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Swinburne’s Social Trinitarian Theory, Part 1


Swinburne sez: Two thumbs up for the social analogy!

Richard Swinburne is an Emeritus professor at Oriel College, Oxford University, and is widely considered one of the greatest living Christian philosophers. He’s done original work in philosophy of science, epistemology, philosophy of mind, and general metaphysics, but is perhaps best known for his work in philosophy of religion and philosophical theology. He has a way of squarely facing tough issues, and treating them in original and principled ways. He’s particularly well known by philosophers for his arguments for mind-body dualism, for his cumulative case for the existence of God, and for his bold social trinitarian theory, which I’ll cover in this series. Read More »Swinburne’s Social Trinitarian Theory, Part 1

Swinburne’s Social Trinitarian Theory, Part 3 – functional monotheism

How the three are tightly functionally unified, in Swinburne’s view.

(See below for the interpretation.)

Last time we looked at Swinbure’s suggested reading of the creeds. They can’t he says, be charitably read as holding that in the same sense there’s only one divinity, and that there’s three. Swinburne comes down on the side of three. Like all social trinitarians, he’s attracted to a vision of the Trinity as being a loving community, three eternal and perfect, spirits, three selves, enjoying one another’s company, living in communion with one another, and working together in all they do. In short, he wants to say there are personal relationships internal to God – and this implies that there are persons – subjects of experience, thought, and action – in God.Read More »Swinburne’s Social Trinitarian Theory, Part 3 – functional monotheism

Swinburne’s Social Trinitarian Theory, Part 2 – a key move

(Picture credit.)

Swinburne isn’t what you’d call a theological liberal. He’s not a conservative evangelical either, given his rejection of things like biblical inerrancy. He was, I believe, a life-long Anglican, until 1996 when he converted to Eastern Orthodoxy. As I understand it, at least part of his motivation was his exasperation with anything-goes style Anglicanism (e.g. priests who are not theists). But my point is that he aims to be a “Catholic” Christian, in the sense of one who holds to mainstream orthodoxy – roughly, that core of doctrines held in common by Catholicism, Eastern Orthodoxy, and (at least in theory) most Protestants. (Actually, he’s probably a good bit more “Catholic” than that – in that he believes in apostolic succession, and in the authority of The Church to decree the meaning of scriptural texts – see his book Revelation.) This requires some dexterity on his part, and creates the burden of crafting a theory that one can claim fits with the “Athanasian” and Constantinopolitan Creeds.

Swinburne argues that it is uncharitable to read the ecumenical councils’ claim that “there is only one god” as asserting that there’s only one divine individual, as that would contradict their committment to there being three divine individuals.Read More »Swinburne’s Social Trinitarian Theory, Part 2 – a key move

Swinburne’s Social Trinitarian Theory, Part 4 – the cooperation involved in procession or spirating

Dale’s Swinburne Trininty chart, version 2.0. (or 1.1 – whatever) Thanks to reader (and Swinburne student) Joseph Jedwab for the correction. He points out: [Swinburne] wants to avoid the idea that the Spirit’s existence is causally overdetermined [i.e. that it has two complete causes, either of which would alone suffice]. But he also wants to avoid the idea that each actively only partly causes the… Read More »Swinburne’s Social Trinitarian Theory, Part 4 – the cooperation involved in procession or spirating

Swinburne’s Social Trinitarian Theory, Part 5 – Yes, we can prove it by reason alone


If there’s at least one, there must be exactly three. Q.E.D.

The installment before the last, we saw that Richard Swinburne’s social trinitarian theory is very carefully built so as to satisfy multiple demands of orthodoxy. There is, he argues, a contradiction-free, reasonable trinitarian theory, which fits well with the classic creeds. But we can do even better than that. In Swinburne’s view, there’s a plausible argument for the Trinity based on reason alone. Don’t believe it? Oh, ye of little faith reason. Have ye not read the earlier Richard on this?Read More »Swinburne’s Social Trinitarian Theory, Part 5 – Yes, we can prove it by reason alone

Constitution Trinitarianism Part 6: summing up

Is Ned in trouble? Here’s a quick post to wrap up the series on Brower’s and Rea’s constitution theory of the Trinity. First, it’s striking how original and self-consistent their approach is. It is rare to find something this new, and this well thought through on such an old topic. They’ve carefully carved out a unique position, one which has a motivation outside of theology… Read More »Constitution Trinitarianism Part 6: summing up

Constitution Trinitarianism Part 2: Craig’s objections

In the same issue of Faith and Philosophy (22:1, Jan 2005, 77-86) Bill Craig has a critical response piece. (Available online here.) First, he gives a nice and clear summary of their article, more complete than the one I gave last time. Then he proceeds to object. As with most philosophical theories, when you start objecting, things start getting complicated, and you start to understand the theory in question better.

For starters, what do they mean by “the divine essence”? What sort of thing is this which constitutes the persons? Rea answers in an email which Craig quotes:

All we mean to commit ourselves to is the idea that maybe the Persons are like a hylomorphic [form plus matter] structure: there’s something…we call it the “divine essence”… that plays the role of commonly shared matter, and, for each Person, something else that plays the role of form. (80)

Read More »Constitution Trinitarianism Part 2: Craig’s objections

Constitution Trinitarianism Part 5: Ambiguous God-talk

 

 


Like about everything else these days.

