Sometimes, trinitarians think that the Son just is God, and that the Father just is God, and yet the Son is different from the Father. But these can’t all be true. In modern logic, we represent the claims as:
- s = g
- f = g
- – (s = f)
If you understand that numerical sameness (=) is symmetrical and transitive, you’ll “see” why these can’t all be true, since any two entail the falsity of the remaining one. But that’s not my point now.
My point is that in the face of this objection some young apologetics enthusiasts will (1) assert that here I’m “assuming unitarianism,” or (2) triumphantly announce that “the Son is God” simply means that the Son is divine, not that the Son and God are numerically identical.
About (1): No, I’m not. I’m only assuming the aforementioned facts about numerical identity, which are taught in any beginning logic course. 1-3 simply are an inconsistent triad, and anyone can know this, irrespective of their theological commitments. About (2): Of course, that is what many trinitarians mean by “Jesus is God.” More on this below.
But why did I think the trinitarian was saying that Jesus just is God (j=g)? Good question! And, it has a good answer. Most likely, I just heard the trinitarian in question argue like this:
1. Only God can forgive sins.
2. Jesus forgave sins.
3. Therefore, Jesus is God.
Never mind that the first premise is false according to the New Testament. Just focus on premise 1. They seem to be using “God” here like a name, a singular referring term which refers to the one God. Notice that 1 makes two claims about God. First, he can forgive sins. Second, only he can; that is, no one else can. Here’s how we analyze a statement like that in standard logic. (This is the right structure – the symbols vary by textbook and are a pain to put in a blog post.)
- (x) (Fx -> x = g)
- Fj
- j = g
In English: 1. For any x whatever, x can forgive sins only if x just is God. 2. Jesus can forgive sins. 3. Jesus just is God. This is an obviously valid argument. In other words, if 1 and 2 are true, then 3 must also be true. That, my friend, is why I hear you identifying Jesus and God. You deployed the concept of numerical sameness / identity in premise 1. And this is why I’m interpreting you as deploying it in the conclusion – because I’m charitably listening to you, trying to hear you as reasoning correctly.
Of course, it is a great mistake for any Christian to agree with 3. But that’s another conversation.
But suppose you then clarify that by “Jesus is God” and “The Father is God” you mean only that each is divine. What about those claims? And what about the “Only God” argument above interpreted as involving only a divine being?
Good questions. And they have good answers. Here’s a redo of our inconsistent triad above:
1. Jesus is divine.
2. The Father is divine.
So far, so good. There are logically consistent; conceivably, they could both be true. But now add:
3. There is only one being which is divine.
It follows that Jesus just is the Father, and vice-versa. But (hopefully) you did not want to imply that! Here’s the triad symbolized:
- Dj
- Df
- (x)(y) ((Dx & Dy) -> x=y) (For any x and any y, they’re both divine only if the one just is the other.)
This is not an inconsistent triad, as above. Rather, it’s consistent. But these three imply something that any Christian must deny.
Here’s the “only God” argument interpreted as involving only predication, as describing Jesus as divine, rather than identifying him with God.
- Only a divine being can forgive sins.
- Jesus can forgive sins.
- Therefore, Jesus is a divine being.
In logic,
- (x)(Fx -> Dx)
- Fj
- Dj
Again, obviously valid. But again, premise 1 contradicts the New Testament. Thus, the argument is unsound.
Premise 1, contra some of Jesus’s critics, is not even remotely plausible. Why can’t an omnipotent God authorize a non-divine being, even a man, to forgive sins? Even you could authorize another to forgive a wrong on your behalf, or a debt. These are not hard things to do! In case you’re tempted here to agree with Jesus’s Jewish critics, the author of the first gospel helps you out:
Now when the multitudes saw it, they marveled and glorified God, who had given such power to men. (Matthew 9:8)
Hi Dale,
Thanks for this post! This sheds even more light on some of your logic. However, I have some objections. Let me use one of your arguments to illustrate my problems:
1. Jesus is divine.
2. The Father is divine.
3. There is only one being which is divine.
4. Therefore, Jesus is the Father.
This argument, it seems, is invalid. Here are the missing premises:
A. Jesus is a being.
B. The Father is a being.
In the sense that orthodox theology asserts 3, it denies A and B. Now you may use “being” in a broader sense and call subsistences beings, but then 3 is false on Christian orthodoxy. Your formalized version of premise 3 shows another side of the problem:
3. ?x?y((Dx ? Dy) ? x=y) [Notice how your “translation” of this differs from your original English premise 3!)
The problem here is that you do not define the set or universe that you’re quantifying over. If it is “beings”, then the argument is invalid; if it is “beings and subsistences”, it is false. If you believe that the notion of subsistences or persons as opposed to beings is incoherent, you need to formulate an argument for it–however, an argument for Jesus being a being (heh) is in itself an argument against Christian orthodoxy, nevermind the Trinity. In general, It seems to me that if in your metaphysics (x and y differ) unconditionally implies (x and y are different beings), and if you argue from that metaphysics, you beg the question against orthodox Trinitarianism. I suspect you use the word “being” differently.
(Now I’m fully aware that my objections have wide-ranging theoretical implications. Am I proposing a non-objectionable Quadrinity? Are there two ways to be divine? Am I suggesting Plantingan Arianism? Does this objection imply “ontological pluralism”? Whatever the answers may be to these questions, they don’t change the fact that your argument as it stands is not valid.)
Oh man, I wanted to be all cool and stuff with my proper notation, but the site messed it up and now it’s all question marks. However I’m pretty sure you can figure out what those are standing for.
I can’t seem to shake the intuition that logic isn’t capturing enough of what’s going on here.
Remember Flatland? A sphere as such cannot be perceived by the Flatlanders. In fact, they have no frame of reference to even fully conceive of one. However, a sphere can intersect with Flatland, and Flatlanders can see that intersection as a circle, albeit with rather strange properties (such as a constantly-changing size). Is the circle which is the intersection of the sphere in Flatland identical with the sphere? Clearly not. However, the circle very much is the sphere, as much as anything in Flatland could be said to be the sphere.
Could the Incarnation not be something along these lines? God the Father is clearly a being incapable of existing in our world as himself. But if Jesus were the intersection of God with our three-dimensional space-time, then he would both be God and not be God much like the circle in Flatland both is the sphere and isn’t it. Just because our “geometry” can’t completely describe their relationship doesn’t mean their relationship is impossible. It could just mean our geometry has limitations.
Hi Dale,
Thank you for this blogpost. As you may recall, I propose that my Relative-Social Trinitarianism resolves all of your criticism about logic, identity, and the Trinity (http://journalofanalytictheology.com/jat/index.php/jat/article/view/jat.2016-4.181919061425a/283).
By the way, I am still working on the outline for my analysis and proposal of my two-nature Christology in response to your propositional logic in “Podcast 145.”
Pax,
Jim
Comments are closed.