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Linkage: Disproving the existence of Hooloovoo? (Dale)

photo by Ieuan Jenkins - http://www.flickr.com/photos/dijitali/3083227540/

Hooloovoo - as pictured by photographer Ieuan Jenkins.

In a well-argued recent guest post and follow up comment, Greg Spendlove argued that for all we know, there could be a property (feature) which is also a person / self / personal being.

As I explain in my comments there, I’m not convinced -  I think we’re on firm ground to deny the alleged possibility, but I loved his example of Hooloovoo – author Douglas Adam’s “hyperintelligent shade of blue”.

Thanks to Ieuan for the use of his beautiful photos here. When I found them, I thought they were a great picture of a Hooloovoo. I’m not sure that’s right, though. A shade of blue is a universal, but the blue thing in any of the pics is a particular (mass of water and ink) or at least a group of particulars. According to the theory of universals, it or they would “instantiate” the shade of blue property, the universal. So, what is in the picture, would not be Hooloovoo himself, but would rather be an instance or instantiation of him. Maybe also an incarnation of him?

Greg also mentioned this contest at the Matters of Substance blog: Alex Pruss is offering the princely sum of $50 in Amazon currency for the best argument that no property is a person.

It seems that Alex is gearing up to take on the strongest entries. Good luck with that! :-)

Not believing in properties, I can’t get too excited about the contest myself; as Alex points out, if there are no properties, then there isn’t any property which is also a self. But I must say that on the assumption of realism about (universal) properties, a number of the arguments strike me as very plausible – so much so that it’d be difficult for a theological argument (that a person is a property) to be as plausible.

Posted 07 February 2010 † Dale § Christology § Linkage § Philosophy ‡ Comments (0) °

Linkage: Vallicella and Lukas on Supposita (Dale)

No, suppositUM - settle down, kitty!

Thanks to Vlastimil Vohánka for referring us to this discussion between Maverick Philosopher Bill Vallicella and Dr. Lukas Novak of Charles University, Prague.

As I understand it, a suppositum is supposed to be an ultimate subject of characteristics / properties, as distinct from non-ultimate subjects. My individual human nature is supposed to be suppositum, but Christ’s is not.

One ought to be a little suspicious of this supposita theory, as apparently it was originally formulated just to deal with Incarnation difficulties, that is, to come up with a coherent reading of the creed of Chalcedon. Apart from this, apparently it’s hard to come up with any metaphysical work for this theory to do.

I confess that I don’t understand how this concept is being applied to come up with a consistent Trinity theory. Should I add a section to the entry?

Dr. Novak says,

Regarding my place in the classification of trinitarian theories in the SEP: frankly, it seems to me that the traditional orthodox position (which I hope I maintain :-) ) is not listed. It is located somewhere under the “Latin trinitarianism”, but none of the modern attempts to capture it seems to do justice to it.

I think, based on what he says in that comment, he’s what I call a negative mysterian, although with some more metaphysical speculations added than the ancient “fathers” thought possible or advisable. As I think of it, mysterianism comes in both kinds and degrees, and is usually combined with another, apparently more positive Trinity theory.

Posted 04 February 2010 † Dale § Theories ‡ Comments (14) °

Richard of St. Victor’s De Trinitate, Ch. 22 – part 2 (Dale)

Last time I tried to analyze Richard’s argument in ch. 22 that his view preserves monotheism. This time, I critically evaluate the argument. Is it sound?

