) is itself a car. So, e.g., KITT at t3 is just as much a car as the whole KITT. But now, suppose David Hasselhoff is driving KITT on, say, Easter. He’s actually, on this metaphysics, driving two cars, for KITT on Easter is a different car than KITT (the sum of KITT-stages).

Not to worry, argues Baber. We simply need a concept of “tensed identity”. This is not numerical identity as normally understood, but is rather the relation between KITT and KITT at Easter, such that they “count as one”. (p.5) Thus, Baber suggests that if we believe in temporal parts, the thesis of “tensed identity” is a “plausible way to avoid over-population.” (p. 5)

Back to God. She’s exploring the idea that God is a whole composed of three temporal parts Read More »“Sabellianism Reconsidered” Considered – Part 3

A Lesson in Christological Rhetoric

“I believe in the divinity of Christ.” Perfect. Like a Rorschach test, people can read it however they want.

He is risen! (Dale)

“And if our hope in Christ is only for this life, we are more to be pitied than anyone in the world. But in fact, Christ has been raised from the dead. He is the first of a great harvest of all who have died. So you see, just as death came into the world through a man, now the resurrection from the dead has… Read More »He is risen! (Dale)

“Sabellianism Reconsidered” Considered – Part 2

President Bush, President Reagan, President Carter, President Ford, President Nixon
What is this adequate Trinity theory called “Sabellianism”, according to Baber? It is what I’ve called serial, non-essential FSH noumenal modalism – each “person” of the Trinty is a mode of God, a way God is during a period of time. None of these overlap (serial), they supervene on God’s intrinsic features (noumenal), and they are non-essential – if God hadn’t created, there would have been no time, and so no temporal parts to his life.
So the theory is that the one God is an everlasting self with three temporal parts, the Father (up to the time of the Incarnation?), the Son (during the earthly life of Jesus, ending at Pentecost?) and the Holy Spirit (Pentecost and after?). So the three “persons” of the Trinity are in fact person-stages of the one divine person/self, but they are also persons as well.

Following an ancient tradition of mocking modalists as “patripassians”, she seems to think the biggest or the main problem with modalism is that it identifies the Father and the Son. (pp. 1, 3) On her modalist theory, they are temporal parts (person-stages) of one being, but they are not numerically identical – they are different temporal parts of God. As she observes, on this theory, “There is… no time at while f=s.” (p. 3) Thus, her theory doesn’t identify any of the persons with one another, or with God for that matter.

Many metaphysicians, she knows, reject the theory of temporal parts, and the perdurance theory of how a thing can “last” through time.

But moving on, is this theory monotheistic? She urges,

All we need to capture the spirit of monotheism is the doctrine that at any time there is exactly one God. (3)

Huh? She draws an analogy with US Presidents; at any given time, there’s one one.

But imagine this:Read More »“Sabellianism Reconsidered” Considered – Part 2

“Sabellianism Reconsidered” Considered – Part 1

Dr. Harriet Baber (aka H.E. Baber) teaches philosophy at the University of San Diego, and has been active for many years in the Society of Christian Philosophers. She’s published a number of papers on gender, philosophy of religion, metaphysics, and other topics. I met her in the 1990s at an SCP conference in California, and I have always found her to be funny, smart, and… Read More »“Sabellianism Reconsidered” Considered – Part 1

Theophilus Lindsey on human stubbornness

…very rarely is there found candour enough in the human breast, for a man to recede from opinions, for the defence of which he has drawn his pen, and been highly applauded, however strong and demonstrative be the evidence to the contrary that is presented to him. (Theophilus Lindsey, An Historical View of the State of the Unitarian Doctrine and Worship, From the Reformation to Our Own Times, p. 175)

Sad but true.

I must add, though, that one should be very careful in wielding this charge. In the context Lindsey is unfair; he makes this remark about a person in a dispute who in my judgment was not simply being stubborn, not ignoring a mass of evidence to the contrary.

We can be too quick to mock politicians (“Flip-flopper!”) who’ve changed their minds about substantial issues. We assume, cynically, that they must be merely saying they’ve changed beliefs to gain political advantage. But how do we know they haven’t really changed their mind, after revisiting the evidence? Case in point: Romney on abortion.

Given how finite and fallible we are, if someone never changes his mind, you can be sure that he just doesn’t think much.

True story: On the day I successfully defended my PhD dissertationRead More »Theophilus Lindsey on human stubbornness

Defeated?

Help James Anderson defeat my defeater for his defeater-defeater. Here. (The target.) What’s all this defeater business? Michael Sudduth explains here. I do not look forward to the agony. May all your defeaters be defeated – except the ones you have for false beliefs.

Scott Williams’s new paper: Henry of Ghent on Real Relations and the Trinity

Congratulations to Scott Williams, trinities contributor and newly minted Oxford University PhD in Theology,  on his forthcoming paper:  ‘Henry of Ghent on Real Relations and the Trinity: The Case for Numerical Sameness Without Identity’, in: Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie Médiévales 79.1 (2012), will be published. Here is his abstract: I argue that there is a hitherto unrecognized connection between Henry of Ghent’s general theory of real relations… Read More »Scott Williams’s new paper: Henry of Ghent on Real Relations and the Trinity

It’s just gotta be true…

<gossip>Once some years ago, I was hanging out with a group of Christian philosophers, and the subject of the Trinity came up. One person,  a well known philosopher, firmly remarked that “It’s just gotta be modalism.” I recently shared this story with a Christian philosopher friend. In response, he told me that more recently, he was hanging with a group of Christian philosophers, and one (who… Read More »It’s just gotta be true…

How not to conduct theological dialogue

A poor exchange. Read it first – then my comments. Where do I start? The unitarian behaves poorly. Pretending to ask questions, he instead puts forward objections. This is disrespectful. And it makes the compliments at the start seem disingenuous, which is obnoxious. But Bill serves it back, by sarcastically labeling the thing “Muslim objections…” Cute. Are these objections “simple-minded”? No, not really. What they are,… Read More »How not to conduct theological dialogue