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\u201cCome on, you tired little brain – don\u2019t fail me now.\u201d (No, I don\u2019t really blog naked – serious thought requires having at least your underpants on.) <\/em><\/small><\/p>\n Joseph Jedwab does an excellent job (here, comments 3 & 4<\/a>) pressing me for details, and taking a shot at defending the Brower and Rea theory<\/a>. I wanted to chew a bit on some issues that Joseph and Ian raise before moving on, offering some corrections and other reflections.<\/strong><\/span> (And JT<\/a> – I want to post your lengthy comment (the second one) as a guest post, so we can discuss the priority issue – email me if you object to this promotion. To non-philosophical readers: I apologize for the over-long load of philosopher-lingo that follows. You may want to skip this one!<\/strong> We\u2019ll be back on earth soon – at least after JT\u2019s post!<\/p>\n So, on to business:<\/p>\n [Ian:] \u2026some, like Ted Sider, insist that counting is necessarily, analytically, always by identity<\/strong><\/p><\/blockquote>\n Ian, do you know where Ted says that? That seems right to me. When someone says that x and y are non-identical, and yet \u201care to be counted as one\u201d – they get the ole blank stare from me. I can see how we might count things by other criteria for various practical purposes, but when we want to know how many things there are<\/em>, anything other than identity seems irrelevant.<\/p>\n Ian also worries that constitution trinitarianism makes the three divine persons non-ultimate – i.e. the divine quasi-matter (\u201dthe divine essence) is \u201cprior to them\u201d<\/strong>. I replied, why can\u2019t they just say that these four – the divine essence, plus the three persons – are equally ultimate – with none \u201cprior\u201d or \u201cposterior to\u201d any other? Responding, Ian says:<\/p>\n I don\u2019t think they can say that all three are equally fundamental since constitution is precisely a kind of metaphysical priority relation<\/strong> – the existence of the three persons depends on, is there in virtue of, or is grounded in (or however you want to say it) the divine essence.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n Good point – there does seem to be an explanatory asymmetry there, when we\u2019re talking about physical objects. I wonder if they\u2019ll just parachute out of this problem by saying \u201cit\u2019s just an inadequate analogy<\/em> – we don\u2019t think there\u2019s literally constitution in any divine persons\u201d? I want to talk about that in a future post, on their other, popular level paper.<\/p>\n On to Joseph\u2019s suggested defenses<\/strong> – any following unmarked quotes are from him.<\/p>\n 1. Numerical sameness is an equivalence relation (i.e. reflexive, symmetric, and transitive). I take it that what unifies each numerical sameness relation is that each is an equivalence relation by which we count: which relation we count by depends on which kind the entities we count belong to.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n I grant<\/strong> that like a lot of other things we don\u2019t believe in, such as 3rd or 4th truth values, or Geachian relative identity, the notion of numerical sameness without identity can be formally defined. I guess your reply helps me to see what they\u2019re getting at with their chart<\/a> (which I defaced with the Clintons). I guess then I\u2019d say: \u201cwe\u201d? Speak for yourselves! 2. The divine essence is either divine stuff or a divine substratum. Either way the divine essence doesn\u2019t qualify as a divine individual, divine Person, or God. So either way it\u2019s false that each divine person \u2018is numerically the same divine individual as the divine essence\u2019, for I presume x is numerically the same F as y iff each of x and y is an F. And, as far as I know, B&R never say this (not on p.70 anyway).<\/p><\/blockquote>\n I think you\u2019re right on this one – I misread them.<\/p>\n 3. I don\u2019t see why B&R need think of an individual in any fancy sense here: it\u2019s an entity, a particular, and a property-bearer for sure, but why think it non-substantial? I see no reason why they need to make a distinction between individuals and substances here, unless, of course, they take the divine essence to be an individual. So, as I see it, for them, each divine Person is an individual and a substance. The only question is whether the divine essence should qualify as an individual but not a substance. But if the divine essence is an individual, it\u2019s not a Person and so not a God. So there\u2019s no question of saying the Persons are individual non-substances but God is an individual substance.