It goes like this:

  1. There can be at most one omnipotent being. (premise)
  2. No being can have more than one token of any property. (premise)
  3. At most one token of omnipotence can exist. (2,3)
  4. Any token of omnipotence is the same as any token of divinity. (divine simplicity)
  5. At most one  token of divinity can exist. (3,4)
  6. No token property can be had by more than one being. (premise)
  7. There is at most one God. (5,6)

What shall we make of this argument? Why believe premise 1? Richard says,

…if it is agreed that omnipotence can do everything, it will be able to carry out with ease what any other power would not be able to do. For this reason it is clear that only one omnipotence can exist. (ch. 22, p. 394)

I have a couple of problems with this. Continue Reading »

Posted 30 January 2010 † Dale § History § Monotheism § Philosophy ‡ Comments (0) °

Guest Post: Greg Spendlove on Logos Christology

Below is a guest post by Greg Spendlove, who is an adjunct philosophy instructor at Salt Lake Community College. He received his Master of Arts in Christian Thought with an emphasis in Systematic Theology and a cognate in Philosophy of Religion from Trinity International University in Deerfield, IL in 2005. His Master’s thesis was entitled “A Critical Study of the Life and Thought of Brahmabandhab Upadhyay” and critically assessed Brahmabandhab’s attempt to reconcile Christian theology as expressed by Aquinas with Shankara’s Advaita Vedanta.

In this post, Greg responds here to my recent post: On Logos Christology Subordinationism, which followed up A Gnome’s Tale.  I added my weird style of bolding to it. – Dale

I see a couple of objections here.

First, I’m not exactly sure why it’s contradictory for one and the same thing to be another thing’s power at an earlier time and a thing with its own power at a later time. It certainly doesn’t affirm and deny the exact same thing. I think this may have to be fleshed out a bit more.

What it we changed it to something like “It’s impossible for one and the same thing to be the power of another thing and a thing with its own power at the same time.” But even this isn’t explicitly contradictory. And I’m not sure how to make it so.

Secondly, both of the principles above just seem to be plainly false. Take the second one. If it were true, it would seem that it would be impossible for me to ride my bicycle. For, when I ride my bicycle, I am the power of my bicycle and a thing with its own power at the same time. But, of course, it’s not impossible for me to ride my bicycle. I just did it the other day. (Okay, not really! I actually sold it two years ago.) :-)

As for the first principle, consider the following scenario with the Wonder Twins.

Zan and Jayna touch hands and say “Wonder Twin powers, activate.” Jayna then says “Shape of a radio.” Zan says “Form of electricity.” Zan then enters Janya and music starts playing. After listening to their favorite song they transform back into Zan and Janya proper to finish their ping-pong game.

If I learned anything watching the Wonder Twins as a kid , it’s that things like this are possible. And, if that is the case then it seems that it is possible for something to be the power of one thing at an earlier time and then a thing with its own power at a later time.

Posted 27 January 2010 † Dale § Christology § History § Philosophy ‡ Comments (8) °

Richard of St. Victor’s De Trinitate, Ch. 22 – part 1 (Dale)

Has Richard, after these 21 chapters so far of Book III of his On the Trinity (De Trinitate) only succeeded in proving that there are at least three gods? In chapter 22, Richard argues for a negative answer.

First, he refers back to the doctrine of divine simplicity, which is common coin for medieval theists, even, surprisingly, for trinitarians. This needs explaining nowadays – theists now tend to think of God’s nature as something he has, and of God as having, and not being, his attributes. Moreover, we tend to think that God has many attributes.

For a primer on divine simplicity, I can do no better than Bill Vallicella:

[According to this doctrine] God is radically unlike creatures in that he is devoid of any complexity or composition, whether physical or metaphysical. Besides lacking spatial and temporal parts, God is free of matter/form composition, potency/act composition, and existence/essence composition. There is also no real distinction between God as subject of his attributes and his attributes. God is thus in a sense requiring clarification identical to each of his attributes, which implies that each attribute is identical to every other one. God is omniscient, then, not in virtue of instantiating or exemplifying omniscience — which would imply a real distinction between God and the property of omniscience — but by being omniscience. And the same holds for each of the divine omni-attributes: God is what he has. As identical to each of his attributes, God is identical to his nature. And since his nature or essence is identical to his existence, God is identical to his existence. (William Vallicella, “Divine Simplicity”, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

Richard starts ch. 22 by gesturing back at book I of De Trinitate – his point is that this divine being/essence/nature common to the three is utterly simple. Yet he realizes that this by itself won’t soothe the concern about monotheism. How can we rule out that there are three gods, each of which has is an utterly simple, composition free being? Then he hits on an additional argument. Continue Reading »

Posted 23 January 2010 † Dale § Heresy & Orthodoxy § History § Monotheism ‡ Comments (6) °

Richard of St. Victor’s De Trinitate, Ch. 21 (Dale)

In the preceding chapters, Richard has been arguing for the impossibility of only one divine person. If there’s one, there must be more than one; more than that, there must be at least three.

