Dale Tuggy

Dale Tuggy is Professor of Philosophy at the State University of New York at Fredonia, where he teaches courses in analytic theology, philosophy of religion, religious studies, and the history of philosophy.

2 Comments

  1. Mario
    October 23, 2014 @ 8:37 am

    @ Dale

    A preliminary terminological comment (and a further invitation to reply my prevous comment).

    «Subsequent to the arrangement of Aristotle’s works by scholars at Alexandria in the first century CE, a number of his treatises were referred to as ta meta ta physika, literally, “the [writings] after the Physics”. This is the origin of the title for collection of treatises now known as Aristotle’s Metaphysics. Some have interpreted the expression “ta meta ta physika” to imply that the subject of the work goes “beyond” that of Aristotle’s Physics or that it is metatheoretical in relation to the Physics. But others believe that “ta meta ta physika” referred simply to the work’s place in the canonical arrangement of Aristotle’s writings, which is at least as old as Andronicus of Rhodes [fl. c. 60 BC] or even Hermippus of Smyrna [third century BC]. Within the Aristotelian corpus itself, the metaphysical treatises are referred to as ta peri tês prôtes philosophias (literally, “the [writings] concerning first philosophy”); “first philosophy” was what Aristotle called the subjects of metaphysics. (He called the study of nature or natural philosophy “second philosophy” – Metaphysics 1037a15)» – [Wikipedia > Metaphysics (Aristotle)]

    Now Kant, in particular in his work “Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics That Will Be Able to Present Itself as [a] Science” (some sort of synthesis of his major work, “Critique of Pure Reason”) affirmed essentially that any metaphysics is merely speculative, incapable of providing us with conclusions about the “reality beyond the phenomena” that are, at the same time, rational and unquestionable …

    … you may want to carry on from here, or, alternatively, dispute any of the above …

  2. Mario
    October 22, 2014 @ 10:08 am

    @ Dale

    At podcast #57, you seem to share Swinburne’s claim that – at least according “analytic philosophers”, even agnostic and atheist, “by reason alone, we can show that it’s reasonable to believe that God exists”. In fact, Swinburne’s claim (at least according to one his two books of which you provided the image in your post) was much more prudent and modest:
    “… there is a moderate probability that there is a God of the kind worshiped by Christians, Jews, and Muslims.” (Richard Swinburne, “Was Jesus God?”, OUP, 2008)

    Here you tackle Swinburne’s a priori arguments for belief in the Trinity. Somewhere in the same book we read:
    “All three members of the Trinity are metaphysically necessary persons, but the Father alone is ontologically necessary. And the whole Trinity is ontologically necessary because nothing else caused it to exist.”
    Now, this is quite a formidable mouthful, but, apart from that, how about:
    [FON] “the Father alone is ontologically necessary”
    [TON] “the whole Trinity is ontologically necessary”
    Maybe my analytical powers are not good enough, but it seems to me that FON and TON are not mutually compatible.

    Can you help? Thank you in advance 🙂