“Stand aside, puny moderns. Or postmoderns. Or whatever you are.”
I thought that Scott and Joseph made some really penetrating comments on the first two posts in this series. Here I want to recap them, so we can discuss how Henry of Ghent (c. 1217-93) a.k.a. The Solemn Doctor would interpret our chart (see the first two posts), specifically, the second, modalistic interpretation I offered.
First, Joseph comes in with some weighty objections to that model (summarized and expanded by me from his comments).
- The one God ought to be not T (which is a state of affairs but not a substance) but rather D, which is a divine substance.
- F, H, and S are supposed to be divine persons, and yet the model wrongly represents them as mere states of affairs. And Joseph urges, “The state of affairs of my being a person is not a person”, and this would seem true of all persons, divine ones included.
- And if you suppose that T is a god, just because it is a state of affairs with D is a component substance, then why are not F, S, and H, resulting in 4 gods. Even worse, why not F + H (i.e. D’s having P and Sp), F + S, and S + H? That’s bring us up to seven gods.
- If you try to get around problem #3, by denying there is a state of affairs F + H (etc.) then this simply seems untrue, but worse, then why would F + S + H be a state of affairs (i.e. that state of affairs which is T, the Trinity).
- And finally, Joseph urges that the model makes D the subject of incompatible properties. D is supposed to have P (paternity) and Fi (filiation). But nothing can have both. Joseph doesn’t quite say why, but here’s a stab at it – to have P is to be ungenerated, while having Fi involves being (eternally) generated. But nothing can be both generated and ungenerated.
Then, Scott and his master The Solemn Doctor reply (again, summarized by me):
- The conjunction of D, P, Fi, and Sp enjoy per se unity. That is why they form a substance/thing, that thing which is identical to the one God, namely T.
- F (etc.) is a divine person, and not a mere state of affairs, because D and P enjoy per se unity. Further, this unity enjoys both will and intellect, and that is sufficient for personhood, so there ought be no worry that we’re trying to pass of an impersonal abstraction or event as a person.
- There’s only one God pictured in our chart (as interpreted by Henry), because there’s only one divine substance, D. The Son and the Father are one god because they share D. And each is the same god as the Trinity, again because both share D.
- In light of our reply to 3, Joseph’s 4th objection doesn’t apply to us.
- P and Fi are not incompatible. D having these involves D in having an active power (to generate), and a passive power (to be generated). All actions involve a thing with a passive, and a thing with an active power, and sometimes one entity is the subject of both.
A couple of comments and objections, by way of refereeing & getting Scott (and Henry) to say more:
- The notion of a per se unity is doing a lot of work here, or at least appears to be! Is this supposed to be a way of setting apart sums of properties which do, and those which don’t constitute a substance (entity, subject of properties)? Or is it a way of saying when a state of affairs counts as a substance/entity? Scott, what else can you say about this concept, to show that this isn’t merely a verbal solution?
- The 3rd answer supposes that we ought to count gods by how many divine essences there are. For any x and y, if they share the same divine essence (and there’s only one, D), then they are one god. This, I suppose, is contentious. If x is a god, and y is a god, and x and y are not identical, then don’t we have two gods? Aren’t we just stipulating an arbitrary language rule if we say that this x and y “ought to be” counted as one god?
- Third, on this model, which thing is identical to God? I take it, it is T. What sort of thing is T? It’s not a divine person. And it’s not a divine essence. So… what on earth is T, according to Henry? Saying there is one God, which is neither a person nor a divine being is a real head-scratcher.
Scott – please email me if you’d like to hit these in a guest post.
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Pingback: trinities - H.O.G. Questions (Dale)
Thanks for the sources.
Now I’ll have more excuses to put off my thesis…
SQO 1.4? Henry talks about form and matter a lot there. But I haven’t read that.
SQO 28.2; 29.1-2? Henry talks about whether God is composed of form and matter there. Haven’t read it.
