In this post I’d like to focus on Richard’s initial argument for why God must be a Trinity of persons. Thus far in his argument he has argued for two divine persons, and now adds a further line of argument to show that God is in fact a Trinity and not a Binity of persons. Why must God be a Trinity of persons? Richard argues from his notion of perfect love.
“Greatest love cannot lack in anything.”
Perfect love requires the following.
(i) A person “wishes another to be loved as oneself.”
(ii) A person “wishes that another person be loved equally by the one whom s/he loves supremely and by whom s/he is supremely loved.”
Translation: For person a, person b, and person c, a has perfect love only if
(1.) a equally loves b, and vice versa.
(2.) a equally loves c, and vice versa.
(3.) a desires that b equally loves c, and that c equally loves b.
(1)-(3) will be jointly sufficient for a‘s perfect love if it turns out that there is a b and a c, and that all the lovin’ obtains between a, b and c as described in (1.)-(3.), especially that b equally loves c, and vice versa.
Recall that ‘equal love’ requires that the persons who ‘equally love’ have the same substance-kind. We might say the intensity (my word) of love is measured by the kind of substance that is the object of love. If I love a human, there’s a certain intensity of my love for a human; but if I love God, then my love is maxed-out because God is the most lovable being. Also, recall that Richard argued in Book 1 of On the Trinity that there can be only one divine substance. Thus, for a to love an equal, b and c, b and c must satisfy the following necessary and sufficient condition:
For divine person a, who has the one divine substance essentially, persons b and c are equal to a if and only if b and c each has the one divine substance essentially.
Notice that a divine person can love a creature ‘perfectly’, but that this love is not ‘love of an equal’ because no creature (besides Jesus) is constituted by the divine substance. So, God can “so love the world that …”, but we might say the quality of this love is fixed by the object of the love. Since divine persons are divine, love for such a person is as intense a love as possible; but love for creatures is less intense simply by reason of the kind of being that a creature is.
The argument from perfect love for a Trinity of persons continues.
(4.) If a has perfect love, then there must be a third person c, otherwise a fails to have perfect love.
(5.) If a fails to have perfect love, then either a is unwilling to have perfect love or is unable to have perfect love.
(5.i) If a is unwilling to have perfect love, then perfect love must be elsewhere. But who else besides a divine person could have perfect love essentially? Nobody. But a person who has the divine substance essentially satisfies the description of ‘the best of all possible beings’ (substances). Therefore, a person, who has the divine substance essentially, has perfect love.
(5.ii) If a, who has the divine substance essentially, is unable to have perfect love, then a does not satisfy the description of the best of all possible beings (substances). But a, who has the divine substance essentially, satisfies the description ‘the best of all possible beings’. But a person who satisfies the description ‘the best of all possible beings’ has perfect love. Therefore, a has perfect love.
(6.) Therefore, there are (at least) three divine persons.
In the next post I survey another argument that Richard employs, namely an argument from perfect happiness.
@Dale. Regarding your question about a Father of 4 children, and a set of 2 don’t know about the other set of 2, and vice versa. Can this father perfectly love set 1, without there being love between sets 1 and 2.
Here’s my guess. Richard would say that the Father would lack perfect love (at least) b/c the kids don’t know and don’t love one another. I think Richard is focused equally as much on the overall situation (overall story) and he is one x’s loving y. The love that I have is not the sum total of the love I direct at others, but my love-experience (should, on Richard’s view) include/be directed at others love-experiences. Suppose a mother loves her two children, but the kids hate one another. Although the mother loves both, her overall situation could be better if the kids loved one another. For she grieves at the lack of love between them. This bad situation can be dramatized if the kids try to murder one another. Sure, the mother loves her kids, but the lack of love contributes (negatively) to her happiness and love-experience. Perhaps Richard has a sort of extended mind notion the background?
Yep. It isn’t valid; again, I’m just reporting the argument at this point.
I suppose Richard thinks “to love another” requires that they act rightly by them. So, if I love my cat, but decide not to give her food, then Richard would infer that I don’t in fact love my cat. I suppose for Richard, love entails right action.
Going back to the family analogy. Suppose two parents love their two children. But the children don’t love one another. Even though the parents love the kids, and the kids love the parents, if all of them went on a family vacation there’d be some general unhappiness b/c the kids don’t love one another (e.g., Johnny breaks Sally’s barbie doll and laughs). As it were, the parents grieve at the unrequited love btwn. the kids, and so the overall state of affairs–the over love-states are less perfect than they could be.
Hey Scott,
If that’s Richard’s argument, it looks really problematic to me. The def says that to enjoy perfect love is to (1) love and be loved by (exactly?) two equals, and (2) to want them to enjoy mutual and equal love. I don’t get it – why would having perfect love require those two things? Why couldn’t one perfectly love just one equal? And why would perfect love require that all (or 2 of?) one’s lovees also equally love each other? Suppose I had two kids, from two marriages, and these kids live on different continents and never meet each other. Why is my love for either one of them deficient?
Another problem: “… if I love God, then my love is maxed-out”. That doesn’t seem right – can’t one tepidly love God? There are many characters is the Bible who love God, but who are very unfaithful to him. Again, I think of Jesus’s saying that whoever has been forgiven much, loves much. Maybe the Pharisee or other clean-living but self-righteous person etc. really does love God, but not to a very high degree.
I think your premise (5) is false. If a being lacks perfect love, it doesn’t follow that either it is unwilling or unable to have perfect love. He could be both willing and able, but we waiting for one or more others to freely respond.
On (5i) – why does there actually have to be perfect love in reality?
In sum, I’m not sure the argument is valid. But what’s more important, it seems to me, is that the motivations for crucial parts of the argument are unclear.
I’d suspect that inference is a category mistake….
Hmmm… does that mean that a menage à trois is more perfect than the love of just a couple? Interesting…
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