Richard of St. Victor is well known for talking about love, and how awesome it is. It might surprise a few people who have only read the popular English translation of Book 3 (the love/ethics? book) that On the Trinity contains six books. The English translation has brought attention to what some contemporary (continental-esque) philosophers would call Richard’s ‘erotics’. What remains to be seen is whatever he says in Books 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6. In this post I’d like to focus on one theme in these other books, which I’ll call Richard’s Constitutional Latin Trinitarianism (= CLT). At the start I must say that I am claiming that Richard suggests a constitutional model of the Trinity and not that he straightforwardly proposes one. At least, Richard can be read to propose such a model–after all, certain later scholastics like Henry of Ghent seem to have read Richard in that way.
In what follows I give a taxonomy of constitutional Trinitarian theories. I do not say this is an exhaustive taxonomy; nevertheless it helps to isolate the sort of constitutional model that I think can be read off of books 1, 2, 4, and 5.
Genus: Constitutional Models. Every divine person is constituted by two concrete properties, the divine substance and a unique distinguishing personal property.
Species1: For each divine person there is numerically one divinity. (Three persons, three divinities.) E.g., social trinitarianism.
Species2: There is numerically one divine substance. (Three persons, one divine substance).
Sub-Species1: Material Constitution Model. Divine persons are the same in virtue of having the divine substance essentially, and the divine substance is like a subject of essential accidental forms.
Difference1: Material Constitution Derivation Model. The Father is identical to the divine substance, and the Son and Holy Spirit have the divine substance derivatively. Hence, there are two essential accidental forms that inhere in the divine substance.
Difference2: Material Constitution Generic Model. No divine person is identical to the divine substance. Hence, every divine person has the divine substance in a unique way analogous to three essential accidental forms of the same substance.
Sub-species2: Non-Material Constitution Model. Divine persons are the same in virtue of having the divine substance essentially, and the divine substance is like an immanent universal nature and not like a subject of accidents.
Difference1: Non-Material Constitution Derivation Model. The Father is identical to the divine substance, and the Son and Holy Spirit each have the divine substance essentially and derivatively in a unique way.
Difference2: Non-Material Constitution Generic Model: No divine person is identical to the divine substance. Every divine person essentially has the divine substance in a unique way.
My proposed interpretation of Richard of St. Victor is as follows:
Genus: Constitution Model
Species: Numerically one divine substance.
Sub-Species: Non-material constitution
Specific Difference: Generic model of the divine substance
I should mention what I take to be a similarity btwn. the material and non-material constitutional models. There is a certain job to be done in each theory to account for how the same divine substance is a constituent of every divine person. This addresses the Christian claim that there is one God, one Creator, one Lord, etc.
On the one hand, the material constitution model proposed by Brower and Rea employs the “sameness without identity” thesis. On the other hand, on my read of Richard’s metaphysics of the Trinity he supposes the divine substance is a singular existing non-divisible universal nature, what Richard Cross has aptly called (in discussing Duns Scotus’s theory) the divine substance’s “being exemplifiable”. If we think the divine substance is exemplifiable, then it cannot be numerically divided up, but it can be a constituent of more than one divine person. Being exemplifiable is a peculiar way that a universal is communicable to many. Another way that a universal is communicable to many is if it is instantiable, then it divisible into numerically distinct occurrences. Richard of St. Victor seems to think of creaturely essences as instantiable, and he in effect denies that the divine substance is instantiable. So, it would seem that we could detect a sameness without identity thesis in Richard too–although it wouldn’t be along the lines of a material constitution model, b/c he doesn’t think of the divine substance like a substance that bears accidental forms (essentially). Nevertheless, on Richard’s view the divine substance is one existing thing that constitutes several divine persons.
Now, what of the personal properties? If a common nature is instantiable, then an instantiated nature entails a non-instantiable personal property; if a common nature is exemplifiable, then the exemplified common nature entails a non-exemplifiable personal property. So, to Richard of St. Victor’s mind, the personal properties are (in effect) non-exemplifiable (what he calls “incommunicable”). Whether or not these personal properties are relations or absolute properties is irrelevant here. What matters is that on Richard’s view every divine person is (in effect) constituted by the divine substance (and since the divine substance is a constituent of every divine person we can say it is ‘a common property’) and by a non-exemplifiable personal property which distinguishes the persons from one another.