The alphabetical index of the Badius SQO I lists these texts for ‘matter’:
SQO clxvi; clxxvi; ccxxxii.
There’s also Henry’s version of the ‘rationes seminales’ theory of matter, see his Quod. 4.14. Also, 4.13, where Henry argues that the human needs two substantial forms. There’s probably some good stuff on form and matter in those texts.
There’s some stuff in Marilyn Adams, Ockham, somewhere around p. 650. Though I can’t remember if she discusses Henry or not. It’s very possible.
There’s a book by a cat named Zavalloni on Richard de Mediavilla, which discusses a lot of these issues (or so I’m told).
And, of course, there’s Richard Cross, The Physics of Duns Scotus, chs. 2-5. Henry pops up a fair amount there.
Hmmm, if you want his general theory of natural science, you’d probably need to look in his Quodlibets; but I’d recommend surveying R. Cross’s book _On the Incarnation: Aquinas to Scotus_, there’s all sorts of stuff in there that might be of interest re: general theory of natural science (i.e. ‘Physics’).
But you could look to SQO 53.2 or so, and maybe in SQO 59.2 also.
I’m wondering if there are any good passages in Henry’s SQO on his views of form and matter which would be relevant to the issue? Or is he abstracting so much that this doesn’t really matter?
An important point for Henry is that the origin of the Father is not identical to the origin of the Son. If they had the same origin, then by the same origin the DE would be P and Fi, which seems to elicit ‘Joseph No. 5’. However, if we consider that Henry claims the principiative origin (as opposed to origin of essence) of the Father is ‘not from another’ (or again, ‘ingenitum’), and the principiative origin of the Son is ‘from another’. Is it incompatible that there be one PP (personal property) that is the negation of another PP [PP and ~PP? This perhaps is another way of asking whether there can be more than one principiative origin in ‘God’. If there cannot be more than one principiative origin, then, so far as I can tell, (following Aquinas) there would be no way to distinguish btwn. divine persons (this at least is his argument for why the Son and Holy Spirit are different, b/c the former is ‘from one’ and the latter is ‘from two’).
And then, if we consider that the principiative origin of the Son is not DE simpliciter, but DE qua intellectual power, then in fact we have posited (thus far) two principiative origins for PPs.
A further question, which JT and I have been discussing is ‘what precisely is the product’? And it can’t be just a PP2 (if we take the Father’s PP as PP1) (e.g. being a Son/being an intellectual Word/being generated), the product must be [DE+PP2]. Why? Because a PP is a mode of being (Henry defines this as a ‘respectus’ or ‘habitudine’ of a thing, if we signify a ‘respectus’ and its thing, then we say ‘relation’.) of a thing, and there are no modes just floating out there which get attached to the DE, rather, a PP just is DE with a certain actual principiative origin [PO]. For the Father the PO is ‘not from another, productive of another’, for the Son the PO is ‘from another (i.e. from an intellectual productive act) and productive of another’, and for the Holy Spirit (who has been more or less ignored thus far–in typical Western fashion) the PO is ‘from another, not productive of another’. So with diverse PO’s, Henry thinks he can overcome Joseph No. 5. with Henry Ad No. 5.
Yep, I think that’s a good point. While the substratum view may have trouble explaining how one subject can exemplify incompatible properties, the traditional view has the trouble of explaining how three subjects can each share the numerically same property.
So for (3) we basically have something like an Aristotelian model (possibly) of human creatures (proprium/Father, specific species/Paternity, genus/DE)?
I think perhaps that ‘compatible’ has been equivocated. When I say DE can have P and Fi, I meant it is not a contradiction for the same subject (DE) to have P and Fi, thus it is coherent to say so. Of course, Henry agrees with Richard of St. Victor that P and Fi are incommunicable properties, i.e. the same ‘person’ cannot be constituted by both P and Fi, b.c P cannot be communicated to another divine person (Fi+DE) as it is in-communicable.
