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Trinitarian-Unitarian Debates – 1 Bosserman vs. Finnegan, 2008 – Part 2

  • Finnegan rebuttal 52:28-1:08  Back to pronouns: Bosserman’s rebuttal was unclear. Overwhelming number of pronouns and verbs re: God are singular; by the ordinary meaning of language, this communicates that he is one being. John 17 says Father is the only true God, and presupposes Jesus to be someone else. Bosserman has not answered who the first trinitarian was. And he hasn’t derived three persons and one essence from the Bible. Nor does it make sense. “Elohim” can be translated singular or plural, and needn’t refer to a plural unity. Is he saying Jesus = YHWH? If so, isn’t that modalism rather than trinitarianism. But if he’s a different “YHWH” then it seems there are two of them. “Before Abe was I am [the one]” i.e. the messiah; that’s the best way to take that saying. Believes Jesus an unfallen, sin-free human, being virgin born with God causing him. Col 1:15 doesn’t teach Jesus’ pre-existence; it’s about the new creation effected by Jesus. John 6:62 – “came down from heaven” is figurative. John 1 – can translate with “it” for “logos.” “God” in NT in over 99% of texts refers to Father. Rare in both testaments to call any human a “god.” Jesus died; God can’t. Thus they are two.

Trinitarian-Unitarian Debates – 1 Bosserman vs. Finnegan, 2008 – Part 1

Sean Finnegan is an intelligent and well spoken “Biblical Unitarian” Christian. He recently earned an M.A. in Church History from Boston University. He runs the christianmonotheism website, which aggregates work by contemporary Christian unitarians. I was pleased to meet him at a recent conference, at which he gave a fascinating presentation on how many (but not all) “church fathers” rejected the everlasting earthly Kingdom in favor of “going to heaven,” i.e. a non-bodily afterlife.

Here’s a blog post by Sean on the debate I’ll be reviewing below.

Brent Bosserman was at the time of the debate an adjunct professor at Northwest University in Washington state. I believe he’s still there, but can’t find out much about him online. But here’s a long 2007 talk of his, called “Christianity and Trinitarian Worldview.” He talks at the start about his background.

This debate suffers by not having a precisely defined debate question. While Finnegan mostly sticks to the biblical case for his view and against Bosserman’s, Bosserman pulls out a broad brush and tries to compare all-encompassing “worldviews.” This is not a good idea; a debate is finite in time!

The intros are over-long and intrusive here; I’ve skipped you to the actual start. My summaries and commentary follow.

Arguing against no one

Princeton philosopher Thomas Kelly in a paper on the epistemology of disagreement (i.e. what the reasonable response when we find the people just as smart and informed etc. as us disagree on some important matter):

In principle, we ought to be able to give due weight to the available reasons that support a given view, even in the absence of actual defenders of the view who take those reasons as compelling. But in practice, the case for a view is apt to get short shrift in the absence of any actual defenders. The existence of actual defenders can serve to overcome our blindspots by forcefully reminding us just how formidable the case is for the thesis that they defend… But the case for a given view itself is no stronger in virtue of the fact that that view has actual defenders…

Thomas Kelly, ” The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement,” p. 31 (in pre-print).

At first this reminded me of a proverb I’ve often thought of when reading some catholic theologian who has evidently never put the slightest effort into understanding the overall case for unitarianism:

“The first to speak in court sounds right–until the cross-examination begins.”  Proverbs 18:17 (NLT)

But this is actually a different point than Kelly’s. A better courtroom analogy for Kelly’s point is:Read More »Arguing against no one

Craig on Flying Spaghetti Monster Mockery

The “Flying Spaghetti Monster” was born as an inept parody of intelligent design arguments. About this, philosopher William Lane Craig is right on the money. The FSM is more than this, though. It is thought by many village-atheist-type young males (roughly 12-29) to be an oh-so-clever-and-naughty parody of monotheism in general, apart from any design-creation controversies. The thing is, the FSM is not clever – only naughty… Read More »Craig on Flying Spaghetti Monster Mockery

The Trinity Explained (with Reason)

The word is “Therefore…” When you are making a deductive argument, this means that what you are about to say logically follows from (is implied by) what you have just said. That is, if the former part were to be true, what you’re about to say must also be true. A non sequitur (Latin for: “it doesn’t follow”) is an invalid argument, one in which the premises don’t imply… Read More »The Trinity Explained (with Reason)

Ramble on

I was interviewed a couple of times at the 2012 Atlanta Bible College Theological Conference.

