Richard of St. Victor is well known for his argument that perfect love must be shared between three persons, and since God’s love is perfect, there must be three persons in God. Richard presents this argument in Book 3 of his De Trinitate, and that’s what we’ll be looking at in this series of posts.
At the opening of Book 3, Richard explains that he will ask the following questions.
Question 1:
(a) Are there many persons in God?
(b) If so, are there only three persons?Question 2:
How can those three persons be one God?Question 3:
(a) Is one person unproduced (‘from himself’; a semetipsa), while the other two are produced (i.e., ‘from another’; ab alio)?
(b) If so, is the producer of the two produced persons itself produced or unproduced?Question 4:
(a) Are the two produced persons produced in different ways?
(b) If so, which person is produced which way?
(c) Does anything else follow from each being produced in that particular way?
(Note that the English translation does not identify Question 3b. After asking whether two persons proceed from another (i.e., Question 3a), the translator writes ‘We should also see if there are other things we should inquire into related to this same consideration’. This is a mistranslation. Richard actually says ‘we should also ask the same thing about that “other” from which these [produced persons] proceed’, i.e., we should ask whether their producer is likewise unproduced or produced.)
Richard then claims that rational thinking tells him more about how to answer these questions than the Church Fathers do, though not Scripture. (Does this mean Scripture tells him more than rational thinking, or does it mean he’s bracketing Scripture out for the time being?) Richard claims he can answer these questions with rational argumentation, or at least he’ll die trying.
The first core piece of Richard’s argument occurs in Chapter 2 of Book 3, and although it’s stated very briefly and fairly clearly, there are a lot of claims here.
There are three stages to this argument. In the first stage, Richard tries to show that God’s perfect goodness requires that he be perfectly charitable. In the second stage, Richard tries to show that a perfectly charitable God will share his love with another. In the third stage, Richard tries to show that God can only share his love with an equal who is worthy of that love, namely another divine person. And there you go: there are at least two divine persons in the Godhead.
In the next three posts, I’ll look at each of these stages in turn.
Right.
No divine person is efficiently-caused by a non-divine substance.
Some divine persons (i.e. Son and Holy Spirit) are efficiently-caused by the (Father by means of the) 1 divine substance.
All divine persons are formally-caused by the 1 divine substance.
These three statements are how I make sense of the claims about aseity. So, all divine persons are formally a se; but the Son and Holy Spirit are also efficiently from another.
Let me summarize the conversation so far and see if I follow.
If I’m not mistaken, the original statement under consideration is:
“No divine person is going to be efficiently caused from a substance other than the divine substance.”
It was then suggested by JT that this statement is equivalent to
“Every divine person is efficiently caused by the divine substance.”
Joseph demurred and claimed that it was equivalent to
“Every divine person is not efficient-caused by any substance distinct from the divine substance.”
This statement, however, is ambiguous and may mean either
“Some divine person is not not efficient-caused by any substance distinct from the divine substance”
or
“No divine person is efficient-caused by any substance distinct from the divine substance.”
Scott then chimed in a stated that he meant the latter, namely,
“No divine person is efficient-caused by any substance distinct from the divine substance.”
JT then thought the point of Scott’s claim to be
“Any divine person who is produced (i.e., the Son and Spirit) will be produced by the divine substance.”
Again, Joseph disagreed and stated that not only does Scott’s statement not mean this, his statement does not even imply this. Joseph claimed that Scott’s statement is consistent with both a divine person being caused by nothing and/or by the divine substance. This seems to me to be correct.
I think another way to see this is to change Scott’s statement by conversion, obversion, and then contraposition (I think that’s the order I did it in) to
“Everything that is not efficient-caused by a substance distinct from the divine substance is a divine person.”
It’ clear to me that this last statement leaves open the possibility that either the divine persons are not caused by any substance at all or that the divine persons are caused by the divine substance itself; for either way they are not efficient-caused by any substance distinct from the divine substance.
Is this the point?
