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Pruss on Latin Trinitarian Perfect Being Theology

Alex @ Alexander Pruss’s Blog urges that even non-social trinitarians can make a priori arguments for their trinitarian theology based on the concept of perfection. I don’t think these sorts of arguments work, as I explain in a comment there, but check it out – Alex is always worth a read, and maybe I’m all wet.

Derivation vs. Generic Theories – part 4: Problems for a Derivation View (JT)

Q stunned

“You were filming that?”

In the last post, I explained that for Athanasius’s version of the derivation view, when the Father generates the Son, the Father shares his substance with the Son. That means, I took it, that the Father himself becomes a constituent in the Son, similar to the way that a lump of bronze is a constituent in a bronze statue.

One of the things Athanasius wants to do with this idea is explain how the Son is divine/God. The basic idea is that the Father shares his substance, i.e., Divinity, with the Son, and so the Father shares his properties with the Son. That is, to put it the other way around, the Son inherits properties from the Father. This is supposed to account for how the Son gets divine properties. However, this is where we start to run into problems.

Read More »Derivation vs. Generic Theories – part 4: Problems for a Derivation View (JT)

conjoined twins

The Cerberus analogy revisited

Remember Moreland’s and Craig’s Cerberus analogy for the Trinity? (background here, whole series here) Daniel Howard-Snyder objected: come on, that’s clearly three dogs with overlapping bodies, not one dog with three centers of consciousness or with three minds. And they don’t want to say that the Trinity is three overlapping gods, so ditch the analogy already. The discussion degenerated into pointing at pictures and saying… Read More »The Cerberus analogy revisited

Derivation vs. Generic Theories — part 3: The Derivation View (JT)

Stark Trek - Q

Now Q comes with spring arm action
and dyno bud (optional)!

The Nicene Creed claims that

(Q) The Son is begotten from the substance of the Father.

The term ‘begotten’ is just an older English term for ‘generated’. In the ancient world, ‘generation’ was a technical term for biological reproduction (e.g., when humans make baby humans, when trees make baby trees, and so on). In this post, I want to describe how Athanasius takes Q to imply a derivation view of the trinity.

Read More »Derivation vs. Generic Theories — part 3: The Derivation View (JT)

Derivation vs. Generic Theories — part 2: Arianism and the Trinity (JT)

Arius

“I hate wearing this stupid hat.
They didn’t make me a bishop anyways.
At least the cape’s pretty cool.
It’s got St. George’s Cross going on.”

In my last post, I gave some basic definitions for the ‘derivation view’ and the ‘generic view’ of the Trinity, and I said that the historical background for the ‘derivation view’ rests in the Nicene Creed’s claim that

(Q) The Son is begotten from the substance of the Father.

Of course, the meaning of ‘from the substance of the Father’ is not exactly clear, not in a philosophical sense anyways. What exactly is Q supposed to mean? In this post, I want to explain what one interpreter, namely Athanasius, felt was at stake with Q.

Read More »Derivation vs. Generic Theories — part 2: Arianism and the Trinity (JT)

Derivation vs. Generic Theories — part 1 (JT)

 

Branching Tree

— “Daddy, why do trees branch out?”
— “So you can climb in them, Jimmy.”

Patristic scholars tell us that the doctrine of the trinity was really developed in the 4th century. The question is: what exactly is the ‘development’? If you read many of those scholarly big books on patristic theology, you’ll occasionally come across the idea that there were two major theories of the trinity floating around in the 4th century: the ‘derivation view’ and the ‘generic view’. But what exactly are these two views, and who held them?Read More »Derivation vs. Generic Theories — part 1 (JT)

The Importance of Nicea

Not sure what it’s doing on LiveScience.com, but it’s a decent article. We covered this in more theological detail some time back. Update: and there is now an episode of the trinities podcast devoted to the theological significance of the Council of Nicea in 325.

Pruss on essentially loving beings

I Can’t Stop Loving You – actually, it’s worse than that – I can’t not love you!

