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Dale

Dale Tuggy (PhD Brown 2000) was Professor of Philosophy at the State University of New York at Fredonia from 2000-2018. He now works outside of academia in Middle Tennessee but continues to learn and podcast.

trinitarian or unitarian? 5 – Origen’s Against Celsus – Part 1

number-one-Celsus was a pagan philosopher, essentially a cultural and religious conservative, who wrote a book attacking Christianity, perhaps around 177-80 (though some have argued that it must be no later than 161).

Decades later, it is not clear exactly why, the great Christian scholar Origen (182-254) wrote a massive refutation of this book, quoting substantial portions of it. This is the eight-book Against Celsus, which was probably written aronud 246-8.

There are many, many interesting things in the book. Here’s a quotation relevant to our present series:

[Celsus writes:] If these men [Christians] worshiped no other God but one, perhaps they would have a valid argument against the others. But in fact they worship to an extravagant degree this man who appeared recently [Jesus], and yet think it is not inconsistent with monotheism if they worship His [God’s] servant [Jesus]. [Origen responds:] Read More »trinitarian or unitarian? 5 – Origen’s Against Celsus – Part 1

Linkage: Sokal Hoax 2.0

id-rather-like-you-to-know-youve-been-trolled.jpgEvery philosophy student and every theology student should know about the original Sokal hoax. Here’s the best reflection on its important lessons. (Dr. Boghossian later expanded the discussion in this book.)

Now a philosopher has pulled a similar hoax; this time it’s a naturalistic atheist vs. the Association for Reformational Philosophy. The story is at Jerry Coyne’s blog, Why Evolution is True. (Never mind that this particular post provides no such reason. 🙂 ) Coyne notes,

This shows once again the appeal of religious gibberish to the educated believer

True – for some. But Read More »Linkage: Sokal Hoax 2.0

Swinburne @ Biola

Richard Swinburne was a visiting fellow at Biola University’s Center for Christian Thought in the Fall of 2012. Here are the videos they’ve posted from that visit. Interestingly, they seem to have avoided the topic of Swinburne’s Trinity theory – at least, judging by the videos they posted. One has to wonder why. Maybe they just wanted to leave room to discuss the soul, about which… Read More »Swinburne @ Biola

Swinburne on analytic vs. continental philosophy

Here’s a gem of a passage from a little-read paper by Richard Swinburne, from this book. This is part of talk he gave at a 2001 conference in Moscow, Russia, co-sponsored by the Society of Christian Philosophers and the Russian Orthodox church. So he’s explaining the wider context of analytic philosophy to them. Sometimes, when we have to explain things to those outside the camp,… Read More »Swinburne on analytic vs. continental philosophy

Mark Edwards on Councils and the Trinity

“The” doctrine of the Trinity was established neither at Nicea (325 AD) nor at Constantinople (381 AD). In catholic lore, it is all supposed to hang on the then novel term homoousios – but it does not – that is, not only on that. This one catholic Trinity doctrine is in fact not a fully determinate doctrine at all, but only a template, a set… Read More »Mark Edwards on Councils and the Trinity

New Papers

I’ve just updated my homepage with a paper forthcoming in Faith and Philosophy, called “Hasker’s Quests for a Viable Social Theory.” My sincere thanks to editor Thomas Flint, and to that journal’s anonymous readers for their help. The paper critically examines the various discussions of William Hasker, a very accomplished Christian philosopher, and former editor of F&P, from whom I have learned much. I think… Read More »New Papers

Simplifying the Indiscernibility of Identicals

equals - greenI’ve posted quite a few times here before about identity, and about the principle often called “Leibniz’s Law” – the Indiscernibility of Identicals. This is often put:

Necessarily, for any x and any y, x is identical to y only if for any P, x has P if and only if y has P. (Compare, e.g. Colin McGinn, Logical Properties (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 4-7.

I agree with other philosophers that this has apparent counterexamples, if “P” can stand either for any predicate or for any property.

But in my view, the underlying metaphysical intuition – that a thing can’t at one time be and not be a certain way – is undeniable. (And of course, it has important theological implications.)

I would restrict the “P” above to intrinsic properties, if I believed in properties. But I don’t. So I’ve been putting the principle like this:

The Indiscernibility of Identicals: Necessarily, any A and B are identical only if they (1) never have differed, (2) don’t differ, (3) will not ever differ, and (4) could not differ.

This formula doesn’t import any assumptions about property-theory, either for or against. Rather, it uses only a primitive concept of differing, or being different – as to qualitative aspect or way of being, not as to number. I think this well captures the intuition and fundamental conviction noted above.

But it now strikes me that the formula is needlessly complicated. Why not just this?Read More »Simplifying the Indiscernibility of Identicals

Craig wins again

craig - that's your argumentThis post is a commentary on the Craig-Rosenberg debate. Most of my comments are in italics; factual reporting is in regular text.

In short, Craig undeniably wins. I felt bad for Rosenberg, and could hear naturalistic philosophers of religion face-palming throughout the debate.

Debaters: there’s a lot you can learn from here.

