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Blogger Tre Brickley has posted a response to my Challenge to “Jesus is God” apologists.
I don’t know much about Mr. Brickley, other than that he’s trying to find truth, which is good, and that he is not afraid to change his mind, which is also good. The argument, which I have urged that even a trinitarian should agree is sound is:
- God and Jesus differ.
- Things which differ are two (i.e., are not numerically identical).
- Therefore, God and Jesus are two (not numerically identical). (1,2)
- For any x and y, x and y are the same god only if x and y are not two (i.e., are numerically identical).
- Therefore, God and Jesus are not the same god. (3,4)
- There is only one god.
- Therefore, either God is not a god, or Jesus is not a god. (5,6)
- God is a god.
- Therefore, Jesus is not a god. (7,8)
He remarks that some Oneness apologists would deny 2, but he doesn’t want to do that. Again, this is good, as 2 is a self-evident truth that can’t reasonably be denied. Some hapless evangelical apologists have tried this ill-advised response as well. But’s it’s like denying that no triangle has four sides.
I think our friend is also correct in shying away from denying the other premises: 1, 6, and 8. Like philosopher James Anderson, he chooses to deny premise 4. But Mr. Brickley’s reason is:
I think there is a very strong Scriptural reason to deny this premise. My argument is this: The OT records that God has revealed Himself multiple times in ways that can be classified as “numerically distinct”. I am thinking of the so-called “theophanies”.
But this is not a good reason to deny 4. A theophany is not a god, but rather an appearance of a god. Conceivably, one god might appear in various ways at various times and places, and according to scripture God has done exactly that. Sure, one appearance is numerically distinct from other appearances of that same God. There would be a similar general truth that would apply to theophanies: for any x and any y, x and y are the same theophany only if x is a theophany, y is a theophany, and x = y (i.e. the one appearance just is the other appearance). That seems to be true, but so does 4. They’re both instances of a more general principle, that things can be the same F only if the first thing’s an F, the second thing is also an F, and the first thing just is the second thing (so really, there’s numerically one thing here). This general principle seems obviously true, yes? But then, so do specific instances of it, such as the two just given.
To put the point abstractly: 4 concerns the “is” of numerical identity (e.g. “Paul is Saul”), not the “is” of manifestation (e.g. “Did you hear that shout? That is the lost hiker!”)
He then offers an argument against my premise 4. It’s an attempt and a reduction to absurdity; he wants to show that 4 implies a contradiction, and so is false. With a few small clarifications, his argument is:
- Suppose it is true that “For any x and y, x and y are the same god only if x and y are not two (i.e., are numerically identical).” (assumption to be refuted as implying an absurdity – premise 4 in the Challenge)
- Things which differ are two (i.e., are not numerically identical). (premise)
- There were differences between God and the theophany in Genesis 18. (biblical premise)
- Therefore, God and the theophany are two (i.e., are not numerically identical). (2,3)
So far if we grant 3, this is a sound argument. In the broadest sense of “thing” God and this theophany of his are two things. One is a god and the other is an appearance of a god. But the argument continues,
5. It is false that the theophany is the same god as God. (1, 4)
Right, because the theophany isn’t a god at all, so it can’t be the same god as God. It’s merely an appearance of a god.
6. It is true that the theophany is the same god as God. (premise)
7. Therefore, it is not true that “For any x and y, x and y are the same god only if x and y are not two (i.e., are numerically identical).” (5,6)
The problem is that no one should accept his 6. It’s a mistake to think that an appearance of a man is itself a man. Just so, we ought not confuse an appearance of a god with that god himself. The reduction to absurdity doesn’t work, because the proponent of 1 doesn’t also have to accept 6. So it hasn’t been shown that 1 implies a contradiction.
In support of his premise 6, he says,
From the very definition of “theophany” I think it is clear that this is true. The theophany is God Himself. The text says that “the LORD (Yahweh) appeared to Abraham” (verse 1). Throughout the passage, it is “the LORD” that is speaking. After the purpose for which the theophany occurred was served, the text says “the LORD…departed” (verse 33). Therefore, I think premise 6 is true.
The theophany in question is AN APPEARANCE OF God himself. Right. But we can’t collapse together these two things: God and this appearance of God.
