{"id":135,"date":"2007-07-03T13:39:42","date_gmt":"2007-07-03T13:39:42","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/trinities.org\/blog\/archives\/135"},"modified":"2007-07-03T13:42:43","modified_gmt":"2007-07-03T13:42:43","slug":"constitution-trinitarianism-part-2-craigs-objections","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/trinities.org\/blog\/constitution-trinitarianism-part-2-craigs-objections\/","title":{"rendered":"Constitution Trinitarianism Part 2: Craig&#8217;s objections"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><strong>In the same issue of <em>Faith and Philosophy<\/em> (22:1, Jan 2005, 77-86) <a href=\"http:\/\/trinities.org\/blog\/?s=William+Lane+Craig&amp;searchsubmit=Find\">Bill Craig<\/a> has a critical response piece.<\/strong> (Available online <a href=\"http:\/\/www.leaderu.com\/offices\/billcraig\/docs\/matcontrinity.html\">here<\/a>.) First, he gives a nice and clear summary of their article, more complete than the one I gave <a href=\"http:\/\/trinities.org\/blog\/archives\/130\">last time<\/a>. Then he proceeds to object. As with most philosophical theories, when you start objecting, things start getting complicated, and you start to understand the theory in question better.<\/p>\n<p>For starters, what do they mean by <strong>&#8220;the divine essence&#8221;<\/strong>? What sort of thing is this which constitutes the persons? Rea answers in an email which Craig quotes:<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>All we mean to commit ourselves to is the idea that maybe the Persons are like a hylomorphic [form plus matter] structure: there&#8217;s something&#8230;we call it the &#8220;divine essence&#8221;&#8230; that plays the role of commonly shared matter, and, for each Person, something else that plays the role of form. (80)<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><!--more--> You see, sometimes we think of things or objects as constituting other objects (as in my Ned and Lumpy example from last time), but also, going back to Aristotle, there&#8217;s a tradition of saying that &#8220;matter&#8221; together with a certain &#8220;form&#8221; or organization amount to a physical object. So here, an object would be constituted by a portion of matter, and the object would be a &#8220;hylomorphic compound&#8221; &#8211; something which can be analyzed (at least in thought) into two ingredients &#8211; the stuff and the shape of that stuff. <strong>Brower and Rea want to say that (e.g.) the Son is such a compound &#8211; the &#8220;form&#8221; being Sonship and the &#8220;matter&#8221; being something like an immaterial stuff, namely &#8220;the divine essence&#8221;.<\/strong> Of course, they admit, theology ought not posit a <em>material<\/em> stuff in God. They&#8217;re just saying that the divine persons <em>are analogous to<\/em>hylomorphic compounds, and so they must share <em>something analogous to<\/em> a stuff. Craig objects that the ancient tradition (Fathers and councils) &#8220;did not mean that God or the persons of the Trinity were composed of some sort of spiritual stuff&#8221; when they said that the three were &#8220;same substance&#8221; (<em>homoousias<\/em>). Moreover, Craig objects, the notion of immaterial stuff seems incoherent. (80)<\/p>\n<p>Brower and Rea hold that the basic puzzle of the Trinity is that there&#8217;s only one God, but there are three distinct (non-identical) persons each of which &#8220;is&#8221; God. They say &#8211; no problem &#8211; our theory smoothes it all out by saying what that &#8220;is&#8221; amounts to. Each of the three <strong>&#8220;is&#8221; God<\/strong> in the sense of being numerically the same as (but not identical to) God, as well as to each other. That&#8217;s compatible with their only being one God, and with the none of the three being identical to either of the others. <strong>Craig says not so fast. One portion of matter can&#8217;t simultaneously have incompatible properties<\/strong> &#8211; the portion forming Ned the gnome, for instance, can&#8217;t simultaneously be gnome-shaped, and shaped like a 747 jet plane. But are not being a Father and being a Son incompatible properties? If so, how can one something-like-an-immaterial-stuff simultaneously have both? (82-3) Why think those properties are incompatible? Craig points out that the Son can truly think &#8220;I died on a cross&#8221; but the Father cannot truly think that.<\/p>\n<p>I&#8217;ll skip the last two pages of Craig&#8217;s critique, as it&#8217;s a little compressed, and I&#8217;m not sure I follow some of it. The parts I do follow, I&#8217;ll raise in a future post.<\/p>\n<p>Technorati Tags: <a href=\"http:\/\/technorati.com\/tag\/William%20Lane%20Craig\" class=\"performancingtags\" rel=\"tag\">William Lane Craig<\/a>, <a href=\"http:\/\/technorati.com\/tag\/Mike%20Rea\" class=\"performancingtags\" rel=\"tag\">Mike Rea<\/a>, <a href=\"http:\/\/technorati.com\/tag\/Jeff%20Brower\" class=\"performancingtags\" rel=\"tag\">Jeff Brower<\/a>, <a href=\"http:\/\/technorati.com\/tag\/lump%20and%20statue\" class=\"performancingtags\" rel=\"tag\">lump and statue<\/a>, <a href=\"http:\/\/technorati.com\/tag\/identity\" class=\"performancingtags\" rel=\"tag\">identity<\/a>, <a href=\"http:\/\/technorati.com\/tag\/numerical%20sameness\" class=\"performancingtags\" rel=\"tag\">numerical sameness<\/a>, <a href=\"http:\/\/technorati.com\/tag\/material%20constitution\" class=\"performancingtags\" rel=\"tag\">material constitution<\/a>, <a href=\"http:\/\/technorati.com\/tag\/form\" class=\"performancingtags\" rel=\"tag\">form<\/a>, <a href=\"http:\/\/technorati.com\/tag\/matter\" class=\"performancingtags\" rel=\"tag\">matter<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>In the same issue of Faith and Philosophy (22:1, Jan 2005, 77-86) Bill Craig has a critical response piece. (Available online here.) First, he gives a nice and clear summary of their article, more complete than the one I gave last time. Then he proceeds to object. As with most philosophical theories, when you start&hellip;&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/trinities.org\/blog\/constitution-trinitarianism-part-2-craigs-objections\/\" rel=\"bookmark\">Read More &raquo;<span class=\"screen-reader-text\">Constitution Trinitarianism Part 2: Craig&#8217;s objections<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[9,3],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-135","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-philosophy","category-theories"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/trinities.org\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/135","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/trinities.org\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/trinities.org\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/trinities.org\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/trinities.org\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=135"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/trinities.org\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/135\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/trinities.org\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=135"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/trinities.org\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=135"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/trinities.org\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=135"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}