Brian Leftow is recognized as one of the most important living Christian philosophers. Formerly of Fordham University in NYC, he now holds the prestigious Nolloth Chair of the Philosophy of the Christian Religion at Oriel College, Oxford. See Trent Dougherty’s comments here for a list of some of his publications. In person, Leftow is very pleasant and interesting, and his sense of humor also comes… Read More »Leftow 1: “Anti Social Trinitarianism”
Swinburne sez: Two thumbs up for the social analogy!
Richard Swinburne is an Emeritus professor at Oriel College, Oxford University, and is widely considered one of the greatest living Christian philosophers. He’s done original work in philosophy of science, epistemology, philosophy of mind, and general metaphysics, but is perhaps best known for his work in philosophy of religion and philosophical theology. He has a way of squarely facing tough issues, and treating them in original and principled ways. He’s particularly well known by philosophers for his arguments for mind-body dualism, for his cumulative case for the existence of God, and for his bold social trinitarian theory, which I’ll cover in this series. Read More »Swinburne’s Social Trinitarian Theory, Part 1
…why not say that there is a single substance, God, but that the existence of this substance grounds other, non-fundamental entities [i.e. the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit] that perhaps can be considered parts of God. …the existence of the whole is prior to the existence of the parts. For someone drawn to a social trinitarian sort of view that takes the members… Read More »Linkage: Ian’s search for a new Social Trinitarian theory
How the three are tightly functionally unified, in Swinburne’s view.
(See below for the interpretation.)
Last time we looked at Swinbure’s suggested reading of the creeds. They can’t he says, be charitably read as holding that in the same sense there’s only one divinity, and that there’s three. Swinburne comes down on the side of three. Like all social trinitarians, he’s attracted to a vision of the Trinity as being a loving community, three eternal and perfect, spirits, three selves, enjoying one another’s company, living in communion with one another, and working together in all they do. In short, he wants to say there are personal relationships internal to God – and this implies that there are persons – subjects of experience, thought, and action – in God.Read More »Swinburne’s Social Trinitarian Theory, Part 3 – functional monotheism
Swinburne isn’t what you’d call a theological liberal. He’s not a conservative evangelical either, given his rejection of things like biblical inerrancy. He was, I believe, a life-long Anglican, until 1996 when he converted to Eastern Orthodoxy. As I understand it, at least part of his motivation was his exasperation with anything-goes style Anglicanism (e.g. priests who are not theists). But my point is that he aims to be a “Catholic” Christian, in the sense of one who holds to mainstream orthodoxy – roughly, that core of doctrines held in common by Catholicism, Eastern Orthodoxy, and (at least in theory) most Protestants. (Actually, he’s probably a good bit more “Catholic” than that – in that he believes in apostolic succession, and in the authority of The Church to decree the meaning of scriptural texts – see his book Revelation.) This requires some dexterity on his part, and creates the burden of crafting a theory that one can claim fits with the “Athanasian” and Constantinopolitan Creeds.
Swinburne argues that it is uncharitable to read the ecumenical councils’ claim that “there is only one god” as asserting that there’s only one divine individual, as that would contradict their committment to there being three divine individuals.Read More »Swinburne’s Social Trinitarian Theory, Part 2 – a key move
As pretty well summarized here by unitarian Theophilus Lindsey.
In the year 1694 began the great contest concerning the Trinity, betwixt two celebrated doctors of the church, Sherlock and South; each of them reputed and reputing himself orthodox, and each of them espoused by learned and powerful partisans.
Dr. Sherlock expressly asserted, that the three persons in the Trinity are three distinct, infinite Minds or Spirits, and three individual Substances. Dr. South held only one infinite eternal Mind or Spirit, with three Somethings that were not three distinct Minds of Substances, but three modes, faculties, attributes, relations, relative properties, subsistances, as there were variously denominated. Dr. Sherlock was accused, and with great justice, if words have any meaning, of polytheism, or holding three Gods. Dr. South, on the other hand, came under the imputation of explaining away the Trinity, and falling into the Sabellian or Unitarian system: and accordingly some of the Socinians took advantage of the Doctor’s explication of the doctrine of the church, and declared in their writings, that the should not be backward to give their approbation to the Liturgy and the Articles, if that was the kind of Trinity which the language therein used was intended to inculcated.
The university of Oxford, to whom Sherlock was obnoxious on account of his political principles, declared forRead More »the fate of “social” trinitarianism in late 17th c. England (Dale)
Dale’s Swinburne Trininty chart, version 2.0. (or 1.1 – whatever) Thanks to reader (and Swinburne student) Joseph Jedwab for the correction. He points out: [Swinburne] wants to avoid the idea that the Spirit’s existence is causally overdetermined [i.e. that it has two complete causes, either of which would alone suffice]. But he also wants to avoid the idea that each actively only partly causes the… Read More »Swinburne’s Social Trinitarian Theory, Part 4 – the cooperation involved in procession or spirating
If there’s at least one, there must be exactly three. Q.E.D.