To do this, he’s used Anselmian perfect being theology – arguing that since God is absolutely perfect, and it would add to his perfection to have certain features, he must indeed have those. It seems that he prefers a three parallel arguments, from perfect goodness, perfect happiness, and perfect glory. (See, e.g. chapter 5.)

As the book goes on, though, it seems to me that he prefers the argument from happiness. Here, in chapter 21, he sums up his case, because he feels some pressure here at the end of the book  to explain why all this should be considered monotheism, and not polytheism. More on that next time. Here’s what looks like his summary of his argument:

The fullness of supreme happiness requires fullness of supreme pleasure. The fullness of supreme pleasure requires fullness of supreme charity. The fullness of supreme charity demands fullness of supreme perfection. (p. 393)

This last part isn’t easy to see, but as we’ve been over it, I let it go here. In chapter 21, Richard assumes that perfect being reasoning should be applied to each member of the Trinity. If we do this,  then we prove the existence of equally perfect beings, such that “all coincide in supreme equality. In all of them there will be equal wisdom, equal power, undifferentiated glory, uniform goodness, and eternal happiness…” (pp. 393-4, emphasis added)

This, he asserts, meets the requirement of the “Athanasian” creed, Continue Reading »

Posted 21 January 2010 † Dale § Heresy & Orthodoxy § History § Philosophy ‡ Comments (0) °

On Logos christology subordinationism (Dale)

God's expression of his eternal Word - a highly technical and precise diagram.

God's expression of his eternal Word - a highly technical and precise diagram.

Now, for a quick break in our Richard of St. Victor series, so that I can explain the point of my  implausible yarn about a gnome.  Tertullian, Irenaeus, and other late-2nd and early 3rd century catholic thinkers subscribed to what we can all the Logos theory.  This christological theory has three main elements:
  1. God’s internal Word (logos) always existed within God.
  2. At some time just prior to creation, God expressed his Word, so that it was now a he, a helper, an agent alongside God.
  3. Having done this, through Wisdom (logos) God created the cosmos.
The idea – the Word has always been around, so is co-eternal with God, and is divine, because he is “from” God, and in some sense “the same stuff” as God. The crucial assumption here is that the “Word” of John 1 and the “Wisdom” of Proverbs 8 are each just Jesus, numerically the same person as Jesus (but in his pre-incarnate, non-bodily and non-human state).  Biblically, this is all founded an Proverbs 8 and John 1.
In my view, it runs into serious problems Continue Reading »
Posted 19 January 2010 † Dale § Bible § Christology § Heresy & Orthodoxy § History § Incarnation ‡ Comments (5) °

Richard of St. Victor’s De Trinitate, Ch. 20 (Dale)

three loves graphicAs Joseph explained in his last post, in his On the Trinity, Richard of St. Victor asserts the superiority of “shared love” (Latin: condilectus). He holds that it is superior to other loves in value and in the pleasure it involves. He’s imagining something like my chart on the left.

Look at the bottom case, and how the love arrows combine; this seems to be what Richard is imagining (see the quote in the last post). I don’t think it’s coherent, really – affections, or individual love-acts can’t literally fuse. Nor do I understand any non-literal way they can be said to “fuse”.

Still, I’m inclined to agree with Joseph and with Richard Swinburne that there is a unique value in lovers cooperating to love a third party. This is something we recognize, I think, in Mom and Dad’s love for junior, or even in “best friends” graciously including an excluded girl within their circle.

Further, I think Richard of St. Victor is right that there is a relational harmony and cooperation in such cases, and a unique sort of pleasure all around.