Alexander Pruss is an excellent philosophy of religion dude at Baylor. His second PhD dissertation was on possible worlds. Don’t ask me to explain what his first one was on! 🙂 He’s got about a million original ideas on almost as many topics, a lot of which get posted at his creatively-titled blog, Alexander Pruss’s Blog 🙂 as well as at The Prosblogion.

He recently weighed in (comments #8-9) on my attempted argument against social trinitarian arguments. Here are the most relevant bits:Read More »Pruss on essentially loving beings

Linkage: Impossible World Site and Blog (Dale)

Check it out: a whole site and blog devoted to art featuring impossible objects! I can’t help but think that the picture above had a trinitarian inspiration: according to the babelfish, it means “You must in such a way live”. (German speaking readers – feel free to correct the translation.) I read this as addressed to the Trinity. If so, this pic would be an… Read More »Linkage: Impossible World Site and Blog (Dale)

modal shootout on the greatest possible being – Part 2


Mike, reloaded – before the smoke has even cleared.

More from Mike Almeida about a premise in an anti-social-trinitarian-argument argument I’ve been exploring. Also, (sorry Mike – actually, sorry everyone) I continue my cheesy cowboy theme. (But as a native Texan, it’s my sacred right, Pardn’r. 🙂 )

Here’s a summary in (attempted) ordinary English of his thoughtful post on infinitely increasing properties @ his PhilRel Blog, followed by my response, which I posted to his comments section.

  • My premise he’s commenting on: 6. If some great-making properties are infinitely increasable, then the concept of a Greatest Possible Being is the concept of an impossible being. (compare: highest possible integer)
  • But what in tarnation, he asks, is an “infinitely increasable property”?Read More »modal shootout on the greatest possible being – Part 2

modal shootout on greatest possible beings – Part 1 (Dale)


“Don’t mess with Texan metaphysicans, pardner.”

In a recent series of posts (uno, dos, tres, quatro, cinco), I’ve been chewing on some philosophical arguments that “social” trinitarians have used for their doctrine. Been finding more gristle than meat.

In my latest installment, I was privileged to get some penetrating critical feedback from fellow philosophy of religion bloggers located in my home state of Texas – Alexander Pruss of Baylor and Mike Almeida of UT San Antonio (here, comments #2, 7-9) These guys are extremely sharp and are doing a lot of creative work in the field, by the way. About perfect beings – I’ve come to find out that Mike has thought a lot about this!

This post is my attempt to process Mike’s feedbackRead More »modal shootout on greatest possible beings – Part 1 (Dale)

Allah = God?

An interesting discussion, with some links, by philosopher Parableman Jeremy Pierce: Muslims Worshiping God But Not Worshiping God. His view, as against some recent pastors and other folks, is that yes, Muslims do refer to the being that Christians acknowledge as the one true God, when they use the word “Allah”. [Saith Jeremy]…it seems completely ludicrous to me to claim that this being that is… Read More »Allah = God?

perfection, the Trinity, and impossible beings (Dale)


“This clears it all up, right?”
Anselm: “Um, no. I must bestow upon it the analytic frown of uncomprehension.”
(image credit)

I used to think I had a great objection to Anselm’s famous ontological argument. (Bear with me – this has something to do with social trinitarianism.) The argument, at least many forms of it, basically goes like this. If it is logically possible that there’s a Greatest Possible Being (i.e. a being such that there’s no logical possibility of there being a greater one), then it is necessary that there’s a Greatest Possible Being. More simply: if it’s possible (non-contradictory) that God exists, then it’s also necessary that God exists (i.e. it is inconsistent to suppose God not existing). (For more, see here and here. For more than you’d ever want to know, here.)