It is interesting that on the face of it the ‘traditional’ view of three numerically distinct supposites (hypostases), just like Peter, James and John (from the Cappodican examples), gets around this apparent problem, and yet, how is one to square this with various (western) councils re: divine simplicity? I imagine Henry was pushed by such councils to argue for his substratum view, and following Boethius multiplies the divine persons by a theory of relations founded on a subject.
1. In a sense, this is a problem for anyone who wants to say that the same substance x exemplifies two correlatives or incompatible properties such as A and not-A.
2. But in another sense, the ‘traditional theory’ of the trinity doesn’t suffer this problem. The reason is that the traditional theory doesn’t that the divine essence is the subject of the personal properties (Henry says that).
The traditional theory says the persons are the subjects of the personal properties (and also the subject of the divine essence, which here is taken as a ‘second substance’, i.e., a nature-property). So each person is not exemplifying contrary properties. They each exemplify only their own personal property (and the divine essence).
More technically, on the traditional view, the Father produces a suppositum — an ultimate subject of properties — which exemplifies ‘filiation’ and ‘deity’.
Think of it in terms of the statue-vase problem. Consider two scenarios:
(a) There is one super lump of clay x that exemplifies both F (being a statue) and G (being a vase).
(b) There are two lumps of clay x and y, one of which exemplifies F, and the other of which exemplifies G. (Also, they both exemplify the numerically same property H — being a super lump.)
The first of these is obviously incoherent, because one subject is exemplifying incompatible properties. The second of these is not, because it has separate subjects exemplifying the incompatible properties.
The substratum view is like (a): x = divine essence, F = paternity, and G = filiation.
The traditional view is like (b): x and y = Father and Son, F = paternity, G = filiation, H = divine essence.
3. Yeah, I think you’re probably right that Henry would want to say P and Fi are not incompatible. He would have to, I think, for his theory to make any sense. But I’m not sure that’s really wise. After all, he needs the personal properties to distinguish the persons, so if they’re compatible, it’s not clear to me how they could do that (if they’re compatible, there’d be no reason that the Father couldn’t exemplify both P and Fi).
4. In your last paragraph, you ask how (a) Henry’s claim that P and Fi are incompatible can square with (b) his arguments that P and Fi square with the DE. Well that’s just it. I don’t think they can square. He has to take one or the other, a or b, but he can’t take both.
So basically then, this not only a problem with Henry’s substratum theory but also with the tradition theory of opposed relations? How can the same substance exemplify two sets of correlatives (father-son; spirator-spirated)?
Henry is a little fast and loose on whether he thinks the relations are correlatives or ‘diverse relations’. Correlatives identifies the Father-Son correlation, but ungenerate/generator of a mental Word-generated mental Word are diverse relations. Maybe this is the same thing though.
But yes, I think Henry would want to argue that P and Fi are not incompatible. But even more, that the divine essence requires/demands that there be P and Fi (given that DE is perfect being -actus purus- and all its powers are actual(ized)).
If your interpretation is right, that Henry thinks it is incompatible that P and Fi can’t both exemplify DE, how does this square with his making arguments that P and Fi are truly said of DE? Maybe I am missing something you are saying here?
So basically, you’re saying that P and Fi aren’t incompatible, is that right? If so, that would be one way of getting out of the problem. To put this in terms of the statue-vase problem, the problem could be avoided if we object that F and G are not, in fact, incompatible and show why how that is so.
I’m not sure this would work for Henry. After all, he explicitly claims that the Father’s and Son’s personal properties are incompatible (they’re opposite relations, so they’re incompatible by definition).
Heh heh, 32 personal properties. That HoG!
Apologies for certain key omitted words:
“So, it is incompatible for DE to have the properties ‘generating an intellectual Word’ (GW) and ‘being an intellectual Word’ (BW)?”
should be, ‘So, is it incompatible for DE to have the properties ‘generating an intellectual Word’ (GW) and ‘being an intellectual Word’ (BW)?”
