{"id":997,"date":"2009-07-14T13:53:15","date_gmt":"2009-07-14T17:53:15","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/trinities.org\/blog\/?p=997"},"modified":"2009-07-14T22:45:00","modified_gmt":"2009-07-15T02:45:00","slug":"richard-of-st-victor-a-proposed-constitutional-trinitarian-taxonomy-scott","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/trinities.org\/blog\/richard-of-st-victor-a-proposed-constitutional-trinitarian-taxonomy-scott\/","title":{"rendered":"Richard of St. Victor 8 – A Proposed Constitutional Trinitarian Taxonomy (Scott)"},"content":{"rendered":"
\"Yeah!!
Yeah!! It just might be that constitutional theories are on the rise. Thanks Rick St. Vick!<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

Richard of St. Victor is well known for talking about love<\/strong>, and how awesome it is. It might surprise a few people who have only read the popular English translation of Book 3 (the love\/ethics? book) that On the Trinity<\/em> contains six books<\/strong>. The English translation has brought attention to what some contemporary (continental-esque) philosophers would call Richard\u2019s \u2018erotics\u2019. What remains to be seen is whatever he says in Books 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6. In this post I\u2019d like to focus on one theme in these other books, which I\u2019ll call Richard\u2019s Constitutional Latin Trinitarianism <\/em>(= CLT<\/strong>). At the start I must say that I am claiming that Richard suggests a constitutional model of the Trinity and not that he straightforwardly proposes one. At least, Richard can be read to propose such a model<\/strong>–after all, certain later scholastics like Henry of Ghent seem to have read Richard in that way.<\/p>\n

In what follows I give a taxonomy\u00a0 of constitutional Trinitarian theories<\/strong>. I do not say this is an exhaustive taxonomy; nevertheless it helps to isolate the sort of constitutional model that I think can be read off of books 1, 2, 4, and 5.<\/p>\n

Genus<\/strong>: Constitutional Models<\/em>. Every divine person is constituted by two concrete properties, the divine substance and a unique distinguishing personal property.<\/strong><\/p>\n

Species1<\/strong>: For each divine person there is numerically one divinity. (Three persons, three divinities.) E.g., social\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 trinitarianism.
\n<\/strong><\/p>\n

Species2<\/strong>: There is numerically one divine substance. (Three persons, one divine substance).
\n<\/strong><\/p>\n

Sub-Species1<\/strong>: Material Constitution Model<\/em>. Divine persons are the same in virtue of having the divine substance essentially, and the divine substance is like a subject of essential accidental forms.<\/p>\n

Difference1:<\/strong> Material Constitution Derivation Model<\/a><\/em>. The Father is identical to the divine substance, and the Son and Holy Spirit have the divine substance derivatively. Hence, there are two essential accidental forms that inhere in the divine substance.<\/p>\n

Difference2<\/strong>: Material Constitution Generic Model<\/a><\/em>. No divine person is identical to the divine substance. Hence, every divine person has the divine substance in a unique way analogous to three essential accidental forms of the same substance.<\/p>\n

Sub-species2<\/strong>: Non-Material Constitution Model<\/em>. Divine persons are the same in virtue of having the divine substance essentially, and the divine substance is like an immanent universal nature and not like a subject of accidents.<\/p>\n

Difference1<\/strong>: Non-Material Constitution Derivation Model<\/em>. The Father is identical to the divine substance, and the Son and Holy Spirit each have the divine substance essentially and derivatively in a unique way.<\/p>\n

Difference2<\/strong>: Non-Material Constitution Generic Model<\/em>: No divine person is identical to the divine substance. Every divine person essentially has the divine substance in a unique way.<\/p>\n

My proposed interpretation of Richard of St. Victor is as follows:
\nGenus: Constitution Model
\nSpecies: Numerically one divine substance.
\nSub-Species: Non-material constitution
\nSpecific Difference: Generic model of the divine substance<\/p>\n

I should mention what I take to be a similarity btwn. the material and non-material constitutional models. There is a certain job to be done in each theory to account for how the same divine substance is a constituent of every divine person. This addresses the Christian claim that there is one God, one Creator, one Lord, etc.<\/p>\n

On the one hand, the material constitution model proposed by Brower and Rea employs the “sameness without identity” thesis<\/a>. On the other hand, on my read of Richard’s metaphysics of the Trinity he supposes the divine substance is a singular existing non-divisible universal nature, what Richard Cross has aptly called (in discussing Duns Scotus’s theory) the divine substance’s “being exemplifiable”. If we think the divine substance is exemplifiable, then it cannot be numerically divided up, but it can be a constituent of more than one divine person<\/em>. Being exemplifiable is a peculiar way that a universal is communicable to many. Another way that a universal is communicable to many is if it is instantiable, then it divisible into numerically distinct occurrences<\/em>. Richard of St. Victor seems to think of creaturely essences as instantiable, and he in effect denies that the divine substance is instantiable<\/strong>. So, it would seem that we could detect a sameness without identity thesis in Richard too<\/strong>–although it wouldn’t be along the lines of a material constitution model, b\/c he doesn’t think of the divine substance like a substance that bears accidental forms (essentially). Nevertheless, on Richard’s view the divine substance is one existing thing that constitutes several divine persons<\/strong>.<\/p>\n