One last comparison. On the material and non-material constitutional theories, I take it that both affirm the following:
The name ‘God’ is not a proper personal name, since Father, Son, and Holy Spirit equally satisfy it. Hence, the name ‘God’ does not signify this person, but a certain person, namely the Father, the Son, or the Holy Spirit. (Of course, you could also use the name ‘God’ at once to refer to Father, Son, and Holy Spirit; but this grammar might lead away from a constitution account of the Triune God).
Consider the following suggestive passage from Richard of St. Victor’s On the Trinity Book 4.16 ln.35-49:
It should be kept in mind that existence designates substantial being, but sometimes [a substantial being] from what is common, and other times [a substantial being] from what is an incommunicable property. However, we say a common existence when it is understood to obtain from [1] a common property. But [we say] incommunicable when it is understood to obtain from [2] an incommunicable property. In truth [3] it is proper to the divine substance not to be from some other substance (but only from itself), and in truth [4] it is proper to the person that does not have an origin not to be from some other person. On the one hand, [1.1] [the divine substance] is understood [as] a common property, but on the other hand [4.1] [not-having-an-origin-from-another-person] is an incommunicable property. For it is common to all divine persons to be this substance which is not from some other substance but from itself. Therefore when the divine substance is said or understood to be from itself, [5] the same [property] is common to the existing [persons].
In [1] I take Richard to posit a concrete property; from Book 1 he gives a cosmological argument to the effect that the divine substance can only be numerically one. This property is ‘common’–that is, it is (and so can be) a constituent of more than one divine person.
In [2] I take Richard to posit an incommunicable property, which is a personal property. A personal property belongs (and can belong) only to one person.
In [3] I take Richard to posit that the divine substance as such depends on no other substance for its being. Hence, the singular exemplifiable divine substance has the [abstract] property does not depend on another substance.
In [4] I take Richard to be talking about the Father, and he attributes to the Father the incommunicable property does not depend on any other _person_ for his existence. However, the [abstract] property does not depend on another _substance_ is not an incommunicable property of the Father or any divine person. In [5] Richard makes clear that the [abstract] property not being from another substance is common to every divine person. So, it is not unique to the Father to not depend on another substance.
In [5] Richard concludes by saying the [abstract] property not being from another substance is common to every divine person. The reason it is common to all persons is because the singular divine substance, which is not from another substance, is an essential constituent of every divine person.
By inference, no divine person is identical to the divine substance (cf. [1], [5]). In On the Trinity Book 4.8 Richard makes clear that every divine person is constituted by two properties, a common property and an incommunicable property, or what (borrowing from Richard Cross) I call an exemplifiable immanent universal, and a non-exemplifiable personal property.
Dale: What I was saying is that distinctions btwn. universal/particular and btwn. abstract/concrete may not help to explain what Richard has in mind. I’m merely trying to figure out what Richard says; I’m not saying what I think is the case irrespective of Rick. St. Vick. If we were to use these distinctions to help explain Rick St. Vick, we might find they break down and so become unhelpful for understanding what his view is; well, they might be helpful in an accidental way.
JT: Right about Lat. IV– but that was in 1215, and Rick St. Vick died in 1173. In any case, Rick doesn’t seem clear exactly on causal powers. He says the HS proceeds from God (Deus = divinitas), and elsewhere he says HS proceeds from Father and Son. I’m sure he’d go with the Lat. IV view– it is just that he doesn’t seem as nuanced on the production of divine persons issue, in which case he might be read in either way. In any case, I only mentioned this as an example of how the abstract/concrete distinction might fail to capture what Rick St. Vick was up to.
Well, at the very least, a friend who is somewhat like a cheese-sandwich and somewhat like a dog…mmm, mmm. (Well, maybe not the dog part).
Hey Scott,
Only the barest notion of “thing” is required – one which applies to anything that can be thought of. Certainly, in the theory at hand, none of the Three is (strictly) identical to either of the others. Ergo, three things. Perhaps they constitute one god, but that needs to be shown.
