Craig\u2019s use of \u201csupports\u201d has no precedence in the English language. Suppose there is some x<\/em>, y<\/em>, and z<\/em> such that x<\/em> supports y<\/em> and z<\/em>. Why should we infer that, therefore, y<\/em> and z<\/em> compose x<\/em>? The foundation of my house supports its walls, floors, roof, and so on, but they do not compose the foundation. The worry here is intensified by the fact that there is no use of \u201csupport\u201d and \u201ccompose\u201d in ordinary parlance such that supporting entails composing, as a look at the Oxford English Dictionary<\/em> will reveal. Without, at minimum, a stipulative definition in terms that we can understand, we have no idea what [Craig means] by \u201csupports\u201d and hence we have no idea what [Craig means] by the claim that the Persons compose the Trinity \u201cas a whole\u201d because the latter supports the former; we have no idea what proposition is expressed, we have no idea what model is proposed for our consideration. (Howard-Snyder, \u201cTrinity Monotheism<\/a>,\u201d pp. 120-121).<\/p><\/blockquote>\n And similarly in his review<\/a> of Hasker:<\/p>\n [F]ew of [Hasker\u2019s] peers, if any, will understand what he means by \u201csupport\u201d. At some level, he is aware of the problem since he seeks \u201ca more precise account of the relationship between the persons and the divine nature than is provided by the loosely defined \u2018support\u2019 relation\u201d (237). However, the problem is more acute than Hasker acknowledges since nowhere does he define it. He only says that \u201cthe term is used in the ordinary sense in which we can say that the human body\/mind\/soul…\u2018supports\u2019 the continuing conscious life of a human being\u201d (228). This is no definition, not even a \u201cloose\u201d one; nor is there any such thing as \u201cthe ordinary sense\u201d of the term \u201csupports\u201d that is used to say that \u201cthe human body \/mind\/soul supports the continuing conscious life of a human being\u201d. Thus, the primary explanatory relation posited by the first model is an explanatory surd. (review of Hasker, Metaphysics<\/em><\/a>)<\/p><\/blockquote>\n Is the \u201csupports\u201d claim Craig and Hasker make really as unintelligible as Howard-Snyder thinks? I think not. A fairly straightforward case can be made that the relevant \u201csupports\u201d relation here should be understood in terms of parts being grounded in<\/em>\u2014i.e., supported by\u2014a whole, where \u00a0a ground is a relation of non-causal ontological dependence. Here are three examples where this makes perfect sense:<\/p>\n 3. The Fabric and the Flag<\/em> So it seems to me \u201csupports\u201d is a perfectly intelligible word to use to describe the relation between a whole and its parts, where the parts are ontologically dependent on and posterior to the whole. That this is in fact how Craig understands his model is made clear by the fact that he (with Moreland) says as much in their discussion of substances earlier in Philosophical Foundations<\/em> (pp. 219-223). There they distinguish substances from \u201cproperty-things\u201d and argue that substances as wholes are ontologically prior to their parts, whereas property-things as wholes are ontologically posterior to their parts (I have a discussion of this distinction here<\/a>). If Craig\u2019s and Hasker\u2019s Trinitarian models are problematic, it is not because their use of a \u201csupports\u201d relation cannot be given intelligible meaning.<\/p>\n The problem with the claim that a substance “supports” the three divine persons is that it is incompatible with the divine perfection of aseity. It seems clear that “supports,” for Craig and Hasker, tracks ontological priority, as it does in the three examples above. “Supports,” so conceived, is an asymmetric<\/em> ontological dependence relation. But if the three divine persons asymmetrically depend for their existence on an underlying substance then they do not exist a se<\/em> and so are not perfect and so are not divine.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" Building on the substance dualist view that our own individual substance\/soul supports one mind (i.e., person), Williams, Craig, and Hasker propose models of the Trinity according to which a single trope of divinity\u2014a divine substance\/soul\u2014supports three minds (i.e., persons) in like manner. Craig relies on this claim to flesh out how three persons can be… Read More »Is “Supports” Intelligible?<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":5,"featured_media":34930,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[9,3],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-34921","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-philosophy","category-theories"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/trinities.org\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/34921","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/trinities.org\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/trinities.org\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/trinities.org\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/5"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/trinities.org\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=34921"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/trinities.org\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/34921\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":34937,"href":"https:\/\/trinities.org\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/34921\/revisions\/34937"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/trinities.org\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/34930"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/trinities.org\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=34921"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/trinities.org\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=34921"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/trinities.org\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=34921"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}![\"Peak\"](\"https:\/\/appearedtoblogly.files.wordpress.com\/2015\/01\/peak.png\")
<\/a>1. The Mountain and the Peak<\/em>
\nThe peak of a mountain ontologically depends on and is posterior to the mountain as a whole. Yet the peak of a mountain is undeniably a part of the mountain, and so (partially) composes the mountain. So understood, I see nothing untoward in saying \u201cthe mountain supports its peak.\u201d<\/p>\n![\"circle\"](\"https:\/\/appearedtoblogly.files.wordpress.com\/2015\/01\/circle.jpg\")
<\/a>2. The Circle and the Semi-Circles<\/em>
\nDraw a circle. Now draw a partitioning line creating two semi-circles. The two semi-circles ontologically depend on and are posterior to the circle as a whole. Yet the two semi-circles are undeniably parts of the circle, and so compose it. So understood, I see nothing untoward in saying \u201cthe circle supports its semi-circles.\u201d<\/p>\n
\n![\"Flag\"](\"https:\/\/appearedtoblogly.files.wordpress.com\/2015\/01\/flag.jpg\")
<\/a>A piece of fabric constitutes a flag<\/em> in flag-favorable circumstances (e.g., certain arrangements of colors, patterns, and symbols). The flag ontologically depends on and is posterior to the fabric, yet the flag is constituted by the fabric. Arguably, we might even say the flag is a part (albeit an improper part) of the fabric. So understood, I see nothing untoward in saying \u201cthe fabric supports the flag.\u201d<\/p>\n