“I think Henry would say that it is not compatible,”
should be ‘I think Henry would say that it is not incompatible,’
JT: Look at SQO 59.3 for Henry’s list of 32 personal properties, three of which are really distinct (actually generating, being generated, being spirated) and the rest are rationally distinct in regard to one of these.
Here’s the text (thanks to G. Pini’s draft of the text): Unde colligendo praedicta, series et ordo proprietatum quae sunt in Patre et Filio et rationum earum et ex abundanti quae sunt in Spiritu Sancto, colligendo eas ex dictis circa rationes proprietatum Patris et Filii et consimiles rationes circa proprietates Spiritus Sancti, patet quod numerus earum est iste a quo alius primo, ingenitum, generativum, posse generare, generare, posse generari subiective, generari subiective, posse generari obiective, generari obiective, genitum esse, paternitas, filiatio, posse spirare active, spirare active, et tunc est quinta decima ratio, posse spirari subiective, et sexta decima, spirari subiective, et septima decima (?), posse spirari obiective, et octava decima (?), spirari obiective, et nona decima (?), spiratum esse. Quibus si coniungantur et unum innominatum circa Patrem et Filium communiter respectu Spiritus Sancti et consimiliter unum innominatum circa Spiritum Sanctum respectu Patris et Filii communiter et similiter si iuxta illa octo quae sunt generativum etc. usque genitum esse coniungantur alia octo quae sola ratione differunt ab illis, ut iuxta generativum dictivum iuxta generari posse dici, et sic de caeteris, erunt XXIX rations. Per dicta patet quid dicendum ad obiectum.
Again, this objection is a very good one. And my best guess is that Henry would offer a response by looking to the specific powers and why the have operative and productive ‘strengths’. If the divine essence [DE] is this power and that power, and DE is pure act, and there is an agent to act by these powers, then the powers will be actual (HoG’s phrase: there is no distance between potentiality and its actuality.) So, suppose we accept this view, that all divine powers are actual and that intellectual Word is produced (and that a volitional Zeal is produced = Holy Spirit). Is _being generated_ in compatible with _generating_? If we consider these properties apart from the context of the particular power in question (the intellect), then I think Joseph’s insightful criticism has more teeth, as it were, than if we look to the details of what _generating_ and _being generated_ mean precisely.
Could we then revise ‘generating’ (P) and re-write it as ‘generating an intellectual Word’, and likewise revise ‘being generated’ (Fi) and re-write it as ‘being (taken passively) an intellectual Word’? We could replace ‘Word’ with ‘Son’, but given that Henry wants to explanation generation by this psychological account, it is perhaps better here to stick with ‘Word’ than ‘Son’, although there are various important objections that Henry needs to get around to explain the identity of ‘being a Word’ and ‘being a Son’.
So, it is incompatible for DE to have the properties ‘generating an intellectual Word’ (GW) and ‘being an intellectual Word’ (BW)? If we take GW and BW as absolute properties, then I think Joseph’s objection has teeth, but if these are relative properties (correlatives in fact), then perhaps not. As Aquinas might argue, humans can think and can produce a mental Word, so why can’t God? (1) Can God have DE+GW and DE+BW? Or, (2) could God have DE+GW and _not_ DE+BW, or vice versa? Henry thinks (2) doesn’t work b/c a perfect productive act (GW) necessarily has its correlate term (BW). So we can say (1) is compossible, and in fact (2) is incompossible. Or at least, (1) is more compossible than (2).
Perhaps the ‘trick’ here is to see that the problem stated as ‘generating’ vs. ‘being generated’ formally speaking appears to be a contradiction, but with the right sort of specification of these terms by identifying the particular power and productive act, the contradiction disappears.
