Dale Tuggy

Dale Tuggy is Professor of Philosophy at the State University of New York at Fredonia, where he teaches courses in analytic theology, philosophy of religion, religious studies, and the history of philosophy.


  1. Craig, White, and Cerberus (Dale) » trinities
    March 18, 2012 @ 1:38 pm

    […] be a surprise, first of all. Craig’s book came out in 2003, and he’s been criticized in print in 2006 by a well known Christian philosopher, Daniel Howard-Snyder, in the journal Philosophia […]

  2. trinities - The Cerberus analogy revisited (Dale)
    April 30, 2008 @ 3:27 am

    […] Moreland’s and Craig’s Cerberus analogy for the Trinity? (background here) Daniel Howard-Snyder objected, come on, that’s clearly three dogs with […]

  3. Dale
    June 16, 2007 @ 4:58 pm

    Yeah, those experiments are a tar-pit for the metaphysics-minded to interpret! Whether or not there are “centers of consciousness”, though, I’d be inclined to say that we’ve still got one (malfunctioning) person, one subject of those experiences. In any case, I don’t see that there’s any real help in this area for Trinity Monotheism. They hold persons to be substances, and “streams (centers) of consciousness” aren’t substantival entities. I guess I don’t understand the motivation for thinking of “streams” of experience as grounding anything like a person. A person isn’t any stream or bundle of experiences, but rather the subject of those. I mean, I might be doing my taxes, talking to my wife, and sort of in the background thinking about a philosophical problem, and those may be fairly distinct experiences, but it seems that’s just one being doing three things at the same time. Even if my brain’s been cut, so that only my hand can display tax-information, while I can only speak about the philosophical problem. Am I just being dense?

  4. Joseph Jedwab
    June 13, 2007 @ 8:39 am

    Hi Dale,

    Let me clarify some of the terms I’m using here. The standard view on callosotomy or commissurotomy is that patients who have it done, in experimental conditions, have a disunity of mind. By ‘mind’ here I don’t mean a faculty to think, but a collection of experiences that stand in unity relations to each other alone at a time and over time. Let’s use ‘stream’ rather than ‘mind’. Say two experiences are directly co-conscious iff they are parts of the same experience and say two experiences are indirectly co-conscious iff they stand in the ancestral of direct co-consciousness. A stream then is a collection of experiences that are directly or indirectly co-conscious with each other alone. I have one such stream from when I wake to when I sleep. There’s disunity of mind at a time if one has two experiences then but neither is directly co-conscious with the other. As I said, the standard view on split-brain patients is that they can have such disunity of mind. I’ve been convinced by Tim Bayne, however, that the evidence doesn’t conclusively support the standard view. But I think it still could happen that one of us has such disunity of mind. But if so, I don’t see why we can’t have two streams in the sense of two such collections of experiences at once. But I also don’t see why this turns on whether we are material composite beings or immaterial simple beings. So I think an organism or a soul could have two streams of consciousness at once, each of which on its own suffices to provide the mental life of a person.

  5. Dale
    June 12, 2007 @ 5:41 pm

    re: 2 – Because in the soul case, there are not distinct parts on which the distinct faculties may supervene?

  6. Joseph Jedwab
    June 11, 2007 @ 8:22 pm

    Dear Dale,

    Some comments in defense of Craig here.

    1. I don’t see that Craig commits to the divine Persons’ being minds or faculties. True enough, there’s a one-one correspondence between them, but I don’t see him explicitly identifying them.

    2. If we are organisms, I think there could definitely be mentally-endowed organisms (i.e. sentient creatures), that have two organs of thought. Compare this with Peter van Inwagen’s discussion of Cerberus in Material Beings, chapter 8. I don’t see why this must be different if we are souls. If an organism can have two minds at once, why can’t a soul have two minds at once?

    3. What to say about fission cases is always going to be a big mess. What do we say if Rover, Bowser, and Spike are separated? Perhaps Craig should say only composites (e.g. dog bodies) can undergo fission, in which case we should adopt a closest continuer account, a multiple occupancy account, or something else. But, he should continue, souls, which are simple, can’t undergo fission, so the problem could never arise in their case and so not in the divine case either.