The installment before the last, we saw that Richard Swinburne’s social trinitarian theory is very carefully built so as to satisfy multiple demands of orthodoxy. There is, he argues, a contradiction-free, reasonable trinitarian theory, which fits well with the classic creeds. But we can do even better than that. In Swinburne’s view, there’s a plausible argument for the Trinity based on reason alone. Don’t believe it? Oh, ye of little faith reason. Have ye not read the earlier Richard on this?Read More »Swinburne’s Social Trinitarian Theory, Part 5 – Yes, we can prove it by reason alone
What is “mere” social trinitarianism, and why is it controversial among trinitarian theologians?
A deep dive on divine attributes, processions, and “social” trinitarianism.
In De Trinitate Book 3.7 Richard summarizes some of what comes beforehand. We have learned that supreme goodness requires supreme love (i.e. supreme love is a necessary condition for supreme goodness), and that supreme love requires more than one person. If supreme love were only self-love, then the total state of affairs “one divine person has self-love” is not as perfect a state of affairs as another total state of affairs, namely “two persons have self-love, and each loves the other person.” Thus,
If there is supreme love, then there is a plurality of persons.
Likewise, Henry infers from what he takes to be the nature of supreme love to entail the equality of the persons in question.
If there is supreme love, then there is an equality of persons.
Below I try to explain just what all this means.
Read More »Richard of St. Victor 6 – Supreme Love Only Among Equals, Again (Scott)
In the last three posts, I explained Richard’s argument for why there must be two distinct persons who charitably love each other. Here I want to raise some objections to three of Richard’s claims.
Read More »Richard of St. Victor 5 – Evaluation of the argument thus far (JT)
STAGE 3. Next, Richard tries to establish that God can only charitably love an equal. He introduces this idea by raising the following objection: if God must direct his charitable love at a distinct person, then why couldn’t he direct his charitable love at a created person? That would satisfy T5 from the last post, so that should be enough to perfect God’s charitable disposition, right?
Read More »Richard of St. Victor 4 – Charity is shared by equals (JT)
STAGE 2. In this stage, Richard tries to show that perfect charity must be directed at another person. Here’s the quotation:
‘no one is properly said to have charity on the basis of his own private love of himself. And so it is necessary for love to be directed toward another for it to be charity’.
Read More »Richard of St. Victor 3 – Perfect charity must be directed at another person (JT)
STAGE 1. In this stage, Richard wants to show that God’s perfect goodness somehow requires that God is perfectly charitable. I say ‘somehow requires’ because the logical relation here is not clear. Richard is saying ‘God’s goodness _____ perfect charity’, but what fills in the blank? Is it ‘entails’, ‘presupposes’, or some other logical relation?
Here’s the actual quotation, with the particular claims marked in brackets.
‘[T1] there is [in God] fullness and perfection of all goodness. [T2] However, where there is fullness of all goodness, true and supreme charity cannot be lacking. [T3] For nothing is better than charity; nothing is more perfect than charity’.
Let’s look at T1, T2, and T3 in turn.
Read More »Richard of St. Victor 2 – God’s goodness requires charity (JT)
Richard of St. Victor is well known for his argument that perfect love must be shared between three persons, and since God’s love is perfect, there must be three persons in God. Richard presents this argument in Book 3 of his De Trinitate, and that’s what we’ll be looking at in this series of posts.
Before going into objections to “Trinity Monotheism”, I thought it’d be a good idea to say a bit more about their long, meaty chapter in which they (eventually) set out their own theory, in this book. This’ll take a couple of posts, and we’ll allow time for discussion between them. Theologians in particular should find a lot to chew on here;they’re pretty out of step with the theological world on these issues, as we’ll see.Read More »Trinity Monotheism part 2: their set-up, part 1
Perhaps the greatest issue for Social Trinitarians with respect to the Holy Spirit is “his” personhood.
“This clears it all up, right?”
Anselm: “Um, no. I must bestow upon it the analytic frown of uncomprehension.”
(image credit)
I used to think I had a great objection to Anselm’s famous ontological argument. (Bear with me – this has something to do with social trinitarianism.) The argument, at least many forms of it, basically goes like this. If it is logically possible that there’s a Greatest Possible Being (i.e. a being such that there’s no logical possibility of there being a greater one), then it is necessary that there’s a Greatest Possible Being. More simply: if it’s possible (non-contradictory) that God exists, then it’s also necessary that God exists (i.e. it is inconsistent to suppose God not existing). (For more, see here and here. For more than you’d ever want to know, here.)
Many critics have replied like this:
I’d be a sucker to grant your premise. Why should I think that the notion of a Greatest Possible Being is the notion of a possible thing at all? Read More »perfection, the Trinity, and impossible beings (Dale)
The Social Trinity may be more social than you thought. In this episode I talk with trinities contributor Mr. Chad McIntosh about his new twist on a “social” Trinity theory – that not only are there three divine persons or selves, but in another but related sense, the Trinity is a person, what he calls a functional person.
