{"id":42205,"date":"2020-02-25T22:22:08","date_gmt":"2020-02-26T04:22:08","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/trinities.org\/blog\/?p=42205"},"modified":"2020-03-22T23:07:22","modified_gmt":"2020-03-23T04:07:22","slug":"a-oneness-response-to-the-challenge-to-jesus-is-god-apologists","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/trinities.org\/blog\/a-oneness-response-to-the-challenge-to-jesus-is-god-apologists\/","title":{"rendered":"a Oneness response to the Challenge to “Jesus is God” apologists"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

Blogger Tre Brickley has posted a response<\/a> to my Challenge to “Jesus is God” apologists<\/a><\/strong>. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

I don’t know much about Mr. Brickley, other than that he’s trying to find truth, which is good, and that he is not afraid to change his mind<\/a>, which is also good. The argument, which I have urged that even a trinitarian should agree<\/strong> is sound is:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

  1. God and Jesus differ.<\/li>
  2. Things which differ are two (i.e., are not numerically identical).<\/li>
  3. Therefore, God and Jesus are two (not numerically identical). (1,2)<\/li>
  4. For any x and y, x and y are the same god only if x and y are not<\/em> two (i.e., are<\/em> numerically identical).<\/li>
  5. Therefore, God and Jesus are not the same god. (3,4)<\/li>
  6. There is only one god.<\/li>
  7. Therefore, either God is not a god, or Jesus is not a god. (5,6)<\/li>
  8. God is a god.<\/li>
  9. Therefore, Jesus is not a god. (7,8)<\/li><\/ol>\n\n\n\n
    \"\"<\/figure><\/div>\n\n\n\n

    He remarks that some Oneness apologists would deny 2<\/strong>, but he doesn’t want to do that. Again, this is good, as 2 is a self-evident truth<\/a> that can’t reasonably be denied. Some hapless evangelical apologists have tried this ill-advised response as well. But’s it’s like denying that no triangle has four sides. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

    I think our friend is also correct in shying away from denying the other premises: 1, 6, and 8. Like philosopher James Anderson<\/a>, he chooses to deny premise 4<\/strong>. But Mr. Brickley’s reason is:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    I think there is a very strong Scriptural reason to deny this premise. My argument is this: The OT records that God has revealed Himself multiple times in ways that can be classified as \u201cnumerically distinct\u201d.<\/strong> I am thinking of the so-called \u201ctheophanies\u201d.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

    But this is not a good reason to deny 4.<\/strong> A theophany is not a god, but rather an appearance of<\/em> a god. Conceivably, one god might appear in various ways at various times and places, and according to scripture God has done exactly that. Sure, one appearance is numerically distinct from other appearances of that same God. There would be a similar general truth that would apply to theophanies: for any x and any y, x and y are the same theophany only if x is a theophany, y is a theophany, and x = y (i.e. the one appearance just is the other appearance). That seems to be true, but so does 4. They’re both instances of a more general principle, that things can be the same F only if the first thing’s an F, the second thing is also an F, and the first thing just is the second thing (so really, there’s numerically one thing here). This general principle seems obviously true, yes? But then, so do specific instances of it, such as the two just given. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

    To put the point abstractly: 4 concerns the “is” of numerical identity (e.g. “Paul is <\/em>Saul”), not the “is” of manifestation (e.g. “Did you hear that shout? That is <\/em>the lost hiker!”) <\/p>\n\n\n\n

    He then offers an argument against my premise 4.<\/strong> It’s an attempt and a reduction to absurdity; he wants to show that 4 implies a contradiction, and so is false. With a few small clarifications, his argument is:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    1. Suppose it is true that \u201cFor any x and y, x and y are the same god only if x and y are not<\/em> two (i.e., are<\/em> numerically identical).\u201d (assumption to be refuted as implying an absurdity – premise 4 in the Challenge)<\/li>
    2. Things which differ are two (i.e., are not numerically identical). (premise)<\/li>
    3. There were differences between God and the theophany in Genesis 18. (biblical premise)<\/li>
    4. Therefore, God and the theophany are two (i.e., are not numerically identical). (2,3)<\/li><\/ol>\n\n\n\n

      So far if we grant 3, this is a sound argument. In the broadest sense of “thing” God and this theophany of his are<\/em> two things. One is a god and the other is an appearance of a god. But the argument continues,<\/p>\n\n\n\n

      5. It is false that the theophany is the same god as God. (1, 4)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

      Right, because the theophany isn’t a god at all, so it can’t be the same god as God. It’s merely an appearance of a god. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

      6. It is true that the theophany is the same god as God. (premise)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

      7. Therefore, it is not true that \u201cFor any x and y, x and y are the same god only if x and y are not<\/em> two (i.e., are<\/em> numerically identical).\u201d (5,6)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

      The problem is that no one should accept his 6<\/strong>. It’s a mistake to think that an appearance of a man is itself a man. Just so, we ought not confuse an appearance of a god with that god himself. The reduction to absurdity doesn’t work, because the proponent of 1 doesn’t<\/em> also have to accept 6. So it hasn’t been shown that 1 implies a contradiction. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

      In support of his premise 6, he says,<\/p>\n\n\n\n

      From the very definition of \u201ctheophany\u201d I think it is clear that this is true.<\/strong> The theophany is God Himself. The text says that \u201cthe LORD (Yahweh) appeared to Abraham\u201d (verse 1). Throughout the passage, it is \u201cthe LORD\u201d that is speaking. After the purpose for which the theophany occurred was served, the text says \u201cthe LORD\u2026departed\u201d (verse 33). Therefore, I think premise 6 is true.  <\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

      The theophany in question is AN APPEARANCE OF God himself. Right. But we can’t collapse together these<\/strong> two things: God and this appearance of God. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

      Why? Because there are differences between them, e.g. this appearance lasts for 30 minutes (or whatever) but God is eternal. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

      Notice that response of mine doesn’t, as he supposes, “deny the concept of theophany.\u201d I take it that be this he means claim that theophanies are impossible. No, that’s not what I’m saying. I’m just analyzing the concept of a theophany<\/strong>. I think they are both possible and actual. He supposes that his premise 6 is simply implied by scripture. But I would urge that we should not project this confusion onto those authors. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

      He continues,<\/p>\n\n\n\n

      As for denying premise 6, one would have to radically allegorize the language of the Scriptures in order to sustain this route. It says \u201cthe LORD appeared\u201d and in the form of \u201ca man\u201d no less. I invite the reader to review Genesis 18 in its entirety and judge for themselves if it seems reasonable to think this theophany is someone other than YHWH Himself. <\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

      A theophany – an appearance – is not identical to<\/em> any “someone.” But by definition a theophany is<\/strong> an appearance of a god. Not a god, but an appearance<\/em> of<\/em> a god. No allegorization necessary. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

      Here’s an analogy. Remember this scene from the original Star Wars?<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

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