{"id":2323,"date":"2011-01-07T10:28:38","date_gmt":"2011-01-07T15:28:38","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/trinities.org\/blog\/?p=2323"},"modified":"2018-02-04T09:28:30","modified_gmt":"2018-02-04T14:28:30","slug":"review-of-thomas-mccalls-which-trinity-whose-monotheism","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/trinities.org\/blog\/review-of-thomas-mccalls-which-trinity-whose-monotheism\/","title":{"rendered":"Review of Thomas McCall’s Which Trinity? Whose Monotheism?"},"content":{"rendered":"

\"\"<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

Forthcoming in <\/em>Faith and Philosophy<\/a>: my review of <\/em><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

Which Trinity? Whose Monotheism? Philosophical and Systematic Theologians on the Metaphysics of Trinitarian Theology<\/a><\/em><\/span><\/span><\/span>, by Thomas McCall<\/a>.<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

Thanks to Dr. McCall for his feedback on my first draft of this, which saved me from several errors.<\/em><\/p>\n

This is a unique, stimulating and yet unsatisfying book which should be widely read. The answers to the questions in the title, respectively: (1) either a \u201csocial\u201d or a constitution theory, (2) Richard Bauckham\u2019s. McCall is a theologian well versed in analytic philosophy. This book attempts, with some success, to bridge the cultural, intellectual, and institutional divides between Christian philosophers and theologians. McCall notes that the book \u201cwill at points be less than satisfying to partisans in both camps.\u201d (8) <\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

In chapter 1, he nicely summarizes much recent positive work on Trinity theories by Christian philosophers, as well as some anti-\u201csocial\u201d-theory arguments. In the next two chapters he sets out to correct the oversights and misunderstandings of various of these philosophers by endorsing Richard Bauckham\u2019s thesis that the earliest Christians \u201cunderstood [Jesus] to be included in the identity of the one God\u201d (57). New Testament era Judaism was \u201cstrictly monotheistic\u201d, and yet Christians properly worshiped Jesus. In my view McCall is too confident that the New Testament supports all these claims. His treatment of the source material (56-72) is perfunctory, and will be unsatisfying to those familiar with competing interpretations. The last part of chapter 2 gives helpful expositions of what ancient Arianism and modalism really amounted to (as contrasted with the ways some philosophers have thrown around those heresy-terms).<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

In chapter 3 McCall rejects the apparent modalism of Barth and Rahner (87-9), and returns to the theories of chapter 1. Utilizing the fruits of chapter 2, McCall rebuts Leftow\u2019s charge that a \u201csocial\u201d theory is \u201cArianism\u201d. (95-8) McCall admits that it is unclear how well this \u201csocial\u201d approach coheres with the Western tradition, especially the \u201cAthanasian\u201d creed and theories of divine simplicity. (98-103) He rejects relative identity theories because in his view they don\u2019t get us far enough from modalism and metaphysical antirealism, while he dubs the Rea and Brower \u201cconstitution\u201d theory \u201cpromising\u201d (109); in his view it faces no theological problems, but a few philosophical ones. He rejects Leftow\u2019s \u201cLatin\u201d theory on the grounds of unclarity, misfit with the Bible, and that it likely can\u2019t avoid modalism. (111-21) In chapter 3 and later in the book, McCall defends what most would call a \u201csocial\u201d theory; we\u2019ll return below to this positive thrust.<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

Chapter 4 sympathetically critiques theologian Robert Jenson\u2019s Trinity theory, founded on this non sequitur<\/em> (in Jenson\u2019s words): \u201c…since the biblical God can truly be identified by narrative, his hypostatic being, his self-identity, is constituted in dramatic coherence.\u201d (132) Thus, \u201cthe one God is an event; history occurs not only in him but as his being\u201d and \u201cGod is the event of the world\u2019s transformation by Jesus\u2019 love…\u201d (ibid.) McCall points out what is plausibly a confusion about identity underlying Jenson\u2019s project. (132-55) Jensonians will want to take a close look at McCall\u2019s friendly suggestions for amending the theory.<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

