{"id":254,"date":"2019-11-16T04:36:56","date_gmt":"2019-11-16T10:36:56","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/trinities.org\/blog\/archives\/254"},"modified":"2019-11-16T23:14:36","modified_gmt":"2019-11-17T05:14:36","slug":"playing-with-daviss-playful-proof-dale","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/trinities.org\/blog\/playing-with-daviss-playful-proof-dale\/","title":{"rendered":"Playing with Davis&#8217;s Playful Proof"},"content":{"rendered":"\n<div class=\"wp-block-image\"><figure class=\"alignleft is-resized\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" src=\"http:\/\/trinities.org\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/playful.jpg\" alt=\"\" width=\"340\" height=\"325\"\/><\/figure><\/div>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong><a href=\"http:\/\/www.claremontmckenna.edu\/academic\/faculty\/profile.asp?Fac=21\">Stephen T. Davis<\/a><\/strong> is a much-admired veteran Christian philosopher. (For more about him, check out <a rel=\"noreferrer noopener\" aria-label=\"this podcast (opens in a new tab)\" href=\"https:\/\/trinities.org\/blog\/podcast-40-dr-stephen-t-davis-on-christians-in-philosophy\/\" target=\"_blank\">this podcast<\/a> and <a rel=\"noreferrer noopener\" aria-label=\"this podcast (opens in a new tab)\" href=\"https:\/\/trinities.org\/blog\/podcast-41-stephen-t-daviss-christian-philosophical-theology\/\" target=\"_blank\">this podcast<\/a>.) Many have read his <em><a href=\"http:\/\/www.amazon.com\/Logic-Nature-Library-Philosophy-Religion\/dp\/0333331796\/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&amp;s=books&amp;qid=1202989382&amp;sr=8-1\">Logic and the Nature of God<\/a><\/em>. I also particularly enjoyed his <a href=\"http:\/\/www.amazon.com\/Risen-Indeed-Making-Sense-Resurrection\/dp\/0802801269\/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&amp;s=books&amp;qid=1202987314&amp;sr=8-1\"><em><span class=\"sans\">Risen Indeed: Making Sense of the Resurrection<\/span><\/em><\/a>, his recent <em><a href=\"http:\/\/astore.amazon.com\/trinities-20\/detail\/0199284598\/002-7329164-3076045\">Christian Philosophical Theology<\/a><\/em>, and his personal Christian testimony <a href=\"http:\/\/www.amazon.com\/Philosophers-Who-Believe-Spiritual-Journeys\/dp\/0830815430\">here<\/a>. I have fond memories of his exciting Philosophy of Religion class that I took when I was a Master&#8217;s student at the <a href=\"http:\/\/www.cgu.edu\/pages\/1.asp\">Claremont Graduate University<\/a> back in 1994. He&#8217;s a very kind and helpful man, and he&#8217;s been a help and an encouragement to me several times since then. <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Back to his work: his writing has an attractive clarity, forthrightness, independence, and brevity &#8211; not unlike his one-time colleague John Hick, but he&#8217;s more sober and irenic than Hick. Some <strong>things that, to me, make him stand out<\/strong> among analytic Christian philosophers are his thoughtful engagements with the Bible, with biblical scholarship, and with academic theologians.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Davis has his own take on the Trinity, which he calls <strong>&#8220;Perichoretic Monotheism&#8221;<\/strong>. He considers it a form of Social Trinitarianism, and I believe he first developed it after reading <a href=\"http:\/\/trinities.org\/blog\/?s=leftow&amp;searchsubmit=Find\">Brian Leftow<\/a>&#8216;s aggressive attack on all &#8220;social&#8221; Trinity theories in his 1999 article, &#8220;Anti Social Trinitarianism&#8221;, in&nbsp; <a href=\"http:\/\/http:\/\/astore.amazon.com\/trinities-20\/detail\/0199246122\/002-7329164-3076045\">this book<\/a> (co-edited by Davis). <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Here I want to consider Davis&#8217;s argument for social trinitarianism<\/strong>. He doesn&#8217;t claim to be super-original here &#8211; he acknowledges similar reflections by Augustine, Richard of St. Victor, Richard Swinburne, and C.J.F. Williams. But he can claim to have put this train of thought into an admirably clear (and thus evaluable) form. He first tentatively put out a simpler version of this argument in &#8220;<strong>A Somewhat Playful Proof<\/strong> of the Social Trinity in Five Easy Steps,&#8221; <a title=\"journal website\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer\" href=\"http:\/\/http:\/\/www.epsociety.org\/philchristi\/\" target=\"_blank\"><em>Philosophia Christi<\/em><\/a> 2:1, 1999, 103-5. In <em><a href=\"http:\/\/astore.amazon.com\/trinities-20\/detail\/0199284598\/002-7329164-3076045\">Christian Philosophical Theology<\/a><\/em> he offers it as a straight-up proof. I guess it&#8217;s <strong>no longer playful<\/strong>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Here, then, is <strong>the argument<\/strong>:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ol class=\"wp-block-list\"><li>Necessarily, God is perfect, and perfect in love.