Whether this value would provide a perfect person with a compelling reason to create mysteriously originate at least two other divine persons is a further matter.

In chapter 20, Richard makes clear that my chart here is too simple – there should be a Continue Reading »

Posted 15 January 2010 † Dale § Books § History § Philosophy § Theories ‡ Comments (2) °

Richard of St. Victor’s De Trinitate, Ch.19 (Joseph)

Here Richard spells out more fully than before the nature of shared love (condilectus). Here he offers one main argument (A.1-3) from supreme shared love for the Trinity and then a follow-up argument (B.1-3) again from supreme shared love for the Trinity. So (A) consider the nature of shared love:

  1. If one person loves another and only he loves only her, there is love but not shared love.
  2. If two mutually love only each other (if the affection of each goes out to the other), again there is love but not shared love.
  3. Shared love exists only if a third person is loved by two persons jointly:

“Shared love is properly said to exist when a third person is loved by two persons harmoniously and in community, and the affection of the two persons is fused into one affection by the flame of love for the third.” (Richard of St. Victor, On the Trinity, p.392)

(This is as close as we ever get to a characterization of shared love.)

So, in divinity, if there is shared love, there are at least three persons. Continue Reading »

Posted 12 January 2010 † Joseph § Books § History § Theologians ‡ Comments (1) °

Richard of St. Victor’s De Trinitate, Ch.18 (Joseph)

Here is my paraphrase of the argument in ch.18:

It might seem that supreme goodness can exist where one person supremely loves and receives nothing in return from the other person for full happiness. But in fact such supreme goodness can’t even exist where only two persons mutually love each other. Suppose that, in divinity, there are only two persons. Then each gives and receives love, and each gives and receives the pleasure that such love brings. If each is alone, neither receives such love nor such pleasure. So supreme generosity requires three persons. If, in divinity, there are only two, neither shares such pleasure. But each divine person, being perfect, is supremely generous. Therefore, supreme goodness requires that if there are at least two divine persons, there are at least three persons.

Note that the first sentence seems out of place and does no work here. Really the argument here only begins with the third sentence. The only new thing here is the mention of supreme generosity. Supreme generosity requires that each of two divine persons have a third divine person with whom to share love and the pleausre such love brings. Not so to share would be less than supremely generous. But I don’t see that we really have a new argument here for at least three divine persons (if God exists). So that’s ch.18. Next up will be ch.19, which will be my final post for the series.

Posted 11 January 2010 † Joseph § Books § History § Theologians ‡ Comments (0) °

Richard of St. Victor’s De Trinitate, Ch.17 (Joseph)

So next up ch.17. Here it is short and sweet:

Supreme happiness requires that if there is at least one divine person, there are at least two divine persons. Suppose, in divinity, there is only one person. Then (1) this person gives supreme love to no one and receives supreme love from no one. (2) Such a person lacks the pleasure of love that one draws from another. (3) But nothing is better than such pleasure. So such a person, who lacks such supreme pleasure, isn’t supremely happy. (4) But any divine person, being perfect, is supremely happy. Therefore, supreme happiness requires that if there is at least one divine person, there are at least two divine persons.

A few comments:

Re (1): This assumes again that with a divine person supreme love is only between divine persons, who are equally perfect.

Re (2): This assumes again that the pleasure of love requires love.

Re (3) and (4): I wonder what exactly Richard means by happiness. My guess is that he means something like Aristotle’s eudamonia where someone is happy only if overall they are a success in life. Richard seems to think that supreme happiness includes supreme pleasure so that someone who has supreme happiness couldn’t have more pleasure. Is that right? I believe that God has pleasure: just because many of his desires are satisfied. But I’m also inclined to think that God suffers, not in the sense that he is affected by things contrary to his will. But rather God suffers in the sense that some of his desires are frustrated, e.g. because we freely do things or things occur as a result of such, that God desires we didn’t do or that didn’t occur. Now just because God suffers doesn’t mean he doesn’t have supreme pleasure. But I can’t help wondering whether if things had gone differently with some of our choices and their results, God might have had more pleausure than he actually does. But I’m also pretty sure that Richard needn’t base the claim that God has the pleasure love brings on the claim that God has supreme pleasure. Couldn’t he get that from the claims that God is supremely good and that the pleasure love brings is a supreme good that God needn’t forego for some contrary good that is equally good?

