{"id":35402,"date":"2015-05-26T14:36:09","date_gmt":"2015-05-26T18:36:09","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/trinities.org\/blog\/?p=35402"},"modified":"2015-06-01T13:39:53","modified_gmt":"2015-06-01T17:39:53","slug":"dialogue-with-the-maverick-philosopher-god-is-a-being-not-being-itself-part-5","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/trinities.org\/blog\/dialogue-with-the-maverick-philosopher-god-is-a-being-not-being-itself-part-5\/","title":{"rendered":"Dialogue with the Maverick Philosopher: God is a being, not Being itself \u2013 part 5"},"content":{"rendered":"

\"pleaseIn the most recent post<\/a> in this series, I plunged into some metaphysical issues about God, essence, existence, and necessity. As promised, I now discuss why is it impossible that God doesn\u2019t exist<\/strong>.<\/p>\n

Let me start by saying that I know I’m out on a speculative limb<\/strong> here. This is uncertain business, metaphysics. But I’m going to state my views forthrightly. Refute them if you can, and if you do, I’ll thank you for showing me where I’ve gone wrong.<\/p>\n

Now Bill and others influenced by Thomism, wants to say that the best and\/or only explanation<\/strong> of God’s necessity is that in God, essence and existence are the same. Whereas, e.g. in a kitty, essence and existence are different<\/strong>, and so in principle could be separated, resulting in the annihilation of the kitty, in God, essence and existence are one and the same, and so in principle can’t be separated. You can’t separate a thing from itself.<\/p>\n

Well, that last part is obviously true<\/strong>. If A just is B, then it is not possible that they exist and not be in that (reflexive, transitive, and asymmetrical) relation of identity. And I also agree that these are coherent concepts: necessarily existing<\/em>, and necessarily existing because of something else<\/em>. And I agree that God is supposed to satisfy the first concept but not the second.<\/p>\n

\"getBut where I get off the bus is this<\/strong>. I don’t grant that it is coherent to suppose that anything’s essence just is<\/em> its existence. I don’t grant that it is possible that there could be something whose essence just is its existence.<\/p>\n

I suppose that “essence” and “existence”<\/strong> here are each\u00a0 supposed to name something intrinsic to a thing, sort of like an individual property of a thing. The cat’s “essence<\/strong>” is ways it absolutely has to be, as a cat; it is its essential properties. The “essence” is supposed to be whatever it is because of which the cat can’t change into, say, a potato, or a dog, or a rock. The “existence<\/strong>” or being or esse<\/em> of the cat is supposed to be that in virtue of which there is that particular cat. If the cat is Fluffy, then Fluffy’s “being” is supposed to be that because of which Fluffy exists. Now one can quibble about quite how to express all of this, e.g. whether to call a thing’s existence its “property.” But the key claims<\/strong>, I take it, are that essence is that because of which the thing can and can’t change (or exist) in certain ways, and that the existence of a thing is its existing, or that because of which it is true to say that the thing in question exists or is real.<\/p>\n

What seems impossible to me<\/strong> is that something’s essence could just be its existence. If the one just is the other, then by the indiscernibility of identicals<\/a>, they can’t differ in any way – whatever is true of one, must be true of the other. But necessarily, it seems to me, something will be true of a thing’s essence which fails to be true of<\/strong> its existence, or vice versa.<\/p>\n

Fail #1<\/strong><\/p>\n

    \n
  1. Fluffy’s existence explains why Fluffy exists.<\/li>\n
  2. Fluffy’s existence just is her essence.<\/li>\n
  3. Therefore, Fluffy’s essence (i.e. catness<\/em>) explains why Fluffy exists.\"kitten<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

    No, it doesn’t. Also, I don’t think that 1 is true. But if<\/em> 1 is true, then since we know 3 to be false, we would have a reason to deny 2.<\/p>\n

    Fail #2<\/strong><\/p>\n

      \n
    1. Fluffy’s essence explains why it is natural for her to purr.<\/li>\n
    2. Fluffy’s essence just is her existence.<\/li>\n
    3. Fluffy’s existence explains why it is natural for her to purr.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

      No, it doesn’t. As the argument is valid and we know that 3 is false, we have a reason to deny at least one of the premises. 1 seems true to me; it’s part of being a cat<\/em>, of catness<\/em>, that it is natural to the thing to purr.<\/p>\n

      I don’t see why things should be different in the case of God<\/strong>. One can assert<\/em> that this is different in the case of God, that in God’s case only, being and essence are one and the same. But I don’t see any reason to think it is so, other than than we need a reason<\/strong> to think that God is necessary and not because of another. But theoretical need can’t get around evident impossibility.<\/p>\n

      Fail #3?<\/strong><\/p>\n

        \n
      1. God’s existence explains why God exists.<\/li>\n
      2. God’s existence just is his essence.<\/li>\n
      3. Therefore, God’s essence (i.e. deity) explains why God exists.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