Now, what of the personal properties<\/strong>? If a common nature is instantiable, then an instantiated nature entails a non-instantiable personal property<\/strong>; if a common nature is exemplifiable, then the exemplified common nature entails a non-exemplifiable personal property<\/strong>. So, to Richard of St. Victor’s mind, the personal properties are (in effect) non-exemplifiable (what he calls “incommunicable”). Whether or not these personal properties are relations or absolute properties is irrelevant here. What matters is that on Richard’s view every divine person is (in effect) constituted by the divine substance (and since the divine substance is a constituent of every divine person we can say it is ‘a common property’) and by a non-exemplifiable personal property which distinguishes the persons from one another.<\/p>\n

One last comparison. On the material and non-material constitutional theories, I take it that both affirm the following:<\/p>\n

The name \u2018God\u2019 is not a proper personal name, since Father, Son, and Holy Spirit equally satisfy it. Hence, the name \u2018God\u2019 does not signify this person<\/em>, but a certain person<\/em>, namely the Father, the Son, or the Holy Spirit. (Of course, you could also use the name \u2018God\u2019 at once to refer to Father, Son, and Holy Spirit; but this grammar might lead away from a constitution account of the Triune God).<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

Consider the following suggestive passage from Richard of St. Victor\u2019s On the Trinity<\/em> Book 4.16 ln.35-49:<\/p>\n

It should be kept in mind that existence designates substantial being, but sometimes [a substantial being] from what is common, and other times [a substantial being] from what is an incommunicable property. However, we say a common existence when it is understood to obtain from [1] a common property<\/strong>. But [we say] incommunicable when it is understood to obtain from [2] an incommunicable property<\/strong>. In truth [3] it is proper to the divine substance<\/strong> not to be from some other substance (but only from itself), and in truth [4] it is proper to the person that does not have an origin not to be from some other person. On the one hand, [1.1] [the divine substance] is understood [as] a common property, but on the other hand [4.1] [not-having-an-origin-from-another-person] is an incommunicable property. For it is common to all divine persons to be this substance which is not from some other substance but from itself. Therefore when the divine substance is said or understood to be from itself, [5] the same [property] is common to the existing [persons].<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

In [1] I take Richard to posit a concrete property<\/strong>; from Book 1 he gives a cosmological argument to the effect that the divine substance can only be numerically one. This property is ‘common’–that is, it is (and so can be) a constituent of more than one divine person.<\/p>\n

In [2] I take Richard to posit an incommunicable property, which is a personal property. A personal property belongs (and can belong) only to one person.<\/p>\n

In [3] I take Richard to posit that the divine substance as such depends on no other substance for its being. Hence, the singular exemplifiable divine substance<\/strong> has the [abstract] property does not depend on another substance<\/em><\/strong>.<\/p>\n

In [4] I take Richard to be talking about the Father, and he attributes to the Father the incommunicable property does<\/em> <\/strong>not depend on any other _person_ for his existenc<\/strong>e<\/em>. However, the [abstract] property does not depend on another _substance_<\/strong> <\/em>is not an incommunicable property of the Father or any divine person. In [5] Richard makes clear that the [abstract] property not being from another substance<\/em> is common to every divine person. So, it is not unique to the Father to not depend on another substance<\/em>.<\/p>\n

In [5] Richard concludes by saying the [abstract] property not being from another substance<\/em> is common to every divine person. The reason it is common to all persons is because the singular divine substance, which is not from another substance<\/em>, is an essential constituent of every divine person.<\/p>\n

By inference, no divine person is identical to the divine substance (cf. [1], [5]). In On the Trinity<\/em> Book 4.8 Richard makes clear that every divine person is constituted by two properties, a common property and an incommunicable property, or what (borrowing from Richard Cross) I call an exemplifiable immanent universal, and a non-exemplifiable personal property.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Richard of St. Victor is well known for talking about love, and how awesome it is. It might surprise a few people who have only read the popular English translation of Book 3 (the love\/ethics? book) that On the Trinity contains six books. The English translation has brought attention to what some contemporary (continental-esque) philosophers… Read More »Richard of St. Victor 8 – A Proposed Constitutional Trinitarian Taxonomy (Scott)<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":1001,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[18,14,9,13,3],"tags":[42,30,31,40,22],"class_list":["post-997","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-guest-posts","category-history","category-philosophy","category-theologians","category-theories","tag-constitutional-latin-trinitarianism","tag-derivation-view","tag-generic-view","tag-richard-of-st-victor","tag-trinity"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/trinities.org\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/997","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/trinities.org\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/trinities.org\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/trinities.org\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/trinities.org\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=997"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/trinities.org\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/997\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":1014,"href":"https:\/\/trinities.org\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/997\/revisions\/1014"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/trinities.org\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/1001"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/trinities.org\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=997"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/trinities.org\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=997"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/trinities.org\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=997"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}