Here’s the first, in which I ramble on about my own religious history and views about God, the Trinity, and Jesus.

Also: pacifism (I’m agin’ it. Perhaps the majority of conference goers, I think, were for it.) I wasn’t expecting that question – hence the rambling. 🙂

Thanks to Carlos Jimenez for filming, editing, and posting this. You can comment on the youtube page.

Better rambling below the fold…Read More »Ramble on

What is idolatry?

In a recent public presentation I tried to define two concepts of idolatry, but I wasn’t quite happy with either of them.

So here’s the 2.0 version, submitted to you for criticism and comment:

  • idolatry (def 1): the practice of honoring a representation or symbol as if it were a god or a person worthy of honor.

This is literal idolatry, which is the rule rather than the exception in the world’s religions – bowing, etc. to things like this Jain statue I photographed in Bombay. It was this sort of practice which was forbidden in the ten commandments:

You shall not make for yourself a carved image, or any likeness of anything that is in heaven above, or that is in the earth beneath, or that is in the water under the earth. You shall not bow down to them or serve them… Exodus 20:4-5, ESV

“Serve” here, I think, clearly signifies religious worship specifically. It is not clear, I think, that it is against any sort of respect for images, e.g. saluting a flag. But it is against the sort of image honoring typical of ancient near eastern religions.

Apart from this command, it seems to me, it is by no means obvious that the one God shouldn’t be worshiped by means of some object, be it representational or abstract. After all, millions, probably billions of people do this, either for some god or for the one God.

But very often in the New Testament, it is not the above concept which is in view. Instead, they have in mindRead More »What is idolatry?

Anthony Buzzard: That Jesus Should be Worshiped Does not Imply that He is God

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Sir Anthony Buzzard is the author of a number of books, including the 2007  Jesus Was Not a Trinitarian.

Interesting title, no?

Some Christians will think it true but trivial.

Others, against the evidence, assert it to be false.

Others will urge that he is implicitly but not explicitly a trinitarian, i.e. that his beliefs entailed it, though he did not believe it.

I agree with with Buzzard, though, that it is both true and important. According to the gospels, Jesus’ beliefs included the numerical identity of the one true God with his heavenly Father, and we should assume him to be self-consistent on this subject, so he did not also think that the one true God is numerically identical to this: Father+Son+Spirit. (Things identical to the same thing must also be identical to each other.)

But isn’t Jesus worshiped in the New Testament? And doesn’t that show that he is God himself?

No – I agree with the substance of this recent video by Buzzard:Read More »Anthony Buzzard: That Jesus Should be Worshiped Does not Imply that He is God

Patton’s problem with Apologists

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I recently stumbled upon a great post by Michael Patton that just about perfectly expresses how I’ve felt about Christian apologists since growing past teenagerhood.

In part:

This is the problem that I have with some apologists (those who defend the faith). Don’t get me wrong, I believe very much in apologetics and also love many apologists. But very rarely do I find a reasonable apologist. Most are very hardened because they are committed first to defending their particular position, not so much to learning.

Read the whole thing. He also has done a similar post recently.

I would add: apologists too often fall into mere rhetorical violence: hyperbole, attacking a straw man, verbal aggression, smug, acid condescension, simply repeating oneself more loudly, insults, poisoning the well, and so on. And this is leaving aside poorly constructed arguments. Sadly, debates between philosophers (one or both of whom may be atheists) are nearly always “cleaner” (more reasonably and respectfully conducted) than your average debate between a Christian apologist and anyone else.

