I (and so we) took a break from the Richard posts. But we now return. Perhaps at some point I’ll blog on some conferences I’ve been to: the Metaphysics of the Incarnation conference at the University of Oxford last September. And I might share a very brief talk I gave on the Trinity at a local church last October. But for now, on to the main attraction.
Richard has already argued in various ways that if there is so much as one divine person, there are at least three divine persons. But the arguments have all been a bit here and there. So to make the reasons even more evident, he plans to gather them all up into one. So here it is:
Suppose there is only one divine person: P.
1) Then P doesn’t share his greatness.
2) Compare two situations. In the first, P is the only divine person. In the second, P is not the only divine person; there is another: Q. In the second situation, P and Q love each other and P has the pleasure that love brings. So in the first situation, P lacks in eternity not only such love but also such pleasure.
3) Anyone supremely good shares her greatness. (Not so to share is to retain something greedily. But anyone supremely good does nothing greedily.)
4) Anyone supremely happy has such pleasure. (Not to have such pleasure is not to have an abundance of pleasure. But anyone supremely happy has an abundance of pleasure.)
5) P is supremely good and happy.
So if there is at least one divine person, there are at least two divine persons.
Suppose there are only two divine persons: P and Q.
6) Then P shares greatness. But P doesn’t share love or the pleasure that such love brings. (Only a person who has a partner and a beloved in the love shown him has the pleasure of love.)
7) Anyone supremely happy shares love and the pleasure of love. (Nothing brings more pleasure than love.)
8) P is supremely happy.
So if there are at least two divine persons, there are at least three divine persons.
Therefore, if there is at least one divine person, there are at least three divine persons.
There are two parts here. Let’s just briefly look at each in turn. So first let’s look at the section that aims to show that if there is at least one, there are at least two divine persons. Here I note only one thing: there’s an ambiguity in (2). It could mean that if there is only one divine person: P, then P doesn’t always love another, i.e sometimes P doesn’t love another. But it’s not clear this is right. This assumes that any creature begins to exist and so is not always around for P to love. But even if any creature does begin to exist, it still doesn’t follow that P doesn’t always love another. For it could be that at every time there is a creature that exists then and so there is someone around for P to love even if every creature begins to exist. It could also mean that if there is only one divine person: P, then P always lacks love of another divine person. This is true, in which case, Richard is not just speaking of love of another, but love of another divine person and so is relying on previous arguments for why the supreme love a divine person has includes love of another divine person.
Secondly, let’s look at the section that aims to show that if there is at least two, there are at least three divine persons. Here I comment on only one matter: a point of interpretation to do with (6). We have seen before Richard’s idea that love always involves a second person and sharing love always involves a third person. And here he seems to rely on what he said previously. I can see that, by Richard’s lights, P doesn’t love and so have the pleasure love brings unless there is a second P loves. And I can also see that, by Richard’s lights, P doesn’t share love unless there is, not only a second (Q) P loves but, a third with whom P shares his love of Q. But Richard says: “He alone possesses the sweetness of such delights who has a partner and a loved one in the love that has been shown to Him”. It’s not clear which of these two things Richard is saying. First, he is saying that P alone has such pleasure who has another to love, in which case the partner is the loved one, and then he later makes the point that to share love involves a third person. Secondly, he is saying that P alone has such pleasure who has a second to love and a third to love, in which case the partner is not the loved one. The problem with the first interpretation is that it makes the statement seem out of place coming as it does right after the claim that if there are only two divine persons, there’s no sharing of the pleasure of love. The problem with the second interpretation is that it makes the statement seem wrong by Richard’s own lights.
Well, this is enough to be getting on with for chapter 14. Next up chapter 15 on the claim that two divine persons must seek out a third divine person with equal desire and for a similar reason.
There’s a section on the Trinity. I thought that the claim that perfect love is love between equals (e.g. in a perfect marriage) was a new note. But it’s been a while since I read The Christian God. So I might be wrong.
Oops – and I was looking not at my copy of that, but rather at my copy of The Resurrection of God Incarnate!
Actually, I did read most of Was Jesus God? Which parts did you think were most important?
Correction: the title of Swinburne’s new book is *Was Jesus God?*
Hey Joseph,
Let’s wait – I’m really very interested in your take on my paper, and I want to get it together in decent shape before I take up your time with it.
