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the fate of “social” trinitarianism in late 17th c. England (Dale)

sherlockAs pretty well summarized here by unitarian Theophilus Lindsey.

In the year 1694 began the great contest concerning the Trinity, betwixt two celebrated doctors of the church, Sherlock and South; each of them reputed and reputing himself orthodox, and each of them espoused by learned and powerful partisans.

Dr. Sherlock expressly asserted, that the three persons in the Trinity are three distinct, infinite Minds or Spirits, and three individual Substances. Dr. South held only one infinite eternal Mind or Spirit, with three Somethings that were not three distinct Minds of Substances, but three modes, faculties, attributes, relations, relative properties, subsistances, as there were variously denominated. Dr. Sherlock was accused, and with great justice, if words have any meaning, of polytheism, or holding three Gods. Dr. South, on the other hand, came under the imputation of explaining away the Trinity, and falling into the Sabellian or Unitarian system: and accordingly some of the Socinians took advantage of the Doctor’s explication of the doctrine of the church, and declared in their writings, that the should not be backward to give their approbation to the Liturgy and the Articles, if that was the kind of Trinity which the language therein used was intended to inculcated.

The university of Oxford, to whom Sherlock was obnoxious on account of his political principles, declared forRead More »the fate of “social” trinitarianism in late 17th c. England (Dale)

Richard of St. Victor’s De Trinitate, Ch. 25 (Dale)

At long last, we’ve reached the 25th and last chapter of book three of Richard of St. Victor’s De Trinitate! (Here are the other Richard-related posts here @ trinities.)

Richard starts off with the point that for the Persons of the Trinity, unlike the case of any other persons, there is “individuality without plurality” – each is what it is without any plurality of any kind – and “unity without inequality” – I’m not sure what he means by this second phrase. (p. 396)

In contrast, any other person, such as you or me, can be “unequal to himself”, in that we can become greater or lesser over time. (e.g. I’m smarter and morally better now than when I was 14.) And persons like us have multiple properties (we’re not simple). (p. 396) And of a human person, say Barak Obama, we can say that “his power alone is dissimilar to itself… [since] one thing is easy for him, another is difficult and a third is impossible.” (p. 397)

Then he says, “one and the same nature… in one respect is less, in another it is greater, and [so is]… dissimilar and unequal to itself.” (p. 397) So, the same point he made about persons, can also be made about natures. Thus,Read More »Richard of St. Victor’s De Trinitate, Ch. 25 (Dale)

Richard of St. Victor’s De Trinitate, Ch. 24 (Dale)

In chapter 24, Richard says that

Certainly one and the same substance is not something greater or lesser, better or worse than itself. Therefore, [there are no inequalities among members of the Trinity] since one and the same substance is certainly in each. …for this reason any two persons [in the Trinity] will not be something greater or better than any one person alone; nor will all three taken together be more [great?] than any two or any one alone by himself… (p. 396)

I take it that in the first sentence here that by “substance” he’s referring to the divine nature, saying that it can’t be greater than itself. That’s hard to argue with. He then argues that no person can be greater than any other. There’s an assumption here that greatness is solely a function of a thing’s nature. I’m not sure why we should accept that. Why not other intrinsic properties as well? One might think, e.g. it is greater to be the Father than it is to be the Son, hence even though they share the divine nature, one might think that the Father is greater than the Son. The inference from X and Y have the same substance to X and Y are the same in greatness, seems invalid. But if we make a valid argument, by adding the premise that greatness is a function solely of essence, we have valid argument, but then, Read More »Richard of St. Victor’s De Trinitate, Ch. 24 (Dale)

Richard of St. Victor’s De Trinitate, Ch. 21 (Dale)

In the preceding chapters, Richard has been arguing for the impossibility of only one divine person. If there’s one, there must be more than one; more than that, there must be at least three.

To do this, he’s used Anselmian perfect being theology – arguing that since God is absolutely perfect, and it would add to his perfection to have certain features, he must indeed have those. It seems that he prefers a three parallel arguments, from perfect goodness, perfect happiness, and perfect glory. (See, e.g. chapter 5.)

