At the blog The Time Has Been Shortened, interviews with Dr. Nathan MacDonald and Dr. Michael S. Heiser. I read most of MacDonald’s Deuteronomy and the Meaning of ‘Monotheism’. I found it helpful, but had some fundamental disagreements with it. Those another time. The two have very different views of the OT and the issue of monotheism. To oversimplfy, MacDonald thinks that for a long… Read More »two scholars on the concept of monotheism
Stephen Prothero, of Boston University, is the rare professor who is to a household name and face. He’s been on all sorts of media, and is an able spokesman for the cause of religious literacy. Preach it! His latest book, God is Not One, is possibly the best introduction to a variety of religious traditions for the general reader. It’s well-written, informative, humorous, apt at… Read More »Prothero on Christianity, Jesus, and the Trinity
The poll below is an interesting one. (The bogus one to the left is only fun, but not interesting.) As I write this post, it is still current, and is available for voting at the upper right of the main blog page. Which of these is false? The Christian God is a self. The Christian God is the Trinity. The Trinity is not a self.… Read More »Comment on a Poll – an inconsistent triad
“Classic” (i.e. mainstream catholic, Platonic) Christian theism holds that God is timeless, and so incapable of any change whatever.
And they add: the Word is God, and the Word became flesh.
Sounds like a change, doesn’t it? First, the Word is simply divine, and a moment later, he’s entered into a “hypostatic union” with a “complete human nature.”
Reformed philosophical theologian James Anderson takes a crack at this one. (HT: Triablogue.) I much like his set-up. I’m less keen on the solution. Short answer: it’s a mystery (apparent contradiction). You’ll have to read his post to see why I chose this pic.
A few quick comments: first, I’m with Read More »Linkage: Did God the Son change in becoming incarnate?
In his comment on my previous post, Brandon points out that he doesn’t assert the case described there to be a counterexample. Rather, he was wondering why it isn’t a counterexample; he was probing to see my response.
Fair enough. I’ve left the title of the post as is just for continuity with part 1.
The case Brandon described, was an omniscient God, who is both subject and object of knowledge of himself. God as knower is subject of knowledge but not object. But God as object is what is known, and not the subject of knowledge. So, don’t we here have something which is and isn’t intrinsically some way (being self-knowing) at a time? If so, the principle is false.
My response is that there Read More »On an alleged counterexample to Leibniz’s Law – Part 2 (Dale)
In a recent post I put forward my own preferred version of “Leibniz’s Law,” or more accurately, the Indiscernibility of Identicals. It’s a bit complicated, so as to get around what are some apparent counterexamples to the simpler principle which is commonly held.
Aside for non-philosophers: philosophers are usually after universal principles, truths which hold in all cases, rather than mere non-universal generalizations, i.e. rough rules of thumb which have exceptions. (An example of the latter: Boys love trucks.) Thus, when a philosophers makes a (universal) claim, other philosophers come along and try to show that it is false with “counterexamples” – real, or even merely possible, examples which show the principle to be false (as it doesn’t apply to them). For example, if someone says that all Texans love tacos, a counterexample to this would be a person who is from Texas and doesn’t like them. Just one counterexample is enough to show a universal claim to be false. When provided with a counterexample, of course, one will often refine, as it were, the original claim (e.g. All native Texans love tacos, or All Texans who appreciate Tex-Mex food love tacos) and the game goes on. This is all in the interest of discovering together what is true and what is false. (In my example, of course, those “refinements” would admit of easy counterexamples too.)
So my principle said, to paraphrase, that for any x and y, x just is (=) y, only if they don’t ever intrinsically differ. (I put this in terms of one having a “mode” at a time if and only if the other also has that mode at that time. Others would call these “intrinsic properties.”)
Here our friend, philosopher and blogger Brandon offered a counterexample, Read More »On an alleged counterexample to Leibniz’s Law – Part 1
Could a god have been a baby? It depends on what it takes to be a real god… Hindus who believe in avatars, and catholic Christians say: yes, this is possible, for it has been actual. In Hinduism, this is particularly emphasized in Vaishnavite traditions, in Christianity, Roman Catholicism. They of course differ about which god this was. For other Christians, the answer is no. In… Read More »God the baby – Rama / Ram, avatar of Vishnu – Reloaded
One answer: the Messiah. Another answer: here. (HT: kingdomready.) Evidently, Fred Sanders isn’t the only theological cartoonist out there. But I do prefer his cuddly lecturing bear Dr. Doctrine. Commenters: please link your best God, Trinity, or Jesus related cartoons. Only requirements: that they be at least mildy amusing, and not too offensive. Re: “Herman & Nudix“. True story: in Christian college c. 1990, some yahoo… Read More »Who do you say I am?
Last Christmas season I posted in a slightly Grinch-like way about catholic Incarnation theories, and about some Christians’ lack of critical thinking about them.
There’s an interesting human impulse observable here. The best analogy I can think of right now is posters like the one to the left. The ladies love them.