Chapter 5 sympathetically critiques the theological font of much recent social-trinity theorizing, Jurgen Moltmann. McCall convincingly argues that Moltmann\u2019s doctrine of \u201cperichoresis\u201d (applied by him both to intra-Trinity relations, and to God-world relations) \u201ceither does \u2018not enough\u2019 or does \u2018too much\u2019 (157) \u2013 that is, it doesn\u2019t do enough to show how the three divine persons amount to one god, and it amounts to a God-world relation that is too close. To help, McCall urges that there are two kinds of perichoresis \u2013 one for inter-Trinity relations, and the other for God-cosmos relations, which he defines. (170, 172) This reader was unable to see how these constitute two species under any shared genus.<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

Chapter 6 enters the recent debate among evangelical theologians concerning whether or not the Son is eternally \u201csubordinate to\u201d the Father. This thesis, he argues, is either trivial or inconsistent with the creedal claim that the two are homoousios<\/em>. (175-80) Further, proponents like Grudem and Ware on unclear about which version they really want to defend. (188). In the end McCall pleads that this issue be held separate from debates about the proper roles of women in church life.<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

Chapter 7 discusses Orthodox theologian John Zizioulas\u2019s claims that \u201cnothing in existence is conceivable in itself… since even God exists thanks to an event of communion\u201d (190), \u201cthere is no true being without communion\u201d (191), and \u201clove \u2026 is constitutive of his [God\u2019s] substance\u201d. (192) McCall discusses these startling claims under the banner \u201cBeing as Communion\u201d. They seem to entail that it is metaphysically impossible that there be only one thing, and that it is impossible for there to be a self not in a personal relationship with at least one other self. McCall might have demanded arguments to back these claims up, discussing prima facie<\/em> counterexamples (respectively: God, a lifelong human hermit atheist \u2013 say, Christopher Hitchens raised by wolves). <\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

McCall too is entranced by this picture of God as fundamentally an eternal, perfect, three-way friendship. Thus he accepts \u201cBeing as Communion\u201d but argues that it is in conflict with another thesis to which Zizioulas is committed, what McCall dubs the \u201cSovereignty-Aseity Conviction\u201d. This is the claim that God and only God exists a se<\/em> \u2013 independently, or solely through himself, everything else depending on him. In Zizioulas\u2019s view, only God \u2013 that is, the Father – exists a se<\/em>, and he is radically free \u2013 not only creation, but even the existence of the Son and Spirit depend on his free choice. Thus, the Trinity exists contingently, and dependently on the Father. (193, 196) <\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

McCall argues that this ascription of aseity only to the Father amounts to an objectionable subordinationism. In his view, \u201cTraditional affirmations of subordination have revolved around the \u2018function\u2019 of the Son.\u201d (198) He argues that Zizioulas should keep the \u201cBeing as Communion\u201d thesis, as it is \u201ccentral to the teaching of Scripture and the Christian tradition.\u201d (205) But he should ascribe aseity not to the Father alone, but rather to the Trinity, holding it to be implied by the property divinity<\/em>. (207) Further, the notion of aseity should be clarified \u2013 we should re-define it to mean a lack of dependence on anything which is not divine<\/em>. (209) Thus, both the Trinity and each of the Persons exist a se<\/em>. But, preserving the \u201cBeing as Communion\u201d theme, each person depends for his existence on the other two \u2013 existing as a person only because of their relation to another. <\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

What happened to the patristic \u201cgeneration\u201d and \u201cprocession\u201d claims, which seem to entail that the Son and Spirit both exist because of the Father? McCall\u2019s response is to redefine the sentence \u201cthe Father eternally generates the Son\u201d:<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

\n

…eternal generation refers us to (a) the incompleteness of the persons as individuals and (b) their complete and irreducible uniqueness in relation to the other persons. Seen this way, the doctrine of eternal generation emphasizes that to be a person \u2013 even a divine person \u2013 is to be incomplete \u201calone\u201d or in oneself. (212-3)<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