Why? Because there are differences between them, e.g. this appearance lasts for 30 minutes (or whatever) but God is eternal.
Notice that response of mine doesn’t, as he supposes, “deny the concept of theophany.” I take it that be this he means claim that theophanies are impossible. No, that’s not what I’m saying. I’m just analyzing the concept of a theophany. I think they are both possible and actual. He supposes that his premise 6 is simply implied by scripture. But I would urge that we should not project this confusion onto those authors.
He continues,
As for denying premise 6, one would have to radically allegorize the language of the Scriptures in order to sustain this route. It says “the LORD appeared” and in the form of “a man” no less. I invite the reader to review Genesis 18 in its entirety and judge for themselves if it seems reasonable to think this theophany is someone other than YHWH Himself.
A theophany – an appearance – is not identical to any “someone.” But by definition a theophany is an appearance of a god. Not a god, but an appearance of a god. No allegorization necessary.
Here’s an analogy. Remember this scene from the original Star Wars?
This is a Leia-phany. (Sorry.) It’s an appearance of Leia to these two men and two bots, via technological means. You can point at that image and say, “Look, it’s Princess Leia!” And that is true. It is an appearance of her. But it’s not her. Someone who thought that this blue shimmery thing just is (i.e. is numerically identical to) Princess Leia would be very confused about what sort of thing a woman is. (Now, of course this appearance is by means of technology, whereas God wouldn’t need any devices to accomplish a theophany. But I don’t see that this difference affects the point at issue.)
What do you think, Tre? With these clarifications, do you accept 4 now? If so, what’s preventing you from riding the bus all the way to the conclusion, step 9?
In the rest of his post he suggests that Jesus is God himself and that Jesus is a permanent manifestation of God. We unitarians agree that God reveals himself through Jesus. And so Jesus’s life has involved appearances of God, or better, self-revelations of God to humankind. As Jesus said, “If you’ve seen me, you’ve seen the Father.” But to say that Jesus is numerically the same as a manifestation or appearance is to make him an event, a happening – and so, not a human being. No human being is a mere event, occurrence, or happening. We undergo such things, or are involved in them, yes. Our lives consist of events. But events are, as it were, spread out across time, with their beginning at an earlier time, their middle at a later time, and their end (if they have one) at a yet later time. In contrast, things like human beings exist entire through stretches of time. I exist now, and I existed forty years ago – not a portion of me, just me, all of me. Lasting things like people don’t happen or occur, they exist.
This, I suggest, is a common-sense little bit of metaphysics that we should agree on, and bring to the task of interpreting scripture.
If you want to say that Jesus is an appearance of God and yet is still a man, this is to say that God has acted through and with Jesus, to better reveal himself. These revelations/appearances involve Jesus, yes, but he is not one. You can say “Jesus is a revelation of God” if this is what you mean. But let’s be clear-sighted about the distinction between a thing and an appearance of that thing.
Dr. Tuggy,
Thank you for your reply.
I find myself compelled to accept my premise 6 instead of my premise 5 (the logical conclusion of your premise 4) because the people present were convinced they had seen God Himself and the language of Scripture is such that I think it is acceptable to say that the theophany *was* God Himself. It seems to me we would have to call these people mistaken who claimed to have “seen God” in the Scriptures if we accept your theophany. As I see it, there is a sense in which one cannot see God: in His natural state of existence. He is spirit and is thus invisible. He is holy and thus infinitely glorious. We cannot perceive such a God physically and, if it were even possible, we would immediately be consumed by the weight of His glory. But, this does not mean that our great God cannot reveal Himself to us in such a way that we can be said to have “seen Him” in some sense. I think a theophany is just such a sense in which we can be said to “see God”. This is the thing about a theophany: it is God revealing Himself and yet is not God in His normal state of existence. The need for a theophany is precisely because humanity cannot see God in His normal state of existence (spirit, invisible, glorious). But, I find it odd to think that, when God manifests Himself in order that we may experience Him, we should think this is *not* God Himself before human eyes. This is my point: the theophany is distinct from God in His normal state of existence and so can be classified as “numerically distinct” (to use your terminology) but is still God Himself.
I hope this can advance the discussion a little more.