JT: No, that’s not quite right yet. As Scott says in reply to me, it doesn’t even imply that every divine person that is efficient-caused by something is so by the divine substance, it only implies that every divine person that is efficient caused by some substance is so by the divine substance. But that’s consistent with the claim that no divine person is efficient-caused by any substance.
Thanks Joseph. Indeed, I was saying that no divine person is efficiently produced by a substance that is not the divine substance. This is not meant to entail anything about persons being produced by the 1 divine substance or not. It is a standard claim from an infinite regress argument that there is nothing more basic than the divine substance; and that no divine person is ‘causally’ depend on a substance that is not the divine substance. Of course, the Father is not going to be (efficiently) caused by the 1 divine substance, but the Son and Holy Spirit are going to be (efficiently) caused by the Father (by means of the 1 divine substance), etc.
JT: Yes, Richard does say that human persons are composed (conjoined) of two substances (Bk. 3.10; Bk. 4.25). In Bk. 4.25 he also says the a human person is composed of two ‘essences’ (essentia). I am not exactly sure what Richard’s metaphysics are about substances. So I don’t know that he is a cartesian dualist. I wouldn’t think so; but I’m sure someone else (in France) has looked closely at this question.
I don’t know if this helps any, but Scott’s already mentioned that Henry of Ghent later says that all divine persons have aseity because they have the divine essence as a constituent, but that’s compatible with, say, the Son having the divine essence because the Father gave it to him.
Henry then says that the Son is necessary ‘in himself’ (for he has the divine essence as an essential constituent), but he gets that necessity ‘from another’ (for the Father gave him the divine essence by producing him).
Avicenna is in the background here, for he argued that anything which is necessary in itself cannot be produced, for it has the kind of nature that just exists. Consequently, reasons Avicenna, if something is produced, then it must not be necessary in itself. Rather, it must be ‘possible in itself’ (this does not mean ‘contingent’; it just means ‘not necessary in itself’ and ‘not impossible in itself’).
Henry is clearly reacting to that, saying that the Son is still ‘necessary in himself’, even though he is produced, for the Son gets the divine essence, and that’s necessary in itself.
“JT: Sorry, it’s equivalent to: every divine person is not efficient-caused by any substance distinct from the divine substance. This implies that (but is not equivalent to): every divine person is efficient-caused by the divine substance or not efficient-caused by any substance. In any case, it doesn’t imply that: every divine person is efficient-caused by the divine substance. This is at most, rather, a conversational implicature.”
Oh right. Yeah, okay. So the point is that any divine person who is produced (i.e., the Son and Spirit) will be produced by the divine substance. Is that right?
JT: Sorry, it’s equivalent to: every divine person is not efficient-caused by any substance distinct from the divine substance. This implies that (but is not equivalent to): every divine person is efficient-caused by the divine substance or not efficient-caused by any substance. In any case, it doesn’t imply that: every divine person is efficient-caused by the divine substance. This is at most, rather, a conversational implicature.
JT: I think it’s equivalent to: every divine person is efficient-caused by the divine substance or not efficient-caused by any substance.
I note that you gloss ‘from himself’ (a semetipsa) as unproduced. If that’s right, it’s clear that being from himself and being from another are mutually exclusive.
Scott: I don’t see how it could be an open question at this point whether the Father’s substance is efficient-causally from another substance. Surely, Richard must have dealt with the question already whether the divine substance is efficient-caused and if not, this is not the place to raise it.
Anselm, in Monologion, explicitly says that God is from himself. Of course, I don’t think this means God efficient-causes himself. Rather, it means something like the reason God exists is in his own nature. The only way I can make sense of this is to say that God’s existence is necessary and it is reason enough that God exists that he can’t fail to exist.
Anselm also explicitly says that each divine person is through himself. Perhaps we should make a distinction here between from himself and through himself as it applies to divine persons. But earlier on, Anselm says that in God being from himself and through himself are the same.
I raise all this because it seems to me that Richard is very much influenced by Anselm’s writings or at least Anselmian lines of thought that were in the air. I should also say that in the Monologion, Anselm speaks of the divine persons and love, which may well be a more direct influence on Richard here than Augustine’s discussion of the triad of love in De Trinitate.
