In this book, I argue that all reference is story-relative. We cannot understand reference to God, nor to his prophets, nor to any other character mentioned in the Jewish, Christian, or Muslim scriptures, without reference to those very scriptures.
Does Aristotle discuss the concept of numerical identity in only one passage?
“Is there any Son who does not cause His Father to become a Father and vice versa?”
Here I wish to briefly summarize what I take to be Henry’s position on the question: is the Father constituted by the (personal) property of being ‘ungenerated’ (ingenitum)? Henry’s discussion of this comes from his Summa Quaestionum Ordinariarum 57.1.
Henry engages in a lengthy discussion of ways the word ‘ingenitum’ (not generated) or ‘innascibile’ (not able to be born) can be predicated of the Father, whether negatively, privately, or positively. The upshot of these distinctions is to ask about the precise nature of this property ‘ungenerated’. Is it saying what the Father is not (negation), or is it saying the Father lacks some further property and is potentiality to receive some new property (privation), or is it saying there is some positive property the Father really is constituted by?
Henry rejects predication of the property ‘ingentium’ to the Father by negation and by privation; instead he opts for predication of a positive property. What then is this positive property that the Father has/is?
Read More »HoG: “What does it mean to say the Father is ungenerated?” (Scott)
John Duns Scotus (d. 1308), nicknamed by tradition “the Subtle Doctor,” was one of the most important medieval Christian philosophers, and was notorious for the difficulty of his thought. In this episode, we hear a specialist in medieval philosophy give a conference presentation on Scotus’s views on identity (sameness) and distinction (difference). Nowadays most philosophers and logicians recognize qualitative sameness (aka similarity), which comes in degrees,… Read More »podcast 65 – Dr. Joshua Blander on John Duns Scotus on Identity and Distinction
Barak Hussein Obama, as I write this, enjoys untold legions of fans. Some of them identify him with Jesus, or with Abe Lincoln, or Franklin Delano Roosevelt, or Moses. What I just said is true. But what it mean? It sure does not mean that a lot of people think B.H.O. is one and the same being as (i.e. is numerically identical to) Abe (etc.).… Read More »Don’t think/write like a contemporary theologian – Part 5 – identity blabber
Is the idea of “divine identity” the key to understanding New Testament christology?
Maria Rosa Antognazza teaches at King’s College London, where she also directs the Centre for the History of Philosophical Theology. She has written a highly praised forthcoming intellectual biography of the great Leibniz. Below is my review of her book pictured here. The review is forthcoming in Religious Studies. Bottom line: Leibniz employs positive and negative mysterian moves, as well as rational reconstruction of the… Read More »Dealing with Apparent Contradictions: Part 19 – Review of Antognazza on Leibniz
Continuing the discussion with the Maverick (Bill)… “Being itself,” I take it, is something like a universal property, an abstract and not a concrete object. (Or at least, it’s not supposed to be concrete; maybe he thinks that it is neither abstract nor concrete.) I’m not sure if Bill would accept those characterizations, but if not, I invite him to say a little more about… Read More »Dialogue with the Maverick Philosopher: God is a being, not Being itself – part 2
The Clarke-Waterland duel went on for many, many pages in several books, getting increasingly snippy.
Last time I said that I thought Waterland was a social-mysterian-trinitarian. But I’m not so sure about the “social” part! He’s very unclear on whether the “Persons” are selves. They’re different somethings, in any case. But in this series, I’m sticking to an exegetical issue.
Here are excerpts of Waterland’s second salvo about the “only God” texts.
[Clarke] had produced John 17:3, 1 Cor. 8:6, Eph. 4:6, which prove that the Father is styled, sometimes, the one God, or only true God; and that he is the God of the Jews, of Abraham, etc. I asked how those texts proved that the Son was not? You say… “very plainly… Can the Son of the God of Abraham (Acts 3:13) be himself that God of Abraham, who glorified his Son?” But why must you here talk of that God, as if it were in opposition to this God, supposing two Gods; that is, supposing the thing is question. …I tell you that this divine Person is not that divine Person, and yet both are one God… (A Second Vindication of Christ’s Divinity in Waterland’s Vindications of Christ’s Divinity, 422-3, original italics, bold added, punctuation slightly modernized)
This is wheel-spinning. Clarke does, and Waterland does not take the passages in question to identity (assert to be numerically identical) the Father and Yahweh.
Clarke had asked whether Waterland thought that the term “Father” in these texts actually includes, i.e. refers to, the Son as well. Waterland clarifies,Read More »DANIEL WATERLAND ON “THE FATHER IS THE ONLY GOD” TEXTS – PART 2
Such as, “the question of whether there is one god or many (or none) as a version of the question of whether there is “one truth or many.” Eh? The Maverick Philosopher shines the bright sunlight of clarity on this whole mucky swamp of confusion: The claim that truth is absolute, and cannot be relative to individuals or groups or historical epochs or races, or… Read More »the Maverick Philosopher on some fashionable confusions
In three of the last four posts (Rick St. Vick 6, 7, 9, 10) I surveyed some of Richard of St. Victor’s arguments for why there must be at least three divine persons. (We’ve yet to see an argument for there aren’t more than three persons.) Here I’d like to respond to these, and to one JT’s responses too.Read More »Richard of St. Victor 11 – Response to the Argument From Love Thus Far (Scott)
An apologist spells out “the Trinity” as incoherent monotheistic tritheism.
Not all engagement is good engagement.
Continuing our yarn from last time, imagine that our guru Opi changes his strategy. Now he instead tells his disciples that “Opi is the dopi” means that Opi is eternally the uniquely smartest teacher, and also that eternally, there is a teacher smarter than Opi. Here, he teaches them to believe an apparent contradiction, that eternally, Opi is and is not the smartest teacher. But is… Read More »10 steps towards getting less confused about the Trinity – #3 Take the mystery out of appeals to “mystery” – Part 3
To continue Baber’s attempt to retool Sabellianism:
Suppose your car, named KITT, has temporal parts. KITT, then is the sum of, the whole composed of these parts. (KITT at t1, KITT at t2, KITT at t3, KITT at t4…etc.) Further, Baber urges each of these car-stages (temporal parts of a car) is itself a car. So, e.g., KITT at t3 is just as much a car as the whole KITT. But now, suppose David Hasselhoff is driving KITT on, say, Easter. He’s actually, on this metaphysics, driving two cars, for KITT on Easter is a different car than KITT (the sum of KITT-stages).
Not to worry, argues Baber. We simply need a concept of “tensed identity”. This is not numerical identity as normally understood, but is rather the relation between KITT and KITT at Easter, such that they “count as one”. (p.5) Thus, Baber suggests that if we believe in temporal parts, the thesis of “tensed identity” is a “plausible way to avoid over-population.” (p. 5)
Back to God. She’s exploring the idea that God is a whole composed of three temporal parts Read More »“Sabellianism Reconsidered” Considered – Part 3
I argue that the theoretical costs of Bauckham’s theory outweigh its theoretical benefits.
A dialogue with trinitarian apologist Dane Van Eys on Trinity, identity, history, and the New Testament.
In evangelical Protestant circles – to the highest degree in apologetics, followed by theology and Christian philosophy, it is popular to denounce theological views as “heresy”. For a while now, this has struck me as a little odd, and in this post, I’ll explain why. The concept of heresy arose within Catholicism, and on traditional Catholic assumptions, it makes perfect sense to decry something as… Read More »some thoughts on heresy
“It’s not identification, but rather predication.”