        Here, I don’t<\/em> think that the conclusion is false. I think 3 is true, as I’ll explain in the next post. But that doesn’t mean I think the argument is sound. I’m inclined to think that both premises are false. But all I need for my purpose here, which is to argue that nothing’s essence can possibly be the same as its existence, is this clear fail:<\/p>\n

        Fail #4 <\/strong><\/p>\n

          \n
        1. God’s essence explains why God can’t be ignorant.<\/li>\n
        2. God’s essence just is his existence.<\/li>\n
        3. Therefore, God’s existence explains why God can’t be ignorant.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

          No, it doesn’t. 3 is false. Clearly though, the argument is valid. And 1 is true. Deity<\/em> is understood to imply omniscience<\/em>. And omniscience<\/em> rules out being ignorant of any fact, truth, or reality. The culprit must be 2, then. It seems that 2 is false.<\/p>\n

          The upshot is that even in the case of God, there will be some respect(s) in which his essence differs from his existence<\/strong>. Thus, by the indiscernibility of identicals, God’s being can’t just be (be numerically identical to) God’s essence (and vice-versa).<\/p>\n

          Maybe there are other responses, but the most obvious response I can imagine to Fail #4<\/strong> is for someone to just bite the bullet<\/a> and insist that 3 is true. I think the only reason one would have for accepting #3 (in our last argument above) is that one already accepted the theory that in God, being just is essence and vice-versa. But if you’re thinking that God’s existence is merely a fact involving God, or an aspect of God, a respect in which God is similar to any other real entity, then 3 will seem false to you.<\/p>\n

          We may be at an impasse<\/strong> here. A person may just be so loyal to Catholic tradition that he’s just going to accept that in God being just is essence because the tradition says so. But here’s one last pass at the disagreement.<\/p>\n

          Note that in 1 and 3 in our last argument, we’re explaining why something can’t be. To do this, we need to show how that scenario includes or implies a contradiction<\/strong>. We can do that with 1. Suppose that God is ignorant. This implies that God exists, and background assumptions include that God’s essence is divinity<\/em>, and that divinity<\/em> implies omniscient<\/em>. But it is self-evident that knowing all rules out being ignorant to any degree. Thus, in the scenario at hand, God is ignorant, and it is not the case that God is ignorant. We can’t<\/em> coherently suppose that God is ignorant. Here the contradiction is revealed by God’s essence, by God’s divinity, which includes omniscience.<\/p>\n

          We can formally derive a contradiction<\/strong> from the assumptions we’re handed.<\/p>\n

            \n
          1. God’s essence is divinity<\/em>.<\/li>\n
          2. Divinity<\/em> includes omniscience<\/em>.<\/li>\n
          3. God is ignorant.<\/li>\n
          4. God is divine. (1)<\/li>\n
          5. God is omniscient. (2)<\/li>\n
          6. It is not the case that God is ignorant. (5)<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

            This shows that 1-3 are not consistent with one another. Supposing 1-3 leads to a contradiction, namely 3 and 6, which are of the form P and not-P. Thus, at least one of 1-3 is false.<\/p>\n

            Contrast this with 3 in Fail # 4 above<\/strong>. What needs explaining is that God can’t be ignorant. What do we have to do the explaining? Just that God exists. That’s not enough. It’s not enough to show where there is a contradiction in imagined situation of God’s being ignorant. Think: how would you continue the proof below, so as to derive a contradiction? 4 certainly doesn’t follow from 2 alone. Nor does it seem to follow from 1 alone, or from 1 and 2 together. What must be added?<\/p>\n

              \n
            1. God exists.<\/li>\n
            2. God is ignorant.<\/li>\n
            3. ???<\/li>\n
            4. It is not the case that God is ignorant.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

              You’re going to have to add in additional facts<\/em> about God, right? Such as: that God is divine. But then, God’s existence alone is not<\/em> enough<\/strong> to explain why it is impossible for God to be ignorant. But his essence does<\/em> explain that, as we showed in the previous proof. So, his essence ain’t his existence.<\/p>\n

              Next time, I try to give a different reason for thinking that God can’t not exist.<\/em><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

              In the most recent post in this series, I plunged into some metaphysical issues about God, essence, existence, and necessity. As promised, I now discuss why is it impossible that God doesn\u2019t exist. Let me start by saying that I know I’m out on a speculative limb here. This is uncertain business, metaphysics. But I’m… Read More »Dialogue with the Maverick Philosopher: God is a being, not Being itself \u2013 part 5<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":35405,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[63,9],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-35402","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-being","category-philosophy"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/trinities.org\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/35402","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/trinities.org\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/trinities.org\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/trinities.org\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/trinities.org\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=35402"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/trinities.org\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/35402\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":35471,"href":"https:\/\/trinities.org\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/35402\/revisions\/35471"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/trinities.org\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/35405"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/trinities.org\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=35402"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/trinities.org\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=35402"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/trinities.org\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=35402"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}