Many critics have replied like this:

I’d be a sucker to grant your premise. Why should I think that the notion of a Greatest Possible Being is the notion of a possible thing at all? Read More »perfection, the Trinity, and impossible beings (Dale)

Trinity Schminity – the music video

He’s baaaaack. A smokier, bluesier, dirtier “Trinity Schminity”. Now in basement music video form! Apparently there’s been some big shakeup in the band. Their website says “we are now a Christian father and son band”. Mother and daughter, we hardly knew ye. 🙁 Thankfully, they’re still “100% monotheist”. And they still ROCK. Get it? Winter has made himself a phony Trinity. “Bobo” and “Hayseed” are… Read More »Trinity Schminity – the music video

on interpersonal love and stick figures (Dale)


Four vivid, moving, memorable depictions of Love.

A post on some previous post commentary – no one can navel-gaze like a philosopher! 🙂 Here’s a pictorial recap, and some additional thoughts on the comments here, in response to Scott and JT. The point of all this: we’re exploring why people who call themselves “social trinitarians” don’t like what they call “Latin” theories, and specifically the claim that those “Latin” theories can’t do justice to the loving relationships between the persons of the Trinity.Read More »on interpersonal love and stick figures (Dale)

Reflections on the Impossibility of a truly lonely Christian God (Dale)


Not possible. But why? (image credit)

Here are some rough-draft thoughts on another line of thinking associated with social trinitarian theories.

God is perfect. Arguably, an absolutely perfect being could not fail to be “well off” – in classical terminology, a perfect being must be happy, must be in a “blessed” condition. Part of perfection is independence. One kind of independence is the kind which comes up when discussing ontological or cosmological arguments for God’s existence – the idea of aseity, or existing but not because of anything else. But here’s another kind of independence or self-sufficiency: not requiring any thing (i.e. any fact not entailed by your existence) to be well off, to have a good life. Perhaps we could call it the divine property of security, or independent or self-sufficient happiness.

Is God as well off as he could possibly be? Arguably not,Read More »Reflections on the Impossibility of a truly lonely Christian God (Dale)

Are persons essentially relational?

Dallas Willard is one of my favorite authors, and I don’t normally go in for criticizing what he writes. But I found a great example in this (good) book (p. 122) of an idea that is fairly widespread, and which underlies a lot of social trinitarian speculation. This brief passage got me to thinking. He says, …God is love and sustains love for us from… Read More »Are persons essentially relational?

Linkage: Pruss on liberal theology (Dale)

You tell ’em, Joe. An interesting post & discussion: Alexander Pruss’s Blog: Liberal theology I think a lot of liberal theologians don’t have a “high view of reason” – many (not all) of them strike me as lazy drifters on miscellaneous intellectual currents. e.g. Has anyone’s reason really revealed to them, so to speak, that miracles don’t happen, or even that it’s irrational to believe… Read More »Linkage: Pruss on liberal theology (Dale)

Brentano and the Trinity, Part 1 (Joseph)

Franz Brentano

What a great beard!

Franz Brentano (1838-1917), a forerunner of the phenomenological movement and the analytic movement, was of great influence on folk such as Edmund Husserl, Alexius Meinong, Anton Marty, Carl Stumpf, and Kasimir Twardowski. He is best known for his work Psychology From an Empirical Standpoint (1874). And in that work he is best known for his view that the mark of the mental is intentionality:

Every mental phenomenon is characterized by what the Scholastics of the Middle Ages called the intentional (or mental) inexistence of an object, and what we might call, though not wholly unambiguously, reference to a content, direction toward an object (which is not to be understood here as meaning a thing), or immanent objectivity. Every mental phenomenon includes something as object within itself… (Brentano, Psychology, 88)Read More »Brentano and the Trinity, Part 1 (Joseph)

Reader Question About Modalism


Ice, ice, baby. (image credit)

A reader emailed me this question, and I thought others would be interested in my (attempt at) an answer. Also, this is a good chance to review and summarize some of my previous postings on modalism.

I was wondering if you could read [the following] and tell me what I was believing? (I think it might have been a form of Modalism) Also, I search everywhere and find that Modalism is wrong, but no explanations specifically why. Can you help me out on some links explaining that?

I used to believe there was one God. He sometimes is called Father, sometimes called Jesus, and sometimes called the Holy Spirit. And sometimes called all at the same time. Read More »Reader Question About Modalism