As the book goes on, though, it seems to me that he prefers the argument from happiness. Here, in chapter 21, he sums up his case, because he feels some pressure here at the end of the book  to explain why all this should be considered monotheism, and not polytheism. More on that next time. Here’s what looks like his summary of his argument:

The fullness of supreme happiness requires fullness of supreme pleasure. The fullness of supreme pleasure requires fullness of supreme charity. The fullness of supreme charity demands fullness of supreme perfection. (p. 393)

This last part isn’t easy to see, but as we’ve been over it, I let it go here. In chapter 21, Richard assumes that perfect being reasoning should be applied to each member of the Trinity. If we do this,  then we prove the existence of equally perfect beings, such that “all coincide in supreme equality. In all of them there will be equal wisdom, equal power, undifferentiated glory, uniform goodness, and eternal happiness…” (pp. 393-4, emphasis added)

This, he asserts, meets the requirement of the “Athanasian” creed,Read More »Richard of St. Victor’s De Trinitate, Ch. 21 (Dale)

three loves graphic

Richard of St. Victor’s De Trinitate, Ch. 20 (Dale)

three loves graphicAs Joseph explained in his last post, in his On the Trinity, Richard of St. Victor asserts the superiority of “shared love” (Latin: condilectus). He holds that it is superior to other loves in value and in the pleasure it involves. He’s imagining something like my chart on the left.

Look at the bottom case, and how the love arrows combine; this seems to be what Richard is imagining (see the quote in the last post). I don’t think it’s coherent, really – affections, or individual love-acts can’t literally fuse. Nor do I understand any non-literal way they can be said to “fuse”.

Still, I’m inclined to agree with Joseph and with Richard Swinburne that there is a unique value in lovers cooperating to love a third party. This is something we recognize, I think, in Mom and Dad’s love for junior, or even in “best friends” graciously including an excluded girl within their circle.

Further, I think Richard of St. Victor is right that there is a relational harmony and cooperation in such cases, and a unique sort of pleasure all around.

Whether this value would provide a perfect person with a compelling reason to create mysteriously originate at least two other divine persons is a further matter.

In chapter 20, Richard makes clear that my chart here is too simple – there should be aRead More »Richard of St. Victor’s De Trinitate, Ch. 20 (Dale)

Jesus and “god” – part 3 – analyzing “X is a god” (Dale)

What does it mean to say that this dude is a god (or is divine)?

In this series, we first set out an important argument from Christian theology and apologetics about Jesus. In the second installment, we simplified the argument in two ways, and pointed out that to have valid argument, we need to avoid equivocal terms.

It is important now that we push the “pause” button on our christological interests and theological agendas, and think carefully about the terms “god” and “divine”.

I’ve tried to analyze the meaning of “god” and related terms in western languages. (I’m not sure how this compares, e.g. to the Japanese term kami.) What I’ve come up with is this: “X is a god” (or “X is divine”) means “X is a provident being which must be honored”.Read More »Jesus and “god” – part 3 – analyzing “X is a god” (Dale)

Dealing with Apparent Contradictions: Part 18 – Mysteries and the Bible (Dale)


Hombre…RUN!!!!

Enthusiastic positive mysterians tend to be complacent traditionalists about Bible interpretation – that is, people who are pretty sure that their Christian group (e.g. Catholicism, Reformed Christianity, or maybe simply small-c catholicism) has got the Bible (generally) right. There is a reason for this.

The reason is that if you’re trying to reason your way towards the correct interpretation of some passage, rather than rest on the laurels of hoary precedent, then it looks like a show-stopper if your proposed interpretation seems self-contradictory (positive mysterianism), or unintelligible (negative mysterianism).Read More »Dealing with Apparent Contradictions: Part 18 – Mysteries and the Bible (Dale)

Dealing with Apparent Contradictions: Part 1 – the four R’s (Dale)

This chart has been brought to you by the letter “R” and the number “4”.

In this series I’ll describe 4 basic ways Christian thinkers respond to apparent contradictions in theology. I don’t claim these are complete. Maybe ya’ll can help me clarify and add to this scheme.

I’ve been working for a while on what I call “mysterianism”, and a main purpose of mine here is to locate this defense strategy and contrast it with others. (Mysterianism is a kind of Resistance.)

Above is my basic division. Future posts will give more detail, but here’s a brief illustration of each sort of response.

Objector/puzzled fellow believer/one’s intellectual conscience: “Huh? Isn’t X inconsistent?”Read More »Dealing with Apparent Contradictions: Part 1 – the four R’s (Dale)

modal shootout on greatest possible beings – Part 1 (Dale)


“Don’t mess with Texan metaphysicans, pardner.”

In a recent series of posts (uno, dos, tres, quatro, cinco), I’ve been chewing on some philosophical arguments that “social” trinitarians have used for their doctrine. Been finding more gristle than meat.

In my latest installment, I was privileged to get some penetrating critical feedback from fellow philosophy of religion bloggers located in my home state of Texas – Alexander Pruss of Baylor and Mike Almeida of UT San Antonio (here, comments #2, 7-9) These guys are extremely sharp and are doing a lot of creative work in the field, by the way. About perfect beings – I’ve come to find out that Mike has thought a lot about this!

This post is my attempt to process Mike’s feedbackRead More »modal shootout on greatest possible beings – Part 1 (Dale)