But suppose you don’t buy this. Suppose you think that it is incompatible for DE to have the properties (GW) and (BW). Another way to look at this is to look closer at (GW) and (BW) as modes of DE. On this view, DE has two real characteristics. Suppose my toddler is standing next to me. She and I both have determinate quantitative dimensions. Based on these we can say I am double her height, and she is half my height. But now suppose that an NBA basketball player stands next to me, and now based on my quantitative dimensions, I am half his height, and he is double my height. Is it a contradiction that based on the identical quantitative dimension that I have the modal property based on quantity of being ‘double’ and of being ‘half’. Is this not a contradiction, an obvious incompatibility? How can the very same ‘thing’ (DE/my quantity) have two seemingly incompatible characteristics or modes (GW and BW)/my being double and my being half)?
I think Henry would say that it is not compatible, and this can be explained by the order of origin of being double and being half, or again, of GW or of BW. GW has a different order of origin from BW. In fact, we need to revise how we und. GW b/c its referent also is identifiable as ‘ungenerate’ (cf. the latin from SQO 59.3). So GW is ‘not from another person’, but BW in fact is from another person. GW and BW have diverse origins, just as my modal quantitative properties have diverse origins, and yet GW and BW are ‘of’ the same DE, just as my being double and my being half is ‘of’ the same quantity.
This, I think, is how the H.O.G. might respond (i.e. digressively).
Scott, how do you think Henry would respond to the statue-vase problem?
Let x be a lump of clay — a magical lump of clay that has special powers to change its shape, and let F be the property of being a statue, and G the property of being a vase. Also, suppose that F and G are incompatible (e.g., enough spatial parts of the statue and the vase simply don’t coincide).
Now suppose that:
(1) x is F (the lump of clay is a statue),
(2) x has the power to produce G in itself (the clay can shape itself into a vase),
(3) x has the power to receive or instantiate G in itself (this is entailed as the correlative of 2),
(4) x’s active and passive powers are necessarily exercised unless otherwise impeded.
By 4, x must actualize the powers stated in 2 and 3. So the statue would produce or instantiate G in x (i.e., x+F would produce G, and G would be received/instantianted in x). But now we have this:
(5) x is F, and
(6) x is G.
But that’s impossible. A lump of clay cannot be both a statue and a vase at the same time, because F and G are incompatible.
How would Henry get out of this scenario? We can talk about powers and fecundities (2-4) all we like, but the problem really lies elsewhere, namely in the fact that x ends up instantiating incompatible properties (5 and 6).
(Of course, we could put this in divine terms — just let x be the divine essence, F the property of being the Father, and G the property of being the Son — but I don’t really want to get distracted by little things about Henry’s view and all that. I just want to know how Henry would respond to this specific problem, since this is, as I see it, the major problem with any substratum view.)
Useful comments Scott.
The order of the Father’s (rationally distinct) personal properties, as I remember it, is: generativity, able to generate, generator, and Father. I’m sure ingenerate is in there somewhere, but I don’t remember actually seeing it in SQO 58.4.
Anyways, I’ve always found Henry a little bit confusing on all these (rationally distinct) personal properties (and I’m heavily dependent on Scotus and Ockham’s discussions for my understanding), so maybe you could explain that a little more?
As I understand it, there is in reality only one personal property of the Father, call that A. But in our minds, we can imagine a number of properties, call them B, C, D, and E. B-E are all different concepts (they are ‘rationally distinct’), but in reality, they all map onto one property, A. So there is one property in the Father (A), but there are many concepts of that property (B-E).
Further, we can talk about A as having the character of B, C, D, or E (as Henry puts it: A sub ratione B, C, D, vel E). So we get reduplication here: A qua B, A qua C, etc. And this reduplication is important, because Henry maintains that the Father is only constituted by A qua B, not A qua C/D/E. (Obviously, Ockham takes issue with this point: if the real property is A, and if B-E are just concepts, then A constitutes the Father, irrespective of whether we think A qua B/C/D/E.)
