{"id":178,"date":"2007-07-31T14:55:29","date_gmt":"2007-07-31T14:55:29","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/trinities.org\/blog\/archives\/178"},"modified":"2014-12-08T08:38:16","modified_gmt":"2014-12-08T13:38:16","slug":"constitution-trinitarianism-part-6-summing-up","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/trinities.org\/blog\/constitution-trinitarianism-part-6-summing-up\/","title":{"rendered":"Constitution Trinitarianism Part 6: summing up"},"content":{"rendered":"<p id=\"post-157\" class=\"hentry p1 post publish author-Dale category-mystery category-philosophy category-theories y2007 m07 d31 h05\">\n<p class=\"entry-content\">\n<p align=\"center\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" class=\"alignright\" src=\"http:\/\/trinities.org\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/lumpy-on-trial.jpg\" alt=\"\" width=\"310\" height=\"476\" \/><\/p>\n<p align=\"center\"><em><small>Is Ned in trouble?<\/small><\/em><\/p>\n<p>Here\u2019s a quick post to <strong>wrap up the series on Brower\u2019s and Rea\u2019s <a href=\"http:\/\/trinities.org\/blog\/\/?s=Brower+Rea&amp;searchsubmit=Find\">constitution theory<\/a><\/strong> of the Trinity. First, it\u2019s striking how original and self-consistent their approach is. It is rare to find something this new, and this well thought through on such an old topic. They\u2019ve carefully carved out a unique position, one which has a motivation outside of theology (i.e. solving the reputed problem of material constitution) as well as in. Further, they\u2019re <em>trying<\/em> to construct a mainstream, orthodox theory.<\/p>\n<p>The above is enough to recommend it in the eyes of some of my fellow philosophers. I\u2019m afraid that I\u2019m not as sympathetic. <strong>Here I\u2019ll briefly recap my misgivings and maybe add a few<\/strong>. <span id=\"more-157\"><\/span><br \/>\nNone of is even close to constituting (sorry) a killer objection, but to me, taken together, they sour the deal. The last four are more important than the first five.<\/p>\n<ol>\n<li>You have to be a metaphysician to understand it. Best as I can tell, this theory is totally off the map of theologians. It is probably destined to remain so. You have to be able to get your head around the concept of numerical sameness without identity, and you need to understand why we might want to say there\u2019s such a thing. Why are these points objections? Well, if you think the doctrine of the Trinity is a revealed one, it needs to (1) have been believed by previous Christians, and (2) be understandable fairly widely.<\/li>\n<li>To believe it, you have to be a metaphysician who (1) believes in the problem of material constitution, who also (2) accepts the Aristotelian numerical sameness without identity solution. Of course, you might think that the idea of numerical sameness without identity only applies to the Trinity. That\u2019s a consistent position, but it\u2019ll be lacking in motivation, as it\u2019ll look like the only reason you believe in it, is that it provides a consistent reading of the \u201cAthanasian\u201d creed (etc.). It would remain on the level of a mere lawyerly defense, in the manner of van Inwagen\u2019s relative identity approach. Also, if you don\u2019t believe in the theory applied to material objects, you\u2019ll give \u2018em the old \u201cblank stare\u201d when they tell you that the Father and the Son are non-identical, and yet they \u201care to be counted as one\u201d.<\/li>\n<li>Sorry, but I don\u2019t have a concept of <strong>\u201cimmaterial stuff\u201d<\/strong>. You can say that there something in the Trinity which \u201cplays the role of matter\u201d, i.e. which is somewhat like matter in, say, a statue, but I just draw a blank. It\u2019s not that I can\u2019t picture it; it\u2019s that I fear this talk is unintelligible. Compare: Metaphysician Renee tells us that \u201cThere\u2019s something that plays the role of a Cartesian soul\u201d in every golf ball.\u201d And you say: \u201cSo, it\u2019s a subject of consciousness?\u201d She says, \u201cNope.\u201d You say, it\u2019s immaterial and extensionless, and she\u2019s says \u201cNope, and nope. But it is something which is IN the golf ball, and not at all in the way that a sailor is in a ship. Dualism is true, right? Well, there\u2019s something somewhat like a soul in golf balls.\u201d Do we really know what she\u2019s talking about? Nope.<\/li>\n<li>Related problem: by calling this something-like-an-immaterial-stuff in the Trinity \u201cthe divine essence\u201d, they make the theory look more traditional than it probably is. The church fathers are brimming over with talk of the divine nature, essence, or \u201cgodhead\u201d. But &#8211; these guys are (sort of) Platonists, not Stoics. Probably few of them thought of <em>homoousios<\/em> in terms of sameness of stuff.