In this post I want to explore what to me is the oddest and hardest part to grasp of the constitution trinitarianism. When I first read their paper, I thought they thought God was a stuff – that is, that the term “God” referred to a certain thing, that immaterial stuff they call “the divine essence”. That was wrong on two counts. For as we’ve seen, “the divine essence” isn’t supposed to be a thing (although they think it wouldn’t be a catastrophe if they admitted it was a thing – see their footnote 10). Hence, it can’t be a thing which is identical to God. Second, they don’t think that “God”, say, when used in a Psalm, refers to that stuff. So, what do they think it refers to? It depends. They hold that it’s a systematically ambiguous term. Why is that?Read More »Constitution Trinitarianism Part 5: Ambiguous God-talk

Constitution Trinitarianism Part 1: Ned and Lumpy

The next theory up to bat is by philosophers Mike Rea of Notre Dame and Jeff Brower of Purdue University. In some ways Mike reminds me of his mentor Al Plantinga – a tall guy you don’t want to argue against unless you absolutely have to. He’s published many articles in metaphysics and philosophy of religion, and is perhaps best known for this book. He’s presently editing several books, including one of recent essays on the Trinity, which I’m really looking forward to seeing. Jeff is one of the best medieval philosophy specialists around, focusing on metaphysics, philosophy of religion, and ethics. I think he has excellent tastes in medieval philosophers. Both of these guys are top-notch, and you’ll always learn a lot from anything they publish. Both of them, by the way, have many papers available to download from their websites, and their other Trinity work will surely be discussed here at some future date. The one I’ll be discussing in this series is here. Theirs is a bold and controversial theory, and one which is quite out of step with the Social Trinitarian views that have been so popular of late.

“Material Constitution and the Trinity” (Faith and Philosophy 22:1, Jan 2005, 57-76) is a difficult and technical article, dense with argument. Philosophers will appreciate how well it’s crafted; I not sure many others can get through it! Here I’ll just lay out the broad lines of it, getting slightly more precise in future installments. Consider Ned the gnome:

 

How many things are pictured here? Read More »Constitution Trinitarianism Part 1: Ned and Lumpy

Constitution Trinitarianism Part 3: The Meaning of “Is”

Is the Son God? In the immortal words of Bill Clinton, “It depends on what the meaning of the word ‘is’ is.” Brower and Rea suggest the following classification of meanings of “is” (in logic, “is” is called “the copula” – that which connects the subject and what’s being said of that subject).

Um, no the Clintons aren’t in the original chart in their paper (71).
And yes, Bill is intrigued by the word “copula”. Read More »Constitution Trinitarianism Part 3: The Meaning of “Is”

Constitution Trinitarianism Part 4: pausing and revisiting some issues

 

rodin1.jpg

“Come on, you tired little brain – don’t fail me now.” (No, I don’t really blog naked – serious thought requires having at least your underpants on.)

Joseph Jedwab does an excellent job (here, comments 3 & 4) pressing me for details, and taking a shot at defending the Brower and Rea theory. I wanted to chew a bit on some issues that Joseph and Ian raise before moving on, offering some corrections and other reflections. (And JT – I want to post your lengthy comment (the second one) as a guest post, so we can discuss the priority issue – email me if you object to this promotion. :-) ) Any bold type that appears in quotes here has been added by me.

To non-philosophical readers: I apologize for the over-long load of philosopher-lingo that follows. You may want to skip this one! Read More »Constitution Trinitarianism Part 4: pausing and revisiting some issues

podcast 34 – Albrecht vs. Tuggy debate – Was Tertullian a trinitarian? Part 2

In this episode, the final half of my debate with Roman Catholic apologist Mr. William Albrecht. The question: was Tertullian a trinitarian? (Part 1 is here.) First, we take turns cross-examining one another, and then the closing arguments. I’ve shortened the audio here,  but have not cut any meaningful content at all. Who makes the better case? As Fox News says, we report, you decide.… Read More »podcast 34 – Albrecht vs. Tuggy debate – Was Tertullian a trinitarian? Part 2

podcast 33 – Albrecht vs. Tuggy debate – Was Tertullian a trinitarian? Part 1

On March 29,  I debated Catholic apologist William Albrecht on whether or not Tertullian was a trinitarian. In this episode, our opening statements, and rebuttals, slightly edited (“cleaned up”) from the original audio (“in studio” for me, unfortunately, just over the internet for his side – but I did my best to make the whole thing listenable.) You can also listen to this episode on… Read More »podcast 33 – Albrecht vs. Tuggy debate – Was Tertullian a trinitarian? Part 1

Linkage: Ian’s search for a new Social Trinitarian theory

…why not say that there is a single substance, God, but that the existence of this substance grounds other, non-fundamental entities [i.e. the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit] that perhaps can be considered parts of God. …the existence of the whole is prior to the existence of the parts. For someone drawn to a social trinitarian sort of view that takes the members… Read More »Linkage: Ian’s search for a new Social Trinitarian theory

Further thoughts on Swinburne’s God-talk

In this 2010 post I reacted to an interview by social trinitarian Richard Swinburne. My concern was that Swinburne has a theory on which the Trinity is not itself a person, but in answer to the question “Is God a self?” He answers affirmatively. What gives? Recently a reader e-mailed me with this link (thanks, Anthony). If you look at around 14 minutes, you’ll hear… Read More »Further thoughts on Swinburne’s God-talk

Trinity Monotheism Part 3: Their Set-Up, Part 2

To fully understand a philosophical theory, one needs to understand not only the content of it, but the reasons for which it is held. This is why I’m patiently going through how Moreland and Craig reject what they see as the competing Trinity theories, before giving their own.

As we’ve seen, they consider themselves to be “social trinitarians” (last time we looked at their rather vague definition of that term). They then adopt Brian Leftow’s taxonomy of social trinitarian theories, and decide that the first of these is the most promising. Read More »Trinity Monotheism Part 3: Their Set-Up, Part 2