Also, B-E have an ordering. B is primary, and then C and D follow on each other in succession (or perhaps better: C presupposes B, D presupposes C, etc.). But I don’t really understand how Henry defines each of B-E, or why B-E follow on each other in succession.
Anyways, that’s what I understand about it, but I just feel very hazy on this. could you explain more about this?
(Some of my questions about this:
(a) Would the Son also have corresponding B’-E’ properties?
(b) If so, what would B’-E’ be? Is B’ not generativity?
(b) If so, would the Son’s constitutive property be A’ qua B’, not A’ qua C’/D’/E’?
(c) If so, wouldn’t that mean that the Son is constituted by not generativity?
(d) And if so, wouldn’t not generativity apply just as equally to the Spirit? Then the Son and Spirit would be equally constituted by the same property, which would obviously be an undesirable consequence.
(e) And does the Spirit have corresponding B”-E” properties?)
re: (c), indeed, Henry has heavy lifting to do to get around this criticism. It seems to me that one thing Henry offers ‘in response’ is by focusing on the agents who perform the productive acts. So Henry talks about F, he breaks it down into conceptual moments (if you will), or technically he analysis according to a distinction of reason: (this ordering is from memory, I can double check tomorrow) first F is ‘generative’, second it is ‘ingenerate’, third it is ‘able to generate’, fourth, it is ‘actually generating’.
What does this have to do with the D as constituted by active and passive powers? (1) to speak of a power is to speak broadly without identifying the specific power. IF we speak specifically, then we’d say the Father’s first ad intra productive act is to generate a Word or Son by means of the divine intellect (DI). And further, we say that the product of this intellectual productive act is a perfect intellectual copy of the divine essence, and it is so perfect that it is the same D but as ‘being generated’.
Henry employs what I call a double-exposure argument. Recall the scene in the Woodie Allen film _Annie Hall_ where Woody is laying on a bed and lamenting his problems with Annie. And then you see a copy of Woody stand up and pace back and forth in the room while the original Woody is laying on the bed. And then, the copy Woody returns to the original Woody and then they are indiscernible from one another, other than the fact that one is original and one is a copy. Henry himself uses an example of a bronze statue whose image is copied but remains in the very same bronze (SQO 54.9 or 54.10).
Why does Henry think we should posit a copy of the original with the identical material? He does so b/c he thinks the divine intellect is fecund for operating (just thinking) and for producing a Word (i.e. a perfect copy). If the D is perfect, then all of its powers (intellect and will) and their ‘strengths’ (operation, production) are performed. Thus, given that there is a first actor (thanks to Henry’s proof for God’s existence) Henry says this actor acts by powers (and strengths). Since all powers and strengths in God are fully actual, and all powers only are enacted by an actor, we say that the first divine persons acts by the DI, and so thinks and in turn produces a Word (the causal connection btwn. F thinking and F producing another PP -personal property-, is another complexity, which would require lots of space).
So basically, you either accept Henry claim that divine powers have strengths (operative and productive strengths) or you don’t. If you do, then you can give a _specific_ rather than general account of the procession of the Son from the Father.
So in response to Joseph’s important objection (5), I’d say Henry would respond by saying that D is not formally identical with Fi, rather D contains certain powers (and strengths) and if there is an actor (P) who acts by these, then Fi will be a mode of D (necessarily). Given that there is a first actor, it follows that there will be Fi (a second actor).
Henry would say D formally speaking is not generative, but P is generative by means of D, such that P’s acting by D (i.e. productive strength of DI) principiates Fi; or again, P’s acting by D principiates a new modal determination of D, namely Fi. For Henry, PP’s are modally distinct from D, so D taken by itself is not generating or is generated, but only by a modal determination of D (i.e. D + P), does a new modal determination of D ‘come about’ (i.e. D + Fi).