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n Right – it seems to me that they need to say that the divine essence is an individual, in a less metaphysically-loaded sense – i.e. a real entity that can be referred to using singular terms. They can\u2019t make it a substance, as then they\u2019d be saying that there are three divine persons but only one divine substance, and that\u2019d put on the pressure to identify it with God. Nor do they need to say it\u2019s a substance.<\/p>\n 4. Monotheism<\/strong> is the claim that there\u2019s one God. On B&R\u2019s account, there\u2019s one God and so monotheism is true. It all turns on whether one permits their definition of a God: x is a God iff x is a (quasi-) hylomorphic composite whose stuff is some divine essence; x is the same God as y iff each is a God and they share the same stuf; there\u2019s one God iff some God is the same God as every God; and x is God iff x is a God and there\u2019s one God.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n As I see it, this definition just brings out the wierdness of their theory. A God is (re-) defined as a being made of a god-stuff, to put it roughly. Really? If there\u2019s immaterial stuff (or something like it) constituting the Father, Son, and Spirit, how do we know that that same kind of stuff or even the same quantity of it couldn\u2019t constitute something other than a god, such as an angel, or something analogous to an immaterial chair? Doesn\u2019t that stuff have to be arranged in the right way<\/em> to make a god? But how could it be arranged to make three such non-identical gods, given that the stuff isn\u2019t divided among them? Of course, we have no grasp of what \u201carranged in the right way\u201d would mean here. My point is that only partisans of their theory will accept this definition of \u201cgod\u201d<\/strong>. To everyone else, \u201cgod\u201d means something<\/em> like this: a person (personal being) which is greater than any human, and which is worthy of worship by humans. The concept of a god is, it seems to me, a bit vague, but not ridiculously so – it always means a thing with thus and such god-making features, e.g. great power, domain over some portion of the physical world, pure goodness. As far as I know, this is the first time \u2018God\u2019 has been defined with reference to the (something like a) stuff it is (something like) constituted by.<\/p>\n 5. Why think there\u2019s a sense of \u2018God\u2019 on which it means the one and only divine Person? If so, if, in effect, the concepts of a divine Person and God coincide, there can\u2019t be three of one and one of the other: this would be enough to show the doctrine of the Trinity incoherent. On their view, what \u2018divine Person\u2019 and \u2018God\u2019 mean permits it to be that there are three divine Persons (and one can\u2019t also count one divine Person) and there is one God (and one can\u2019t also count three Gods). So on their view, there\u2019s no sense in which there\u2019s no God.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n To the first question, \u2018god\u2019 and \u2018divine person\u2019 mean the same (vague) thing, just as \u2018my child\u2019 and \u2018my immature offspring\u2019 do. Pointing this out doesn\u2019t make the doctrine of the Trinity (or at least all versions of it) false by definition, nor does it assume monotheism. Many other trinitarians (following Augustine) will say: \u201cLook, of course<\/em> God just is a certain person. The Bible is littered with personal pronouns that refer to him. But within this great personal being, there are three something-or-others, which we call \u2018persons\u2019 just cause we can\u2019t think of anything better to call them.\u201d In contrast, Rea and Brower have three non-identical divine personal substances, three hylomorphic compounds.<\/p>\n I can imagine a conversation which goes like this<\/strong>:<\/p>\n Should Brower and Rea announce, not that they\u2019ve discovered a viable theory of the Trinity, but rather, than they\u2019ve discovered (invented?) a new definition of \u201cgod\u201d?<\/strong> That would at least clue people in that when they talk of \u201cmonotheism\u201d, it\u2019s a different thesis than most people would understand by that term.<\/p>\n Some final points by Joseph:<\/p>\n 8. It must be that if one accepts the traditional creeds, one accepts the doctrine of the Trinity and so one should believe that there\u2019s some solution to the logical problem of the Trinity, even if one doesn\u2019t know what it is. But it doesn\u2019t follow from this that one needs to accept B&R\u2019s account.<\/p>\n . . .