Dear Tre,
I wonder if you find my distinction below between “theophany” in the sense of an *event* and “theophany” in the sense of the *immediately object of perception* helpful. (I.e., the thing that is, literally and directly being seen.) It seems to me that Dale is taking “theophany” in the former sense (in which case, the theophany is clearly not God, because it’s an event, and God is not an event). But it seems to me that you may be intending “theophany” in the second sense (in which case, I think Dale owes you some other response).
If one says that a genuine theophany “is God” what that means is that it was a self-manifestation of God. We might also say “that was God himself” – meaning the same thing. It was God, not someone else, who was appearing there. Still, the point I make in this post holds – a thing is to distinguished from an appearance of that thing – those are going to be numerically distinct.
Now you say, ” the theophany is distinct from God in His normal state of existence and so can be classified as “numerically distinct” (to use your terminology) but is still God Himself.”
A theophany, e.g. God-appearing-in-a-vision-to-Isaiah is yes, distinct from God as God intrinsically is. But these are what philosophers call distinct (take your pick) events, states of affairs, or facts. Suppose we call them events. Each of those *involves* one and the same God. But still, they are different events. If an event is analyzed as a thing having at least one property at at least one time, the properties and times will be different, though the thing/substance is numerically the same.
But none of this gives us a reason to deny 4 in the Challenge argument. Your idea was that this would be a counterexample of some x and y that *are* the same god while *not* being numerically the same. But neither of these – a theophany, this event which is God existing as he intrinsically is – is a god. They would be distinct events, yes. But we don’t have a counterexample to the principle at hand. And as I point out in the post, premise 4 just seems to be an example of a self-evident truth regarding any sort of thing there can be. So it looks ad hoc to deny 4 while accepting other instances of 4. For example, on a jury you find that the defendant differs from the killer, because the killer was in Detroit while the defendant was in Dallas. This exonerates the defendant, because you all on the jury assume that being the same man requires being numerically the same thing. Anyway, it seems to me that premise 4 is untouched by your remarks on theophanies and such, and so I would still urge that you ought to accept the argument as sound.
Dr. Tuggy,
I’d like to reformulate my argument for the sake of clarity. I would argue that the Scriptures present two facts with regard to theophanies: 1) the theophany is distinct from God and yet 2) the theophany is equal to God. With regard to fact #1, I would say it like this: the theophany is distinct from God as He exists in His normal state of existence. God exists normally as an invisible spirit being. However, a theophany is a visible being, and sometimes, it seems, physical. Again, to use your terminology, the theophany is “numerically distinct” from God. Nonetheless, the Scriptures present the theophany as equal to God, which is fact #2. More on this later.
It seems to me that some of your points against my argument are simply just reaffirming premise 2, which I’ve accepted and included in my argument. For example, you say “a thing is to be distinguished from an appearance of that thing”. Yes, that is premise 2, and I agree with it. It is part of my argument.
I think that to refer to God as He normally exists as an “event” seems odd considering this word has temporal baggage. I suppose you could say that God’s normal state of existence is an eternal or timeless “event”. The only significant thing to draw out of this that I can think of is that if I were to accept this conceptualization I would point out that if God is truly unlimited by space and time then there were two simultaneous events in which the same God was existing during a theophany-event: x) God existing as He always does in His normal state of existence and y) God existing as this theophany.
You say: “neither of these – a theophany, this event which is God existing as he intrinsically is – is a god.” Well, here is where I start to wonder about the legitimacy of referring to “God existing as he intrinsically is” as an “event”: it seems to lead to this weird conclusion that God existing as He intrinsically is is not “a god”, at least, it seems to lead to that conclusion in your mind. Could we perhaps remove this language of “event” and simply work with the formulation as I’ve laid it out above?
Here is what I would want to say: God, as He normally (perhaps “intrinsically” is a better word) exists, is “a god”, that is, is God Himself. This existence is as an invisible spirit being. But, in order to reveal Himself for some purpose, He manifests Himself in some visible form – a theophany. Now, yes, we can and should distinguish between God, in His normal state of existence, and God in this abnormal state of existence. This is how they are “numerically distinct” on your view. But, the Scriptures seem to suggest that the theophany is God and do not seem to suggest that it is “not-God”.
Again, I’m not coming at this from a philosophical standpoint. I’m arguing that the Scriptures very strongly suggest that the theophany just is God even though it is simultaneously numerically distinct from God (since it is not God in His natural state of existence).