Hi all, been super busy and only have a moment to jump in here and there. But here’s some thoughts.
1. To Joseph’s point 5. This relates back to the material constitution stuff. For B-R, the divine essence is the subject of the personal properties, similar to the way that a lump of clay is the subject of the property being a statue. Henry also proposed this model (way before B-R). I call this a ‘substratum view’ because it construes the divine essence as the substratum or subject of the personal properties.
Anyways, Joseph’s point 5 is, to my mind, one of the more powerful objections to SV. The idea is that if D is the subject of properties, then those properties cannot be incompatible. For example, D cannot at the same time possess both the property being generated and being not-generated, for then D would be both generated and not-generated, which is clearly a contradiction.
This assumes that properties characterize their subjects. It assumes that if some x has a property F, then F will characterize or make x an F (hence we can say ‘x is F). Call this assumption PC, for ‘Properties are Characterizers’.
Without PC, Joseph’s point 5 won’t necessarily be effective. But of course PC is extremely plausible. So it seems to me that if SV wants to avoid Joseph’s point 5, it has to deny PC. And that would probably lead to all sorts of weird problems (or rather, it would probably lead to a parts-view of the trinity).
Henry does not, so far as I know, address this problem, but I can’t see how he (or B-R) would get out of it.
The standard medieval view of the trinity doesn’t suffer this problem. On the standard view, neither the divine essence nor the personal properties are subjects of the other. Rather, the persons are the subjects of properties. The persons all share one property (the divine essence), but they each also have one unique property (their personal property, which is incompatible with the other personal properties). This model preserves PC, but avoids the problem in Joseph’s point 5.
2. To Scott’s point 1. The whole conjunction of D, P, Fi and Sp aren’t per se united. Only D + P, D + Fi, and D + Sp. Each of those conjunctions are per se united. Henry thinks P, Fi, and Sp are incompatible with each other, so they can’t enjoy a per se unity with each other. But P, Fi, and Sp are not incompatible with D, so they can each share a per se unity with D.
3. To Scott’s point 5. A few clarifications here.
(a) the divine essence itself does not have the power to be generated. If so, it could be produced, and Henry wouldn’t accept that. It’s more accurate to say the active power is the power to generate some F, and the passive power is the power to receive that F.
On Henry’s view, D has the active power to produce a person, and it has the passive power to receive a person. The way that works out is this. The Father (D + P) produces Fi in the divine essence (so we get D + Fi, the Son). Fi is produced in D much like how a sculptor produces the form of a statue in a lump of clay. The only difference with the divine case and the sculpture case is that the sculptor produces the statue in another object (the clay), while in the divine case, the Father produces the Son in himself (in his own ‘clay’, the divine essence).
(b) It is not incompatible that something has both an active and a passive power, that’s true. I can do all sorts of things to myself. I can draw on myself, talk to myself, slap myself, and so forth. But that doesn’t mean that the personal properties are not incompatible.
As I mentioned already, the passive power in question is the power for D to receive a property Fi (and Sp). If Fi is incompatible with other properties (such as F) exemplified by D, then it doesn’t matter that D has both an active and passive power for Fi. Fi will still be incompatible with P. Thus, if D exemplifies P and Fi, then D is both generate and ingenerate, which leaves us back where we started.
(By analogy, a lump of clay has the passive power to receive the form of a statue, or the form of a vase. There’s nothing incoherent about that. But nevertheless, being a statue is incompatible with being a vase, so the lump of clay cannot receive the forms of both a statue and a vase at the same time.)
(c) I think I mentioned this already, but Henry does think P and Fi are incompatible properties. They are what distinguish the persons, after all. But Henry obviously thinks that the same thing (the divine essence, the divine substance, God, whatever you want to call it) can be both the Father and the Son. Again, though, that leaves Henry right in the headlights of Joseph’s point number 5, and I don’t see how Henry (or B-R) could escape the problem. Any ideas?
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