<\/p>\n 2. I don\u2019t think belief that the doctrine of the Trinity is true is essential to salvation, as opposed to belief in the Trinity. I suppose one could hold a view of theological semantic deference. Just as Putnam says we semantically defer to scientists for the meaning of natural kind terms, so we might say we semantically defer to the Church\u2019s theologians for the meaning of Christian doctrinal terms. But we needn\u2019t hold this view. B&R\u2019s account gives us a good analogy here. Folk have many beliefs about material beings: arguably they believe there are statues, lumps, lumps can survive radical change of shape, and statues can\u2019t, but there\u2019s only one material being, at least many are disposed to accept these things. Perhaps they believe these things but they don\u2019t know how it could be that all these things are true together. Either they see no problem or if they do, they don\u2019t know how to solve it. Just so, Christians have many beliefs about God: they believe there is one God, three divine Persons, and each divine Person is God, at least many of them are disposed to accept this. Again, perhaps they see no problem here or do, but don\u2019t see how to solve it. So they accept the doctrine of the Trinity but don\u2019t accept an Aristotelian solution to the logical problem of the Trinity. After all, most have never read any of the relevant writings on the matter. I don\u2019t see why Brower and Rea can\u2019t accept all this. Their solution doesn\u2019t imply that Christians accept this solution, even implicitly.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n Re: semantic deference – man, do I wish<\/em> I could defer to the theologians!<\/strong><\/p>\n If you think that belief in the doctrine of the Trinity isn\u2019t essential to salvation, you don\u2019t believe in the authority of the \u201cAthanasian\u201d creed.<\/p>\n As to your suggestion at the end, that makes sense only if \u201cthe doctrine of the Trinity\u201d is thought of as a set of sentences<\/strong>, rather than of propositions, for it\u2019s only those that Joe Pewsitter, Thomas Aquinas, Swinburne, Rea, and Craig have in common. Can you see some serious \u201ccost\u201d to that move though?<\/p>\n Technorati Tags: Mike Rea<\/a>, Jeff Brower<\/a>, numerical sameness<\/a>, material constitution<\/a>, form<\/a>, matter<\/a>, Athanasian Creed<\/a>, monotheism<\/a><\/p>\n <\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" \u201cCome on, you tired little brain – don\u2019t fail me now.\u201d (No, I don\u2019t really blog naked – serious thought requires having at least your underpants on.) Joseph Jedwab does an excellent job (here, comments 3 & 4) pressing me for details, and taking a shot at defending the Brower and Rea theory. I… Read More »Constitution Trinitarianism Part 4: pausing and revisiting some issues<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[4,9,13,3],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-174","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-heresy-orthodoxy","category-philosophy","category-theologians","category-theories"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/trinities.org\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/174","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/trinities.org\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/trinities.org\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/trinities.org\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/trinities.org\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=174"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/trinities.org\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/174\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/trinities.org\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=174"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/trinities.org\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=174"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/trinities.org\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=174"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}![\":-)\"](\"http:\/\/trinities.org\/blog\/wp-includes\/images\/smilies\/icon_smile.gif\"){kind=icon}
) Any bold type that appears in quotes here has been added by me.<\/p>\n I<\/em> count by identity. But seriously, one part of their paper which struck me as odd, is where they say that some sorts of sortal-concepts mandate counting by identity, while others admit only of counting only by numerical sameness without identity<\/strong>. (63) They suggest that \u201ctechnical philosophical sortals like \u2018hylomorphic compound\u2019\u2026 \u2018thing\u2019 or \u2018being\u2019\u2026\u201d admit of counting by identity. I\u2019m not sure why they put it in terms of language here; it seems they\u2019re positing different sorts of things<\/em>. Where to draw this line? Just where it needs to be to preserve trinitarian orthodoxy and the Aristotelean solution to the problem of material constitution? I worry that this is only going to be a theory-saving distinction, and not one grounded in reasonably firm intuitions.<\/p>\n\n