That’s it. After this, ch.18. Notice again we are building our way up to three divine persons. In ch.16 we had an argument about one divine person. In ch.17 we have an argument for at least two divine persons (if God exists). And in chs.18-19 we will have an argument for at least three divine persons (if God exists).

Posted 11 January 2010 † Joseph § Books § History § Theologians ‡ Comments (3) °

Richard of St. Victor’s De Trinitate, Ch.16 (Joseph)

So next up ch.16. Here’s my version of what goes on in this chapter:

  1. Full wisdom and power can exist in only one person. If, per impossibile, there is only one divine person, he can still have fullness of wisdom and power.
  2. The pleasures of wisdom and love differ. The pleasure of wisdom can be drawn from oneself. The pleasure of love must be drawn from another. Anyone who loves and desires to be so loved but doesn’t receive such love is displeased. But the pleasure of wisdom is even better when one derives it from oneself.
  3. If, in divinity, there is only one person, such a person can have full wisdom. Full wisdom and full power can’t exist without each other. For suppose someone lacks omnipotence. If she doesn’t know how to obtain what she so lacks, then she lacks full wisdom. And anyone who unwillingly suffers some defect of wisdom lacks full power.  Therefore, if, in divinity, there is only one person, such a person can also have full power.

Re 1: I like the implicit distinction here between what is a real and only a conceptual possibility. There can’t really be only one divine person. For, as Richard is trying to demonstrate, there must be at least three divine persons. But the concepts of full wisdom and power don’t conceptually imply the concept of more than one divine person. Continue Reading »

Posted 09 January 2010 † Joseph § Books § History § Theologians ‡ Comments (10) °

Richard of St. Victor’s De Trinitate, Ch.15 (Joseph)

So we’re done with ch.14. Now on to ch.15. Here’s a paraphrase of his argument:

  1. With divine persons, the perfection of one requires another, and so the perfection of a pair requires union with a third. Each such person is perfectly benevolent and so shares his perfection with the other. But if each is perfectly benevolent, then each with equal desire and for a similar reason seeks a sharer of his joy. Why?
  2. Well, if two such persons mutually supremely love each other, the love each has for the other includes supreme joy. If only the one is loved by the other, only the one has such joy. And if the second doesn’t have one who shares in love for a third (condilectus), the second lacks the sharing of joy. (We must wait until ch.19 for Richard to spell out more fully the idea of condilectus.) So that each may share such joy, each must share in love for a third.
  3. So if those who mutually love each other have perfect benevolence and so they desire that each perfection they have is shared, then it must be that each with equal desire and for a similar reason has a third with whom to share love.

Re 1. This is our conclusion: if there are at least two, there are at least three divine persons.

Re 2. The basic idea is this. The Father and the Son are perfect and perfectly love each other. Naturally, they take perfect delight in such love. The Father enjoys the love the Son has for him and the joy this brings. And so does the Son: the Son enjoys the love the Father has for him and the joy this brings. So each, being perfectly good, wants to share such love with another. The Father wants to share the love the Son has for him and the joy this brings with another. And the Son wants to share the love the Father has for him and the joy this brings with another. So each seeks out a third (the Spirit), one who is also loved by the Son and one who is also loved by the Father and also takes delight in such. To evaluate Richard’s argument here, we must consider what the mark of perfection is here. If perfection involves sharing and a perfect being is loved by another perfect being, will the first also share the perfection of being loved by the second? Richard apparently coins the term ‘condilectus’. We will meet this term again in ch.19.

Re 3. This is a summary of points made already.