I’m always reminded of what James says:Read More »Patton’s problem with Apologists

Copan answers: Who created God?

“Well, who created God, then?” Many an atheist has lobbed this one, supposing it to be a devastating objection in question form. In reply, Christian philosopher Paul Copan knocks this one out of the park. Well played, sir. I would add a few points: One of the perfections a perfect being is supposed to have is aseity – existing but not because of anything else.… Read More »Copan answers: Who created God?

Defining the concept of a Christian unitarian

Thanks to reader Mike Gant  for his question about my last post. As of now I think I’ve got a solid definition of the concept unitarian: someone who believes that the one God just is (i.e. is numerically identical to) a certain self and not to any other self. But I then tried to define the more specific concept of a Christian unitarian: someone who believes that… Read More »Defining the concept of a Christian unitarian

Defining the concept of a unitarian

Last time I offered a definition of the concept of a trinitarian.

This time, I will try to define the concept of a unitarian.

Many definitions of this concept are unacceptably polemical.  It is unacceptable to define a unitarian as an anti-trinitarian.  This violates requirements 3 and 5 – it doesn’t tell us what a unitarian is, but only what a unitarian is against.  And this is part of a common slashing rhetorical strategy which I have recently mentioned.  For the same reasons we must reject defining the concept unitarian as one who “denies the Trinity” or “has heretical beliefs about the Trinity,” etc. Equally, it is unacceptable to define a unitarian as one who holds the correct or biblical view about Jesus and God. Whether or not that’s so, it’s trying to sneak an argument for a thesis into a pseudo-definition of that thesis.

One common definition is,

Definition 1: someone who believes in exactly one unipersonal God.

I think this is on the right track, but the term “unipersonal” is obscure, and so this definition violates requirement 6 (and possibly also 3).

I have been working with this definition of the concept:

Definition 2: someone who believes that the one God just is (is numerically identical to) the Father.

I now think that this isn’t quite right.

First the definition is arguably too narrow.  Read More »Defining the concept of a unitarian

Defining the concept of a trinitarian

I woke up this morning, and realized that there is a problem with how I’ve been defining the concept of a unitarian.  In this post, I will attempt a definition of the concept of a trinitarian, after reviewing what is required of a good definition. Next time, I’ll try to define the concept of a unitarian.

According to the textbook I have used for years in my critical thinking class, a good definition should:

  1. Include the genus and a differentia.
  2. Not be too broad or too narrow.
  3. State the essential attributes of the concept’s referents.
  4. Not be circular.
  5. Not use negative terms unnecessarily.
  6. Not use vague, obscure, or metaphorical language. (p. 44)

What is a trinitarian?

Definition 1: someone who believes in a triune god.

This failsRead More »Defining the concept of a trinitarian

“Sabellianism Reconsidered” Considered – Part 8

In this last post in this series, I want to put out a few critical reactions to Baber’s “Neo-Sabellian” Trinity theory.

My thanks to Harriet for this piece and for her interaction with us here.

No doubt, she’ll argue back; and she will probably say something about how her views have changed since she wrote this piece.

So, in no particular order:

  1. I agree with her that it’s suspicious if some philosophical theory should appeal to us only or mainly because it’ll help us in theology. I also agree with her that it’s interesting to at least try to come up with what is in some sense an acceptable Trinity theory which uses only metaphysical doctrines we have other reasons to believe.
  2. Again, I think it is a good aim to produce an intelligible (seemingly consistent) Trinity theory, assuming some such theory is called for. I think she’s correct to complain about the severe obscurity of traditional claims about “eternal generation” and “procession”.
  3. Picky point: I think “Neo-Sabellian” is a misnomer. It’s “Neo” all right, butRead More »“Sabellianism Reconsidered” Considered – Part 8

Biddle: many “Gods” but one God

Here’s an interesting but tightly wound passage from John Biddle (1615-62) in a book from 1648: Again, though he [Jesus] be a God, subordinate to the most high God, as having received his godhead, and whatsover he hath, from the Father; yet may not anyone thence rightly infer, that by this account there will be another God, or two Gods?  For though we may, with… Read More »Biddle: many “Gods” but one God

“Sabellianism Reconsidered” Considered – Part 7 (Dale)

Time for the old Spanish Inquisition. Will she survive The (self-administered) Rack?