I’d like to refocus on a different Scriptural example to make my point. In Genesis 32:24-30, it is said of Jacob that “a man wrestled with him” (v.24). But Jacob later says “I have seen God face to face” (v.30), which is clearly a reference to the “man” with whom he wrestled. It is said later in Genesis, by God Himself, that “God…appeared to you” (35:1). The author of Genesis comments on this and says that “God revealed himself to him [Jacob]” in v.7. In v.9 it says that “God appeared to him again” and later says “God withdrew [lit. “went up”] from him” (v.13).
So, yes, I think a theophany is a Scriptural reason to deny premise 4 of your argument for it seems clear to me that the Scriptures indicate that the theophany, while being numerically distinct from God (due to the fact that He is an invisible spirit being and the theophany is a visible and sometimes physical being), is simultaneously equal to God.
I hope this can advance the discussion further.
Interesting exchange. Thanks to Skylar for pointing me towards this. It seems to me that there are two different senses of “theophany”/ “appearance” / “manifestation” etc. that are in play here, and Dale and Tre *may* be talking past one another a bit.
(1) Talking about a theophany / Leiaphany / appearance or manifestation of X, can just be talk about an *event* in which God / Leia X appears or is manifested to somebody. In this sense, “the Leiaphany” is just the 40-second event in the movie clip where Luke is seeing Leia’s hologram. Let’s disambiguate this with the term “event-theophany” (“ET”). This seems like the sense in which Dale is using the term “theophany,”{ and to that extent I’m basically sympathetic with the content of his response here. An event isn’t a god, so Tre’s argument is all beside the point (if we take “theophany” in the sense of “event-theophany”).
(2) When we talk about a theophany / Leiaphany / appearance or manifestation of X, we might be talking about the *thing* that is doing the appearing / manifesting. I.e., **the thing that is the *immediate* object of perception** and which *represents* the entity that is appearing. In this sense, “the Leiphany” is *the hologram* (not an event that has the hologram as a sort of constituent). Let’s disambiguate this as “object-of-perception-theophany” (OPT). I think this *may* be the sense Tre intended. Or, if not, I would say it’s what he *should* intend. I.e., if this wasn’t what he wanted to focus on, he should ask Dale to focus on it.
When we focus on the question “what is the object of perception?” in these events, I think it leads to much deeper and more interesting questions. As both Tre and Skylar point out, God Himself (the Father) is invisible. So, the Father can’t be the object that is being perceived in any of these events in which we read that somebody “saw God” or “saw YHWH.” Thus, the OPT is not God Himself, just like the hologram is not Leia herself. Yet, neither is it a *different* Leia or a “second” Leia. There is still only one Leia — the human woman. But, as Dale points out, it’s still *true* to say “That’s Leia” in reference to the hologram. Dale’s argument states that “x and y are the same god only if x and y are not two.” The analogue here is “x and y are the same Leia only if x and y are not two.” But Leia and the hologram are two, yet the hologram is in fact “the same Leia.” At least, there’s no sense in which they are “different Leia’s.” Well, there’s a lot to unpack there, but that’s the direction I assume Tre really would want to go in, or at least the direction I think he should go in.
I think it would be interesting to hear both how Oneness and BU address the issue of the OPT’s (rather than ET’s). Of course, the big question that got us to the Trinity (more specifically, the “homoousion”) was precisely about the nature of the OPT. In what *way* does the OPT represent God the Father? By *nature*, or merely by *convention*? The same dialectic pops up in a number of other areas of philosophy. E.g., how do John Locke’s “ideas” represent their objects? He says primary qualities do so by nature (by actual “resemblance”), while secondary qualities don’t. But Berkeley argues that ideas are totally unlike material objects. So, we end up with a lot of skeptical worries. Similarly with Russell’s “sense-data,” which he himself admits don’t always resemble things as they actually are. Similarly, David Lewis’s possible worlds are concrete objects, and his propositions are sets of those worlds, so it’s obvious how they represent other things — by actual resemblance. He argues that van Inwagen’s possible worlds and propositions — which are simple, abstract objects — can’t really represent anything. They certainly don’t *resemble* concrete objects, and they can’t have all been put into correspondence with their objects by convention either. One of the big points of disagreement between Orthodox and Arians was just this issue. In what *way* does the OPT (or OPTs if they are multiple) represent God? And is the representation accurate? And is it *informative*?