It’s a little worrisome that because of the Trinity we’re ready to discard the abstract vs. concrete distinction, as well as the universal vs. particular distinction – I mean, you’re saying that neither division is mutually exclusive. But I think they’re defined that way, so in your/his view, there just are no such distinctions to be made.
Or perhaps, you want to completely allow both distinctions, and go negative mysterian about God – God (or “the divine nature”) is somewhat universal like as well as somewhat particular like, and somewhat like both an abstract thing, and like a concrete thing. I doubt, though, that saying this results in any theologically useful, positive conception of the divine nature…
Analogy: I’ve got a friend. It’s much like a male, and much like a non-male. And it’s much like a human, and much like a non-human. And it’s somewhat like a dog, and equally so, somewhat like a non-dog. Also, it is like a cheese-sandwhich, but also like a non-cheese sandwhich. I assume you’ll agree that in a sense, I haven’t really said what sort of friend I have.
Hmm…the divine essence has causal umph? What about Lateran IV: the divine essence neither generates nor is generated, which would seem to imply that the divine essence does not have the causal power to produce or to be produced, but rather is the power-pack, so to speak, that the persons utilize to produce and be produced.
I wouldn’t think Rick St. Vick thinks there are three ‘things’. I suppose you’d need to cash out, if possible, what you mean by ‘thing’ (ugh).
Yes: “two non-identical things should share all and only the same constituents” is false. There is one constituent shared by all divine persons, but each divine person has a constituent the others lack, namely a personal property. I’ll let Rea speak for himself …
Talk of ‘universal’ vs ‘particular’ properties is somewhat misleading. And again, so is talk of abstract vs. concrete properties. I take it that lots of people think of abstract properties as properties that have no causal umph, and concrete properties do have causal umph. But, what if I believed that the divine substance is universal-like and that it has causal umph? So, it’s like a ‘particular’, but a particular that can be shared by more than one ‘person’ (= Aristotelian primary substance?).
So, for every divine person there’s two particulars: the shareable divine substance and a personal property.
There’s tons more to be said. So yeah, the divine nature is both a universal and a particular—- or rather, it is a peculiar sort of universal (not just any old universal).
Hey Scott,
Smaller bites, please! 🙂
About the classification, I think I need a chart.
Let me try to sum his theory, on your reading:
Richard thinks that each member of the Trinity has two part/constituents, namely (1) the divine nature (which is a universal, not a particular), and (2) a personal property. (So while the divine nature may be simple, no person is. And if “God” refers to the Trinity, God isn’t simple.) This divine nature is thrice “exemplified” but is NOT thrice “instantiated”, thus it is not thereby “divided” among the Three.
Some comments:
We’ve got three things, each of which has the same sort of claim on being divine. Ergo, there are three gods here, monotheism is false. No?
I’m afraid I don’t know what to make of the “dividing” talk… maybe I need to read more Cross on this…
About your top level genus: Rea is committed to thinking of the divine nature quasi-material stuff shared by the Three, but is he also committed to each person having some other constituent, i.e. a personal property? I take it you’re assuming that this is impossible: that two non-identical things should share all and only the same constituents.
And “personal properties” are particulars, right – neither instantiable nor exemplifiable. So this theory requires both universal and particular properties?
Again, is he saying that the divine nature is both a universal and a particular? If so, that hurts. 🙂
By ‘accidental form’ I merely meant what would be taken as an accidental form to the material substrate. It might very well be a ‘substantial form’, but it has accidental sameness with its material substrate. The point of saying it is ‘essential’, is well, that there is no possible world in which the material substrate is not the same as the form. Sorry for any confusion. See Rea’s article on this in the new Oxford Hand. on Phil. Theology.
Not that I have a problem with talking about this in terms of accidents. I’m just curious about the motivation.
Two questions.
1. What exactly is an ‘essential accidental form’? Aren’t ‘essential’ and ‘accidental’ opposites?
2. What’s the reasoning behind choosing to talk about this in terms of ‘accidental forms’? Why not, say, substantial forms? Don’t most people agree that there are no accidents in God?
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