<\/li><li>Necessarily, if God does not experience love of another, God is imperfect.<\/li><li>Therefore, necessarily, God experiences love of another. (1,2)<\/li><li>Necessarily, it is possible that only God exists (i.e. that God does not create).<\/li><li>Necessarily, if ST [social trinitarianism] is false, there is no &#8216;other&#8217; in the Godhead.<\/li><li>Necessarily, if God alone exists, and if ST is false, then God does not experience love of another, and thus is not perfect. (2,4,5)<\/li><li>Therefore, necessarily, ST is true. (4,6) (<em><a href=\"http:\/\/astore.amazon.com\/trinities-20\/detail\/0199284598\/002-7329164-3076045\">Christian Philosophical Theology<\/a><\/em>, page 65) <\/li><\/ol>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">This argument is more modest than some other attempts &#8211; he aims to prove not that there must be exactly three divine persons, but only for<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\"><p>&#8220;divine plurality or robust differentiation (&#8216;otherness&#8217;) among the Persons&#8230; to the effect that God is something like a community.&#8221;<\/p><cite>(page 66)<\/cite><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The argument seems <a href=\"http:\/\/www.jimpryor.net\/teaching\/vocab\/validity.html#valid\">valid<\/a> to me. <strong>Still, I don&#8217;t think this is a successful proof<\/strong>, even of that limited conclusion. Some critical points:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\"><li><strong>Why believe premise 2, <\/strong>that <strong>&#8220;<\/strong>Necessarily, if God does not experience love of another, God is imperfect&#8221;<strong>? Here&#8217;s the whole reason offered:<br \/><\/strong><\/li><\/ul>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\"><p>&#8220;It seems that a God who does not and cannot love another has <strong>missed out on something high and wonderful; there would be a deficiency in God<\/strong>. God would be less than perfect. (The same would be true of any great good that can logically be experienced by an omnipotent and perfectly good being; if God were not to experience beauty or justice, that would be a deficiency in God.)&#8221;<\/p><cite>(pages 66-67)<\/cite><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\"><li>This sort of argument <strong>would prove too much<\/strong>. It is a great good to be the heavenly Father presiding over a loving community of worshipful human beings. If God didn&#8217;t create, he&#8217;d lack this good. But Davis and I would agree that God would nonetheless be perfect. Again, it&#8217;s a great good to be the source of a gorgeous, amazing cosmos, teeming with life, which one beholds with satisfaction as &#8220;very good.&#8221; But we don&#8217;t want to say that God would be imperfect if he&#8217;d made nothing. There&#8217;s a <em>non sequitur<\/em> in Davis&#8217;s reasoning. <strong>Were God to have &#8220;missed out on something high and wonderful,&#8221; it doesn&#8217;t seem to follow that there would be &#8220;a deficiency in God.&#8221;<\/strong> Not all goods, not even all great goods, are such that their absence would render one imperfect, or even, less than perfectly well off. Some goods one doesn&#8217;t need for those things &#8211; for being perfect and\/or happy\/well off.<\/li><li><strong>To believe premise 2, we a reason to think the following scenario is contradictory<\/strong>: <ul><li>A uni-personal, perfect God exists, and decides not to create. He&#8217;s just there, beholding and loving himself, but not anyone else. He&#8217;s a perfectly loving being &#8211; just as much as he would be were he to whip up some creatures, so as to have an object of love beyond himself. He&#8217;s all-knowing, and so can perfectly imagine what it&#8217;s like to love another. But, he doesn&#8217;t experience an such relationship, as only He exists. <strong>God is perfect, but perfectly alone<\/strong>.<\/li><li>We have to ask: where&#8217;s the contradiction here? There doesn&#8217;t seem to be one. Nor has Davis pointed out one. <\/li><\/ul><\/li><\/ul>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\"><li>Davis urges, and rightly so, that it&#8217;s possible that God should not create &#8211; that is, he didn&#8217;t have to create anything. (pages 67-68) There&#8217;s no reason to think that an only-God scenario is impossible; better to agree, in Davis&#8217;s words, that &#8220;God is totally self-sufficient, and does not need to create.