In ch.16, there will be a change of gear. There he will go back to the start and work his way up to the claim that if at least one, then there are at least three divine persons. In ch.16 he claims that supreme power and knowledge can exist in a single person. In ch.17 he claims that supreme happiness can’t exist in fewer than two persons. And then in chs.18 and 19 he claims that supreme goodness and shared love can’t exist in fewer than three persons.

Posted 08 January 2010 † Joseph § History § Theologians § Theories ‡ Comments (5) °

Richard of St. Victor’s De Trinitate, Chapter 14, Part 2 (JOSEPH)

I (and so we) took a break from the Richard posts. But we now return. Perhaps at some point I’ll blog on some conferences I’ve been to: the Metaphysics of the Incarnation conference at the University of Oxford last September. And I might share a very brief talk I gave on the Trinity at a local church last October. But for now, on to the main attraction.

Richard has already argued in various ways that if there is so much as one divine person, there are at least three divine persons. But the arguments have all been a bit here and there. So to make the reasons even more evident, he plans to gather them all up into one. So here it is:

Suppose there is only one divine person: P.

1)      Then P doesn’t share his greatness.

2)      Compare two situations. In the first, P is the only divine person. In the second, P is not the only divine person; there is another: Q. In the second situation, P and Q love each other and P has the pleasure that love brings. So in the first situation, P lacks in eternity not only such love but also such pleasure.

3)      Anyone supremely good shares her greatness. (Not so to share is to retain something greedily. But anyone supremely good does nothing greedily.)

4)      Anyone supremely happy has such pleasure. (Not to have such pleasure is not to have an abundance of pleasure. But anyone supremely happy has an abundance of pleasure.)

5)      P is supremely good and happy.

So if there is at least one divine person, there are at least two divine persons. Continue Reading »

Posted 06 January 2010 † Joseph § Books § History § Theologians ‡ Comments (8) °

A Gnome’s tale (Dale)

Willy and Will

The man (right) and his expressed sense of humor (left).

Once upon a time, I met a friendly lawn gnome named Willy. I happened upon him when trimming the bushes along the side of my house – nearly slashed the poor little guy with my electric trimmer. I quickly apologized, and asked him to come inside and have a beer with me. Willy graciously accepted, and inside my kitchen, I poured him a shot glass of Sam Adams Lager, and made some small talk.

“So, have you always live here in western New York state?”

“No.”

“Where are you from?”

“California originally. But more recently, New York City. Ah, but that was before I was a gnome.” Continue Reading »

Posted 04 January 2010 † Dale § History § Incarnation § Stories ‡ Comments (2) °

Linkage: Helm on Reason, Theology, Logic, Turretin, and McGrath (Dale)

Spock sez: it will take you approximately 10 minutes, 43.5 seconds to read Helm's interesting post.

Spock approves.

Some good stuff from philosophical theologian Paul Helm at his blog Helm’s Deep.

Among other things he criticizes this book by Alister McGrath.

My favorite quote:

…there is some confusion between affirming the logical consistency of the mysteries of the faith, and showing that they have not been proved to be inconsistent, and demonstrating their consistency.

Posted 01 January 2010 † Dale § Apologetics § Linkage § Mystery § Philosophy ‡ Comments (0) °

Book review: Randal Rauser’s Faith Lacking Understanding (Dale)

Note: this review originally appeared in Religious Studies Review.

FAITH LACKING UNDERSTANDING: THEOLOGY ‘THROUGH A GLASS DARKLY’. By Randal Rauser. Colorado Springs, CO: Paternoster, 2008.

This rausing little book is a work of popular philosophical theology which exhibits uncommon intellectual honesty, courage, humor, clarity, and insight. Each chapter but the first is devoted to a doctrine of the Apostles’ Creed: Trinity, Creation, Incarnation, Atonement, Ascension, and Final Judgment (heaven and hell).

In sometimes dense but riveting, concise, and clearly written prose, Rauser explores serious difficulties facing various ways of understanding these doctrines, arguing that “every one of these doctrines violates the basic dictates of logic, our our moral sense, or minimal plausibility in light of our scientific understanding of the world.” These “provide a serious cumulative challenge to Christianity.” No chapter contains a resounding resolution of difficulties; instead, we are reminded that theology is a realm of mysteries, and that a relationship with God is compatible with this admission.