Chapter 8 is McCall\u2019s manifesto for trinitarian theology, some \u201ctheses for scholastic disputation\u201d. (219) I\u2019ll highlight just a few. We should think critically about alleged social and political implications of trinitarian doctrine. (225-7) Appeals to mystery can\u2019t atone for doctrines which are \u201cobviously inconsistent\u201d (228); Trinity doctrines must be \u201ccoherent (or at least not obviously incoherent)\u201d (229) as well as biblically and creedally kosher. But theologians \u201cneed not undertake to show how<\/em> God is three and one. Indeed, to attempt to do so reeks of hubris.\u201d (232) This seems inconsistent with his friendliness towards any attempt to construct a coherent metaphysical model of <\/em>the Trinity. Doesn\u2019t a response to the threeness-oneness problem entail<\/em> an answer to the \u201chow\u201d question? <\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

Another important assertion is that \u201cChristian<\/em> theological commitments should receive priority… if our intuitions about \u201ctheism\u201d and \u201cmonotheism\u201d conflict with the central elements of Trinitarian doctrine, then so much the worse for our intuitions about such things!\u201d (233) It is hard to argue that if something is known to be divine revelation, it may be reasonably believed even if it conflicts with our prior commitments. But exactly what are these central elements? <\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

McCall nowhere explicitly advances his preferred Trinity theory. But the outlines are clear enough. \u201cThe\u201d Trinity theory, for McCall, involves three distinct \u201ccenters of consciousness and will\u201d (12, 87-9, 236) \u2013 what I would call so many selves – <\/em>capable of personal relationships with one another. Their status is absolutely (ontologically) equal, and each depends for his existence as a self on the others. These, in some<\/em> sense are<\/em> the one, triune God. This \u201cGod\u201d is not a self, though it is \u201ctruly personal\u201d (93-4), and so it has personal properties \u2013 or at least, it has parts which do. (Misleadingly, but following other recent social theorists, McCall refers to it throughout using personal pronouns.) But are not three equally divine selves three gods? No, for it is only Bauckham\u2019s<\/em> idea (which McCall agrees is also the first century Jewish idea) of monotheism which is relevant and Bauckham<\/em> thinks it (this special New Testament era \u2018monotheism\u2019, the content of which is never spelled out) is consistent with trinitarian developments (233-6), we assume, even \u201csocial\u201d ones. <\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

Here most philosophers will balk; Bauckham\u2019s claim cries out for clarification. Is not Jesus portrayed in the New Testament as someone other than<\/em> God, someone who prays to and depends on God, who does God\u2019s bidding? On the other hand, isn\u2019t Jesus supposed to be \u201cGod incarnate\u201d, God himself, in human form? Is God who Jesus is? Bauckham often writes as if God and Jesus are the same self. And yet, Jesus is in his words \u201cincluded in the identity\u201d of God, which suggests<\/em> that they are not. He sometimes suggests that the Father is also<\/em> so included. Through this cloudy lens, McCall would have us view the New Testament witness about God and Christ. But this claim, no less than speculative flights about perichoresis<\/em>, is in need of careful analysis and evaluation. McCall himself, not holding God to be a self, won\u2019t say that God and Jesus are the same self. In what sense, then, is Jesus \u201cin God\u2019s identity\u201d?<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

McCall makes some excellent points about monotheism and the Trinity. It won\u2019t imply monotheism, he says, to say merely that there\u2019s one generic divine essence, that there\u2019s only one divine \u201cfamily\u201d, that there\u2019s only one font of divinity (the Father), or that the Three are united by a mysterious relation of \u201cperiochoresis\u201d. (241-2) Amen to all that.<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

My biggest criticism of the book is its friendliness towards theoretical solutions which crucially depend on bold, arguably ad hoc<\/em> redefinitions. Yet it is clearly written, sober, insightful, and rich with argument. As intended, it gives theologians and philosophers some important things to argue about together<\/em>.<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

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