“He says that we find material persons constituted by two substances, a material one (body) and an immaterial one (soul).”
Does Richard actually use the word ‘substance’ here?
“Thus, no divine person is going to be efficiently causally from a substance other than the divine substance. Period.”
Hmm. That’s equivalent to: every divine person is produced (= efficiently caused) by the divine substance? Is that really what Richard believes?
Answer: so yes (1) ‘being from another’ and (2) ‘not being from another’ could be compatible properties (for the Son and Holy Spirit) if we interpret (1) efficient causally, and (2) formal causally–and if we interpret efficient cause here to exclude any substance numerically distinct from the 1 divine substance.
RE: whether ‘being from another’ and ‘not being from another’ are incompatible properties?
There is a little background here. In Book 1 Richard talks about substances. He says that we find material persons constituted by two substances, a material one (body) and an immaterial one (soul). And then makes the rhetorical move to say that if we find such a thing in creatures– 2 substances = 1 person, then we shouldn’t find it absurd that in God there could be 1 substance but 3 persons. So, for God there is just one (immaterial) substance. And, this 1 substance is not produced by any other substance. So, the divine substance is not efficient causally from another substance (I don’t remember if Richard actually says ‘efficient causally’- but that’s the idea– Henry of Ghent who read Richard makes just such an interpretation). Thus, no divine person is going to be efficiently causally from a substance other than the divine substance. Period.
But, what about the 1st divine person. Is the Father ‘from himself’? If we look to any person constituted by the divine substance, then Richard will say the Father is not from another person (who is also constituted by this 1 divine substance). But it remains logically open (at this point) to ask whether the Father (and the substance that constitutes him) is efficient causally from another. Of course, Richard denies this. So, no, there is no divine person constituted by the 1 divine substance that is efficiently causally from a numerically distinct substance.
The next set of issues is the distinguishing properties for divine persons constituted by the 1 divine substance. And here Richard will say that the 2nd divine person is ‘from’ the 1st divine person (qua efficient cause). What is important is that the 2nd divine person is not efficiently caused by a numerically distinct substance than the one that constitutes the Father. I don’t recall at this point whether Richard thinks the divine substance is the agent or is that by which the Father generates the Son.
In any case, now that we’ve got the efficient cause question on the table–the next would be to look at whether there is any formal cause. On this view, we might say that the divine essence is the formal cause of all divine persons. And, since all divine persons are identical with the divine substance, each is formally a se. But in the efficient causal sense, only the Father is ‘not from another’ and the Son and HS are ‘from another’.
And, I don’t know what it would mean to say that e.g., the Son is efficiently causally from another and from himself. This looks like a contradiction. But if we introduce formal causality, then we could say any divine person is formally a se b/c each is identical with the divine substance, but that the Son and Holy Spirit are efficient causally ab aliud (form another). There is a lot more, of course, to get into here — but this seems to be the general vibe as I see it.
I agree with Scott about the role of reason here. Richard wants to demonstrate the doctrine of the Trinity by natural reason alone. But I assume he expects that all who read his work already believe this doctrine on the basis of scripture, tradition, and the church’s teaching. I see Anselm as trying to do the same in the Monologion. This is faith seeking understanding. So I think he’s saying that few if any church fathers try to demonstrate the doctrine of the Trinity by natural reason alone. So we find less in them to answer the questions at hand.
I also agree with Scott about why Richard doesn’t use the argument that since God is alive, God’s spirit exists, and since God is wise, God’s wisdom exists. Augustine put up warning signs about this. I actually thought it distinctive of pro-Nicenes that they backed off from this kind of argument. But I might be wrong about this: some pro-Nicenes were into this and others not. Finally, there is some precedence for Richard’s argument in Augustine. If I recall rightly, one of Augustine’s many triads is of a lover, beloved, and the love. This together with Anselm’s perfect being theology may well have suggested to Richard the arguments he proposes.
