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Dealing with Apparent Contradictions: Part 4 – Restraint and Implicit Faith

One way to deal with an apparently contradictory doctrine in your religion is the response of Restraint. There’s a connection here, with the medieval Catholic doctrine of “implicit faith”, so I thought I’d explore it a little, and in my next post, I’ll apply this to the issue of Restraint in the face of an apparent contradiction. I welcome any Catholic friends out there to… Read More »Dealing with Apparent Contradictions: Part 4 – Restraint and Implicit Faith

Swinburne on analytic vs. continental philosophy

Here’s a gem of a passage from a little-read paper by Richard Swinburne, from this book. This is part of talk he gave at a 2001 conference in Moscow, Russia, co-sponsored by the Society of Christian Philosophers and the Russian Orthodox church. So he’s explaining the wider context of analytic philosophy to them. Sometimes, when we have to explain things to those outside the camp,… Read More »Swinburne on analytic vs. continental philosophy

Dealing with Apparent Contradictions: Part 13 – Mysterian Resistance


Roll up, folks.

We now move one the fourth R – what I call Mysterian Resistance (or Mysterianism). The Resistor is resisting the pressure to resolve the apparent contradiction, i.e. changing one of the apparently contradictory beliefs. Unlike the Redirector, the Resister doesn’t ignore the apparent inconsistency. And unlike the Resolver, he doesn’t think there’s a reasonable way to make the apparent contradiction go away. So the Resistor resists – he makes his stand – he comes up with a rationale for keeping his apparently contradictory beliefs.Read More »Dealing with Apparent Contradictions: Part 13 – Mysterian Resistance

Don’t think/write like a contemporary theologian – Part 1 – “grounded” blabber

This is the start of a series where I give some unsolicited advice based on things that make me want to throw the book across the room when I’m reading recent theologians. I’ll avoid naming names, but will sometimes use actual quotes. I offer it in love, though I admit I’m pretty cranky about it all. If you’re a philosopher or theologian, these are a series of “don’ts” – things to avoid. If you are a reader of theology or philosophical theology, these are some things to watch out for. If you detect a high density of them in what you’re reading, you may well be wasting your time in that book.

Memo my theologian friends: please, stop saying “grounded”.

Examples:

  • The doctrine of the Trinity is thoroughly grounded in the Bible.
  • The unity of the persons is grounded in their perichoresis.
  • All of systematic theology is grounded in the doctrine of the Trinity.
  • The threeness of God is grounded in salvation history.

Why? Because you are faking it when you say things like thisRead More »Don’t think/write like a contemporary theologian – Part 1 – “grounded” blabber

How not to do theology, Or: the theological Vogon (Dale)

newvogon.jpg

Poetry, anyone?

Karen Armstrong is a famous ex-nun who has written, among other things, a puffing biography of the prophet Muhammad. She frequently appears on TV confidently gassing about various religious matters. But I was really taken a back by this, which I ran across in a podcast:

Ms. Armstrong: Well, you see, I think theology is poetry. That’s what my Jewish friend, Chaim Maccabee, told me all those years ago when he quoted Hillel’s golden rule to me and said, “You know, it doesn’t matter what you believe. Theology is poetry.”Read More »How not to do theology, Or: the theological Vogon (Dale)

Are all religions the same?

I have been working through Alvin Plantinga’s excellent (but frustrating) book Warranted Christian Belief, and I am particularly intrigued by his critique of the work of theologian John Hick. Hick began his spiritual odyssey as a traditional, orthodox Christian, accepting what I have been calling ‘Christian belief’. He was then struck by the fact that there are other religions in which the claims of orthodox Christianity—trinity,… Read More »Are all religions the same?