Why? There’s the sex appeal of the dude. And the cute baby. Everyone likes a cute baby.
But there’s something else, something affecting about a big, strong, tough manly man, stooping to gently cradle a teeny, vulnerable baby. He’s made himself so vulnerable. Of course, that adds to the “sexy” part. My point is, the affecting nature of the man’s condescension is a distinct element of the appeal.
Now imagine that God, big strong God, becomes an ignorant, weak, dependent little baby. There’s a similar, recognizable emotional tug there. What an amazing idea! Of course, it may be amazing in part because it’s contradictory. But I’ll not argue that here.
Instead, a bit of cross-cultural comparison. Christians aren’t the only ones who go in for the idea of a god who comes down from his mighty position, to be a cute, puny little baby.
The Ramayana is an epic poem, and a sort of scripture in Hinduism. Parts of it go back perhaps to the 400s BCE, though it comes in many versions, some of which are from the high middle ages. The clip below is from a wildly popular Indian television series from 1986 called Ramayan. If you’re interested in Hinduism, I recommend it, but it’s a real time commitment to watch the whole thing. I’ve edited some bits of it, to include the more theological parts, and to get it down to youtube length. It’s here, Ram or Rama, is supposed to be an avatar of the god Vishnu.
My point is notRead More »God the baby – Rama / Ram, avatar of Vishnu
In discussing the Trinity or Incarnation, I often have an exchange which goes like this:
- someone: Jesus is God.
- me: You mean, Jesus is God himself?
- someone: Yeah.
- me: Don’t you think something is true of Jesus, that isn’t true of God, and vice-versa?
- someone: Yes. e.g. God sent his Son. Jesus didn’t. God is a Trinity. Jesus is not a Trinity.
- me: Right. Then in your view, Jesus is not God.
- someone: But he is.
- me: So, you think he is, and he ain’t?!
- someone: [silent puzzlement]
In this post, I want to explain the part in italics. First: a point of clarification. The second and third lines are important. When many say “Jesus is God” they just mean that in some sense or other Jesus is “divine.” (This could mean a lot of things, depending on one’s assumed metaphysics.) But this sort of person (line 3) understands Jesus to be “divine” in the sense of just being one and the same as God – that Jesus is God himself – one person, so just one (period).
In the italicized line, I’m applying something called Leibniz’s Law, or the Indiscernibility of Identicals. I sometimes put this roughly as, some x and some y can be numerically identical only if whatever is true of one is true of the other. That’s a sloppy way to put it.
In logic, a more precise way of stating it (used e.g. by Richard Cartwright) is:
(x)(y)(z) ( x= y only if (z is a property of x if and only if z is a property of y))
Literally: for any three things whatever, the first is identical to the second only if the third is a property of the first just in case the third is a property of the second.
The basic intuition is that things are as they are, and not some other way. So if x just is (is numerically the same as) y, then it can’t be that x and y qualitatively differ. This seems undeniable.
There are a few problems, though, with the above formula, which any person trained in philosophy may spot. Read More »A formulation of Leibniz’s Law / the Indiscernibility of Identicals
Some good recent work on the concept of identity.
Partly compiled by David Waltz with some apt comments at Articuli Fidei. Another sort of review, quoting the above, with some comments. Latest entry here, with my comment. Can’t keep up with all the posts. A “tale”? Man, I was hoping for a better story. 🙂 Am I foolish for responding? Quite possibly. I hope not. I care passionately about these issues and have infinite… Read More »Obsession
The Clarke-Waterland duel went on for many, many pages in several books, getting increasingly snippy.
Last time I said that I thought Waterland was a social-mysterian-trinitarian. But I’m not so sure about the “social” part! He’s very unclear on whether the “Persons” are selves. They’re different somethings, in any case. But in this series, I’m sticking to an exegetical issue.
Here are excerpts of Waterland’s second salvo about the “only God” texts.
[Clarke] had produced John 17:3, 1 Cor. 8:6, Eph. 4:6, which prove that the Father is styled, sometimes, the one God, or only true God; and that he is the God of the Jews, of Abraham, etc. I asked how those texts proved that the Son was not? You say… “very plainly… Can the Son of the God of Abraham (Acts 3:13) be himself that God of Abraham, who glorified his Son?” But why must you here talk of that God, as if it were in opposition to this God, supposing two Gods; that is, supposing the thing is question. …I tell you that this divine Person is not that divine Person, and yet both are one God… (A Second Vindication of Christ’s Divinity in Waterland’s Vindications of Christ’s Divinity, 422-3, original italics, bold added, punctuation slightly modernized)
This is wheel-spinning. Clarke does, and Waterland does not take the passages in question to identity (assert to be numerically identical) the Father and Yahweh.
Clarke had asked whether Waterland thought that the term “Father” in these texts actually includes, i.e. refers to, the Son as well. Waterland clarifies,Read More »DANIEL WATERLAND ON “THE FATHER IS THE ONLY GOD” TEXTS – PART 2
Daniel Waterland (1683-1740) was by all accounts the most important disputant of Samuel Clarke about the Trinity.
