At the blog The Time Has Been Shortened, interviews with Dr. Nathan MacDonald and Dr. Michael S. Heiser. I read most of MacDonald’s Deuteronomy and the Meaning of ‘Monotheism’. I found it helpful, but had some fundamental disagreements with it. Those another time. The two have very different views of the OT and the issue of monotheism. To oversimplfy, MacDonald thinks that for a long… Read More »two scholars on the concept of monotheism
We now turn to Richard’s De Trinitate Book 3, Chapters 14-19
Here’s my formulation of the first part of ch.14:
Suppose there’s at least one divine person: P.
Then (1) P is so benevolent that he wants to have no good that he does not want to share.
And (2) P is so powerful that everything is possible for him.
And (3) P is so happy that nothing is difficult for him.
And (4) if (1)-(3) are true, there are at least three divine persons.
Therefore, (C) If there is at least one divine person, then there are at least three divine persons.Read More »Richard of St. Victor’s De Trinitate Ch.14
My seven year old nephew believes that once upon a time the young George Washington chopped down a cherry tree. For my part, I don’t think that happened. I believe that the cherry-tree story is a myth. Therefore, when my nephew talks about “George Washington” he’s not referring to the same guy I’m referring to when I talk about “George Washington.” Once, this nephew overheard… Read More »God, Allah, George Washington, and Eric Clapton
Now that I’m actually looking for it, I see that this stuff is very popular on Catholic websites and blogs. Here it is – the same version I mentioned last time in comic form. Excellent epistemologist and apologist Tim McGrew responded on Facebook to my previous post: Of the 318 bishops that Athanasius (and Eusebius in his Chronicon) say were present, I can find names… Read More »Santa vs. Arius, round 2
So next up ch.16. Here’s my version of what goes on in this chapter:
Re 1: I like the implicit distinction here between what is a real and only a conceptual possibility. There can’t really be only one divine person. For, as Richard is trying to demonstrate, there must be at least three divine persons. But the concepts of full wisdom and power don’t conceptually imply the concept of more than one divine person.Read More »Richard of St. Victor’s De Trinitate, Ch.16 (Joseph)
A forgotten 4th c. debate: Is the Logos of John 1 a divine being in addition to God, or a power and energy of God?
Biblical unitarianism vs. what Dale calls one-self trinitarianism.
Post-debate thoughts and more, in dialogue with an ex-biblical-unitarian who is now a trinitarian.
A few thoughts on re-reading Sudduth’s open letter explaining his conversion.
Saith Sudduth,
Krishna is the all-attractive Absolute who is manifested in the different religious traditions of the world. There is merging into impersonal Brahman. There are also distinctly theistic experiences in which the self encounters a personal God.
The ultimate being is either personal or not. Thus, it can’t be that both the aforementioned experiences are veridical, i.e. represent God as God really is.
I think Sudduth agrees; he goes on to explain that “merging” experiences are something like the devotee coming in contract with what some would call the “energies” of God. Of course, Indian philosophers like Sankara would disagree. And I don’t know why we should accept Sudduth’s claim that:
…that transcendental consciousness (the aim of nearly all religious traditions) is in fact variegated in nature.
I don’t know that there is any one general sort of experience which nearly all traditions aim at. Experiences of a loving god are not at all like the sorts of experiences monistic types profess, wherein, they say, Read More »A Few Thoughts on Sudduth’s Open Letter
As reported in Christianity Today, and in other places, the Catholic hierarchy is forbidding the liturgical use of “Yahweh” (YHWH, Yahveh, Jehovah). Why? Because Jews consider it improper, and we ought not offend needlessly. On the face of it, this is an oddly politically correct move. Yes, Jews believe the word “Yahweh” is too holy to pronounce or write, but should we agree? Must we… Read More »2 Holy 2 Say?
“It’s not identification, but rather predication.”
Pastor-theologian Greg Boyd has been theologizing about the Incarnation recently. He tips his hand right at the start – he’s going kenoticist. Boyd’s reasoning, I think, can be illustrated like this. Consider this inconsistent triad: A fully divine being is essentially omniscient. A human being is not essentially omniscient. A fully divine being can be a human being. Why believe 1? Perfect being theology, and… Read More »Boyd on Incarnation
In discussing the Trinity or Incarnation, I often have an exchange which goes like this:
- someone: Jesus is God.
- me: You mean, Jesus is God himself?
- someone: Yeah.
- me: Don’t you think something is true of Jesus, that isn’t true of God, and vice-versa?
- someone: Yes. e.g. God sent his Son. Jesus didn’t. God is a Trinity. Jesus is not a Trinity.
- me: Right. Then in your view, Jesus is not God.
- someone: But he is.
- me: So, you think he is, and he ain’t?!
- someone: [silent puzzlement]
In this post, I want to explain the part in italics. First: a point of clarification. The second and third lines are important. When many say “Jesus is God” they just mean that in some sense or other Jesus is “divine.” (This could mean a lot of things, depending on one’s assumed metaphysics.) But this sort of person (line 3) understands Jesus to be “divine” in the sense of just being one and the same as God – that Jesus is God himself – one person, so just one (period).
In the italicized line, I’m applying something called Leibniz’s Law, or the Indiscernibility of Identicals. I sometimes put this roughly as, some x and some y can be numerically identical only if whatever is true of one is true of the other. That’s a sloppy way to put it.
In logic, a more precise way of stating it (used e.g. by Richard Cartwright) is:
(x)(y)(z) ( x= y only if (z is a property of x if and only if z is a property of y))
Literally: for any three things whatever, the first is identical to the second only if the third is a property of the first just in case the third is a property of the second.
The basic intuition is that things are as they are, and not some other way. So if x just is (is numerically the same as) y, then it can’t be that x and y qualitatively differ. This seems undeniable.
There are a few problems, though, with the above formula, which any person trained in philosophy may spot. Read More »A formulation of Leibniz’s Law / the Indiscernibility of Identicals
Is it “Lord” or “Jesus” here? What’s a layperson to do?
It seems I touched a nerve, judging by the word count so far (here, and here). First, let me make clear that I have no interest in mocking Catholic doctrine. I’m a non-catholic (and so non-Catholic) Christian, and am in sympathy with the Catholic tradition in many ways. I’m going to avoid some well-worn Catholic-Protestant battle areas here, and try to stick to what I… Read More »More on Loyola’s “white is black” passage
Catholic analytic philosopher Tim Pawl (University of St. Thomas, in Minnesota) argues that this is logically consistent: Jesus has both a divine and a human nature.
His answer is challenged by another talented young Catholic philosopher, Tomas Bogardus, of Pepperdine University. With their permission, I’ve reposted their dialogue from Facebook. I thought it deserved a wider audience.
From that same thread, I learned that Dr. Pawl is working on a book on the metaphysics of the Christology that comes from the “ecumenical” councils. I’ve thought and taught a good bit about those in recent years, and plan to discuss them in upcoming podcasts, so I look forward to seeing this book, and the discussion it will generate.
Which is mightier – this beard or this one?
You decide. I’ll weigh in with a comment later.
Here, unedited but for the addition of a few explanatory links (and a gratuitous picture), is their dialogue:Read More »Tim Pawl: a God-man is possible
Dear Christian, I’ve been meaning to talk to you about God and me.