Guest Post: Jedwab on “Trinity Monotheism”

I’m very pleased to introduce Joseph Jedwab, who has some interesting comments on Moreland’s and Craig’s understanding of the Trinity. I haven’t had the privilege of meeting him, but given how he spells “center”, I gather he’s English. 🙂 Joseph is currently teaching philosophy and finishing his dissertation at Oriel College of Oxford University, on the metaphysics of the Trinity and the Incarnation. And he’s working under the supervision of one of the greatest living philosophers of religion, Richard Swinburne. Hiring committees take note – he goes on the job market next year! – Dale

I agree this is a clear account. I’m a bit worried about how the discussion might influence terminology. Moreland and Craig describe their view as Social Trinitarian and contrast this with an Anti-Social Trinitarian view. This is a mistake. Leftow’s title indicates his paper is against Social Trinitarianism (ST). It’s not supposed to be the name of a Trinitarian view. As you know, the name of the view Leftow defends is ‘Latin Trinitarianism’ (LT). Further, they say that the main commitment of ST is that there are three centres of consciousness, but it’s not clear what a centre is.Read More »Guest Post: Jedwab on “Trinity Monotheism”

Derivation vs. Generic Theories – part 5: The Generic View (JT)

“Gee Hank, it sure is swell that communism won out.
This house belongs to all of us!”

In the last post, I pointed out some of the problems faced by an Athanasian sort of derivation view. If you found such problems to be decisive, then alternatively you could opt for a generic view. In this post, I would like to introduce the generic view.

As I mentioned in the first post, the generic view claims that Divinity belongs equally to the three persons, similar to how three people might jointly own the same house. Divinity thus belongs to no one divine person any more than another. The generic view (let’s call this GV) rejects DV in favor of this:

(GV) Divinity belongs equally to each divine person.

For both the derivation and the generic views of the trinity, Divinity is an entity that’s shared by the persons. On (the Athanasian version of) the derivation view, this shared entity just is the Father, but on the generic view, this shared entity is not the Father. The Father isn’t shared, Divinity is.

Read More »Derivation vs. Generic Theories – part 5: The Generic View (JT)

Derivation vs. Generic Theories – part 4: Problems for a Derivation View (JT)

Q stunned

“You were filming that?”

In the last post, I explained that for Athanasius’s version of the derivation view, when the Father generates the Son, the Father shares his substance with the Son. That means, I took it, that the Father himself becomes a constituent in the Son, similar to the way that a lump of bronze is a constituent in a bronze statue.

One of the things Athanasius wants to do with this idea is explain how the Son is divine/God. The basic idea is that the Father shares his substance, i.e., Divinity, with the Son, and so the Father shares his properties with the Son. That is, to put it the other way around, the Son inherits properties from the Father. This is supposed to account for how the Son gets divine properties. However, this is where we start to run into problems.

Read More »Derivation vs. Generic Theories – part 4: Problems for a Derivation View (JT)

Ignored Analytic Theology

Over at Aporetic Christianity Paul has had a worthy post on a major new tome of systematic theology, which he says whiffs it on the contributions of analytic philosophers of the last 40 years or so. I agree with all the examples Paul gives of philosophers / analytic theologians whose work should not be ignored by any serious investigator – not because they’re my peeps –… Read More »Ignored Analytic Theology

Dealing with Apparent Contradictions: Part 9 – Rational Reinterpretation, cont.


Yes, this is the real thing. Really.
And it can be yours for a mere $50.

Last time we highlighted one problem with Resolution through Rational Reinterpretation – often, only a metaphysician could love the new-fangled (but precise and seemingly consistent) version of the Doctrine in question. A second concern is that many believers think this “new version of” the Doctrine just ain’t that doctrine at all, but a knock-off – something similar, but different, and moreover, not genuine.

Consider these pronouncements of the First Vatican Council of 1869-70:

…that meaning of the sacred dogmas is ever to be maintained which has once been declared by holy mother church, and there must never be any abandonment of this sense under the pretext or in the name of a more profound understanding.Read More »Dealing with Apparent Contradictions: Part 9 – Rational Reinterpretation, cont.