To clarify – I think this has never been shown self-contradictory: one divine person exists and no created thing exists. Further, such a scenario seems possible. Now, this could be overturned by divine revelation; my claim is that philosophical reflection on divinity doesn’t reveal any impossibility in a one divine person scenario. If I’m right, and divine revelation does imply that a lone divine person is impossible, then this is a genuine faith vs. reason conflict.
You’re right – it is a different issue whether divinity implies uniqueness (so that if there’s a god, there’s only one god). One might think so, but I’m not prepared to argue that – I’m not sure I understand divinity enough to see either way!
No – most days of the week, I don’t reject perfect being arguments – but I’m aware that they are perilous. My arguments against a priori ST proofs don’t depend on rejecting the method outright.
I have Swinburne’s Is Jesus God, but haven’t read it yet. I’m particularly interested in ch. 3 The Marks of an Incarnate God and ch. 6 Jesus Implied his Divinity. If I weren’t too swamped already, I’d consider blogging through it.
I don’t mind waiting to have it out. But I’m still not clear whether you think it could be God alone exists or whether you think it must be that if God exists, then some or other created being also exists, or whether you’re undecided between these. It seems to me ‘only one divine being’ is ambiguous between only one being who is divine, and if there is any divine being at all, there is only one of them.
When I was preparing my talk, I looked at Richard Swinburne’s Is Jesus God? I found new points there on reasons to believe God is a Trinity. Might be worth a look.
Good points, as always. Yes, he’s assuming that God’s existence is actual (so also possible), and he’s not here arguing for God’s existence, but rather assuming it. So yeah, he’s arguing: necessarily, if there’s one, then there’s at least three.
Yes, I do think it is possible for there to be only one divine being. I’ve been working on a paper – actually, it was on the shelf, but now I’m trying to finish it – in which I argue that the arguments by Swinburne, Morris, and Davis (that one divine person implies at least one other divine person) don’t work, and further, that we ought to think it is possible, at least, going by reason alone. Now I’m revisiting Richard of St. Victor, seeing if he really adds anything to their case. So far, I think for the most part the newer arguments are better, but I’m probably going to discuss a few of his tries as well. Also, I’m slogging through parts of this book because he has a try at interpreting Richard of St. Victor as well. Also, he says a lot about mysteries, in a heavy, German sort of way, and I’ll still trying to finish my book proposal on that. Anyway, I think I’ll serialize a draft of my paper in progress – maybe after we’re done with this series – and we’ll have it out then. 🙂 Unless we do before then in the comments.
Yes, that sounds right. We should say, though, that Richard is not (in Book 3 anyway) trying to prove that God exists or that there is at least one divine person. So you can say he argues that it’s impossible for there to be only one divine person. But we shouldn’t say he argues that it’s impossible for there to be less than three divine persons, which implies that there is at least one divine person. That’s why I put it in the form of a conditional: if there is at least one, then there are at least three divine persons.
I don’t think we’ve really had it out yet about whether one divine person can exist alone. Do you think for all Richard says one divine person can exist alone or do you think rather that for all Richard says, though one divine person can’t exist alone, i.e. there must be another thing or person, there needn’t be another divine person? Do you buy into perfect-being theology arguments at all?
Hey Joseph,
Don’t tease us! Let’s see those conference posts, and that church talk! 🙂
So in chapter 14, Richard realizes his discussion has been diffuse and rambly (like our posts), and he wants to summarize his arguments more clearly.
Maybe we can help him be more concise – he’s really urging that two things are impossible:
that there should be only one divine person
and
that there should be less than three divine persons
In ch 1-14, he’s made it clear that he wants a triple (trinitarian) argument for these claims, and so he urges that we’ll see that both of the above are impossible when we properly consider three divine features:
perfect charity
perfect happiness, and
perfect glory.
The only one divine person scenario is impossible because in it that divine person would (allegedly) lack each of the three features above. So there must be at least two.
But, it’d be greedy to hold back sharing this two-way love, and would be inconsistent with perfect love, or glory, or both. Hence, any more than one but less than three scenario is inconsistent / impossible as well.
Is that fairly accurate?
To me, he hasn’t made the sale for either yet – but for right now, I’m just trying to help people to catch up with where we’re at.
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