<\/li>\n<li>I\u2019m still worried about the problem of \u201cGod\u201d, \u201cYahweh\u201d, and \u201cthe creator of the world\u201d <a href=\"http:\/\/trinities.org\/blog\/archives\/148\">being ambiguous<\/a>. Not sure how big a problem it is, but it seems it is one.<\/li>\n<li><a href=\"http:\/\/trinities.org\/blog\/archives\/142\">It seems to me<\/a> that they secure monotheism at the price of redefining what is meant by a \u201cgod\u201d. This redefinition isn\u2019t totally unmotivated, but it\u2019s still a hard pill to swallow.<\/li>\n<li><strong><a href=\"http:\/\/trinities.org\/blog\/archives\/135\">Bill Craig\u2019s objection stands<\/a><\/strong> &#8211; how can one portion of matter (or immaterial quasi-matter) simultaneously constitute things with incompatible (present-based, non-modal) properties? (his Venus and David example) Without answering this, the account is at best incomplete, for it\u2019s not clear that it is consistent.<\/li>\n<li><strong>This theory does not, despite how it first looks, provide a literal metaphysical account of the Trinity, nor does it try to. It\u2019s all, in the end, an analogy<\/strong>, and one of several incompatible ones they offer in <a href=\"http:\/\/www.nd.edu\/%7Emrea\/Online%20Papers\/Understanding%20the%20Trinity.pdf\">this clear, popular-level paper<\/a>. In short, the metaphysical fireworks are for the philosphers. To common folk, they preach good, old-fashioned seemingly inconsistent analogies: three men, <a href=\"http:\/\/trinities.org\/blog\/archives\/130\">Ned and Lumpy<\/a>, and multiple personality disorder. To be fair, they say they think theirs is the best analogy, but the point is, if <a href=\"http:\/\/trinities.org\/blog\/archives\/92\">like Craig<\/a> you\u2019re holding out for a believable and non-analogical metaphysics of God, you won\u2019t find it here. I realize that some will take this last concern as something to recommend the theory, being convinced (probably by the church fathers) that multiple and admittedly pretty bad analogies are the best we could hope to do.<\/li>\n<li>It\u2019s clear from the second paragraph of their popular paper that they accept the common apologetics arguments to the effect that the creedal statements providing the boundaries for trinity doctrines are deducible from the Bible. I think these arguments are quite weak. But that\u2019s a topic for future discussion, or rather, for a whole series of \u2018em.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Is Ned in trouble? Here\u2019s a quick post to wrap up the series on Brower\u2019s and Rea\u2019s constitution theory of the Trinity. First, it\u2019s striking how original and self-consistent their approach is. It is rare to find something this new, and this well thought through on such an old topic. They\u2019ve carefully carved out a&hellip;&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/trinities.org\/blog\/constitution-trinitarianism-part-6-summing-up\/\" rel=\"bookmark\">Read More &raquo;<span class=\"screen-reader-text\">Constitution Trinitarianism Part 6: summing up<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[14,10,38,9,3],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-178","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-history","category-logic","category-monotheism","category-philosophy","category-theories"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/trinities.org\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/178","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/trinities.org\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/trinities.org\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/trinities.org\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/trinities.org\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=178"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/trinities.org\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/178\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":6796,"href":"https:\/\/trinities.org\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/178\/revisions\/6796"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/trinities.org\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=178"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/trinities.org\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=178"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/trinities.org\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=178"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}