&#8221; (page 68) And obviously, if this would have been, and if a three-self or &#8220;social&#8221; Trinity theory were false, then God &#8220;would not have experienced the great good of love of another.&#8221; (page 68)<\/li><li>Just as obviously, I would add, if God were <em>not <\/em>in any personal relationship (so does not enjoy love which isn&#8217;t self-love), he would <em>want<\/em> to be. Why? Because love of another is a great good, and God is all-knowing and all-good. It doesn&#8217;t follow, though, that God would, in such a state, but unhappy, disturbed, lonely, or otherwise incomplete. No, he might still be perfect, as best we can tell.<\/li><li><strong>Consider again premise 5: &#8220;<\/strong>Necessarily, if ST [social trinitarianism] is false, there is no &#8216;other&#8217; in the Godhead.&#8221;<strong> It&#8217;s not clear we should accept this<\/strong>. What is meant by an &#8220;&#8216;other&#8217; in the Godhead.&#8221;? He says a [relationship-worthy] &#8220;other&#8221; is a &#8220;separate center of consciousness, will, and action,&#8221; and I take it he means three non-identical somethings within the divine nature or within God. Why, we can ask, does this require a <em>social<\/em> theory? Why, for instance, wouldn&#8217;t the &#8220;subsistent relations&#8221; of some &#8220;Latin&#8221; theories count, or Leftow&#8217;s three &#8220;streams in God&#8217;s life&#8221;? Might not those be &#8220;centers&#8221; as well? To be fair, Davis ultimately doesn&#8217;t think there is much different between so-called &#8220;Latin&#8221; and &#8220;social&#8221; theories. But my point is that the impact of the proof, even if it had no other problems, is lessened by the unclarity of at least two terms in premise 5: &#8220;other&#8221; and &#8220;ST.&#8221;<\/li><li>About premise 1: all theists, or at least all Christian ones, hold that God is perfect. But what is it to be <strong>&#8220;perfect in love&#8221;<\/strong>? The obvious meaning would be: a being is &#8220;perfect in love&#8221; just in case he <strong>enjoys a maximally loving character<\/strong>, that is, being disposed to act for the benefit of others &#8211; and this without deficiency. I wonder if some confuse this with the idea that God must be perfectly lov<em>ing<\/em> &#8211; i.e. loving as much as, or in all the important ways that he can. <ul><li>Such a person might infer premise 2 from premise 1. <\/li><li>But Davis doesn&#8217;t do that &#8211; he offers 2 as an independent premise. But we have reason to think 2 is false, and Davis has not given us a reason to think 2 is true.<\/li><li>On the whole then, <strong>we should that this argument is unsound<\/strong>, because premise 2 is false.<\/li><\/ul><\/li><\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Can one argue from divine perfection to a &#8220;social&#8221; Trinity?<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":253,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"default","neve_meta_container":"default","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"off","neve_meta_content_width":70,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"off","neve_meta_disable_footer":"off","neve_meta_disable_title":"off","footnotes":""},"categories":[37,91,47,9,3,43],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-254","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-apologetics","category-creation","category-papers","category-philosophy","category-theories","category-unitarianism"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/trinities.org\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/254","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/trinities.org\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/trinities.org\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/trinities.org\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/trinities.org\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=254"}],"version-history":[{"count":5,"href":"https:\/\/trinities.org\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/254\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":41987,"href":"https:\/\/trinities.org\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/254\/revisions\/41987"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/trinities.org\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/253"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/trinities.org\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=254"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/trinities.org\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=254"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/trinities.org\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=254"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}