Just as Locke’s ideas and Russell’s sense-data aren’t homoousious with the material objects they represent and van Inwagen’s propositions and possible worlds aren’t homoousious with the things they represent, the Arian OPT isn’t homoousious with God. When we “see” a Lockean idea or a Russellian sense-datum, in what sense are we really “seeing” a physical object? Likewise, if we deny that the OPT is homoousious with God, in what sense is anybody “seeing” God when they see the OPT?
These are the sorts of questions historically-informed Trinitarians are bound to have. I don’t presume that Dale, Tre, or other BU’s or Oneness might not have interesting answers to them. But I think the discussion would be furthered by going in that direction.
Hey Beau – the hologram of Leia is an event, right?
“The analogue here is “x and y are the same Leia only if x and y are not two.” But Leia and the hologram are two, yet the hologram is in fact “the same Leia.” At least, there’s no sense in which they are “different Leia’s.””
A Leia is not a general kind of thing, unless that is just the concept of something which is called by the name “Leia.” Yes, Leia the woman and Leia the hologram can both be so called. But they are clearly not the same Leia (i.e. the same thing which can be called “Leia”). But it seems to me that if I point to the woman and say “She is Leia” I have identified her with the Leia of whom we spoke at some earlier point, whereas if I point to the hologram and say “She is Leia” I am saying that this is *a representation of* this “Leia” mentioned before. So again, I think we must separate an “is” of identity from an “is” of appearance, manifestation, or representation.
Philosophy of perception is interesting to be sure, but I don’t see how it is relevant to the Challenge argument.
Hi Dale,
I’m no longer Oneness, so I’m not going to pretend to speak for them. But I do think Tre is on to something. This post coalesces on a couple of things I’ve been working on recently, so I think it will be fun to talk about it.
To deal with the issues of theophanies in light of John 1:18; 5:37; and 6:46, it’s my opinion that Oneness folks need to opt for a more robust understanding of modes. Here’s one you and I are familiar with: Leftow’s “modes without modalism” view of the Trinity.
All the Oneness advocate has to say is that God doesn’t live out his life in these three modes eternally. So, say at the first moment of creation, God lives out his life as both Father and Son, though on distinct life-segments in God’s life.
Now add this: It seems like Scott Williams is right in a recent paper to say Leftow’s view amounts to one Boethian Person (“individual substance of a rational nature”) living out his life as three Lockean (streams of consciousness) persons. I’ll proceed with that understanding, but correct that if you think it’s wrong.
Either way we take “God,” as “God himself” or as “the Father,” a premise of the Challenge is false.
If “God” means “God himself,” or that one Boethian Person who lives in distinct life-streams, isn’t (1) false? Jesus (or pre-incarnate Son/Jesus) just is God living out his life in that life-stream. They can’t and don’t differ, right? I guess you can’t blame me for being wrong about that if Leftow is–he’s beyond me intellectually!
If “God” means “the Father,” then isn’t (8) false? This is basically how Leftow solves the Patripassianism objection. For, in the God-as-Son live-stream, it is “no longer” the case to God that he is living out his life as Father. On his personal timeline, but not the public one, God is not a god because the God-as-Father life-stream is no longer taking place.
Now what does this have to do with theophanies? Well, if it’s true that nobody has seen God’s “form” at any time, this includes what you call “appearances.” You even say that if you see the Leia-ophany, “Look there’s Leia!” is true. So you see Leia in this form that is projected. You see Leia’s form.
To say that God’s appearances are seen, but God himself isn’t seen, makes John assert vacuous truths. What you’d then be making John 1:18 say is that “God cannot be seen, except in the way(s) he can be seen.” What seems far more straightforward from those texts is to say who (and who’s form) was seen in the OT is somebody other than the Father’s.
I’d like to hear more about how your view of theophanies is consonant with those texts in John. But it seems quite clear to me that it isn’t. And if what I’ve suggested on Tre’s behalf works, at least a Oneness Pentecostal has a way to avoid the thrust of those texts that you don’t as a biblical unitarian.
So why not go Arian on this?
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