RE 3b: I feel the pain of the translator here. After asking whether some person is from itself and the others are from another, it seems odd to ask whether that first person is from itself or from another. Well clearly, if it is from itself, it is from itself. The only question could be: is that person from another? If there are only three persons and that person is from another, it would have to be from one or both of the other two persons. But then if one of the other two persons is also from itself and from another, the first person and this other person don’t have their own properties, i.e. a quality in virtue of having which it is the person it is rather than another person.
A question: is being from itself and from another exclusive and exhaustive? I think this gets into material outside of book 3. If I recall, Anselm in the Monologion has much to say about all this and says that the Son and Spirit are each from himself and from another (i.e. the Father). So they aren’t exclusive. But he also says that nothing is from nothing and so everything is either from itself or from another. So they are exhaustive.
I think Richard is fairly ‘infected by’ the Ps. Athanasian creed (take that as a good or bad thing as you wish)–and he doesn’t think that the Son or Holy Spirit have a distinct “what-kind-nature”– it isn’t like the Father is divine, and the Son just is the Father’s being really smart, etc. This line of course, comes from Augustine: the Father is not wise by generated wisdom. So, Richard certainly would be aware of this Augustinian declared-hazard. So those ‘pro-Nicene’ strategies don’t seem to work for Richard.
So yes– it would appear Richard thinks a better argument should be made. That is, he thinks we should have an argument for why there are exactly three divine persons, and afterward an argument for precisely how the persons are distinct from on another. Book 3 is all about why there are exactly three persons; but books 4 and 5 show how there can be more than one divine person. In fact, he gives another argument for why there are only three divine persons which is not based on the perfect-love argument, but derives from his discussion of how there can be more than one divine person. I mentioned this argument elsewhere on this site, but don’t remember where it is. I represented Richard’s ‘other argument’ in this way:
-+ / ++ / +-
Father: – (not from another); + (productive of another).
Son: + (from another); + (productive of another).
Holy Spirit: + (from another); – (not productive of another).
In addition to the nice chiasmus, Richard also makes arguments for the ‘filioque’ based on it; which I’ll let a post-er post about later.
I thought his little dance at the end of ch. 1 was interesting. He’s aware that readers may not admire his chutzpah. So, he says he’s just going to try, that he like Balaam’s Ass is going to rely on supernatural aid. In short, it’s a big performance designed to show his humility. This is to obscure the fact that, in his view, he has seen farther into these things than any of the great Fathers. Or at least, he’s discovered a new, a priori argument for the Trinity. One question I have is: why didn’t Richard rest content with their a priori argument. (In brief: God can’t be stupid or dead, so he must eternally have his Wisdom and Spirit.) Did he see this argument as leading to modalism? Or did he not know about it? Or what?
Also: he does shove aside the issue of Scripture. But this raises the question: does his proof independently confirm what Scripture (allegedly) says about the Trinity? Or does he think he’s discovering new, hitherto unrevealed truths about the Trinity?
No, but if you email one of us, we have a pdf we can send you.
Is there a place on the web to get a translation of Richard’s work?
With regards to the question about the status of Scripture, church fathers, and reason, Richard states at the beginning of book 1 that there are very very few ‘rational arguments’ for the Trinity and that he wants to give it a try. He often says he won’t use scripture or quotations from church fathers to ‘prove’ anything. He wants his reader to be persuade that God is triune without needing his reader to be persuaded by reference to Scripture or a respected church father. Basically, he wants to bracket out any argument from authority (Scripture, tradition, church fathers) and give one based on what anyone can observe from the world and from which he can make rational inferences.
However, he does in fact recite bible verses from time to time, and he does in fact mention the Ps.-Athanasian creed in places. It is hard not to see this as a turn to an argument from authority in some places. Nevertheless, it is in book 6 where we get scriptural language like the Son is the “word”, etc. And, some think that book 6 is an unfinished draft.
One of the interesting (and partly annoying) feature of Richard’s de Trinitate is that sometime he seems to give an argument, tells you that an only an idiot wouldn’t understand the argument, and then move along. All the while his 21st c. readers feel as though he doesn’t say enough. There are golden nuggets here and there, however.
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