Waterland spent his career at Cambridge, where he rose through the ranks, eventually becoming Vice-Chancellor, and also serving as a Chaplain to the King, and as an Anglican clergyman in a number of cities.
He had a good reputation, and was an energetic, but normally cool-headed controversial/polemical writer (aganist Clarke, and other other theological topics, against other respected men), and he gained somewhat of a reputation in Anglican circles as a defender of catholic orthodoxy.
Many, including himself, contemplating his becoming a bishop, but in 1740 he died after complications, seemingly, from surgeries on an ingrown toenail in one of his big toes! He was survived by his wife of 21 years. (His only children were his books.)
I’d describe Waterland’s views on the Trinity as social, with a liberal dose of negative mysterianism. Like Clarke, he insists that his is the ancient catholic view, and much of the dispute concerns pre-Nicene fathers. Like Clarke, he wants to stick to those fathers and to the Bible, and takes a dim view of medieval theology.
About the pre-Nicene catholic “fathers,” I’d say both Clarke and Waterland somewhat bend the material to their own ends (I mean, they tend to see those authors as supporting their view, and being perhaps more uniform than they were), but I think Waterland bends the materials more. In his view, catholics had always believed the Three to be “consubstantial” in a generic sense, yet which, somehow, together with their differences of origin, makes them but one god. Like Swinburne and Clarke, he agrees that the Father is uniquely the “font of divinity.” He continually hammers Clarke with the claim that there’s no middle ground between the one Creator and all creatures.
In this series, I’ll examine the way he deals with some favorite unitarian proof-texts, which, unitarians think plainly assert the numerical identity of the Father with the one true God, Yahweh. According to Waterland, these unitarians are making a mistake like the one I made.
You [i.e. Clarke] next cite John 17:3, 1 Cor. 8:6, Eph. 4:6, to prove, that the Father is sometimes styled the only true God; which is all that they prove. Read More »Daniel Waterland on “The Father is the only God” texts – Part 1
“Melissa, you’re my only true love,” whispered the mother. I was just within earshot, pretending to read. The girl leaned into her mother, received a kiss on her forehead, and then went back the children’s section of the library. The mother returned to her book. She was a beautiful woman, with a kind face. How sad, I thought, that all she has is her daughter.… Read More »Her only true love
This time, the second and final part of our tale. (Part 1.) It features staggering scientific breakthroughs and moderate fool-pitying, so it should be suitable for all audiences. Bill went on to serve for several decades at the Central Police Station, and often enjoyed regaling guests or fellow employees with tales of the two most confused polygamists he’d run across. “Probably too much of the… Read More »Counting Wives – a tale of three polygamists – Part 2
Here’s a bit of fresh fiction, possibly part of a future paper or book some day. Of course, there is purpose behind the madness. (See 2.2.2 here.) It is dedicated to philosopher Bill Hasker. Enjoy. It was a quiet day at the Salt Lake City Central Police Station. Bill looked at the clock and fiddled with his pen. Two hours till quitting time, and he’d… Read More »Counting Wives – a tale of three polygamists – Part 1
Carl Mosser teaches theology at Eastern University in Pennsylvania. I recently read, and profited much from his “Classifying Mormon Theism.“ Check it out. It’s part of a book dedicated to the work of the unique Mormon philosopher of religion David Paulsen. Mosser’s paper is of interest for several reasons: First, is Mormonism a sort of polytheism, monotheism, or what? You’ll have to read the paper… Read More »Classifying Mormon Theism – a paper by Carl Mosser
Yet another round from Steve Hays. This is my last entry in the discussion; I may or may not comment, but no more posts. Again, this is what I hear from him: Yes, the divine nature is a universal, shared by the Three. But let’s not make any Platonic assumptions about forms/universals being in some other realm than what has them, or being more fundamental.… Read More »What is the Trinity? A Dialogue with Steve Hays – Part 3
Last time, what I thought I heard from Steve was this (this is my summary):
In sum, the one God is a perfect being, a perfect self, who is the Trinity. He has within himself three parts – the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. Each of these parts fully has the (universal) divine nature, and so, each of the essential divine attributes. Each is a divine self. And these three parts are indistinguishable from one another, or nearly so, though they be numerically distinct.
Steve has now responded twice, here and here. These contain a lot of extraneous material, which I’ll pass by. My question is, what did I get wrong above? Here’s what I hear (bulleted):
Right – “nearly so.”
Because he says this nature is shared, I’m going to infer that it is a universal – something capable of being had by multiple subjects.
Steve, it’s not because you think God has multiple attributes. (Yes, I too reject the classical doctrine of simplicity, though I don’t think God has parts.) Rather, I’m trying to figure out what the relation is, in your view, between God/The Trinity and those three Persons. If it isn’t whole-parts, help me out!
Sure you do Read More »What is the Trinity? A Dialogue with Steve Hays – Part 2