  • 8:00 The debate has judges? Yet no philosophers? Or rather, one who used to teach it?
  • 17:14 – Debate finally starts. C comes out hitting on all cylinders, with a clean argument for a self (an “unembodied mind,” “a consciousness,” or “person”) which exists a se (he hedges with talk of “a personal being”) (person etc. – before 24 min). (See comment re: 37:00 below.)
  • 25:30 It is clear that C has read some of Rosenberg’s work.
  • C keeps his arguments simple, short, and understandable – though philosphers and other pros might prefer more detail. But this is effective communication; he knows his audience. His pace is conversational, and not a word is wasted. It is clear that C has tailored his arguments to his opponent, even while using mostly his standard arguments – and he points out some of the most ridiculous things R has said follow from naturalistic atheism.
  • 28:00 – I don’t at all understand C’s comeback to the multiple cosmoi objection to the fine tuning argument. A rare mis-step in C’s debate performance.
  • 37:00 C: God “can be personally known.” Never mind that God is NOT literally a self/person, or C’s controversial Trinity speculations, which he habitually presents as “the” doctrine of the Trinity. But, this does nothing to hurt him in this debate.
  • 38:00 Rosenburg starts his case, and is hilariously rude. He falsely implies Read More »Craig wins again

Santa vs. Arius, round 2

Now that I’m actually looking for it, I see that this stuff is very popular on Catholic websites and blogs. Here it is – the same version I mentioned last time in comic form. Excellent epistemologist and apologist Tim McGrew responded on Facebook to my previous post: Of the 318 bishops that Athanasius (and Eusebius in his Chronicon) say were present, I can find names… Read More »Santa vs. Arius, round 2

Did Santa punch out Arius?

If memes are to be believed, yes. Santa (Nicholas, Bishop of Myra) punched Arius himself in the face, at the famous council of Nicea, no less. But – I hate to tell you – memes are not always to be believed. This one’s been making the rounds online for a few years. Even Catholic philosophy professors are getting in on the fun. And it is… Read More »Did Santa punch out Arius?

You’re another!

“You’re another” – that’s what tu quoque means – it’s the name of an informal fallacy, often called a fallacy of relevance. For example, if I argue that your theory is self-contradictory, suppose you retort that my theory is too. Well, so…? It’s irrelevant to the point that the first theory mentioned is self-contradictory (so, self-refuting).

Cornell grad student Chad McIntosh argues that if the social trinitarian God – or rather: the three divine persons  posited by clear “social” Trinity theories – would be deceivers, then so would the perfect self in whom I believe, being a unitarian Christian. So granting that an ST is implausible, for similar reasons unitarian Christian theology is implausible (because it has a perfect being doing what appears a wrongful deception).

Is this a defense of ST?

I’ve already argued in that paper than a Swinburne-type ST implies what looks like wrongful deception by at least one of the three divine persons. This hasn’t been disputed.

I don’t grant that if God is a single self, then Read More »You’re another!

God and his Son: the Logic of the New Testament – conference presentation

Here’s a video of my May 2012 talk in Atlanta, “God and his Son: the Logic of the New Testament.” Many thanks to Sharon and Dan Gill, who filmed, edited, and posted it on their fine website, 21st Century Reformation. The characteristic thesis of unitarian Christianity (aka Biblical Unitarianism, Christian Monotheism) is that the Father of Jesus just is the one God, Yahweh, and Jesus… Read More »God and his Son: the Logic of the New Testament – conference presentation

Buddhist positive mysterianism

Positive mysterianism: it’s not only for Christians. And I very much doubt it was Christians who first hit upon the strategy… In any case, here’s an example from fourth century India: Our only grounds for speculating about Mainstream responses to Mahayana thought are the objections that the Mahayanists address in the own writings. In some cases, the Mahayanists argue against the objections, in others they… Read More »Buddhist positive mysterianism

Further thoughts on Swinburne’s God-talk

In this 2010 post I reacted to an interview by social trinitarian Richard Swinburne. My concern was that Swinburne has a theory on which the Trinity is not itself a person, but in answer to the question “Is God a self?” He answers affirmatively. What gives? Recently a reader e-mailed me with this link (thanks, Anthony). If you look at around 14 minutes, you’ll hear… Read More »Further thoughts on Swinburne’s God-talk

Orthodox modalism

The standard orthodox formulas admit of a “modalistic” or one-self interpretation.

Metatheology with Baber

(click for image credit)

Thanks to all you excellent commenters! I can’t always keep up.

I see my friend philosophy professor Harriet Baber has been on there asking some provocative questions like some kind of Socratic gadfly. 🙂  I thought they deserved a post. The quotes here are from her comments.

WHAT pre-existed: the 2nd Person of the Trinity or Christ?

Orthodox / catholic-kosher answer: both. The 2nd person of the Trinity is assumed to be personally identical to (and so, identical to) the man Jesus.

What if I hold that the Trinitarian Person was pre-existent but became a human at some time in the late 1st century BC so that, in effect, Christ is a proper temporal part of the 2nd Person of the Trinity. Does this make me an adoptionist?

To all the non-philosophers out there; she is applying the recent metphysical doctrine of temporal parts here, thinking of, e.g. a self as extended across or spread out over time, rather than lasting (entire) though time. In current day metaphysicians’ lingo, people perdure rather than endure. So in this case the one Christ would be that whole four-dimensional, event-like thing, with the early part being the pre-human logos and the latter part being the human Jesus – but as I’m using the terms here (this is tricky – there are no standard terms here) the logos and Jesus would be temporal parts of the one Christ.

I don’t know, Harriet, whether or not this makes you an adoptionist; I suggest we lay aside Read More »Metatheology with Baber