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“Sabellianism Reconsidered” Considered – Part 4

The theory, then, is that God is an everlasting, temporally extended thing with three temporal parts, each of which is a god. But, they’re the same god as God. Yet as we saw last time, how can the Three be gods at all, as each exists at some times but not others?

Without going into the arguments for this controversial thesis, Baber appeals to the claim made by Derek Parfit and others, that “identity is not ‘what matters’ for survival”. (p.6) Thus, a future thing can count as my surviving, though it is not (numerically) identical to me.

Suppose (I’m stealing this thought experiment from Richard Swinburne) some mad scientists, such as Pinkie and the Brain, are going to cut my brain in half, and put the left half in one body, and the right in another. The body which gets the left half will be tortured to death, while the body getting the right half will be given lifetime passes to all NFL games and a lifetime supply of good beer. If I’m to undergo this experiment, I want to know which of these resulting people will be (numerically identical to) me: the unlucky one, the lucky one, or neither.

Baber (following Parfit) wants to say that depending on how exactly the resulting people are related to me, both may count as the continuation of or survival of me. Specifically, she suggests that psychological continuity is enough – it is enough that the later people have the same or nearly the same beliefs, desires, and so on that I have.

I don’t think this is right, but back to the Trinity: In her view, the god which is a God-stage (temporal part of God) called the Father would, just before the Incarnation, be mistaken to think he’s about to be annihilated and replaced by the Son. Rather, since each would be omniscient and omnibenevolent, the two whould be very similar as far as their mental life, if not indistinguishable. So, although the Father isn’t identical to the (coming) Son, the Father should anticipate surviving as the Son. (pp. 6-7)

But can both Father and Son be omniscient and omnipotent at all? That remains to be seen. (p.7) She reasons that, as e.g. the Father and God are (to be counted as) one god, then whatever properties God has during the career of the Father will be properties the Father must have as well. Or more accurately, the “basic properties” God has at a time – properties had because of how things are solely at that time – will be shared by the Father at that time. (p.7)

God at the Father may differ in their “non-basic” properties. At a time t just before the Incarnation, God has, but the Father lacks this property: being about to be the Son. (p.8)

She then suggests that both omnipotence and omniscience are non-basic properties – properties never had because of how things are at one time, but which are always had, at any given time, because of how things are at other times. (p.8) Her idea is that being omniscient-at-t requires have a total set of beliefs about what happens at all times and places. That’s all at t. But being omniscient-at-t also requires that things are as you believe them to be, at all times and places. Hence, omniscience is a non-basic property.

“Omnipotence,” she says, “poses additional difficulties.” (p.8)

Next time: additional difficulties.

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6 thoughts on ““Sabellianism Reconsidered” Considered – Part 4”

  1. Hi Marg – no, there are more than two options about how Jesus and God are related. But if the question is, are they in fact one and the same (numerically identical), then there are just two options about that – they either are or are not. About the friendly man – I was talking about a consequence of thinking that Jesus is God himself, as many evangelicals nowadays do.

  2. The question and the answer presuppose only two possibilies, it seems. I, for one, do not subscribe to either. On the one hand, I do not believe that Jesus is the one God (identified in the NT as the Father). On the other hand, I do not believe that he is just a “friendly, self-sacrificing, Jewish man”. Neither did Samuel Clarke. I hope some day we can explore that option in detail.

    BUT – I agree with Harriet that if U and I are both truly disciples of Christ, our BEHAVIOUR will be similar, in spite of the differences in our views. (I am thinking of Willard’s description of a disciple as one who walks with Christ, in order to learn from him how to be like him.)

  3. Let me then ask you a different question: If A believes that Christ is human and B believes that Christ is God, but both believe all authority in heaven and on earth have been given to Christ (Matt 28:18; Eph 1:20-21; etc.) such that all should obey Him (Heb 5:9; 1 Pet 1:2; etc.), what differences, if any, will we see in the behavior of A and B, all other things being equal?

    One may think it won’t matter, as both Christ and God will be endorsing the same commands. But the latter person will be confusing God with the Son of God, and will not believe that Jesus is a mediator between God and us. Rather, he’ll think that God has turned out to be rather non-threatening – a friendly, self-sacrificing, Jewish man – so there need be no mediator, and in a sense one’s fear of God is lessened. God is his own mediator, which is to say, there is no need for one, contrary to the NT. Also, Christ will no longer be a practical model for us to imitate; as God himself, he’s quite unlike us, really. Just off the top of my head, those are some important differences.

  4. Yes, I think identity is “what matters.” I think this is the common sense view, and have never been moved from it by any metaphysician’s thought experiment.

    I don’t find that last point you mention counterintuitive at all. If neither will be (identical to) me, then that is to say that dividing my brain would annihilate me. That some leftover of me might start its career is not relevant to what I should anticipate.

    Yes, it may be that identity facts are brute facts; I can’t rule that out.

  5. Do you want to know which of your continuers will be identical to you, or do you want to know something else, e.g. which has “what matters” or even which your closest continuer is. Admittedly the latter really takes biting the bullet. My point though is that in this case you want to know which of the two bears some privileged relation to you–and I don’t see why this thought experiment pushes you to assume that that relation must be identity.

    For that matter, since in this case the continuers have equal claim, since each has one of your brain hemispheres, unless you’re prepared to say identity is brute, you’re pushed to the conclusion that neither of these guys is you. And if you hold that identity is what matters then you shouldn’t worry about the torture OR anticipate the beer. And this is really counterintuitive.

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