In the final part of her article “Sabellianism Reconsidered”, Baber turns to theological objections. To wit:

  • The account renders it impossible for the Son to pray to the Father. But the NT says this happened.
  • The account denies that each Person of the Trinity is himself eternal, and has eternally born relations to the other two Persons. (pp. 8-9, paraphrased)

Her answers? Jesus, like his contemporaries, was not a trinitarian. That is, he didn’t realize  that the God to whom he prayed had temporal parts which were gods. Or even if he did, he didn’t intend to teach any trinitarian doctrine. Thus, he addressed not the Father, but God, as “Father”. (p. 10) Thus the term “Father”, in Jesus’ context, referred to God, while nowadays (post 380 CE?) it refers to the Father, the (temporally) first Person of the Trinity.

In response to the second objection, she notes that “a notion of timeless, metaphysically necessary causationRead More »“Sabellianism Reconsidered” Considered – Part 7 (Dale)

“Sabellianism Reconsidered” Considered – Part 6 (Dale)

Switchfoot “are one”. But they are really just five dudes, not one.

Baber observes,

Typically, aggregates of Fs are not themselves Fs. A collection of cats is not itself a cat… an aggregation of persons is not a person. (p. 7, emphasis added)

Still, she thinks this needn’t preclude three gods from themselves being a god. Some sorts of things, it seems, can have other things of that same sort for parts, such as a Sierpinski Triangle. (p. 10) Maybe, then, gods are more like triangles like cats, in that groups of god can be (temporal) parts of a god. At least, we can’t rule out that this is possible.

How many temporal parts does God, on this theory have? There’s no reason to think it is exactly three. Read More »“Sabellianism Reconsidered” Considered – Part 6 (Dale)

LaBreeska’s right

LaBreeska Hemphill is right. Jesus isn’t God; he’s the Son of God. God is a certain perfect self, the one both we and Jesus call “our Father” and “our God”. Jesus is a man – but by no means a mere man, to wildly understate the case. God is not a man, not, as C.S. Lewis would say, a Son of Adam. She’s not a theologian.… Read More »LaBreeska’s right

“Sabellianism Reconsidered” Considered – Part 5 (Dale)

To be omnipotent, Baber says, “is to be able to do [directly, by fiat] any action… including actions at times other than” the time at which one is omnipotent. (p.6) But consider, say, the action of miraculously inflicting some person with a headache on 1/1/2015. It seems that the Father, on this theory, couldn’t do that, as he wouldn’t exist then (having been superseded by… Read More »“Sabellianism Reconsidered” Considered – Part 5 (Dale)

A Tale of Two Tattoos (Dale)

I love philosophy majors. The best of them almost always develop a nerdy and warped sense of humor – and I mean that in the best way. 🙂

These two young ladies, recent alumnas of our department, decided to get complementary tattoos. (Sober, they swear!)

In each case, the tattoo artist left off the two initial universal quantifiers: AxAy (I can’t find the symbol codes for the upside down A representing the universal quantifier – so please imagine those A’s upside down.) They would read: For any x whatsoever and for any y whatsoever…

Now to the tattoos. “F” is supposed to be, either a predicate or a property. On the right tattoo (wrist) the right, closing parentheses is just out of view.

One of the tattoos says something nearly all philosophers agree is true (a rarity!) while the other is held to be false by many. Here’s your homework, dear reader:Read More »A Tale of Two Tattoos (Dale)