The book demands a response from the reader. Some will explore other construals of various doctrine, others will revise or deny them, and yet others will agree to settle for mysteries. While Rauser puts much weight on mystery appeals, he’s far from being a mindless mystery-monger; he would prefer doctrines not beset by the above problems. It just that he can’t find such theories. The book is widely informed by recent literature in theology, philosophy of religion, and science-and-religion. Though accessible to the general reader, would provide high-octane discussion fuel for a graduate seminary course or an advanced undergraduate course at a Christian institution.

Posted 28 December 2009 † Dale § Books § Christology § Incarnation § Logic § Mystery § Philosophy ‡ Comments (0) °

Linkage: What Randal wants for Christmas (Dale)

A contradiction free christology, courtesy of Santa & his theological elves!

A contradiction-free christology, courtesy of Santa and his theological elves!

Philosophical theologian Randal Rauser has been blogging as the Tentative Apologist. This year, for Christmas, he says he’s hoping for “a coherent account of the incarnation“. In other words, he wants a way of understanding the incarnation doctrine which is apparently consistent. Will he get it? Word has it that the elves are working overtime on this request, as Rauser has been a very good boy.

But seriously, I’m a big fan; he’s doing philosophical theology for the masses, something we’ve tried to do here, and he does it well, in short, clear, but potent posts. He disses mystery cop-outs. He holds his nose at the qua-dodge (“reduplication”). In the latest posts, he is beginning to grapple with a “two minds” approach. Check it out.

Small complaint: in the qua post, he asserts that a “nature” in christology is a universal, a mere property or set of properties. It is pretty clear that a lot of the ancient disputants instead held Christ’s two “natures” to be concrete particulars, in our current lingo. Nor is it clear where Chalcedon comes down on this. On this, a place to start is Alvin Plantinga’s “On Heresy, Mind, and Truth”, Faith & Philosophy 16.2, April 1999.

Posted 23 December 2009 † Dale § Christology § Incarnation § Linkage § Mystery § Theories ‡ Comments (0) °

Hitler: consumer of trinitarian speculations (Dale)

A rare image from Hitler's little known fro period.

A rare image from Hitler's little known fro period.

This is one for the history buffs.

Check out this piece from my favorite magazine: Hitler’s Forgotten Library. Skip to the end (last 9-10 paragraphs) for the Trinity stuff – which is (I think, ultimately Hegel-inspired) absolute idealist / monist riffing on the Trinity.

Can’t muster much interest in that genre myself, since I think monism is obviously false. But I note that some theologians are still batting around this sort of stuff.

And the conclusion drawn about Hitler’s motivation at the end is interesting, and perhaps true.

Posted 28 November 2009 † Dale § History § Philosophy § Theologians ‡ Comments (0) °

“Incarnation” @ the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Dale)

brilliant

Kudos to the team at the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, for

  1. their recent radical re-design, done by Josh D. May. Notable improvements include a nice print-friendly page feature, and the entries sorted by topic. Here are the Philosophy of Religion ones.
  2. their new entry “Incarnation”, by University of Wisconsin Madison PhD David Werther, who teaches in their division of Continuing Studies. He does an excellent job of keeping it simple; it’s a brief and clear introduction to the Incarnation as treated by analytic philosophers, and is by design pretty ahistorical.

Missing in #2 are references to, if not summaries of, Tom Senor’s work, particularly his criticisms of the Stump/Leftow property-borrowing approach, and of the hoary qua-move. Maybe a couple of references to Hick would be appropriate as well, e.g. his criticism of two-minds theories. Positively, maybe a reference to van Inwagen on relative identity. But on the whole, I thought it was well done – congrats to David. And I hope we see more philosophical theology in the IEP.

One quick reflection: Continue Reading »

Posted 12 October 2009 † Dale § Christology § Incarnation § Linkage ‡ Comments (1) °